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  • Order 21 Rule 32 (5), Civil P. C.
  • S. 91, Civil P. C. Section 91,
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  • Order 21 Rule 32 (5), Civil P. C.
  • S. 91, Civil P. C. Section 91,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Second Appeal arises from a long-standing dispute between brothers concerning rights over a short, blind village lane marked C–C1 in the plan filed with the plaint. The dispute dates back to 1927. In O.S. No. 287 of 1927 the plaintiff (in that earlier suit) obtained a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing passage through the lane C–C1 to the plaintiff's house (whose compound gate is A–4) and a mandatory injunction directing removal of an alleged obstruction.

In the present suit the plaintiff alleged that defendant 1 recently constructed pials C-2 and C-3 in front of his (defendant’s) house which encroached on the lane C–C1 and obstructed free passage of bullock carts to the plaintiff's house. The defendants pleaded the pials had long existed and were merely repaired, that the plaintiff suffered no special injury, that the suit was not maintainable without the Advocate-General's sanction under Section 91, Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and that the plaintiff's remedy lay by execution of the earlier decree (O.S. No. 287 of 1927).

At trial the suit was dismissed on the grounds that the lane was a public highway, the complaint was of a public nuisance, there was no proof of special damage to the plaintiff, and the suit was unsustainable in view of Section 91, CPC. The lower Appellate Court reversed that finding, concluding that the pials were of recent construction, encroached on the lane and made it difficult for double bullock carts to enter the plaintiff's compound; it relied on Madras High Court authority to hold that villagers affected could prevent infringement of a village lane without proof of special damage and without complying with S.91, CPC. The present appeal challenges the lower Appellate Court's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' act in constructing pials encroaching on lane C–C1 amounted to a public nuisance.
  2. If the act is a public nuisance, whether the plaintiff proved such special damage as would entitle him to sue without the sanction required by Section 91, Civil Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The defendants (specifically defendant 1) recently constructed pials C-2 and C-3 encroaching on lane C–C1 and obstructing free passage of bullock carts to the plaintiff's house (the plaintiff needs passage to gate A–4).
  • Because the obstruction interferes with entry of bullock carts into the plaintiff's compound, the plaintiff has a cause of action for removal of the obstruction (a mandatory injunction).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The pials had existed for a long time and were recently only repaired or improved, not newly constructed.
  • Even assuming there was some encroachment, the plaintiff did not suffer any special injury beyond that shared by other residents.
  • The suit was not maintainable without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 91, CPC because it concerned a public matter (public nuisance).
  • The plaintiff's remedy, the defendants contended, was to seek execution of the earlier decree in O.S. No. 287 of 1927 rather than a fresh suit.

