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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • B.L Mandhana, for Appellant;
  • Akhil Simlot with U.S Tanwar, for Respondents
Judges
  • Mr. Prashant Kumar Agarwal
Acts
  • Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • B.L Mandhana, for Appellant;
  • Akhil Simlot with U.S Tanwar, for Respondents
Judges
  • Mr. Prashant Kumar Agarwal
Acts
  • Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Prashant Kumar Agarwal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit on 10.8.1985 seeking cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 4.7.1985. The plaint alleged that the land transferred by that sale deed was ancestral property: the deceased husband of the plaintiff had a 1/2 share and the defendant-respondent Shri Bhola held the remaining 1/2; after the husband's death the plaintiff asserted her right to 1/2 share. The sale deed was executed by defendant-respondent Bhola in favour of other defendants.

The defendants filed a joint written statement denying that the land was ancestral and asserting that the deceased son had no right in the land during the life of Bhola; they further asserted that Bhola had an absolute right to sell. The defendants also specifically objected to the civil court's jurisdiction, submitting that the suit sought declaration of khatedari (revenue) rights and therefore was barred by Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (the Act), and that such relief must be sought in a revenue court. The written statement also averred that the plaintiff had already filed a revenue suit in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Fatehpur (District Sikar).

The trial court framed issues including issue No. 4 on jurisdiction, decided that preliminary issue in favour of lack of civil jurisdiction (finding the suit was effectively for declaration of khatedari rights), and returned the plaint for presentation in a competent revenue court by order dated 9.9.1993. The plaintiff appealed to this Court by way of a Civil Misc. Appeal challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for cancellation of the sale deed, or whether jurisdiction was barred under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act because the suit in substance sought a declaration of khatedari (revenue) rights.
  2. Whether jurisdiction must be determined from the formal averments and relief claimed in the plaint alone (as contended by the appellant) or from the pith and substance of the plaint (as contended by the respondents).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Jurisdiction of a court is to be decided on the averments made in the plaint and the relief claimed; the written statement cannot be relied upon to defeat jurisdiction.
  • The only relief claimed in the plaint was cancellation of the sale deed dated 4.7.1985, which is a relief within the Civil Court's competence.
  • The trial court erred in looking beyond the plaint and basing its order on matters that should not be introduced into the plaint; the court overlooked the case actually pleaded and treated pleadings as they "ought to have been made."
  • Reliance was placed on Ghani Mohammed v. Meeru Khan (1954 RLW 169) and Kailash Chand v. Bajrang Lal (AIR 1997 (Raj.) 205 : RLW 1997 (1) Raj. 550) in support of these propositions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Jurisdiction should be determined by the substance (pith and substance) of the plaint and not merely its formal frame.
  • Although cancellation was the pleaded relief, cancellation cannot be granted unless the court first declares that the plaintiff (or her deceased husband) in fact has a 1/2 share; that is a declaration of khatedari right which, because the land is agricultural, can be given only by a competent revenue court under the Act.
  • Section 207 of the Act therefore bars the Civil Court from taking cognizance of the suit.
  • Reliance was placed on Mohanlal v. Ratna (AIR 1971 (Raj.) 164) in support of this position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghani Mohammed v. Meeru Khan, 1954 RLW 169 Relied upon by the appellant for the proposition that jurisdiction is to be determined by the averments in the plaint and the relief claimed; written statement should not be used to deny jurisdiction. The Court recorded that the appellant relied on this authority but did not adopt it as dispositive; instead the Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance to the pleadings and found revenue jurisdiction applicable.
Kailash Chand v. Bajrang Lal, AIR 1997 (Raj.) 205 : RLW 1997 (1) Raj. 550 Relied upon by the appellant in support of the contention that the civil court's jurisdiction is to be determined from the plaint and claimed relief. The Court noted reliance on this case by the appellant but, after analysing pleadings under the pith and substance doctrine, concluded the suit was one for declaration of khatedari rights and hence for revenue jurisdiction.
Mohanlal v. Ratna, AIR 1971 (Raj.) 164 Relied upon by the respondents for the proposition that the substance of the plaint, not its form, determines whether a civil or revenue court has jurisdiction. The Court accepted the approach that substance governs and, applying that principle to the facts and pleadings, held the suit was in substance for a declaration of khatedari rights within the exclusive domain of the revenue court under the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first identified the core factual dispute: whether the land was ancestral such that the deceased husband of the plaintiff (and after his death the plaintiff) had a 1/2 share and was a co-tenant along with defendant Shri Bhola. The Court observed the admitted fact that the disputed land was recorded in the revenue records in the name of Shri Bhola.

The Court applied the established doctrinal principle that the pith and substance (the true nature) of the plaint, and not merely the form of the relief claimed, determines the real nature of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. On careful consideration of the plaint and applying that doctrine, the Court concluded that although the plaintiff formally sought cancellation of the sale deed, the relief in substance amounted to a claim for declaration that the deceased husband (and now the plaintiff) is a khatedar/tenant or co-tenant of a 1/2 share in the land.

