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  • provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code
  • Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • provisions of Sub-section (5)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code
  • Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • provisions of Sub-section (5)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise from two criminal matters consolidated for judgment: Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986 and Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986. The sole controversy in both appeals is whether the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiate the trial in a summons case if the investigation is not concluded within six months from the date of arrest and no permission is obtained from the Court to extend the investigation.

In Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986, a case under Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Amar Singh on 25-9-1984; the investigation was not completed within six months. In Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986, a case under Section 304A IPC was registered against Baldev Singh on 1-1-1984; the prosecution also failed to complete the investigation or file a charge-sheet within six months and did not obtain any court order to extend the investigation.

At trial, after charges were framed and some evidence recorded, it was pointed out that the trial was vitiated under Section 167(5) CrPC. The trial Court acquitted the accused respondents relying on a single Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. J.S. Parwana v. State and a Delhi High Court decision in Raj Singh v. State. The State appealed against the order of acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiate the trial in a summons case if the investigation is not concluded within six months from the date of arrest of the accused and no permission is taken from the Court for extending the period of investigation.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. J.S. Parwana v. State, 1985 (2) Rec Cri R 59 Relied upon by the trial Court to support acquittal where investigation was not completed within six months (implying that non-compliance vitiated the trial). The present Division Bench held that the Single Bench decision in Dr. J.S. Parwana cannot be said to be good law and expressly overruled it.
Raj Singh v. State, 1984 (1) RCR 581 : (1985 Cri LJ NOC 41 (Delhi)) Relied upon by the trial Court alongside Dr. Parwana to justify acquittal for non-compliance with Section 167(5). The Division Bench noted that a later decision (State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh) had overruled the earlier Single Bench view relied upon by the trial Court; the Court treated the trial Court's reliance on this authority as misplaced in light of later authority.
Shiv Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1984 (1) RCR 581: (1985 Cri LJ NOC 41 Delhi) The earlier Single Bench Delhi High Court view which was subsequently overruled by a Division Bench (State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh). The Division Bench in State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh overruled this earlier Single Bench view; the present Court refers to that overruling and adopts the Division Bench view.
State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh, 1985 Crl. Law Journal 932 Held that evidence collected within six months after arrest could be used and that non-compliance with Section 167(5) would not vitiate the entire trial or render the entire evidence inadmissible. The present Court relied on and accepted the view in Jai Bhagwan Singh as the correct principle to be applied; it treated Jai Bhagwan Singh as overruling the earlier Single Bench view of the Delhi High Court.
Ravinder Pal Singh v. U. T. Chandigarh, 1987 (1) PLR 391 : (1986 Cri LJ 1371) A Single Bench decision of this Court dissenting from Dr. Parwana and relying on State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh's position. The present Division Bench noted this decision as supporting the Jai Bhagwan Singh view and as dissenting from Dr. Parwana; it viewed Ravinder Pal Singh as consistent with the correct approach.
Gange Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1986 (2) RCR 139 Held that a trial cannot be declared a nullity merely because the challan was put in Court after the expiry of six months in a case under Section 304A IPC. The present Court cited Gange Ram as taking a similar view to Jai Bhagwan Singh and treated it as supporting the proposition that non-compliance with Section 167(5) does not automatically vitiate the trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed Section 167(5) CrPC in its statutory context. It observed that Section 167(5) was introduced to provide procedure where investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours and to limit the time of investigation into petty offences triable as summons cases. The object, the Court stated, was to promote speedy trials and prompt administration of justice in petty offences.

The Court reasoned that although the Legislature barred continuation of investigation after six months unless the Magistrate (for special reasons and in the interest of justice) permits continuation, there is no textual indication that the investigation conducted within six months would be vitiated or that continuation beyond six months would vitiate the entire trial. The Court concluded that the correct consequence of non-compliance is that evidence collected after the six-month period would be rendered inadmissible, not evidence collected earlier.

The Court relied on the statutory mechanism that allows the Magistrate to extend the investigation period and the Sessions Judge to review such orders (sub-sections (5) and (6)), reading these provisions as evidencing a legislative balance between necessary extended investigations and unjustified delay. On that basis the Court held that violation of Section 167(5) would not, by itself, vitiate the entire trial.

The Court then reviewed precedent. It noted that a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh had held that evidence collected within six months could be used and that non-compliance would not vitiate the trial; that decision had overruled an earlier Single Bench view. The Court also noted Single Bench decisions of this Court (Ravinder Pal Singh and Gange Ram) adopting the Jai Bhagwan Singh approach. Having considered these authorities, the Court concluded that the Single Bench decision in Dr. J.S. Parwana (which had been relied upon by the trial Court) was not good law and overruled it.

Finally, applying these principles to the facts of the two appeals, the Court exercised judicial discretion: in Amar Singh's case (minor injuries and nominal damage of Rs.50; prolonged harassment of over four years) it declined to order a retrial; in Baldev Singh's case (rash and negligent driving causing one death) it ordered a retrial but directed that only evidence collected within six months from the date of arrest be used against the accused, and that the trial Court take into account the period of harassment in sentencing.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court concluded that non-compliance with Section 167(5) CrPC does not automatically vitiate the entire trial in a summons case; evidence collected after the six-month period is to be treated as inadmissible unless the statutory extension procedure has been followed. The Single Bench decision in Dr. J.S. Parwana is overruled.

