Fazl Ali, C.J:— These appeals arise out of orders passed by the executing court and will be decided by one common judgment as the points involved are the same. The appeals arise in the following circumstances.
2. There appears to have been a serious dispute regarding the management of Ziarat Makhdoom Sahib between the Intizamia Committee, the Khadims and other persons. A suit was filed which was ultimately referred to arbitration and an award was given by Mr. M.M Siddiqui the then Financial Commr. A decree was passed by the trial court laying down a detailed scheme for the management of the Ziarat which was passed on 3-10-1964 and thereafter various parties to the decree filed five execution applications before the executing court for implementing the provisions of the award of Mr. Siddiqui as embodied in the decree, and the only objection pressed before us was that the decree laying down a scheme for management of the Ziarat was purely declaratory in nature and was not executable. The executing court of the District Judge Srinagar after considering the arguments of the objectors rejected their contention and held that the decree was executable and the parties concerned were directed to perform their respective functions. Against this order of the District Judge dated 20-6-1967 the present appeals have been filed before us. While the appeals were pending in this court, some of the respondents namely, Pir Mohd. Shah, Syed-ud-Din and G.M Shah died on various dates and the respondents took a preliminary objection that since the application for substitution of the heirs was made beyond time, the appeals had abated. The appellants however disputed the date of death of the respondents (deceased) and pleaded their knowledge within the period of limitation. In view of the serious controversy between the parties on this point we remitted the matter to the District Judge for an inquiry as to the date of death of the deceased respondents and the date when the appellants acquired knowledge of the same. The finding has now been received from the District Judge which is against the appellants.
3. The appellants have not contested the finding of the learned District Judge on facts but have argued in their defence that there can be no abatement for two reasons. In the first place it is contended that the deceased respondents were not necessary parties as no relief was sought against them and therefore, the appeals could not abate as a whole. Secondly, it was contended that in view of the provisions of O. 22. R. 12 of the CPC the abatement proceedings did not apply to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings and therefore, the question of abatement did not arise.
4. As regards the first contention we find that it is absolutely untenable because from the terms of the decree it appears that the deceased respondents were persons who were assigned important duties which had to be performed as a part of the obligations imposed upon them by virtue of the decree. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the deceased respondents were merely pro forma parties so as to prevent the appeals from abating as a whole.
5. The second contention poses a serious question of law on which there appears to be some conflict of authorities. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that an appeal against an order in execution proceedings being a continuation of the execution proceedings is clearly governed by O. 22, R. 12 of the CPC which runs thus—
“Nothing in Rr. 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.”
6. It is thus contended that the provision relating to abatement of suits does not apply by virtue of this provision to execution proceedings as also to execution appeals, which are a continuation of the said proceedings. In support of this view the learned counsel has relied on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Hakim Syed Muhammad Taki v. Rai Fateh Bahadur Singh*, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB), where the majority opinion was that Rr. 3, 4, and 8 did not apply to appeals against orders passed in the course of proceedings in execution of a decree or an order. This decision is presumably in favour of the proposition adumbrated by the learned counsel for the appellants. The counsel for the respondents, however, submitted that the Patna authority, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB), (supra) has been expressly dissented from by the other High Courts in India and should not be followed by us. A large number of authorities have been cited before us and a perusal of them no doubt shows that the concensus of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the provisions of O. 22, R. 12 do not apply to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings and that O. 22, R. 12 is limited to execution proceedings alone. Before, however, analysing the authorities cited before us, we would like to approach the subject from its various comprehensive aspects.
