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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 18 of the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act, VI of 1898,
  • section 58, clause (f), of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • section 58, cl. (f), of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Contract Act
  • Transfer of Property Act. Section 58, clause
  • section 7 of the Indian Contract Act
  • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Agriculturists' Relief Act
  • Indian Contract Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 18 of the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act, VI of 1898,
  • section 58, clause (f), of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • section 58, cl. (f), of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Contract Act
  • Transfer of Property Act. Section 58, clause
  • section 7 of the Indian Contract Act
  • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • Agriculturists' Relief Act
  • Indian Contract Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Kania, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs were cotton merchants and pucca adatiyas in Bombay. Defendants were members of a Hindu joint family conducting business under the firm name "Balkrishna Poonjoo Mali"; defendants Nos. 1–4 acted as managers. Prior to 1933 defendants had employed plaintiffs as their adatiyas for cotton transactions at agreed interest of 7.5% per annum. Defendants consigned bales to plaintiffs, who advanced money against them. When market prices fell, plaintiffs demanded margin. A number of bales remained unsold in 1931 and the parties corresponded about sending title-deeds (sale-deeds) as security (margin).

Correspondence from 1931 to 1934 shows defendants sent several sale-deeds (some in favour of third persons such as Hari Poonju Mali) by registered post, together with letters of consent or statements that the deeds were deposited as security for the unsold bales. Plaintiffs later sold the bales and claimed a deficit of Rs. 2,632-13-11; defendants initially contended the Court lacked jurisdiction because they were agriculturists under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. Plaintiffs elected not to pursue a personal decree and proceeded only on the mortgage claim.

