Kajiji, J.:— The plaintiff carries on business as a sub-agent of the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas and sells kerosene oil of the Burma Oil Company in the district of Ahmednagar. The defendants are bankers doing business at Ahmednagar. It appears that the plaintiff had dealings for the last 20 years with the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas and in the course of such business the plaintiff used to send from time to time either hundis or cheques by ordinary post to Tarachand Ganshamdas. On October 24, 1923, the plaintiff took from the defendants a cheque for Rs. 3,000 payable to himself or order on the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank, and the cheque was not crossed at the plaintiff's request. The plain tiff endorsed the cheque in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas or order and it was sent, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, by ordinary post with a letter, dated October 24, 1923, along with a hundi, for Rs. 600 to Tarachand Ganshamdas. The letter with the enclosures, namely, the cheque and the hundi, did not reach Tarachand Ganshamdas; it ought ordinarily to have reached him on October 25, but on October 25, some person presented the cheque duly endorsed in the ordinary course of business to the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank in Bombay who in due course made the payment of Rs. 3,000. It appears that the plaintiff, as he did not get an acknowledgment of receipt of the cheque and hundi, sent reminders and, the defendants declining to pay, this suit is filed to recover from the defendants the sum of Rs. 3,000 the amount of the cheque.
It is urged on behalf of the defendants that, as the plaintiff sent the cheque in a letter by ordinary post without the cheque being crossed, he was guilty of gross and culpable negligence and, as the cheque was endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas, the plaintiff had no interest left in Mm in the cheque and, therefore, this suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff and ought to have been filed by the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas. But in my opinion there is no delivery within the meaning of section 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act simply because the cheque is sent by post and, therefore, on the issue whether the suit is maintainable or not, I must find in favour of the plaintiff and hold that there was no delivery within the meaning of section 46. It must also be mentioned that the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas has not given credit to the plaintiff for this amount and the practice has been to give credit only after the cheque is cashed or the moneys of the hundi are recovered and, therefore, the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas were perfectly justified in not giving credit to the plaintiff for the amount. I also hold that the plaintiff was not guilty of gross and culpable negligence as alleged by the defendants simply because he sent the cheque by ordinary post and without it being crossed. There is not the slightest doubt that there was no express or implied request from the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas to the plaintiff to send cheques or hundis by ordinary post. Because the plaintiff for the last 20 years was in the habit of sending cheques and hundis by post, it cannot be inferred that there was an implied request by or that Messrs. Tarachand Ganshamdas approved of the mode of sending cheques or hundis by ordinary post. It is clear from the decision in Pennington v. Crossley and Sons that from the mere fact that cheques were sent from time to time by post in the ordinary course of business it cannot be inferred that there was any implied request from the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas to the plaintiff to send cheques by post.
The real defence to this suit is that under section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act protection is given to the drawee if a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee and if the drawee makes the payment in due course. Section 85 is in these terras:— “Where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee, the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.” The cheque in suit (Exhibit A) was made payable by the defendants to the plaintiff Jugjiwandas Jamnadas or order. Jugjiwandas Jamnadas endorsed it before sending the cheque by post to Tarachand Ganshamdas as follows:—“Please pay to Tarachand Ganshamdas or order” and signed his name. It is not disputed that the endorsement of the payee, namely, Jugjiwandas Jamnadas is genuine. If the cheque, Exhibit A, had not been endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas and had only borne the endorsement of the payee whether genuine or not there is not the slightest doubt that section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act gave complete protection to the drawee. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that as in this case the cheque was endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas section 85 gave no protection to the drawee or drawer. But it is contended on behalf of the defendants that once the payee signs his name and makes it payable to some other person, that other person becomes the payee within the meaning of section 85. In my opinion that contention is absolutely untenable, for section 7 of the Act itself defines payee as the person named in the instrument to whom or to whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid. So in Exhibit A the payee is Jugjiwandas Jamnadas and, therefore, if Jugjiwandas Jamnadas endorsed it in favour of somebody else, and in this case to Tarachand Ganshamdas, then that person cannot be the payeee within the meaning of this definition. Further the word “indorsee” is also defined by section 16 and it is as follows:— “………. if he [sc. the indorser] adds a direction to pay the amount mentioned in the instrument to, or to the order of, a specified person the person so specified is called the indorsee of the instrument.” Therefore, Tarachand Ganshamdas is the endorsee and not the payee and the first contention of the plaintiff that the subsequent indorsee becomes the payee within the meaning of section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments. Act is untenable.
