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Summary of Opinion — Sarjoo Prosad, C.J. (with Ram Labhaya, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order in an execution proceeding enforcing a final decree for partition (decree dated 21-2-1949 in Title Suit No. 36 of 1947). The appeal was preferred by three persons — Balaram Karmakar, Baljuri Das and Fakir Chand Das — who were not parties to the original partition suit but had been impleaded as judgment-debtors (nos. 14–16) in the execution case.

During the pendency of the appeal, Balaram Karmakar died on 13-1-1954. No substitution was immediately effected; an application to set aside abatement and substitute his widow and minor son was filed on 11-3-1955. The decree-holder had sought execution against these judgment-debtors on the basis that they were tenants-at-will inducted on the land by an original judgment-debtor, Lakshmi Narayan Rewani, and thus liable to eviction under the partition decree.

The executing Subordinate Judge had directed execution to proceed against these persons on findings that they were tenants-at-will and hence liable to be evicted; the present appeal challenges those directions and also involves an application by a person called Satya Ranjan De to be added as a party to the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether substitution of heirs is required in an appeal arising from an execution proceeding — i.e., whether Order XXII, Rule 12 CPC (and the exclusion of Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII) applies to appeals from execution proceedings or only to proceedings before the executing court.
  2. Whether the decree for partition can be executed against persons who were not parties to the original suit but who are alleged to be tenants-at-will inducted by a judgment-debtor — in other words, whether such persons are bound by the decree as representatives of the judgment-debtor and can be evicted in execution without a separate suit to determine title.
  3. Whether Satya Ranjan De, who had been described in the execution petition as a judgment-debtor but who admittedly purchased portions of land from the decree-holder after the final decree, can be joined as a party to this appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • No substitution was necessary under Order XXII, Rule 12 CPC; Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII did not apply to execution proceedings or to appeals arising from execution proceedings.
  • The appellants were not parties to the original partition suit; therefore the decree could not be executed against them and any question as to their title should have been decided in a separate suit.
  • Specific to judgment-debtor 12 (Balaram Karmakar), receipts allegedly showed payment for 1947 and thus the Subordinate Judge's finding that tenancy commenced in 1948 was incorrect.

Decree-holder's Arguments

  • The judgment-debtors were tenants-at-will inducted by the original judgment-debtor Lakshmi Narayan and therefore were liable to eviction in execution of the partition decree.
  • These persons were representatives of the original judgment-debtor within the meaning of Section 47 CPC and, as such, the decree could be executed against them without a separate suit.
  • Under Order XXI, Rule 35 CPC the decree-holder was entitled to obtain possession of the land allotted by the decree, if necessary by removing any person bound by the decree refusing to vacate.
  • Evidence was placed to show that at least some of the judgment-debtors had been in occupation for several years (five or six) before the partition suit, and the judgment-debtors failed to rebut that evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ajudhia Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13 (FB) Authority supporting the view that Order XXII, Rule 12 does not apply to appeals arising out of execution proceedings (i.e., that R.12 excludes Rrs.3,4,8 only from executing-court proceedings and not from appellate proceedings). The court cited this decision among others to support its conclusion that substitution is required in appeals from execution proceedings and that O.22 R.12's exclusion is confined to proceedings before the executing court.
Trimbak Narhar v. Gopal Narayan, AIR 1947 Bom 480 Same principle as above regarding the limited scope of O.22 R.12. Used as supporting authority for the court's view that substitution in appeals from execution cases is necessary as provided under O.22 Rrs.3,4,8.
Rajah of Kalahasti v. Jagannadha Rayanimgar, AIR 1932 Mad 574 Same principle regarding non-application of O.22 R.12 to appellate proceedings in execution matters. Relied upon to reinforce the majority line of authority that substitution must be made in appeals arising from execution proceedings.
Chhanga Mal v. Ram Dularey Lal, AIR 1933 All 388 Same principle on interpretation and application of O.22 R.12. Counted among cases supporting the court's conclusion on substitution in execution appeals.
Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB) Full Bench decision taking an opposite view (majority) that R.12 should apply to appeals arising from execution proceedings. The court acknowledged this contrary Full Bench authority but declined to follow it, aligning instead with the majority of other High Court decisions which require substitution in execution appeals.
Niranjan Mukherjee v. Sm. Soudamini Dasi, AIR 1926 Cal 714 (FB) Principle that a person allotted land by a partition decree does not take it subject to a permanent lease granted by former co-owners without his concurrence; after partition a co-sharer not recognising the tenancy is entitled to possession free from that encumbrance. The court applied this principle to hold that the decree-holder could obtain possession free from tenancies inducted by a co-sharer and hence that persons inducted as tenants-at-will by a co-sharer may be evicted in execution of the partition decree.
Jaminikanto Narendralal v. Bonomali Dey, AIR 1948 Cal 172 In execution proceedings, when a decree for ejectment is passed against a tenant, his sub-tenant is bound by that decree and is the tenant's representative (derivative interest). Used to support the proposition that persons deriving interest from a judgment-debtor occupy the position of "representatives" under Section 47 CPC and can be affected by execution proceedings.
Ajodheya Lal v. Brij Kishore, AIR 1940 Pat 615 Supports the concept that persons deriving interest from a judgment-debtor are representatives for the purposes of execution under Section 47 CPC. Relied upon to reinforce the court's conclusion that such persons may be treated as representatives and subjected to execution of the decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main parts: (A) substitution following the death of an appellant during the appeal; and (B) the merits of executing the partition decree against the persons impleaded as judgment-debtors.