7. To begin with a close analysis of the scheme of the Civil P.C would clearly reveal that the statute has provided separate provisions for the procedure to be adopted in the disposal of suits, miscellaneous proceedings, execution proceedings and appeals. It would be seen that Orders 1 to 20 of the First Schedule deal exhaustively with the procedure to be adopted in deciding civil suits. O. 21 Rr. 10 to 103 deal with the various stages of the execution proceedings. O. 21-A deals with insolvent judgment debtors. Section 96 deals with the forum of appeals against decrees and O. 43, R. 1 deals with the forum of appeals against orders. Sections 96 to 108 deal with the forum of appeals and the conditions governing the decision of such appeals and O. 43, R. 1 deals with the nature of appeals from orders in contradistinction to decrees. Orders 41 and 42 deal with the procedure of the hearing of appeals. It will be seen that O. 43, R. 1, which deals with appeals against orders applies the procedure applicable to appeals against decrees by virtue of R. 2, of O. 43.
8. Apart from this there are incidental provisions which apply to suits essentially and which have been expressly or impliedly made applicable to appeals, for instance provisions regarding pauperism, substitution of deceased parties, appointment of the guardians of minor parties and so on. The legislature has taken care to define the powers to be exercised by the original and the appellate courts and wherever it intended to apply the incidental provisions mentioned above, a specific provision therefore has been made. For instance O. 33 deals with the procedure to be adopted in suits by paupers. This provision is specially applied to appeals also by virtue of O. 44, Rr. 1 and 2. Similarly take the case of provisions for substitution which find place in O. 22, Rr. 1 to 12. Rr. 3, 4 and 5 deal with the question of abatement it would be seen that these provisions are made expressly applicable to appeals by virtue of R. 11 which runs thus:—
“In the application of this order to appeals, so far as may be, the word ‘Plaintiff shall be held to include an appellant, the word ‘defendant’ a respondent, and the word ‘suit’ an appeal.”
9. A perusal of this provision would reveal that the statute while applying the provisions of O. 22, Rr. 1 to 10 has not deliberately excluded the provisions of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 so far as appeals are concerned but has only indicated the change in the nomenclature of the plaintiff and the defendant R. 12 which expressly excludes the application of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 to execution proceedings does not say that these provisions would also be excluded from appeals against orders passed in execution of a decree, nor does R. 11, which precedes R. 12 make any mention that while the provisions of this order Would be applicable to these appeals certain other provisions would be exempted. On the other hand the words in the application of this order clearly indicate that all the provisions of O. 22 have been applied to appeals without any exemption or limitation. The only distinction made is in the nomenclature of the parties, that is to say the plaintiff has been held to include the appellant and the defendant a respondent and suit an appeal. Indeed if the legislature intended that Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 should not be made applicable to appeals, then this fact should have been indicated in O. 22, R. 11. This however, is not the position. In other words from the fact that the exemption contained in R. 12 of O. 22 has been deliberately omitted by the legislature in O. 22, R. 11, the only irresistible Inference would be that the legislature did not intend to exclude the operation of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings. There appears to be a very good and sound reason for this deliberate omission. It is well settled that successive execution applications are permissible under law so long as they are not barred by the provisions of Article 181 of the Limitation Act and in such applications the question of abatement does not arise it is for this reason that, the legislature thought it necessary to exclude the provisions relating to abatement namely those contained Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 to execution proceedings only. The same principle, however, cannot apply to appeals from orders passed in execution proceedings, because when an execution appeal is dismissed, another appeal on the same subject-matter cannot be filed or entertained. On a parity of reasoning therefore, while the execution appeals abate against some deceased respondents who are necessary parties the appeals would abate as whole in order to avoid the existence of two inconsistent orders: one of the trial court having become final by abatement and the other passed by the appellate court in the appeal it seems to us that the legislature had a good reason for deliberately not excluding the provisions of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 to appeals in execution of decrees.
10. Another serious question that has to be determined is as to whether or not appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings can be said to be proceedings in execution of a decree or order. In our opinion the answer must be in the negative, because the appellate court in appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings merely examines the legality and propriety of the orders passed; it does not execute the decree, and is concerned only with the correctness of the orders passed by the executing court. The appeal is in one sense a continuation of the execution proceedings but merely by virtue of this fact the appeal cannot be treated to be an execution proceeding properly so-called as contemplated by O. 22, R. 12. In our opinion, therefore, R. 12 of O. 22 applies only to execution proceedings properly so-called and would not apply to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings. It is the executing court alone which executes the decree and not the appellate court.