But it is urged on behalf of the defendant that by Act V of 1914, section 16(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended by adding the words:—“The provisions of this Act relating to a payee shall apply with the necessary modifications to an indorsee”, and therefore, wherever the word “payee” occurs in the Act, the word “indorsee” must also be included and section 85 would, therefore, read:— “Where a cheque payable to order purports to be indorsed by or on behalf of the payee (i.e, indorsee also) the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.” If that contention is correct, that is a complete answer to the suit. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that section 16 under the amending Act V of 1914 purported only to make the amendments to two sections, viz., sections 13 and 16 for as the preamble states there were some doubts as to the validity of making endorsements in negotiable instruments in certain forms and, therefore, it was thought fit to amend both sections, viz., 1.3 and 16 only and to limit its operation to these two sections, and that it was never intended to amend section 85 by implication. It is further urged on behalf of the plaintiff that if it was intended to make such a change in section 85 the easiest way would have been by adding the word “or indorsee” in section 85 or adding a note to section 85. In my opinion the two contentions of the plaintiff that the words “This Act” in section 16, clause 2, do not mean Negotiable Instruments Act and that Act V of 1914 limited its operation to sections 13 and 16 only are both untenable. When a general provision has got to be made it is usual in the Amending Act to say that the provisions relating to a payee shall apply with the necessary modifications to an “indorsee”. In my opinion section 16(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is added by Act V of 1914 certainly gives protection under section 85 to the drawee in the case of an indorsee also if the signature of the indorsee is not genuine. The signature of the indorsee in this case is no doubt a false one. It is true that the evidence of Goculdas Chabildas, a moonim in the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas, does not and cannot carry much weight and is not of much value, for, though he has been in their service for a long time yet as he does not know how to read or write English, his statement that the endorsement of Tarachand Ganshamdas is not by any authorised man is useless. One Vadilal Dayabhai, a clerk in the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas, has sworn that the endorsed signature “Tarachand Ganshamdas” on the cheque, Exhibit A, is not the genuine signature of Tarachand Ganshamdas or his son, Ramprasad, who is also authorised to sign cheques. I, therefore, hold that that signature is not a genuine one. It is urged by the defendants that Ramprasad who is in Bombay has not been called, but I do not think his evidence would have carried the case any further. In my opinion section 85 is a complete answer to the plaintiff even if the signature of the indorsee is not genuine. I cannot understand why, if the Legislature gave protection to the drawee in the case of the signature of the payee not being genuine, the same protection should not be extended to the case of the signature of the indorsee. When the drawee is protected even if the signature of the payee is not genuine, I think the Legislature by Act V of 1914 extended that protection to the indorsee and doubts having arisen as to whether section 85 was applicable or not section 16 was amended in this manner. It is unnecessary to go into section 121 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for even in the case of an indorsee in such a case the protection of estoppel would apply. At one time the learned counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the protection under section 85 was given only to the drawee and not to the drawer. But as far as I am concerned the case of Sulleman Hussein v. The New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited, is binding on me and there Sir Charles Sargent C.J, has held that the protection under section 85 is not limited to the drawee, but it also applies to the drawer. From the evidence of the pay clerk and the accountant of the third party the amount of the cheque was paid by the third party in due course according to the tenor thereof and in good faith and without negligence. I, therefore, dismiss the suit with costs.
Attorneys for the plaintiff:— Messrs. M.B Chothia & Co.
Attorneys for the defendants:— Messrs. Captain and Vaidya.
Attorneys for the third party:— Messrs. Payne & Co.
J.S.K