Appellant's (Counsel's) Submissions

  • It was contended that the lower Appellate Court was wrong to apply single-Judge Madras decisions allowing residents to sue without proof of special damage; counsel argued the lane was a highway and that the fact it was in a village did not make it any less a highway.
  • Counsel maintained there was no special damage to the plaintiff and the suit was therefore unsustainable; reference was made to decisions of several High Courts in support of that contention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Murugesa Mudali v. Arunagiri Mudali, 1950-2 Mad LJ 770 : AIR 1951 Mad 498 (A) Single-Judge Madras decision relied upon by the lower Appellate Court holding that infringement of villagers' rights over a village lane could be prevented without proof of special damage and without S.91 sanction. The lower Appellate Court relied on this authority; the present court acknowledged that reliance and discussed it, but distinguished the circumstances by reaffirming the requirement of special damage in respect of obstructions to public highways while treating the present lane as not a public highway.
Subbamma v. Narayana Murti, 1949-1 Mad LJ 956 : AIR 1949 Mad 634 (B) Single-Judge Madras authority cited as part of a line of decisions about rights over village pathways and the necessity (or not) of special damage / S.91. Noted among the Madras single-judge decisions; considered as part of the jurisprudential background in the court's analysis of whether special damage is required.
Munusami v. Kuppuswami, ILR (1939) Mad 870 : AIR 1939 Mad 691 (C) Another single-Judge Madras decision in the cluster of authorities addressing obstruction to village pathways and relief without proof of special damage. Referred to as part of the body of single-Judge Madras decisions; the court considered these authorities in evaluating whether village lanes differ from public highways for the purpose of S.91 and special damage.
Manzur Hasan v. Muhammad Zaman, ILR 47 All 151 : AIR 1925 P.C. 36 (D) Judicial Committee decision holding a community has a right to conduct a religious procession through a public street without interfering with ordinary public use; a civil suit lies for declaration against those interfering. The court examined the Judicial Committee decision: it had been interpreted by some (Wadsworth J.) as abrogating the need for special damage in India. The present court concluded that the earlier rule requiring special damage had not been abrogated by that decision.
Mandakinee Debee v. Basantkumaree Debi, ILR 60 Cal 1003 : AIR 1933 Cal 884 (E) Obiter expressions supporting the view that proof of special damage may not be required in some Indian contexts. Noted by the court as part of the authorities that influenced some judges to hold special damage unnecessary; the court considered these views in its review but did not accept them as overruling the traditional rule.
Municipal Committee Delhi v. Mohammed Ibrahim, ILR 16 Lah 517 : AIR 1935 Lah 196 (F) Authority expressing views similar to those that special damage need not always be proved in India. Cited among the cases interpreted by Wadsworth J.; the present court weighed this line of cases in its discussion and concluded they did not displace the special-damage rule for obstructions to public highways.
Appayya v. Narasimhulu, 1938 Mad WN 262 : AIR 1938 Mad 338 (G) Horwill, J.'s view that unless special damage was proved the only remedy for a common nuisance was a suit under S.91, CPC. The court observed that Wadsworth, J. criticised Horwill, J. for not considering the Judicial Committee and other cases; the present court nevertheless treated the special-damage rule as authoritative.
Bhuloganatham Pillai v. Rajagopala Pillai, AIR 1941 Mad 669 (H) Division Bench assumed or impliedly decided that special damage was necessary and directed amendment of the plaint to include a plea of special damage. Referred to as a Division Bench decision that had adopted the need for special damage; used to show variance in Madras authorities and buttress the court's view that special damage is required.
Surendra Kumar v. District Board of Nadia, ILR (1942) 1 Cal 533 : AIR 1942 Cal 360 (I) Calcutta decision considering earlier authorities on the question of special damage. The present court expressed respectful agreement with the decision of B. K. Mukerjea and Sen, JJ. in this case and cited it in support of the special-damage rule.
Bihuti Narayan Singh v. Mahadev Asram, ILR 19 Pat 208 : AIR 1940 Pat 449 (J) Patna decision cited in the debate over whether special damage is required in Indian cases. Referred to as part of authorities that the court considered and found supportive of maintaining the special-damage requirement.
Chunilal v. Ramkrishen Sabu, ILR 15 Cal 460 (FB) (K) Wilson, J.'s observations that a village pathway cannot be raised to the dignity of a public highway and that obstruction of such pathway was not a public nuisance; residents might sue with the court's permission under O.1 R.8, CPC. Cited as authority supporting the proposition that village pathways may be treated differently from public highways; the court took this into account when concluding the present lane was not a public highway.
Baslingappa v. Dharmappa, ILR 34 Bom 571 (L) Part of the Madras/Privy Council jurisprudence discussing obstructions that affect only a particular class of persons and whether these constitute public nuisances. Mentioned as part of the ratio that obstruction aimed at preventing only a particular class from using a highway does not amount to a public nuisance; the court relied on this reasoning in distinguishing types of obstructions.
Velan Pakkiri v. Subbayan, ILR 42 Mad 271 : AIR 1919 Mad 674 (FB) (M) Authority addressing whether members of a particular section may obstruct legitimate user of a public street and whether that constitutes public nuisance. Referred to as part of the body of decisions forming the ratio relied upon by the Judicial Committee; used by the court to explain limits of the public-nuisance concept.
Mt. Ramkali v. Munnala, ILR (1939) All 754 : AIR 1939 All 586 (N) Authority cited for the proposition that some village lanes are not public highways and that the public at large do not use them. Relied upon by the court in determining that the lane C–C1 in the present case was not a public highway but a passage for a few residents.
Dalgobinda v. Khatu Mahatha, AIR 1948 Pat 183 (O) Patna authority cited concerning village pathways and their character. Used by the court as supporting precedent for treating the lane as a local residents' passage rather than a public highway.
Dashrathi Mahto v. Narain Mahto, AIR 1941 Pat 249 (P) Another Patna decision cited on the nature of village lanes and rights of residents. Referred to in support of the conclusion that the lane served only the residents of a small part of the village.
Chinnabba Chetty v. Chengalaroaya Chetti, ILR (1950) Mad 764 : AIR 1950 Mad 237 (Q) Authority on execution of decrees and the availability of fresh cause of action when a new obstruction is constructed after an earlier injunction. Relied upon by the court to conclude that a fresh obstruction arising after the prior suit creates a new cause of action and that a fresh suit for mandatory injunction is maintainable.
Hemchandra v. Nurendra Nath, ILR 61 Cal 148 : AIR 1934 Cal 402 (R) Authority concerning remedies where new obstructions arise post-decree and execution of earlier decrees. Used to support the proposition that a new obstruction gives rise to a fresh cause of action and thus a fresh suit is maintainable.
Angad v. Madho Ram, ILR (1938) All 673 : AIR 1938 All 416 (S) Authority cited in relation to fresh obstructions and the availability of fresh suits rather than limited recourse to execution. Referenced by the court in concluding the present obstruction was new and therefore the present suit for mandatory injunction was maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by framing Section 91, Civil Procedure Code, as dealing with "suits relating to public matters" (suits to vindicate public rights) and explained that an obstruction to a public thoroughfare is a public nuisance. The court emphasized that leaving a remaining width equal to the narrowest portion of the road does not prevent an encroachment from being a nuisance.