The sole contested point at trial became whether a valid equitable mortgage by deposit of title-deeds had been created in favour of the plaintiffs by the defendants sending the title-deeds as described in the correspondence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 58, clause (f), of the Transfer of Property Act, a deposit of title-deeds creating a mortgage by deposit requires the person delivering the deeds to be physically present in one of the listed towns (e.g., Bombay), or whether delivery by post to a creditor in those towns can suffice.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs, by their correspondence, authorised the defendants to send title-deeds by post so that the post office would operate as the plaintiffs' agent and the transaction would be complete on posting (including the applicability of section 7 of the Indian Contract Act).
  3. Whether, on the facts and correspondence produced, a valid mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was created in favour of the plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • Clause (f) of section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act must be read so that the word "person" is associated with "in any of the following towns" — i.e., the person delivering the deeds must be physically in Bombay (or another listed town) when delivery occurs; sending deeds by post from elsewhere is not permitted.
  • Punctuation (the comma after "towns") supports reading the clause to require the deliverer to be in the listed towns.
  • If the deeds were posted from the defendants' native place, the plaintiffs had constituted the post office as their agent (expressly or impliedly) and the transaction should be treated as complete on posting; authority such as Thorappa v. Umedmalji supports that principle.
  • The plaintiffs had prescribed acceptance by posting (invoking section 7 of the Indian Contract Act), and the defendants complied with that prescribed mode.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Section 58, clause (f) should be read to require deposit (delivery) in Bombay and that delivery must be to the creditor or his agent in Bombay — thus the documents had to be actually received in Bombay to create the mortgage.
  • Ordinarily an agreement to deposit title-deeds must precede transfer; sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Contract Act (formation and communication of acceptance) apply so the transaction would not be complete until documents were actually received by the plaintiffs in Bombay.
  • Even if deeds were posted, the defendants could withdraw or recall the documents prior to actual receipt (reference made to the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act and rights of reclamation), so posting alone did not create an equitable mortgage.
  • Reliance was placed on Jagjivandas v. Nagar Central Bank to show that mere sending of instruments by post in ordinary course does not necessarily imply authority to send them by ordinary post.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Taylor (Miss) v. Charles Bleach Cited regarding reliance on punctuation and the construction of statutory wording. The Court noted attempts to rely on punctuation had been resisted historically; Taylor was discussed but not treated as overruling the older rule that punctuation alone is not decisive.
Isap Ahmed v. Abhramji Ahmadji Cited in support of arguments about punctuation and construction. Mentioned as authority relied upon by defendants for punctuation-based interpretation; the Court rejected the defendants' punctuation-based reading.
Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh Held that punctuation should not be relied upon in construing statutes (decision from 1887). The Court relied upon this principle to reject the defendants' argument that the comma mandated the "person" be physically in the listed towns.
Borgonha v. Borgonha Discussed in relation to attempts to explain or limit Maharani of Burdwan. The Court observed that Taylor's attempt to explain Maharani was not accepted in Borgonha, supporting the proposition that punctuation is not decisive.
Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen Privy Council decision rejecting the punctuation-reliance approach described above. Relied on to confirm that punctuation cannot be the determinative factor in statutory construction, undermining the defendants' punctuation-based contention.
Thorappa v. Umedmalji Authority on whether posting an instrument with an express or implied authority operates as delivery to an authorised agent (issue of post office agency for an addressee). The Court considered Thorappa closely: it accepted the principle that if express or implied authority is given to send by post, the post office can be the addressee's agent. The Court then examined the correspondence and found such authority here.
Ex parte Cote: In re Deveze Relied upon for the proposition that, with express or implied authority, the post office may be agent of the addressee. Used with other authorities to support the general proposition about agency of the post office where authority to post is proved; the Court applied this principle in analysing whether plaintiffs authorised posting.
Thairlwal v. Great Northern Railway Also cited as supporting precedent that express or implied authority to send by post makes the post office the addressee's agent. Considered among the authorities that justify treating the post office as agent where authority is shown; used in the Court's assessment of the parties' correspondence.
Norman v. Ricketts Relied upon in the same context as the previous authorities about posting and agency. Applied as part of the cluster of authorities supporting the proposition that express or implied authority to use the post renders the post office the agent of the addressee.
Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Basle Chemical Works (Bindschedler) Cited regarding delivery of goods and the principle that a carrier/post office may be agent of the consignee if authorised. Referred to for the analogous proposition in relation to delivery of goods; Court noted that title-deeds may be treated as "goods" for these purposes and drew the analogy in evaluating agency by post.
Jagjivandas v. Nagar Central Bank Held that mere sending of cheques by post in ordinary business does not alone establish an implied authority to send by ordinary post. The Court stated that Jagjivandas did not help plaintiffs because, unlike that case, the plaintiffs here had made an express request to send deeds by post and the correspondence as a whole supported an implied authority for subsequent postings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of analytical steps and factual determinations, applying statutory construction principles and agency/contract principles from the Indian Contract Act and the cited authorities:

  1. Construction of section 58, clause (f), Transfer of Property Act:
    • The defendants argued that punctuation and the sequence of words require the "person" delivering the deeds to be physically present in a listed town (e.g., Bombay) when delivery occurs.
    • The Court rejected reliance on punctuation as decisive, citing long-standing authority (Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh) and noting that later cases (Borgonha, Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen) supported that rejection. The Court read the clause to mean that delivery to a creditor or his agent in any of the listed towns suffices — i.e., the delivery need be made in the listed towns but not necessarily by a person physically present there at the moment of delivery.
  2. Factual question of where the title-deeds were delivered:
    • Having interpreted the clause so that the deeds must be delivered in one of the named towns to the creditor or his agent, the Court framed the issue as a question of fact: whether the title-deeds were in fact delivered in Bombay.
  3. Whether posting constituted delivery via plaintiffs' agent:
    • The defendants relied on Thorappa v. Umedmalji and related authorities to argue the post office could be treated as the plaintiffs' agent if there was express or implied authority to send by post.
    • The Court analyzed the correspondence and concluded the plaintiffs had in 1931 suggested three alternatives and, read as a whole, had intimated that the defendants should send title-deeds by post. Therefore the Court found an express/implied authorisation was present.
    • Applying the principle in Thorappa and the cluster of authorities (Ex parte Cote, Thairlwal, Norman, Badische Anilin), the Court held that where the addressee has authorised posting, the post office acts as the addressee's agent to receive the instrument.
  4. Application of contract principles:
    • Relying on section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, the Court held that once defendants posted the title-deeds in reliance on the plaintiffs' authorisation, the transaction was complete. The Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the transaction remained incomplete until physical receipt in Bombay and rejected the contention that defendants could unilaterally cancel the security by recall before receipt.
  5. Distinguishing and applying Jagjivandas:
    • The Court accepted that ordinary postal correspondence between parties (as in Jagjivandas) does not by itself imply authority to send negotiable instruments by ordinary post, but distinguished that case because here there was an express request to send the deeds by post and subsequent postings were consistent with that request.
  6. Final factual/ legal conclusion:
    • Although the Court found that the plaintiffs had, by correspondence, authorised postal sending and that posting completed the transaction vis-à-vis the parties under section 7, the Court concluded (on the legal construction of section 58(f) and the evidence as read) that "the title-deeds were not deposited in Bombay within the meaning of section 58, clause (f), and there is no valid mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of that clause." (This is the Court's stated legal conclusion on the mortgage issue.)
  7. Other statutory contentions:
    • The Court noted arguments about section 18 of the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act and post office rules but declined to decide those points because plaintiffs' counsel had not put before the Court published rules or demonstrated rules made under the Governor General in Council; accordingly, the Court did not consider the exact effect of those rules on the facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The suit was dismissed with costs and the Court held that there was no valid mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of section 58, clause (f), of the Transfer of Property Act.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that plaintiffs cannot succeed on their mortgage claim based on the deposit/posting of the title-deeds and the defendants are not held liable on that mortgage theory; the suit was dismissed with costs in favour of the defendants.
  • The opinion does not state any broader rule or announce a new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities; the decision rests on the Court's construction of section 58(f), its factual findings about the correspondence and agency by post, and the application of previously decided authorities. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general principle beyond the case's facts.

Other Case Information

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Mulla & Mulla.
Attorneys for defendants: Messrs M.V. Gokhale & Co.

Disposition: Suit dismissed.

    Indian Cotton Company Ltd. v. Hari Poonjoo

    Kania, J.:—

    Plaintiffs are merchants dealing in cotton and also act as pucca adatiyas. Defendants are members of a joint Hindu family and carry on business in the joint family firm name of Balkrishna Poonjoo Mali. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are the managers of the joint family. For several years before 1933 the defendants had employed the plaintiffs as their adatiyas in respect of their dealings in cotton in Bombay. The business was on the usual terms and interest was agreed to be paid at seven and a half per cent per annum. Defendants consigned to the plaintiffs cotton bales for sales and against the same the plaintiffs advanced money from time to time. The market price of cotton went down and the plaintiffs demanded margin from the defendants. In September, 1931, fifty bales of the defendants were lying with the plaintiffs unsold.

    On August 31, 1931, the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs a letter in which they offered to send promissory notes and debt bonds as margin. By their reply of September 10, 1931, the plaintiffs informed the defendants that they will not be accepted and further stated as follows:—

    “… Therefore you will please mortgage to us for Rs. 2,500 some field owned by yourself and send the deed from the same place after getting (it) ‘Registered’ in our name. Otherwise if there be any field which has been purchased in your name you will please send the sale-deed addressed to as simply by ‘registered’ (post) Otherwise, if you have got with you any sale-deed in favour of another person then along with the said deed you will please send a letter written by him stating that he is giving us the said deed as taran (margin money) in connection with Balakrishna Poonju's bales …”

    In reply, the defendants wrote a letter dated September 15 in which they stated:—

    “… Your letter was received yesterday. Accordingly, as required by you, a sale-deed has been sent to yon. The particulars thereof are:—

    ******

    The said sale-deed is deposited (with you) as security on account of my fifty bales of cotton which are lying with you. The said deed is in favour of Hari Poonju Mali. But we both of us are brothers and are joint. Moreover his letter of consent is also annexed hereto. You will therefore be pleased to accept the sale-deed and you will please not cause any inconvenience to Devrao Madhavrao on account of me …

    The said sale-deed has been sent by registered post. You will please send a letter acknowledging receipt thereof …”

    Along with this letter was sent an undated letter signed by Hari Poonju Mali in which that party stated as follows:—