Implications and direct effects:

  • Amar Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986): No further action was ordered; in view of the minor nature of the offence and the harassment suffered by the accused during the pendency of proceedings for over four years, the Court did not send the matter back for retrial.
  • Baldev Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986): The appeal is accepted; the case is remitted for retrial. The trial Court is directed to use only that evidence which was collected within six months from the date of arrest. The trial Court is also to take into account the period of harassment undergone by the accused while awarding sentence. Baldev Singh is directed to appear before the trial Court on 9-10-91 and furnish requisite bonds to its satisfaction.
  • Precedential effect: The Court's decision rejects the view that mere non-compliance with Section 167(5) mandates acquittal or nullity of the trial and clarifies admissibility of evidence collected within six months versus beyond six months; the Single Bench authority in Dr. J.S. Parwana was overruled.

    State Of Punjab v. Amar Singh .

    S. Sekhon, J.

    1. This judgment will also dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986.

    2. The sole controversy involved in Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986 and Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986 is whether the povisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiate the trial in a summons case if the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused and no permission is taken from the Court for extending the period of investigation.

    3. In Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986, a case under Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Amar Singh, respondent on 25-9-1984. Admittedly, the investigation of that case was not completed within a period of six months. Similarly, in Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986, a case under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Baldev Singh, accused-respondent on 1-1-1984. In this case also, the prosecution failed to file any charge-sheet or complete the investigation within a period of six months without obtaining any order from the Court.

    4. In both these appeals, after framing of the charge of the trial Court and recording the evidence of some witnesses, it was pointed out to the trial Court that the trial is vitiated under the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial Court acquitted the accused respondent by placing reliance on a single Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. J.S. Parwana v. State, 1985 (2) Rec Cri R 59 and of the Delhi High Court reported in Raj Singh v. State, 1984 (1) RCR 581 : (1985 Cri LJ NOC 41 (Delhi).

    5. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order of acquittal, the State has come up in appeal.

    6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. The provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as under: --

    167(5). Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.--

    If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfied the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary.

    This Section provides the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours of the arrest of the accused. There is no dispute that the above provisions have been added by the Legislature in the present Code of Criminal Procedure obviously to limit the time of investigation into petty offences under the Indian Penal Code which are triable as summons cases as per the. provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn implies that the speedy trial or prompt administration of justice was the main consideration behind the incorporation of these provisions. A bare glance through the above-referred provisions leaves no doubt that the Legislature in its wisdom has barred the continuation of the investigation after the expiry of period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused. There is no indication, direct or indirect therefrom that the investigation already conducted within the period of six months would also stand vitiated or that the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months in summons cases would vitiate the entire trial or result in acquittal of the accused. In other words, it can be well said that the evidence collected during the investigation beyond the period of six months would be rendered inadmissible by these provisions and not the evidence which was collected earlier by the investigation. Moreover, the Magistrate has been given the powers to extend the period of investigation under the circumstances of a particular case. Under Sub-section (6) of this Section, the Sessions Judge has been invested with the powers to review such order of the Magistrate. Thus, the perusal of the provisions of Sub-section (5) also provides an oblique indication that the Legislature have struck a balance between justifiable protracted investigation and the investigation unnecessarily delayed beyond a period of six months in summons cases. Consequently, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held that the violation of the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code would result in vitiating the entire trial.

    7. It appears that when the trial Court passed the impugned order of acquittal in both these cases, the judgment of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh, 1985 Crl. Law Journal 932 was not brought to its notice. In that case, the Division Bench had overruled the earlier view of the single Bench of Delhi High Court in Shiv Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration., 1984 (1) RCR 581: (1985 Cri LJ NOC 41 Delhi) relied upon by the trial Court by holding that the evidence collected within a span of six months after the arrest of the accused could be used against him and not the one collected thereafter and that the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code would not vitiate the entire trial or render the entire evidence inadmissible.

    8. The matter does not rest here as view of the single Bench of this Court in Dr. Parwana's case (supra) was also dissented upon in Ravinder Pal Singh v. U. T. Chandigarh, 1987 (1) PLR 391 : (1986 Cri LJ 1371) by a Single Bench of this Court. In that case, the decision of Delhi High Court in Jai Bhagwan Singh's case (supra) was relied upon. Again a Single Bench of this Court in Gange Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1986 (2) RCR 139 has taken similar view by holding that the trial cannot be declared as a nullity merely on the ground that the challan was put in the Court after the expiry of period of six months from the arrest of the accused in a case under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code.

    9. For the reasons recorded above, the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in Dr. J.S. Parwana's case (supra) cannot be said to be a good law and is hereby overruled.

    10. The question then arises whether under the particular circumstances of these cases, the matter be sent back to the trial Court for retrial. In this regard, it is noteworthy in the case of Amar Singh, which is a case under Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, only minor injuries are involved besides damage to the car of the complainant to the extent of Rs. 50/- only. In view of the minor nature of offence and factum that Amar Singh, accused-respondent has suffered harassment of the pendency of the investigation trial and appeal against him for a period of more than four years, it is not a fit case for sending back for fresh trial. Thus, no further action is called for in this appeal.

    11. The case of Baldev Singh, accused-respondent (in Criminal Appeal No. 75-DBA of 1986), stands on different feeting as due to his rash and negligent driving, one life was lost. Thus, this case is sent back for retrial with the direction that the trial court shall use only that evidence against the accused which was collected within six months from the date of his arrest. The trial Court shall also take into consideration while awarding sentence, the period of harassment which this accused has undergone during the pendency of this appeal before this Court. This appeal stands accepted. Baldev Singh, respondent is directed to appear before the trial Court on 9-10-91 and furnish requisite bonds to its satisfaction.

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    Comments

    State Of Punjab v. Amar Singh .
    (Sep 3, 1991)