The court then addressed characterization of the lane: it adopted a categorical approach that a road is either public or private. A road used only by inhabitants of a particular village or by persons who visit them on business is not a public road; a public highway is dedicated to the public at large. A village road may, however, be a public highway if dedicated to the public at large (for instance trunk roads).

On the central legal question the court stated its considered position: apart from and in conformity with Section 91, CPC, no action can be maintained by an individual against another for obstruction to a public highway without proof of special damage. The court grounded this rule in public policy concerns — to avoid harassment of alleged wrongdoers by innumerable suits by persons who have not sustained damage peculiar to themselves — and observed that Indian courts had enforced this rule until 1924. The court expressly held that the Privy Council decision cited (Manzur Hasan) did not abrogate that rule.

The court reviewed conflicting authorities: it discussed the interpretation by Wadsworth, J. (who viewed Manzur Hasan as establishing that the special-damage rule does not apply in India), other single-Judge decisions, and Division Bench decisions that required special damage. The court stated its respectful agreement with the decision of B.K. Mukerjea and Sen, JJ. in ILR (1942) 1 Cal 533 : AIR 1942 Cal 360 (Surendra Kumar), which considered the earlier decisions and supported the special-damage rule.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that lane C–C1 was a short, blind lane serving not more than three houses and used only by the residents for both pedestrian and bullock-cart passage. The defendants' pial in front of their house interfered with the free passage of double bullock carts into the plaintiff's compound. Because the plaintiff's house was at the end of the lane and at right angles to the defendants', the court found that the obstruction caused special damage to the plaintiff — meaning damage affecting the plaintiff individually or peculiar to him, beyond that suffered in common by other owners of houses opening into the lane.

On the procedural point about whether execution of the prior decree was the plaintiff's sole remedy, the court held that the present obstruction was not in existence at the time of the prior suit and was a new obstruction erected shortly before the present suit. The court referred to Order 21 Rule 32(5), CPC, and authorities such as Chinnabba Chetty, Hemchandra, and Angad to conclude that where a prohibitory injunction is disobeyed by a fresh construction causing obstruction, a fresh cause of action arises and a fresh suit for removal of the obstruction is maintainable.

In sum, the court concluded (a) the lane C–C1 was not a public highway but served only local residents; (b) the plaintiff had suffered special damage because of the particular difficulty in bringing double bullock carts into his compound; (c) the suit for a mandatory injunction to remove the new obstruction was maintainable; and (d) the Second Appeal failed.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. (The opinion states: "I hold that the Second Appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.")

Implications and Consequences:

  • The court reaffirmed that, in conformity with Section 91, Civil Procedure Code, an individual cannot maintain an action against another for obstruction to a public highway without proof of special damage. The court concluded that the Privy Council decision relied upon by some did not abrogate this rule.
  • The court held, on the facts, that lane C–C1 was not a public highway but a village pathway used only by a few residents; nevertheless the plaintiff had suffered special damage (peculiar difficulty in using the right of way) and therefore could maintain the suit for removal of the obstruction.
  • Where a prohibitory injunction has been obtained earlier but a fresh obstruction is subsequently constructed, that fresh act gives rise to a new cause of action and a fresh suit (i.e., execution of the earlier decree is not always the sole remedy). The court invoked Order 21 Rule 32(5), CPC and cited authorities to this effect.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff is entitled to proceed with a suit for mandatory injunction to remove the new obstruction; the defendants' plea that the remedy was merely execution of the prior decree and that Section 91 barred the suit was rejected on the present facts.
  • The court's decision reaffirms the established rule requiring proof of special damage where an individual sues in respect of obstruction to a public highway, while recognizing that village pathways not dedicated to the public at large may be treated differently on the facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle beyond this reaffirmation and application to the facts before it.