A. Substitution in Appeals from Execution Proceedings

  • The appellants initially contended that Order XXII, Rule 12 CPC excluded Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII from application to execution proceedings and, by implication according to appellants, to appeals arising out of execution proceedings.
  • The court reviewed the consensus of decisions from several High Courts and concluded that although Rule 12 excludes Rules 3, 4 and 8 from proceedings before the executing court, Rule 12 does not apply to appeals arising from execution cases. Appeals are governed by Order XLI CPC and substitution of heirs in such appeals is necessary as under the ordinary rules governing appeals.
  • The court cited multiple authorities (Ajudhia Pershad; Trimbak Narhar; Rajah of Kalahasti; Chhanga Mal) supporting this interpretation and noted there was a contrary Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court (Mohammad Taqi). The court elected to follow the majority approach of the other High Courts and rejected the contrary Full Bench view.
  • Applying this legal position to the facts, the court examined the substitution application filed by the widow and minor son of the deceased appellant Balaram Karmakar. The widow stated she first learned of the appeal on 4-3-1955 and filed for substitution and setting aside abatement promptly on 10-3-1955. The decree-holder's counter-affidavit alleging earlier knowledge by the widow was held to be speculative and insufficient to discredit her statement.
  • On this basis the court directed that the abatement be set aside and that the heirs be substituted and brought on the record.

