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  • Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Appellate Jurisdiction) Act
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  • Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Appellate Jurisdiction) Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was tried for the murder of his 16-year-old wife, Radhabai, who died of burn injuries sustained on 24 July 1981 in their home at Village Pemath, Police Station Raisen. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, after sending his mother away, poured kerosene on the deceased, set her on fire, and fled. The mother-in-law returned, found the victim burning, summoned the appellant, and the victim was then taken to hospital. Two dying declarations were recorded: Ex. P-7 by Sub-Inspector (PW 9) and Ex. P-19 purportedly by the Tehsildar (PW 10). Other prosecution witnesses were either hostile or not material.

The Sessions Judge doubted both dying declarations for procedural irregularities, acquitted the appellant, and the State appealed. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed the acquittal, relied principally on Ex. P-19, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The present appeal to the Supreme Court arose under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Appellate Jurisdiction) Act challenging that conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether dying declaration Ex. P-19 was recorded in a manner that renders it reliable and admissible as the sole basis for conviction under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal when the only evidence against the appellant was the impugned dying declaration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Ex. P-19 appears to have been recorded by Sub-Inspector (PW 9), not by the Tehsildar (PW 10) as claimed, casting doubt on its authenticity.
  • No doctor certified that the deceased was conscious and fit to make a statement, nor did any doctor attest the declaration.
  • The dying declaration bears neither the signature nor thumb impression of the deceased, further undermining reliability.
  • With no corroborative evidence beyond the impugned dying declaration, the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

State's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court carefully scrutinised both dying declarations. Ex. P-7, recorded by the Sub-Inspector, was deemed akin to an FIR and lacked independent corroboration, rendering it unreliable. Turning to Ex. P-19, the Court observed multiple defects:

  • The document was unsigned by any medical professional, and no medical certification of the declarant’s consciousness or fitness was obtained.
  • The declarant’s signature or thumb impression was absent.
  • Although PW 10 (Tehsildar) claimed authorship, the document’s body bore only the Sub-Inspector’s signature with date and time matching the alleged recording, indicating the Sub-Inspector, not the Tehsildar, likely wrote it.
  • PW 10 offered no convincing explanation for failing to secure a doctor’s presence or the declarant’s signature/thumb impression.

Given these irregularities, the Court held Ex. P-19 to be “highly doubtful.” As there was no corroborative evidence against the appellant, the Sessions Judge’s acquittal was a reasonable view that should not have been disturbed. The High Court, therefore, had erred in reversing that acquittal solely on the basis of an unreliable dying declaration.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; Conviction and Life Sentence Set Aside.

The appellant’s acquittal is restored and he is to be released forthwith if not already free. The decision underscores the judiciary’s insistence that dying declarations—when uncorroborated—must strictly conform to procedural safeguards (doctor’s certification, declarant’s signature or thumb impression, and clarity about the recording authority) before being relied upon for conviction. No new legal precedent was expressly set, but the ruling reinforces existing standards governing the evidentiary value of dying declarations.

    Maniram v. State Of M.P .

    Order

    1. This is an appeal under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Appellate Jurisdiction) Act against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversing the order of acquittal of the respondent and convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.