    “… But I am giving you by way of security a sale-deed for Rs. 6,000 … passed in my favour against the loss arising on account of rates going down … I have deposited the said sale-deed by way of security with you …”

    The sale-deed mentioned in the above correspondence was sent by registered post and is produced by the plaintiffs. The bales remained unsold, and in 1933 the market having further gone down, the plaintiffs wrote six more letters calling upon the defendants “to send security” for the deficit. On February 2, 1934, Hari Poonju Mali wrote the following letter to the plaintiffs:

    “… The reason for writing (this) is as follows:— Field bearing survey No. 60 is allotted to the share of Balkrishna Poonju Mali. I have no dispute whatever regarding the same. You will therefore accept the sale-deed sent herewith as a security.”

    Another sale-deed was sent along with that letter. On February 16, 1934, the plaintiffs sent a reply in which they stated as follows:—

    “… You have sent 1 (one) sale-deed. It will suffice if you send similar (sale) deeds in respect of two more fields. Please therefore send a reply at once.”

    In reply the defendants sent an undated letter in which they inter alia stated as follows:—

    “… You say that you want a sale-deed for double the amount payable by us by way of security. But you have got my two sale-deeds of the value of at least 9,000 … rupees this day. Notwithstanding this I do not wish to go against your wish. Therefore I have this day sent to you again a sale-deed of the value of at least 4,000 … rupees … You have got in all three sale-deeds of the value of Rs. 13,000 … by way of security …”

    The plaintiffs in reply sent a letter on March 7, 1934, stating:—

    “… Your letter is received and the contents are noted. Similarly a sale-deed in respect of S. No. 214 (land) measuring A. 9-7G. sent therewith on account of taran (margin money) is received …”

    The plaintiffs thereafter sold the bales and claimed a deficit of Rs. 2,632-13-11 from the defendants by their letter of October 6, 1934. At the request of the plaintiffs the defendants also confirmed that they were indebted to the plaintiffs for Rs. 2,632-13-11.

    The defendants at first contended that they were agriculturists within the meaning of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The plaintiffs, thereupon, elected not to claim a personal decree against the defendants and proceeded with their suit only as a mortgage suit. The only point in dispute which therefore remained to be decided was whether there was a valid equitable mortgage created in favour of the plaintiffs by the defendants sending the title-deeds as mentioned above. On behalf of the defendants it is urged that, having regard to the wording of section 58, cl. (f), of the Transfer of Property Act, it is necessary that the person making the deposit of title-deeds should be in Bombay and it is not permitted to send the title-deeds by post. The clause was inserted in section 58, by act xx of 1929. Before that amendment, the relevant portion of section 59 ran as follows:—

    “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render invalid mortgages made in the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi and Rangoon, … by delivery to a creditor or his agent of documents of title to immoveable property, with to create a security thereon.”

    Clause (f) of section 58, at present, runs as follows:—

    “Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Rangoon, Moulmein, Bassein and Akyab, … delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immoveable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.”

    The contention is obviously raised because of the comma after the word towns and because in the present clause the words “in any of the following towns” are put immediately after the word “person” and before the verb “delivers”. Relying on the terms of this clause it is urged that the word “person” must go with “towns” and therefore the person should be “in the towns” when the documents are delivered. It is urged that there is no hardship in interpreting the clause in this manner, because it has always been contemplated that this particular kind of mortgage could be created within the Presidency-towns and the towns mentioned in this clause, and nowhere else; for that purpose it is essential that the party delivering the title-deeds should be in Bombay. It is pointed out that the existence of the comma after the word “towns” clearly indicates that the towns mentioned in this clause do not go with the verb “delivers” but with the noun “person”. In support of the contention that punctuation should be relied upon my attention has been drawn to Taylor (Miss) v. Charles Bleach, and Isap Ahmed v. Abhramji Ahmadji.