B. Merits — Execution Against Non-parties Alleged to Be Tenants-at-Will

  • The Subordinate Judge had found that the judgment-debtors were tenants-at-will inducted by Lakshmi Narayan (an original judgment-debtor and co-sharer) and therefore liable to eviction in execution of the partition decree. Specifically, for Balaram Karmakar the lower court found tenancy commenced in 1948; for the other two judgment-debtors the lower court found no evidence was produced to rebut the decree-holder's assertion of tenancy.
  • The appellants argued that because they were not parties to the partition suit, the decree could not be executed against them and the question of title required a separate suit. The decree-holder countered that these persons were representatives/derivative occupants and thus bound by the decree under Section 47 CPC and execution provisions (citing Order XXI, Rule 35 CPC).
  • The court analysed authoritative precedents (notably Niranjan Mukherjee and Jaminikanto Narendralal, Ajodheya Lal) to formulate the legal principle: where a co-sharer inducts persons as tenants without the concurrence of other co-sharers, after partition the co-sharer who did not recognise the tenancy is entitled to possession free from that encumbrance. Further, persons deriving their interest from a judgment-debtor (tenants, sub-tenants) may be treated as representatives under Section 47 CPC for execution purposes.
  • On the facts, the decree-holder had given evidence that two of the judgment-debtors had been in occupation for five or six years before the partition suit and that all were inducted by Lakshmi Narayan without the concurrence of other co-sharers. The judgment-debtors failed to adduce evidence to rebut these assertions. Although there was an issue whether Balaram's tenancy began in 1947 rather than 1948, the court concluded that even if the tenancy began in 1947 it did not alter the legal position: as tenants-at-will under Lakshmi Narayan they remained liable to eviction in execution of the partition decree.
  • Given the unrebutted evidence accepted by the Subordinate Judge and the applicable legal principles, the court saw no reason to interfere with the lower court's findings and allowed execution to proceed against these judgment-debtors as representatives/tenants-at-will.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • The application to set aside abatement and substitute the heirs of the deceased appellant Balaram Karmakar is allowed; the abatement is set aside and the widow and minor son are to be brought on the record.
  • The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge directing execution to proceed against the judgment-debtors (Balaram Karmakar, Baljuri Das and Fakir Chand Das) is sustained; the appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • The application of Satya Ranjan De to be added as a party to the appeal is rejected; on the admitted facts he purchased portions of land from the decree-holder after the final decree and is not properly a judgment-debtor affected by the directions under appeal. No costs are ordered in respect of that application.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the executing court's order to evict the judgment-debtors and deliver possession under the partition decree stands — the persons impleaded as judgment-debtors, being tenants inducted by a co-sharer and unrebutted in evidence, are properly treated as representatives and can be subjected to execution. Substitution rules apply to appeals from execution proceedings; the court aligned with the majority of High Court decisions on this procedural point. The opinion does not announce that it is establishing a new, novel precedent beyond applying and aligning prior authorities; it follows and applies existing authorities to the facts before it.

Order: "Order accordingly." (Ram Labhaya, J. agreed.)

    Balaram Karmakar And Others v. Subodh Chandra Bose .

    Sarjoo Prosad, C.J:— This appeal is directed against an order in an execution case in relation to a final decree for partition. The decree in question was passed on 21-2-1949 in Title Suit No. 36 of 1947. This appeal has been preferred by three persons, Balaram Karmakar, Baljuri Das and Fakir Chand Das. They were not parties to the partition suit itself but they were impleaded as judgment-debtors in the execution case, they being judgment-debtors Nos. 14 to 16 respectively.

    2. The decree-holder alleged in the execution petition that these judgment-debtors were tenants-at-will under the original judgment-debtor Sri Lakshmi Narayan Rewani and as such, they were liable to be evicted in execution of the decree for partition, passed in favour of the decree-holder. Balaram Karmakar died during the pendency of the appeal on 13-1-1954 and no attempt was made to substitute the heirs of Balaram until on 11-3-1955 when an application for substitution after setting aside abatement was filed on behalf of his widow and minor son. The learned counsel for the appellants submits in the first place that no substitution is necessary as under O. 22, R. 12 of the CPC. Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of that Order had no application to proceedings in execution of a decree or even to appeals arising out of such cases.

    3. The consensus of opinion on this point however appears to be in favour of the view that although R. 12 applies to execution proceedings and as such the operation of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 is excluded from those proceedings; yet so far as appeals arising out of execution cases are concerned, R. 12 of O. 22 has not application. Such appeals are governed by O. 41 of the CPC and substitution in place of the heirs of deceased appellants or respondents in such appeals is as much necessary as in the case of any other appeal preferred under O. 41.

    4. Accordingly R. 12 of O. 22 refers only to proceedings before the executing court and not to those in the appellate court which hears appeals from orders in execution proceedings: See — ‘Ajudhia Pershad v. Sham Sunder’, AIR 1947 Lah 13 (FB) (A); — “Trimbak Narhar v. Gopal Narayan’, AIR 1947 Bom 480 (B); — ‘Rajah of Kalahasti v. Jagannadha Rayanimgar’, AIR 1932 Mad 574 (C) and — Chhanga Mal v. Ram Dularey Lal’, AIR 1933 All 388 (D). There is however a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in — ‘Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh’, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (FB) (E), where the majority of the Judges has taken an opposite view.