This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond what the opinion states.

    Nimmagadda Ramabrahma Sastri (Died) And Others v. Nimmagadda Lakshminarasimham .

    Judgement

    There was a prolonged argument in this Second Appeal over a small dispute between brothers who live in a village and who have been fighting since 1927 about their rights over a blind lane, marked C and Cl in the plan filed with the plaint. The houses of the brothers face this lane at one end.

    In O. S. No. 287 of 1927 the plaintiff obtained a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the passage of the plaintiff, his men, carts and cattle through the lane C C1 to his house, the gate of whose compound is A-4 in the plan and a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the obstruction put up by them preventing the passage of the plaintiff, his men, cattle and carts through the gate A-4 into the lane (C C1).

    The finding of the Courts in that case was, and in the present case is that the lane is a village pathway though it is only the residents of the few houses that open into the lane C C1 that have any need to use the pathway. According to the plaintiff, defendant I recently constructed the pials C-2 and C-3 in front of his house encroaching upon the lane C C1 obstructing the free passage of bullock carts through the lane C C1 to the plaintiffs house.

    The defendants plea was that the pials had been in existence for a long time and were recently repaired and improved and that even if there was an encroachment on a portion of the lane, the plaintiff did not suffer any special injury thereby. The defendants also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable for want of sanction of the Advocate General under Sec. 91, Civil P. C. and also because the remedy of the plaintiff was by way of execution of the decree in O. S. No. 287 of 1927.

    The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the lane was a public highway, that the plaintiffs complaint was that the defendants action constituted a public nuisance, that there was no proof of special damage to the plaintiff and that the suit was unsustainable in view of S. 91, Civil P. C. The lower Appellate Court found that the construction of the pials was recent, that the pials encroached upon the lane and rendered it difficult for double bullock carts to turn into the compound of the plaintiffs house.

    Following the decision of the Madras High Court in - Murugesa Mudali v. Arunagiri Mudali, 1950-2 Mad LJ 770 : (AIR 1951 Mad 498) (A), the lower appellate Court found that the infringement of the right of way of the residents over the suit lane could be prevented at the instance of the villagers affected without proof of special damage and without complying with S. 91 Civil P. C.

    2. Sri K. B. Krishna Murthy contended that the decision of the lower Appellate Court was erroneous and that 1950-2 Mad LJ 770 : (AIR 1951 Mad 498) (A), - Subbamma v. Narayana Murti, 1949-1 Mad LJ 956 : (AIR 1949 Mad 634) (B), and - Munusami v. Kuppuswami, ILR (1939) Mad 870 : (AIR 1939 Mad 691) (C), all of them being decisions of single Judges, were wrongly given. He argued that the lane was a highway, that the fact that it was situated in a village did not make it any the less a highway, that there was no special damage to the plaintiff caused by the pials erected by the defendants and that the suit was unsustainable. Reference was made to the decisions of the several High Courts in support of his contention.

    3. The questions that call lor an answer are whether the act complained of is a public nuisance and if it falls under the former category, whether the plaintiff has suffered such damage as entitles him to sue without sanction under S. 91, Civil P. C.

    Section 91, to quote its heading, deals with "suits relating to public matters", that is to say, suits brought to vindicate a public right. An obstruction to a public thoroughfare or public street by a construction raised on any part of it is a public nuisance. The fact that the encroachment still leaves a width equal to the narrowest portion of the road or street as in the present case, does not make it any the less a public nuisance.

    If the lane in question is a highway as contended by the appellant, the act of the defendants in encroaching upon the lane by constructing pials over it would be a public nuisance and the only question then would be whether the plaintiff has proved special damage, that is to say, damage beyond what is suffered by him in common with other persons affected by the nuisance.

