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  • Section 38 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act No. 3 of 1955
  • section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926
  • Article 91 of the Limitation Act (1908),
  • Section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 38 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act No. 3 of 1955
  • section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926
  • Article 91 of the Limitation Act (1908),
  • Section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act.
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for cancellation of a document dated 1-6-1958 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant Ratna. The land in dispute is agricultural land in village Khamnor, District Udaipur, alleged to have been originally owned and possessed by one Damodar. The plaintiff and the defendant are described as the sole survivors of Damodar and the plaintiff pleads that each is entitled to one-half share. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant obtained the 1-6-1958 document by practising fraud so that the plaintiff acknowledged only a one-third share.

The plaintiff states he discovered the fraud on 20-6-1961 and instituted the present suit in the Court of Munsiff Nathdwara on 3-7-1961 seeking cancellation of the 1-6-1958 document. The defendant denied fraud, maintained the plaintiff had only a one-third share, and pleaded that the suit was time-barred.

At trial the plaintiff obtained a decree. On appeal, the Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur allowed the defendant's appeal by judgment dated 19-11-1963 and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding (inter alia) that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 91 of the Limitation Act (1908) and that no fraud had been proved. The appellate court later acknowledged that it had mistakenly treated the plaint as filed on 4-7-1961 rather than 3-7-1961.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit for cancellation of the 1-6-1958 document was barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the plaintiff had established that the document was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation by the defendant.
  3. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or whether the suit properly lay before a Revenue Court (i.e., a question of maintainability/jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The document dated 1-6-1958 was obtained by the defendant through misrepresentation and fraud; accordingly it should be cancelled and the plaintiff's true share (one-half) declared.
  • Counsel for the appellant also argued that the suit was correctly instituted in the Civil Court and relied upon two Allahabad High Court single-judge decisions (AIR 1929 All 845 and AIR 1952 All 922) in support of Civil Court jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendant)

  • The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff actually had only a one-third share in the land and denied practising any fraud on the plaintiff.
  • The defendant contended that the suit was barred by limitation; the first appellate court initially held this ground, although the appellate court's calculation of the plaint filing date was shown to be erroneous.
  • The respondent (through counsel) conceded that, on the correct pleading date (3-7-1961), the suit was within limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mukhtar Ahmad v. Lachman Prasad, AIR 1929 All 845 The case construed section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and held that section 181 provides for precedence of a genuine distraint for rent and does not afford relief to a third person against a fraudulent distraint collusively brought about by a Zamindar. The court distinguished this decision on its facts and confined the observation that "where fraud or collusion is alleged ... the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certainly arises" to the facts of that case; it held that the observation could not be pressed into service universally to sustain Civil Court jurisdiction in all fraud allegations.
Zabar Singh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1952 All 922 The decision held that, in that case, the relief claimed (cancellation of a sub-lease) could only be granted by the Civil Court and that the Revenue Court, in the absence of cancellation by a proper court, could not ignore the effect of a deed and grant a declaration of rights. The court treated this authority as distinguishable: in the present case Section 38 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act No. 3 of 1955 (and Item 5, Third Schedule) permits a person claiming to be a tenant to sue for a declaration of tenancy or share, so the present suit properly lay before a Revenue Court rather than a Civil Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in two main strands: limitation and jurisdiction/maintainability.

Limitation:

  • The first appellate court erred in treating the plaint as filed on 4-7-1961 (a date appearing on the Stamp Report) when the plaint had in fact been filed on 3-7-1961. The court accepted counsel's concession that on the correct filing date the suit was within limitation.
  • Accordingly, the court set aside the finding of the first appellate court that the suit was time-barred and held the suit to have been filed within limitation.

Jurisdiction and Nature of Relief:

  • The court entertained a doubt whether the suit, though framed as one for cancellation of a document, was in substance a suit for declaration of the parties' shares in agricultural tenancy rights. The court recalled the doctrine of pith and substance: to determine the true nature of a suit, the substance of the relief sought must be considered rather than the form.
  • Issue No. 1 in the pleadings directly framed the question whether the plaintiff had one-half share in the tenancy rights; hence the relief sought effectively amounted to a declaration of the plaintiff's share rather than mere avoidance of the document.
  • The court examined the two Allahabad decisions relied upon by the appellant and found them distinguishable on their facts and limited in the scope of the observations relied on.
  • Crucially, the court referred to Section 38 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act No. 3 of 1955 read with Item 5 of the Third Schedule, which (on the court's reading) permits a person claiming to be a tenant to sue for a declaration that he is a tenant or a declaration of his share in a joint tenancy. On that statutory basis the court concluded the present suit lay before the Revenue Court.
  • The court rejected the appellant's submission that the defendant's failure to raise the jurisdictional objection earlier amounted to waiver. The court held that lack of inherent jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and such an objection can be taken at any stage; moreover, deciding the jurisdictional question did not require further factual investigation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The plaint is to be returned to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation to the proper Court (the Revenue Court). The parties are to bear their own costs. Leave to appeal to the Division Bench is refused.

Implications: The direct consequences are:

  • The court corrected the earlier appellate finding on limitation and held the suit was filed within limitation.
  • The court held that, on the pith and substance of the relief sought and on the statutory scheme of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Section 38 and Item 5, Third Schedule), the suit should have been instituted in a Revenue Court; it therefore directed that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court.
  • The court refused to treat the absence of an earlier jurisdictional objection as a waiver because the objection went to inherent jurisdiction, which can be raised at any stage.
  • No broader precedent-creating pronouncement beyond these determinations is recorded in the opinion; the decision's immediate practical effect is to transfer the matter to the competent Revenue forum and to set aside the prior judgments of the Civil Courts below.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion.

    Mohanlal v. Ratna .

    1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for cancellation of a document dated 1-6-1958 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant Ratna.

    2. The plaintiff's case as set out in the plaint is that the land in question which is a piece of agricultural land situated in village Khamnor, District Udaipur was originally owned and possessed by one Damodar and the plaintiff and the defendant are the sole survivors of Damodar and consequently each of them is entitled to one-half share in the land in question. It is alleged by the plaintiff that by practising fraud on him the defendant managed to get the document in question executed by the plaintiff wherein the plaintiff was made to acknowledge that he had only one-third share in this land.

    3. The plaintiff goes on to state that he discovered this fraud when he had a talk with some relations and friends of his on 20-6-1961 at the fair of Partap Jayanti in Khamnor. Having discovered this fraud he filed the present suit in the Court of Munsiff Nathdwara on 3-7-1961 praying that the document dated 1-6-1958 wherein the plaintiff had acknowledged that he had only one-third share in the land in dispute and that two-thirds belonged to the defendant, be cancelled.

    4. The suit was resisted by the defendant, who pleaded inter alia that the plaintiff had only one-third share in the land in dispute and that he had not practised any fraud on the plaintiff for getting the document dated 1-6-1958 executed by him. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by time. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence produced by the parties decreed the plaintiff's suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court the defendant filed appeal which was allowed by the Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur by his judgment dated 19-11-63 and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. Learned Civil Judge held that the version of the plaintiff that he happened to discover the fraud on 20-6-1961 is incorrect, and that the limitation for the suit commenced from the date of the execution of the document, that is, 1st June, 1958. He also held that the suit was governed by Article 91 of the Limitation Act (1908), which was then in force and since the suit has been filed on 4-7-1961, a day after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of the execution of the document, the suit was barred by limitation. He further held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that any fraud was practised upon him for getting the suit document executed by him. In this view of the matter, be set aside the judgment and decree by the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

    5. On the question of limitation I must say that the learned first appellate court did not care to look at the plaint at all. It has observed that the plaint was submitted on 4-7-1961, and counting the period of limitation on that basis it held the suit out of limitation as the last date for presentation of the plaint was 3-7-1961 on which the Civil Courts reopened after summer vacation. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the plaint was filed on 3-7-61 it was clearly within limitation. It is indeed sad to observe that the learned first appellate court held the suit to be time-barred on account of its wrong assumption that the suit was filed on 4-7-1961, which was the date of report submitted by the Stamp Reporter.

    6. It is conceded on behalf of the respondent that in this view of the matter, the finding of the learned Civil Judge that the suit is time-barred should be set aside. Accordingly, I do so and Hold that the suit was filed within limitation.

    7. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that it has been clearly established on the record that the defendant, managed to obtain the document in question from the plaintiff by misrepresentation and by practising fraud upon him. After having heard learned counsel for the parties on the question of fraud, I entertained a doubt regarding maintainability of the suit in the Civil Court as it appeared to me that the suit was virtually for declaration of the shares of the parties in an agricultural land in respect of which the parties are tenants. I, therefore adjourned the case for enabling the learned counsel for the parties to make their submission on this point.