    5. Das, J. the dissenting Judge in that case was also inclined to think that R. 12 of O. 22 did not apply to appeals arising out of execution cases and as such substitution was necessary in those appeals. As at present advised, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the various other High Courts in India that substitution in appeals arising out of execution cases is necessary as provided under O. 22, Rr. 3, 4 and 8 and that their exclusion under R. 12 is confined only to orders in execution proceedings passed in the original stage.

    6. An application however has been made for substitution of the heirs. The heirs are the widow of the deceased Balaram Karmakar and his minor son who is under the guardianship of the widow. It is stated by them that they were not aware of this appeal preferred by Balaram and the other decree-holders and that they came to know of it for the first time on 4-3-1955 through one Digendra Chandra Banenee and as soon as they came to know of it, they filed this application for substitution and setting aside the abatement on 10-3-1955. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-decree-holder alleging that the widow Was, aware of this appeal much earlier.

    7. It is stated that Digendra Chandra Banerjee was the ‘tadbirkarak’ acting on behalf of the judgment-debtors in the execution case and this ‘tadbirkarak’ had informed the lady about the execution case as also about the pendency of the appeal. The allegations in the counter-affidavit are largely of a speculative character and we see no adequate reason to disbelieve the statement made by the widow in the application for substitution and setting aside abatement. It is not improbable that Digendra Chandra Banerjee, if he was at all a ‘Tadbirkarak’ acting on behalf of the judgment-debtors, or whosoever that person may be, may not have considered it necessary in view of the divergence of opinion on the point to make any substitution in the appeal. In the circumstances, we direct that the abatement may be set aside and the heirs who have applied to be substituted may be brought on the record.

    8. The next question then is whether on merits the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge directing execution to proceed against these judgment-debtors can be sustained. I have already pointed out that the case of the decree-holder was that these judgment-debtors were tenants-at-will inducted on the land by one of the judgment-debtors, Lakshmi Narayan. In regard to judgment-debtor 12, Balaram Karmakar, the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is that he was in occupation from 1948 when his tenancy started and he therefore came to occupy the land during the pendency of the suit in which the decree in question was passed as a tenant-at-will.

    9. As to the other two judgment-debtors 14 and 15, the learned Subordinate Judge observed that these judgment-debtors had given no evidence to rebut the evidence of the decree-holder alleging that they were also tenants-at-will under judgment-debtor 2. On these findings, he held that all these persons being merely tenants-at-will of one of the judgment-debtors who was actually a party to the suit, were liable to be evicted at the instance of the decree-holder who had never recognised them as tenants under him.

    10. The finding on the point is assailed by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is pointed out that these appellants not being parties to the suit itself, the decree could not be executed against them and the question of their title had to be decided in a separate suit. On behalf of the decree-holder, it is argued that the appellants being merely representatives of the judgment-debtor, he was entitled to execute the decree as against them, and under O. 21, R. 35 of the CPC he was entitled to get possession of the land allotted to him if necessary by removing any person bound by the decree who refused to vacate, the property.

    11. The decree-holder submits that as the representative of the original judgment-debtor Lakshmi Narayan, these defendants were also bound by the decree and were liable to be removed in giving possession of the land to the decree-holder. A number of cases have been cited by the learned counsel for the decree-holder in support of his contention. In — ‘Niranjan Mukherjee v. Sm. Soudamini Dasi’, AIR 1926 Cal 714 (FB) (F), which is a Full Bench decision of five Judges it was held that a person to whom a parcel of land has been allotted by a decree for partition of a Civil Court does not take it subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence when the land was the joint property of all the co-sharers.

    12. In other words, after the partition the co-sharer who did not recognise the tenancy was entitled to possession of the land free from the encumbrance created by his other co-sharers. The principle therefore can very well be applied to execution cases as well. Here, it appears that these judgment-debtors had been inducted on the land by one of the cosharers who was a party to the partition decree, the appellant-decree-holder not having recognised the tenancy of these judgment-debtors. As such, the appellant was entitled to get khas possession of the land ignoring the existence of any such tenancy.