11. We are fortified in our view by a large number of authorities of almost all the High Courts in India including the Madras, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Orissa, Allahabad, Calcutta, and Lahore High Courts. We would now take up the decision relied on by the appellant reported in, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB) (supra). In that case one of the Judges P.R Das, J. dissented from the majority view and clearly held that the provisions of O. 22, R. 12 do not apply to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings. In this connection the learned Judge observed as follows:—
“In my judgment O. 22, R. 12 does no more than recognize the well established principle that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits does not apply to applications for execution of the decree.
There is no room for the application of the procedure as to abatement to execution proceedings, since it is clear both from the Code itself and from the provisions of Limitation Act that the legislature contemplated that there might be a succession of applications for execution When a decree-holder dies, the execution proceedings come to an end; but it is open to the legal representative of the decree-holder to commence fresh execution proceedings against the judgment-debtor. So also a decree-holder has the right to proceed against the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor in a fresh execution proceeding. But there is no provision for a succession of appeals in execution matters.
In my judgment, as no distinction has been drawn in the Code between appeals in execution matters and appeals generally, and as the provision of R. 11 is without qualification or exception, Rr. 3, 4 and 8 apply to appeals in execution matters; and I must answer the reference accordingly.”
12. The majority judgment observed as follows:—
“In my opinion, R. 11 is controlled by R. 12 and Rr. 3, 4 and 8 do not apply to appeals against orders passed in the course of proceedings in execution of a decree or order. An appeal is merely a continuation of the proceedings in the trial court, and the limitation imposed by R. 12 must in my opinion, apply not only to proceedings in the trial court but also to the continuation of the same proceedings in the appellate court.”
“It is true that no distinction is made in the Civil P.C between appeals against orders passed in the course of execution proceedings and other appeals, but the effect of R. 12, which comes immediately after R. 11, is to exclude the operation of R. 11 from appeals against orders passed in proceedings relating to execution of a decree or order.”
13. It appears that the later authorities of the various High Courts in India express dissent from the Patna view and adopt more or less the reasoning given by P.R Das, J. In his dissenting judgment in the Patna Case, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB) (supra).
14. Apart from this it seems to us that the force of the Patna authority is considerably weakened by two important circumstances. To begin with the majority view in the Patna case relied upon an earlier decision of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1923 Lah 560. This decision (which was a single Bench decision) was expressly dissented from by a Division Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1936 Lah 1022 and was overruled later by a Full Bench decision of the same Court in AIR 1947 Lah 13 where the Full Bench observed as follows:—
“It was held in Cheda Lal v. Aijaz Hussain, ILR 1937 Lah 80 : (AIR 1936 Lah 1022) by a Division Bench that appeals from orders in execution proceedings are not proceedings in execution within the meaning of R. 12 of O. 22 of the CPC and are, therefore, not excluded from the rules relating to abatement contained in that order. The case relied upon by Mr. Kapur, namely, AIR 1923 Lah 560 and ILR 9 Pat 372 : (AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB)) were examined and expressly dissented from by the Division Bench which decided Cheda Lal v. Aijaz Hussain. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken in the latter case”.
15. Secondly the majority judgment of the Patna High Court was greatly influenced by the fact that no decided case taking a contrary view was brought to their Lordships' notice. In this connection their Lordships in the Patna case observed as follows:—
“No decided case has been brought to my notice, and I am not aware of any in which it has been held that Rr. 3 and 4 and O. 22 apply to appeals in proceedings relating to execution of a decree”.