    8. After having heard learned counsel for the parties to-day on the question of jurisdiction I have come to the conclusion that the present suit lies in a Revenue Court and should not have been filed in a Civil Court. Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to two single Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court: Mukhtar Ahmad…Defendant Applicant; v. Lachman Prasad…Plaintiff Opposite Party., AIR 1929 All 845 (1) and Zabar Singh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1952 All 922 in support of his contention that the suit was correctly instituted in the Civil Court. I have looked into these decisions and am of opinion that they are distinguishable.

    9. In AIR 1929 All 845 (1) the plaintiff held a decree against a tenant of the defendant. What the tenant did was to get up a fictitious distraint by the defendant Zamindar and thereby fraudulently prevented the plaintiff from recovering the amount of his decree by selling the tenant's crop. The Subordinate Courts found that really no rent was due from the tenant to the defendant. In these circumstances, it was held that section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 merely provides for the precedence of a rent claimed where distraint is genuine and does not afford any relief to a third person against a fraudulent distraint collusively brought about by a Zamindar against his tenants.

    10. It was, therefore, held that the suit could not be brought under Section 181 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The observation made by the learned Judge in that case that “where fraud or collusion is alleged and one person has derived benefit and another has lost by such fraud or collusion, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certainly arises,” must be confined to the facts of that case, and cannot be pressed into service in all circumstances where fraud or collusion is alleged.

    11. In the other case AIR 1952 All 922 the suit was instituted by the plaintiff-tenant of an agricultural land for cancellation of a sub-lease in favour of the defendant on the allegation that it was voidable on the ground of fraud. It was held that the relief claimed in the suit could only be granted by the Civil Court and in the absence of the relief having been granted the Revenue Court could not grant any relief to the plaintiff.

    12. In the present case the relief claimed in the suit is that the document dated 1-6-1958 in which the plaintiff had acknowledged that he had only one third share may be cancelled, apparently on the ground that the plaintiff had in fact half the share in the land in question. Issue No. 1 framed in the case is, “whether the plaintiff had half share in the tenancy rights, in the land detailed in the schedule annexed to the plaint.” It is well established that in order to determine the true nature of the relief claimed in a suit, the pith and substance, and not the form in which the relief may be couched has to be considered. On considering the pleadings in the plaint in the present case carefully and applying the doctrine of pith and substance of the pleadings, I have come to the conclusion that the relief claimed in the suit really amounted to a relief for a declaration that the plaintiff had half share in the land in question. The suit in the present case cannot be said to be one for mere avoidance of the document.

    13. It may be noticed that according to the pleadings the document cannot be set aside, unless a clear finding is given on the first issue namely whether the plaintiff has half share in the land in question and not one-third as mentioned in the document itself. It cannot be said In the present case that unless the deed is cancelled the Revenue Court cannot give a declaration as to the extent of the share of the appellant in the land in question.

    14. In the Allahabad case : AIR 1952 All 922 referred to above it was observed that unless a proper court cancelled the deed the Revenue Court could not ignore its effect and could not give a declaration as to the right of the appellant.

    15. That situation, however, does not exist in the present ease. A reference to Section 38 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act No. 3 of 1955 read with Item 5. Third Schedule appended thereto would clearly show that any person claiming to be a tenant may sue for a declaration that he is a tenant or for declaration of his share In such joint tenancy, Consequently the present suit clearly lay before a Revenue Court, The plaintiff has expressly indicated in the plaint that he intended that the Court should grant a declaration that he has got half share in the land. In this view of the matter, the suit should have been filed in the Revenue Court.

    16. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the objection regarding jurisdiction was not taken up by the defendant at any stage of the litigation so far and therefore he must be deemed to have waived this objection. I am, however, unable to accede to this contention because the nature of the objection regarding jurisdiction in the present case goes to the very root of the matter and as I have held above there was lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Oval Court to try this suit, and grant appropriate relief on its basis. Such an objection, in my view, can be taken at any stage. Moreover, the decision of this question does not require any investigation into the facts.

    17. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the courts below, and hereby direct that the plaint shall be returned to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation to the proper Court. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own exists throughout.

    18. Learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to Division Bench. However I do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave. The prayer Is disallowed.

    19. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Mohanlal v. Ratna .
    (Aug 11, 1970)