    4. n - Manzur Hasan v.- Muhammad Zaman, ILR 47 All 151 : (AIR 1925 P. C. 36) (D), decided in 1924 the Judicial Committee held that in India there is right for any community to conduct a religious procession through a public street so as not to interfere with the ordinary use of the street by the public and a civil suit lies for a declaration of such right against those interfering with its exercise.

    This decision of the Judicial Committee was interpreted by Wadsworth J. in 1939-1 Mad LJ 392: (AIR 1939 Mad 691) (C), as establishing that the rule requiring proof of special damage where a member of the public sues for removal of an obstruction to a public way does not apply to India and that the earlier decisions of the Indian High Courts to the contrary were not good law.

    A similar opinion was expressed by Jack, J., though obiter, in - Mandakinee Debee v. Basantkumaree Debi, ILR 60 Cal 1003 : (AIR 1933 Cal 884) (E) and by the Chief Justice and Din Mohammad, J., in - Municipal Committee Delhi v. Mohammed Ibrahim, ILR 16 Lah 517 : (AIR 1935 Lah 196) (F). Horwill, J., in Appayya v. Narasimhulu 1938 Mad WN 262 : (AIR 1938 Mad 338) (G) following the earlier Madras decisions decided that unless special damage was proved the only manner in which a common nuisance could be abated was by a suit under S. 91, Civil P. C.

    Wadsworth, J., observed that Horwill, J., had not noticed the decision of the Judicial Committee or of the other cases cited above. In - Bhuloganatham Pillai v. Rajagopala Pillai, AIR 1941 Mad 669 (H), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Leach, C.J., and Somayya, J.) without overruling Wadsworth, J., assumed or impliedly decided that special damage was necessary to entitle a person to sue in respect of a public nuisance without conforming to S. 91, Civil P. C. and directed an amendment of the plaint so as to include a plea of special damage. In 1949-1 Mad LJ 56 : (AIR 1949 Mad 634) (B), Satyanarayana Bao J., followed the decision of Wadsworth, J., and the Calcutta and Lahore cases cited above and dissented from - Surendra Kumar v. District Board of Nadia, ILR (1942) 1 Cal 533 : (AIR 1942 Cal 360) (I), and - Bihuti Narayan Singh v. Mahadev Asram, ILR 19 Pat 208 : (AIR 1940 Pat 449) (J). Satyanarayana Rao, J., held that it was open to an individual member of the public to maintain a suit for removal of obstruction to a public highway which constituted a public nuisance without proof of special damage and without the sanction of the Advocate General under S. 91, Civil P. C.

    Relying on the observations of Wilson, J., in - Chunilal v. Ramkrishen Sabu, ILR 15 Cal 460 (FB) (K), the learned Judge was further of the opinion that a village pathway cannot be treated and raised to the dignity of a public highway, that an obstruction to such a pathway was not a public nuisance, and that it was open to some of the residents of the village to sue on behalf of themselves and the other villagers with the permission of the Court under O. 1 R. 8, Civil P. C., even though no special damage has been caused.

    Reference was also made to several decisions of the Patna High Court, four of them being those of Wort J. Raghavarao, J., in 1950-2 Mad LJ 770 : (AIR 1951 Mad 498) (A) followed the opinion of Satyanarayana Rao, J., and decided that infringement of the rights of the respondents of a village in respect of a public street did not constitute a public nuisance and could be sued upon by any member of the public who suffers from the wrong complained of without the sanction of the Advocate-General under S. 91, Civil P. C. or the permission of the Court under O. 1 R. 8, Civil P. C.

    5. I do not propose to refer individually to the several decisions of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts which were cited by the appellants learned Advocate. The discussion has, to some extent, been obscured by a classification of roadways or pathways into urban and rural, private, quasi-public and public, and by treating village roads and pathways as standing on a separate footing from roads and streets in urban areas and by assuming that there may be more easy civil remedies with respect to infringement of rights in respect of village roads than in respect of highways.

    A road is either public or private. A road or a street whose user is limited to the inhabitants of a particular village or people who visit them on business or otherwise is not a public road. A public highway is dedicated not to a limited section of the public but for all subjects, that is to say, the public at large. A road running through a village is in one sense a village road but it may nevertheless be a highway if it has been dedicated to the public at large as in the case of trunk roads.

    I am humbly of the opinion that apart from S. 91, Civil P. C. and in conformity with its provisions, no action can be maintained by an individual against another for obstruction to a public highway without proof of special damage. This rule is founded on adequate reasons of public policy that a man who may have committed some public injury shall not be harassed by innumerable actions by persons who have not sustained any damage or injury peculiar to themselves. It had been enforced by Indian Courts as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience till 1924 and in my judgment, has not been abrogated by the decision of the Privy Council in ILR 47 All 151 : (AIR 1925 PC 36) (D).