    2. The appellant was prosecuted for committing the murder of his wife Radhabai aged about 16 years on July 24, 1981 in his house at Village Pemath within the jurisdiction of Police Station Raisen. According to the prosecution, because of some earlier trouble and misunderstanding between the wife and husband, the appellant was not happy with her. On the day of occurrence, at about 5.00 p.m, the appellant is alleged to have sent his mother away asking her to go to the market and thereafter poured kerosene on the deceased, set fire and ran away. The mother-in-law who came back found the deceased in burns and sent for the appellant who then came and tried to extinguish the fire and poured water on Radhabai (deceased). Thereafter, the deceased was sent to the hospital where Doctor Tiwari (PW 2) admitted and examined her. The police were informed and the Sub-Inspector (PW 9) reached the hospital early in the morning and he recorded a dying declaration Ex. P-7. A requisition was sent to the Tehsildar and he came to the hospital at about 7.15 a.m and is alleged to have recorded another dying declaration Ex. P-19. The deceased died later and the medical evidence shows that she died because of burns. This aspect has not been in dispute. The prosecution examined about ten witnesses and out of the other witnesses some turned to be hostile and evidence of other witnesses are not very much relevant. Therefore, the prosecution came rested entirely on the two dying declarations — one recorded by the Sub-Inspector (PW 7) — another recorded by the Tehsildar (PW 10) Ex. P-19. The learned Sessions Judge having examined the two dying declarations found that Ex. P-7 was of doubtful nature since no doctor had attested the same and the contents which were in great detail threw doubt. Further, it was in nature of the FIR. Now coming to Ex. P-19 the learned Sessions Judge found that it was not attested by any doctor nor the signature or the thumb impression of the deceased was taken. Accordingly, the trial court acquitted the accused. The State preferred an appeal and the High Court relying on Ex. P-19, convicted the accused reversing the order of acquittal. While coming to such a conclusion, the High Court held that Ex. P-19 is beyond any suspicion and that it was recorded by an independent witness.

    3. In this appeal, Shri Gambhir, learned counsel for the appellant submits that Ex. P-19 would show that it was recorded by a Sub-Inspector (PW 9) not by the Tehsildar (PW 10), as alleged by the prosecution and that at any rate when there is no other evidence except the dying declaration, it should be beyond suspicion and should be wholly reliable. He pointed out several infirmities, namely, that no attestation from the doctor was taken to the effect whether the patient was conscious or not and that the signature or thumb impression of the deceased was not taken and thirdly the perusal of Ex. P-19 shows that the dying declaration was recorded by the Sub-Inspector (PW 9) and not by the Tehsildar (PW 10) as being put forward by the prosecution. We find considerable force in this submission. As already submitted, Ex. P-7 is only in the nature of the FIR and it was recorded by the Sub-Inspector and that by itself does not inspire confidence. Now coming to Ex. P-19, PW 10 deposed that he recorded the dying declaration and he himself attested that the patient was conscious. He was cross-examined at length as to why he did not ask the doctor to be present and certify whether the patient was conscious. He has not given any convincing answer. That apart, he admitted that he did not think it necessary to take the signature of the deceased person or at least take the thumb impression. Further, a perusal of the dying declaration shows that the Sub-Inspector was present and he has affixed his signature on Ex. P-19 and put the date and time which is exactly the time at which the recording of the dying declaration is said to have been recorded by PW 10. In the body of the dying declaration, we only find the signature of PW 9. After that, there is an endorsement of the Tehsildar that the declarant was in the state of senses and was fully aware of what she had stated. It looks like that the Tehsildar was present and the declaration was recorded by the Sub-Inspector and the Tehsildar made only an endorsement that the patient was conscious. The contents of Ex. P-19 are completely at variance with the deposition of PW 10 when he says that he recorded the dying declaration. That apart, in a case of this nature, particularly when the declarant was in the hospital itself, it was the duty of the person who recorded the dying declaration to do so in the presence of the doctor after duly being certified by the doctor that the declarant was conscious and in senses and was in a fit condition to make the declaration. These are some of the important requirements which have to be observed. In the instant case, as noted above, there is no other evidence against the appellant except this dying declaration which is of highly doubtful nature. In our view, the learned Sessions Judge has given the good reasons for acquitting the accused and the view taken by him is quite reasonable and there is no good ground for reversing the same by the High Court. In the result, we set aside the conviction and sentence awarded against the appellant and allow the appeal. If he is in jail, he shall be released forthwith. A copy of this judgment shall be despatched immediately.

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    Comments

    Maniram v. State Of M.P .
    (Sep 23, 1993)