    In my opinion this contention of the defendants is incorrect. In considering the plain words of a section punctuation could not be relied upon. That was held so far back as 1887 in Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh. That decision was attempted to be explained away in Taylor (Miss) v. Charles Bleach, but that position was not accepted in Borgonha v. Borgonha, and has been definitely negatived by the Privy Council in Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen. I do not think the section has introduced any change in the law as to the rights of the parties. Under the old section it was necessary that the deposit should be made in Bombay and that could be done through an agent also. Under the present provision also, in my opinion, it is not necessary that the debtor giving the security should be in Bombay personally. As I read the section it means that the person should deposit the title-deeds in Bombay to a creditor. I realise that it would have been perhaps better if the legislature had put the word “delivers” immediately after the word “person” in clause (f), instead of putting it after the various towns mentioned therein. Even taking the sequence as it is, I am unable to hold that the various towns cannot be read properly as going with “delivers” and must be read in connection with “person” only in the section. Under the circumstances the proper construction of the clause is that the debtor should deliver, in any of the towns mentioned in the clause, to a creditor or his agent, the documents of title to immoveable property with intent to create a security thereon. The question, therefore, must resolve itself into a question of fact, whether on the evidence it was established that the title-deeds were delivered in Bombay.

    In this connection on behalf of the defendants it is urged that they were not in Bombay and had sent the title-deeds, at the request of the plaintiffs, by post. In the present case therefore the plaintiffs had constituted the post office their agent, expressly or impliedly, for the purpose of receiving the title-deeds from the defendants, and when the title-deeds were despatched by the defendants from their native place, with the required intention, the transaction was complete and the validity thereof is to be determined on that footing. It is pointed out that under section 58, clause (f), it was not necessary to have an agreement preceding the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds. Even if the facts were considered from the point of view of an agreement, it is pointed out that having regard to section 7 of the Indian Contract Act, the plaintiffs had prescribed the manner in which the proposal was to be accepted, and the defendants having accepted it in that manner, the transaction was complete when the letters were posted. It is urged that if the plaintiffs had sent their representative and received the title-deeds at the defendants' native place the transaction would have been completed immediately the defendants handed over the title-deeds to the plaintiffs' representative. In the same way the post office, being the plaintiffs' agent for the purpose, the transaction was similarly completed when the title-deeds were posted. On behalf of the plaintiffs, on the other hand, it is urged, that there must be an agreement preceding the deposit of title-deeds and sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Contract Act would apply. It is contended that in whatever way the correspondence is looked at the transaction would not be complete, as against the defendants, till the documents were actually received by the plaintiffs at Bombay. It is pointed out that even if after the title-deeds were sent, if the defendants sent a telegram to the plaintiff, before the title-deeds were received in Bombay, intimating that the title-deeds were not to be taken as security there would be no equitable mortgage. It is further pointed out that under the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act, VI of 1898, the defendants could have got back the documents after they had posted the same without the consent of the plaintiffs if they were so minded. It is, therefore, urged that the post office could not be considered the plaintiffs' agent in India.

    It, therefore, remains to be determined, on the evidence, whether the title-deeds were deposited in Bombay. While realising that in some peculiar circumstances there may be no separate agreement to deposit the title-deeds, I think the agreement must ordinarily precede the actual transfer of interest in immoveable property, as defined by the term “mortgage” in the Transfer of Property Act. Section 58, clause (f), requires that the deposit should be with the intention to create a security and that intention must be conveyed to the creditor and the title-deeds accepted by him on that footing. Therefore, there must be an offer to deposit the title-deeds with the necessary intention and acceptance of that offer theoretically, before the title-deeds actually pass from the possession of one to the other. It may be that in certain cases, the two acts being together, it may be difficult to exactly point out the moment the agreement took place, before the title-deeds were handed over, as the agreement may be completed by the act of handing over the title-deeds by one and receiving them by the other.