    The ratio decidendi of the case before the Judicial Committee as well as of the cases in - Baslingappa v. Dharmappa, ILR 34 Bom 571 (L) and - Velan Pakkiri v. Subbayan, ILR 42 Mad 271 : (AIR 1919 Mad 674) (FB) (M), was that the defendants, the members of a particular section of the community had no right to obstruct the legitimate user of a public street or road by the members of another section of the community and that such obstruction which aimed at preventing only a particular class of persons from using the highway in a particular manner legitimately open to them, did not amount to a public nuisance, that is to say, to a wrong which caused damage, annoyance or injury to the public at large.

    The Judicial Committee approved of the Madras cases which had applied the rule of special damage where the obstruction on the highway amounted to a public nuisance. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of B. K. Mukerjea and Sen, JJ., in ILR (1942) 1 Cal 533 : (AIR 1942 Cal 360) (I), which considers the earlier decisions on the question. See also ILR 19 Pat 208 : (AIR 1940 Pat 449) (J).

    6. In the present case the lane, C-C1 is, as already stated, a short and blind lane on which abut a few houses not more than three, on which the plaintiffs house is the last. The house of the defendants is next to the plaintiffs and the two houses form a rectangular block. The obstruction by the construction of a pial on the lane in front of the defendants house interferes with the free passage of double bullock carts through the lane into the compound of the plaintiffs house.

    It might be possible the bulls are unyoked and the cart is drawn by men carefully and with mathematecial precision, to lead the cart into the compound of the plaintiffs house. To compel the plaintiff to do so would be putting him to trouble and risk and is an injury which is special to the plaintiff, not shared by the other owners of houses abutting on the lane.

    Special damage does not mean serious damage in the sense of irreparable loss but damage affecting the plaintiff individually or peculiar to the plaintiff or damage beyond what is suffered by him in common with the owners of other houses opening into the lane. Regard being had to the peculiar situation of the plaintiffs house at the end of the land and at right angles to the house of the defendants, the extreme difficulty if not impossibility of taking bullock carts into the plaintiffs compound by reason of the encroachment and construction of pials by the defendant constitutes special damage.

    I am also of the opinion that the lane is not a public highway but serves as a passage only for the residents of the few houses opening into the lane, C-C1, and the obstruction caused by the defendants is not a public nuisance within the meaning of S. 91, Civil P. C. See - Mt. Ramkali v. Munnala, ILR (1939) All 754 : (AIR 1939 All 586) (N). - Dalgobinda v. Khatu Mahatha, AIR 1948 Pat 183 (O), - Dashrathi Mahto v. Narain Mahto, AIR 1941 Pat 249 (P).

    The public in general do not use the lane as a pathway but only the residents of a small portion of the village of whom plaintiff is one. The lane has all along been used not only by pedestrians but as a passage for bullock carts of the residents of the locality.

    7. The last objection that the suit is not maintainable and that the remedy of the plaintiff was only by way of execution was not raised in the grounds of appeal land is also untenable. The obstruction to the right of way complained of in the present suit was not in existence at the time of the prior suit O. S. No. 287 of 1927 and was a new one which was put up shortly before the present suit.

    Order 21 Rule 32 (5), Civil P. C. is applicable to the execution of decrees for mandatory injunctions. If, as in the present case, a prohibitory injunction is disobeyed by a fresh construction causing obstruction to a right of way a fresh cause of action arises for which the remedy has to be sought in a suit for removal of the obstruction. See - Chinnabba Chetty v. Chengalaroaya Chetti, ILR (1950) Mad 764 : (AIR 1950 Mad 237) (Q), - Hemchandra v. Nurendra Nath, ILR 61 Cal 148 : (AIR 1934 Cal 402) (R), - Angad v. Madho Ram, ILR (1938) All 673 : (AIR 1938 All 416) (S).

    I do not consider it necessary to refer to the earlier cases. The present suit is one for a mandatory injunction for removal of the new obstruction and is therefore maintainable.

    8. For these reasons, I hold that the Second Appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs. No leave.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Nimmagadda Ramabrahma Sastri (Died) And Others v. Nimmagadda Lakshminarasimham .
    (Jan 18, 1956)