16. On the other hand it would appear that there was an earlier Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Baksh Ali v. Sarat Chandra, AIR 1919 Cal 1053 which had clearly taken the view that the provisions of Rules 3, 4 and 8 applied to appeals against orders passed in execution proceedings and the exemption contained in Order 22, Rule 12 did not apply to such appeals. For these reasons, therefore, the force of the Patna authority has been considerably weakened and we are not in a position to agree with the view taken by the majority judgment of the Patna High Court.
17. In Changa Mal v. Chaubey Ram, Dulare Lal, AIR 1933 All 388 which also is a Division Bench decision, Sulaiman, C.J (who was one of the most eminent Judges that our country has produced) took the view that Order 22, Rule 12 did not apply to appeals and in arriving at this conclusion the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:—
“Fresh applications for execution, unless the principle of res judicata applies, can be made from time to time so long as limitation has not expired. It is therefore, obvious why there need be no abatement of the suit in an execution proceeding. But an appeal stands on quite a different footing. Successive appeals cannot be filed if one has already abated. It seems to us that Rule 12 does not contemplate that if an appeal has been preferred from an order in execution, then also Rr. 3, 4 & 8 would never apply. If this were the correct view, the result would be that the death of the appellants or of the respondents would in no way result in the abatement of the appeal at all”.
18. To the same effect are the decisions in AIR 1941 Oudh 16; AIR 1950 EP 302; AIR 1960 Orissa 14; AIR 1955 Cal 281; AIR 1947 Bom 480; AIR 1956 Assam 9; AIR 1962 Andh Pra 308 and AIR 1932 Mad 574. Most of these decisions dissented from the solitary view expressed by the majority judgment in the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB) (Supra) and almost all these authorities have given some of the reasons which we have given above in holding that O. 22, R. 12 does not apply to appeals.
19. Lastly reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellants on a decision of the Supreme Court in State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 in support of the proposition that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 4 do not apply to execution appeals. On a perusal of this decision it appears that it does not support the appellants at all. What their Lordships decided in that case was that O. 22, Rule 4 did not provide for abatement of appeals against a co-respondent of the deceased respondents and there could be no question of abatement of appeals against them. In this connection their Lordships observed as follows:—
“It is not disputed that in view of O. 22, R. 4 of the CPC. the appeal abated against Labhu Ram deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent”.
20. It would thus appear that their Lordships laid down, on an interpretation of O. 22, R. 4, that the Code did not provide for abatement of an appeal against the heir of a deceased co-respondent whether it is an appeal against a decree passed in a suit or an appeal in execution proceedings. Their Lordships have not at all decided the question as to the applicability of Order 22, Rule 12 which did not arise in that case. This decision therefore, does not help the appellants.
21. On a consideration, therefore, of the circumstances the scheme of the Civil P.C the nature of the provisions of Order 22 and the authorities discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 12 do not apply to appeals and therefore, the provisions regarding the abatement contained in Rules 3, 4 and 8 fully apply to appeals. In this view of the matter it is manifest that the appeals having abated as a whole because the deceased respondents were necessary parties, the appeals should be dismissed on this ground alone. Even assuming, however, that the appeals do not abate, we do not find any force in the appeals even on merits. The only point canvassed before us was that the decree passed by the trial court was not executable as it was purely of a declaratory nature. The question as to whether or not a decree is executable or in executable would naturally depend upon the terms and recitals of the decree itself. In the present case it would appear that under the award which was embodied in the decree each party was asked to fulfil certain obligations and to do certain acts in order to manage the Ziarat. It is therefore, obvious that where any of the parties commit a breach of the terms of the decree the decree-holder can seek relief by getting the decree enforced through execution. The terms of the decree appear to us to be of a clearly executable nature and are not at all declaratory in character. We, therefore, hold that the District Judge was right in deciding that the decree was an executable one and therefore, the objection of the appellant was rightly overruled. For these reasons we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed with costs.
22. J.N Bhat, J.:— I agree.
23. Appeals dismissed.