    The defendants strongly rely on the decision in Thorappa v. Umedmalji for their contention that the delivery of the title-deeds was to a specially appointed agent and also that the post office was the agent of the plaintiffs for receiving the title-deeds. That decision was in respect of a hundi sent by post which was lost in transit. The hundi had been endorsed and it was contended that it was sent under the instructions of the other side by post. The material dispute between the parties was whether after the endorsement the hundi was delivered to the endorsee so as to pass the title in the hundi. Mulla, J. held that to complete a transfer of the property in the hundi it must be established that there was an authority, express or implied, from the party conveyed to the sender, to send the hundi by post. If that was proved there would be delivery of the hundi to the authorised agent and the property passed. It was pointed out that under the regulations of the Indian Post Office a letter once posted cannot be reclaimed except under special circumstances. The decisions in Ex parte Cote: In re Deveze, Thairlwal v. Great Northern Railway and Norman v. Ricketts were relied upon to show that if there was an express or implied authority to send by post, the post office would be the agent of the addressee; if there was no such authority, the post office would be the agent of the sender. Lord Hailsham's Laws of England, Volume II, p. 629, also supports that view. The decision in Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Basle Chemical Works, Bindschedler also supports the same contention, in respect of delivery of goods. It cannot be disputed that title-deeds of an immoveable property would fall under the definition of “goods”, within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act. It remains, therefore, to be considered whether on the correspondence the plaintiffs had given authority, express or implied, to the defendants to send the title-deeds by post.

    In my opinion, the correspondence indicates clearly that the plaintiffs asked the defendants to send the title-deeds by post. In the first letter written by them they suggested three alternatives, and although the post office is not mentioned expressly in respect of each of them, reading the letter as a whole, it is clear that the plaintiffs had intimated that the defendants should send the title-deeds by post. If so, that is sufficient to make the post office their agent to receive the title-deeds on their behalf. Reading the correspondence as a whole in 1931, it seems to me, therefore, that the plaintiffs having constituted the post office their authorised agent to receive the title-deeds and intimated the same to the defendants, as soon as the defendants sent the title-deeds accordingly, under section 7 of the Indian Contract Act the transaction was complete. The plaintiffs contention that the defendants could have cancelled the security before the documents were received in Bombay is incorrect because it assumes that the transaction remained incomplete when the title-deeds were posted. In respect of the subsequent title-deeds received in 1934 also the plaintiffs demanded the same and although in those letters there is no express reference to the post office, reading the correspondence as a whole, it seems clear that the suggestion was that the other title-deeds should also be sent by post. In fact they were so sent.

    On behalf of the plaintiffs reliance was placed on the decision in Jagjivandas v. Nagar Central Bank. That also was a case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Kajiji, J. held that from the mere fact that cheques were sent from time to time by post in the ordinary course of business, it could not be inferred that there was any implied request from the one party to the other to send cheques by ordinary post. In my opinion that decision does not help the plaintiffs. I recognise that the mere fact that the parties did correspond by post would not be sufficient to spell out an authority to send by post. As however in the present case an express request to send it by post was made and the first title-deed was so sent, the subsequent correspondence between the parties should be read along the same lines, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary, either in correspondence or in evidence, I think that the whole evidence justifies the conclusion of an implied authority given by the plaintiffs to send the subsequent title-deeds also by post. The plaintiffs hold these title-deeds as a result of this correspondence and therefore in my opinion the title-deeds were not deposited in Bombay within the meaning of section 58, clause (f), of the Transfer of Property Act, and there is no valid mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of that clause.

    The general contention about the effect of section 18 of the Indian Posts and Telegraph Act, VI of 1898, and the rules stated to have been framed by the Governor General in Council need not be considered. It was contended that the observations in Thorappa v. Umedmalji were on a wrong assumption that the old Act was in force. The report does not show that the Court was proceeding on the footing of the old Act and not Act VI of 1898 when that decision was given. The post office rules put before the Court, on the face of them, are only issued under the authority of the Post-Master General and the learned counsel for the plaintiffs did not draw my attention to its publication in the Government Gazette or to any statement indicating that they were made or published by the Governor General in Council under section 18 of the Act. I had therefore no occasion to consider the exact effect of those rules on the facts of this case.

    The suit will, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

    Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Mulla & Mulla.

    Attorneys for defendants: Messrs M.V Gokhale & Co.

    Suit dismissed.
    B.K.D
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    Comments

    Indian Cotton Company Ltd. v. Hari Poonjoo
    (Feb 11, 1936)