    13. The principle indicated above finds support from another decision in — ‘Jaminikanto Narendralal v. Bonomali Dey,’ AIR 1948 Cal 172 (G), where in an execution proceeding, it was held that when a decree for ejectment is passed against a tenant his sub-tenant would be bound by that decree and would be his representative as being a person who has derived his interest from the tenant; and also from a decision in — ‘Ajodheya Lal v. Brij Kishore’, AIR 1940 Pat 615 (H).

    14. In all these cases, it was held that such a person occupies merely the position of a representative of the judgment-debtor, as contemplated by the term used in Section 47 of the CPC. The word ‘representative’ in that section, is not limited merely to the legal representatives but includes persons on whom interest has devolved by assignment, transfer or otherwise. As such, a matter relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arising between the decree-holder and his representative had to be decided by the executing court.

    15. The contention therefore that the execution should proceed against these judgment-debtors as representatives of an original judgment-debtor is well founded. In regard to judgment-debtor 12, Balram Karmakar, it is urged that the receipts in fact show payment of receipt for 1947 and the finding of the court below that his tenancy commenced from 1948 is therefore misconceived. There is undoubtedly force in this contention. The statement of the judgment-debtor that his tenancy started from the time he first paid rent has to be considered in the light of the receipts and the years to which the payments relate.

    16. That being so, it must be assumed that the tenancy of this judgment-debtor began sometime in 1947. Even then, it would not affect the legal position because as a tenant-at-will under judgment-debtor Lakshmi Narayan, this judgment-debtor would be liable to be evicted in execution of the final decree in favour of the decree-holder. In regard to the other two appellants also, the case of the decree-holder is that these appellants had been inducted by Lakshmi Narayan as tenants-at-will and were therefore bound by the decree.

    17. In the objection petition, these appellants took the plea that they had been in possession of the disputed plot for more than sixty years in their own right; it was therefore necessary to implead them as parties to the suit in order to eject these appellants. This was controverted by the decree-holder Page: 11in a counter-objection filed by him where he reiterated that these judgment-debtors were tenants inducted on the land by Lakshmi Narayan Rewani, only some years ago without the consent and concurrence of the petitioner-decree-holder or any other co-sharer and their assertion to the contrary was false and incorrect.

    18. The decree-holder further gave evidence in support of that case and he stated that Baljuri and Fakira, the judgment-debtors were there from some five or six years before the partition suit as tenants of Lakshmi Narayan. The judgment-debtors did not adduce any evidence to the contrary and the learned Subordinate Judge was therefore justified in accepting the evidence of the decree-holder on that point. He held that the co-sharer who inducted these judgment-debtors as tenants did so without the consent or concurrence of any other co-sharer and as such these defendants were liable to be evicted as after the passing of the decree they, were in the position of trespassers.

    19. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge on the materials placed before him. It was open to the judgment-debtors to give evidence in proof of their assertion that they were not tenants-at-will but holding the land in their own right as such, but they never did so; and the evidence of the decree-holder on the point was unrebutted. The appeal therefore is without any substance and must be dismissed with costs.

    20. There is an application on behalf of a person called Satya Ranjan De to be added as party to the appeal preferred by the other judgment-debtor-appellants. This person was impleaded as a party to the execution case being placed in the category of judgment-debtors, his serial number being 16. Admittedly, as stated in the execution petition itself, this person had purchased some portions of land from the decree-holder himself after the passing of the final decree.

    21. I fail to understand how this person can be joined as party to this appeal. His position on the face of the execution petition itself is that of a decree-holder, because he is a purchaser of a portion of the land from the decree-holder himself. His description as judgment-debtor in the execution case is obviously a misnomer and cannot affect the legal position. We are therefore not inclined to entertain his application for being added as party to the appeal. The directions of the learned Subordinate Judge in the order under appeal have to be confined to the judgment-debtors as such, and do not obviously affect the interest of this individual who is not a judgment-debtor on the lace of the execution case itself and on the facts admitted by the parties. The application therefore is rejected but in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs of this application.

    Ram Labhaya, J.:— I agree.

    22. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Balaram Karmakar And Others v. Subodh Chandra Bose .
    (Jun 20, 1955)