The Court reasoned that cancellation of the sale deed could not be granted unless a clear finding were made that the plaintiff was a co-tenant entitled to a share; the Civil Court could not make that initial declaration because the plaintiff (and her husband) were not recorded khatedars. Consequently, the Court held that a revenue court must first decide the claim under Section 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act to declare khatedari rights. Section 207 of the Act bars civil courts from taking cognizance of suits specified in the third schedule; Item 5 of the third schedule expressly includes a suit for declaration under Section 88.

The Court further reasoned that a revenue court, if it declares the plaintiff to be a khatedar or co-tenant for any share, can grant consequential relief that the sale deed is void or ineffective to the extent of the plaintiff's share, making a separate civil suit for cancellation unnecessary. The Court contrasted two recognized situations for cancellation suits: (a) where a party to a deed or one bound by it must obtain cancellation before establishing title, and (b) where a third party to a deed need not first get the deed cancelled to establish title. In the facts of this case, the dispute about khatedari required initial adjudication by the revenue court.

Having applied these legal principles to the pleadings and admitted facts, the Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction and that the plaint should be returned for presentation in the competent revenue court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned order of the trial court was affirmed and the Civil Misc. Appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because, in substance, the suit sought a declaration of khatedari rights over agricultural land which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a revenue court under Section 207 and Section 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaint was correctly returned by the Civil Court for presentation in the competent revenue court; the Civil Misc. Appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
  • Scope of relief: The Court explained that a revenue court that declares khatedari/co-tenant rights can grant consequential relief rendering the sale deed void or ineffective to the extent of the declared share, obviating the need for a separate civil suit for cancellation in such circumstances.
  • No new precedent was purportedly created; the decision applies established principles (pith and substance, Sections 88 and 207 of the Act) to the facts and confirms the trial court's jurisdictional ruling.

Show full summary ...

    Rukmani v. Bhola & Ors.

    Prashant Kumar Agarwal, J.:— The plaintiff-appellant has preferred this Civil Misc. Appeal against the order dated 9.9.1993 passed by Civil Judge, Sikar in Regular Civil Suit No. 42/93 (93/87) whereby the plaint was returned for presenting it in a competent Court by the reason that it was found that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant.

    2. The brief relevant facts for the disposal of this Civil Misc. Appeal are that the appellant filed a suit on 10.8.85 for cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 4.7.85 with the averment that the agriculture land, regarding which the above sale deed has been executed by the respondent-defendant-Bhola in favour of remaining defendants, being ancestral land, the deceased-husband of the appellant had ½ share whereas his father defendant-respondent-Bhola has remaining ½ share and after the death of her husband, the appellant has ½ share in it and the defendant-respondent-Bhola was not entitled to sale whole of the land in dispute. It was also averred in the plaint that the sale deed dated 4.7.85 is in-operative and in-effective against the rights of the plaintiff-appellant and, therefore, it is liable to be cancelled by the Court below. The defendant-respondents jointly filed written statement and it was averred by them that the land in dispute is not an ancestral land and in the life time of defendant-Shri Bhola his deceased son Shri Jeevan Ram has no right in it and, therefore, the plaintiff also has no right in it and the defendant-Shri Bhola has an absolute right to sale the disputed land. A specific objection regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court was also taken to the effect that the suit is barred by Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) as infact the relief claimed by the plaintiff-appellant is regarding declaration of her khatedari rights in the disputed land and such relief can be obtained only through a revenue suit filed in a competent revenue court under the provisions of the Act. It was also averred in the written statement that on the same facts, the plaintiff has already filed a revenue suit in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Fatehpur (District Sikar). On the basis of the pleadings, necessary issues were framed by the Court below and issue No. 4 was to the effect that whether that Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Both the parties adduced evidence and the learned Court below decided issue No. 4 regarding jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and after a thoughtful consideration it came to a conclusion that looking to the facts of case and the relief claimed by the plaintiff, infact, the suit is for declaration of khatedari rights in the land in dispute and such relief can be given only by a competent revenue Court under the provisions of the Act. With this finding, the plaint was returned to the plaintiff-appellant for presenting it in a competent revenue court. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff is before this Court by way of this Civil Misc. Appeal.

    3. Assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is a well settled legal position that jurisdiction of a Court is to be decided upon the averments made in the plaint and the relief claimed by the plaintiff and for that purpose written statement filed by the defendant cannot be taken into consideration and in the present case as the only relief claimed by the plaintiff-appellant was for the cancellation of sale deed dated 4.7.85 and such relief can be given only by a Civil Court and, therefore, the Court below was competent to entertain and decide the present suit but the learned Court below without considering the matter in a right perspective wrongly came to a conclusion that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Learned counsel further submitted that it is equally well settled that one should not introduce anything into the plaint which may not really be found there or which may be foreign to its main purpose. It was also submitted that the learned Court below overlooked the case actually pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant but based his order on the pleadings that ought to have been made by him. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the cases of Ghani Mohammed v. Meeru Khan reported in 1954 RLW 169 and Kailash Chand v. Bajrang Lal Reported in AIR 1997 (Raj.) 205 : RLW 1997 (1) Raj. 550.

    5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supporting the impugned order, submitted that the well settled legal position is that substance of the plaint and not the frame of the suit is to be considered for arriving at a conclusion whether civil or revenue court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. In the present case, although the relief claimed was for cancellation of the sale deed but that relief cannot be given unless the Court first comes to a conclusion that the plaintiff or her husband infact has ½ share in the land in dispute and for that purpose declaration to that affect has to be given and as the land in dispute is an agricultural land, that declaration can be granted only by a competent revenue Court under the provisions of the Act. According to learned counsel, therefore, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred under Section 207 of the Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents, relied upon the case of Mohanlal… v. Ratna…. reported AIR 1971 (Raj.), 164.

    6. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also gone through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law cited on behalf of the parties.

    7. In the present case, the relief claimed in the suit is that the sale deed dated 4.7.85 may be cancelled on the ground that the land which has been transferred by way of this sale deed is an ancestral property, and therefore, the deceased-husband of the plaintiff, who was son of defendant-respondent-Shri Bhola had ½ share in it and the remaining ½ share belongs to Shri Bhola and after the death of her husband, the plaintiff has ½ share in it. It is an admitted fact that the whole of the disputed land is recorded in revenue record only in the name of defendant-Shri Bhola. It has been averred by the defendants that the land in dispute is not an ancestral property and, therefore, son of defendant had no right in the life time of his father and, therefore, plaintiff also has no right in it. Thus, the main question to be determined is that whether the land in dispute is an ancestral property and, therefore, the deceased-husband of the plaintiff had ½ share in it and was co-tenant alongwith his father the defendant-Shri Bhola. It is well established that in order to determine the true nature of the relief claimed in a suit, the pith and substance and not the form in which the relief may be couched has to be considered. On considering the pleadings in the plaint in the present case carefully and applying the doctrine of pith and substance of the pleadings, I have come to the conclusion that the relief claimed in the suit really amounted to a relief for a declaration that the deceased-husband of the plaintiff and after his death the plaintiff has ½ share and is co-tenant in the land in question. The suit in the present case cannot be said to be one for mere avoidance of the sale deed dated 4.7.85 In my view unless a clear finding is given that the plaintiff is a co-tenant and has ½ share in the land in question, the sale deed in question cannot be cancelled. It cannot be said in the present case that unless the sale deed is cancelled, the revenue court cannot grant a declaration as to the share of the plaintiff in the land in question. As the plaintiff or her deceased-husband is not a recorded khatedar of the land in dispute, in my view, unless a revenue Court by way of a revenue suit declares under Section 88 of the Act that the deceased-husband of the plaintiff and after his death the plaintiff has ½ share or any other share and thus, is a co-tenant alongwith defendant-Shri Bhola in the land in dispute, the Civil Court cannot cancel the sale deed only on the prayer made by the plaintiff-appellant. It is well settled that a suit for cancellation of a deed affecting certain property can be brought by a person who cannot establish his title to the property so long as such deed is not cancelled. That would be so, in the case of a person, who was a party to the deed or was otherwise bound by it in law. It is also well settled that it is not necessary for a third party to a deed i.e which is neither a party thereto nor is bound by it, to bring a suit for cancellation of the deed in question. In such a case it is not necessary for the plaintiff to get the sale deed cancelled in order to be entitled to the relief claimed by him. In the present case also, the plaintiff or her husband is not a party to the sale deed in question, therefore, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to get it cancelled as she or her husband is not bound by it. If the substance of the pleadings and relief claimed by the plaintiff-appellant is considered in a right perspective, it is clear that the plaintiff by means of the present suit is seeking a relief of declaration in her favour that she is khatedar tenant/co-tenant of ½ share of the land in dispute alongwith the defendant. The land in dispute being an agricultural land, such declaration can be given only by a revenue court under the provisions of the Act. It cannot be disputed that a suit for declaration regarding an agricultural land is to be filed under Section 88 of the Act if a person claims to be tenant or a co-tenant in the agricultural land in dispute. Section 207 of the Act provides that all suits of the nature specified in the third schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court and no other court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit. In Item 5 of the third schedule a suit for declaration under Section 88 of the Act has been mentioned. I am also of the view that if the revenue court passes a decree for declaration in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that she is khatedar-tenant or co-tenant of ½ or any other share in the land in dispute, that court is equally competent to grant a consequential relief to the effect that the sale deed in question is void and ineffective to the extent of share of the plaintiff and it is not essential for the plaintiff to file a separate suit thereafter in a civil Court for getting the sale deed cancelled. I am also of the view that if the revenue court declares the plaintiff-co-tenant of the land in dispute, it is not necessary for her to get the sale deed cancelled as that would be automatically void and ineffective to the extent of share of the plaintiff.

    8. The impugned order very well reveals that the learned Court below, after a thoughtful consideration looking to the facts of the case and prevailing legal position, has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the civil Court has no jurisdiction.

    9. Consequently, by affirming the impugned order, the appeal being devoid of any merit is, hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Rukmani v. Bhola & Ors.
    (Dec 20, 2011)