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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1968 INSC 134
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 161, Indian Penal Code
  • S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947)
  • Section X of the Legal Judgment Excerpt (no specific act/article mentioned)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1968 INSC 134
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 161, Indian Penal Code
  • S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947)
  • Section X of the Legal Judgment Excerpt (no specific act/article mentioned)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An unmarried woman, Miss Eylene, gave birth to a child in July 1963. At her request, her uncle and aunt (Russel Nathaniel and his wife) arranged for Roshan Lal—who wished to adopt—to take the child on 25 August 1963. On the night of 29 August 1963, the appellant, Shiv Raj Singh, a police officer, visited the Nathans’ Delhi residence, accused them of disposing of an illegitimate child and demanded a bribe of Rs. 1,000. He accepted Rs. 90 immediately and coerced a written promise for Rs. 700 more, also taking Roshan Lal’s gold ring.

Alarmed, the family approached the Anti-Corruption Department. A trap was laid on 4 September 1963: marked currency notes (7 × Rs. 100) were handed to the appellant at N. K. Lal’s house and recovered from his trouser pocket by DSP Mukatdhari Singh.

The Special Judge, Delhi, convicted the appellant under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench, Delhi) affirmed the conviction and sentence (except the fine). The present judgment resolves the appellant’s further challenge before the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sanction granted under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was valid and sufficient.
  2. Whether demanding and receiving money to refrain from an “imaginary” prosecution constitutes an offence under section 161 IPC and/or section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  3. Whether the sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment was excessive.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The sanction order was invalid because all relevant papers were allegedly not placed before the sanctioning authority (DIG M. P. Singh), relying on Gokulchand v. The King.
  • Concealment of the birth of an illegitimate child is not an offence; therefore, obtaining money for refraining from a non-existent prosecution cannot amount to offences under section 161 IPC or section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • The sentence of two years’ imprisonment was unduly harsh.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gokulchand v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 A cryptic sanction naming only the accused and the provision contravened is insufficient. Distinguished; the present sanction recited facts, showed a prima facie case, and stated that the authority had “fully and carefully” examined the materials, thus satisfying section 6.
Mahesh Prasad v. State of U.P., [1955] 1 SCR 965 Under section 161 IPC it is unnecessary to prove that the public servant was capable of performing or intended to perform the act for which illegal gratification was taken. Followed; even if no prosecution could have been launched, the demand and acceptance of money for refraining from such action still attracts section 161 IPC liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Sanction validity: The Court noted that the sanction order dated 10 December 1963 explicitly narrated the facts, recorded that a prima facie case existed, and stated that the DIG had “fully and carefully” examined the material. Consequently, section 6 requirements were met and the Privy Council decision in Gokulchand was inapplicable.

Offence under section 161 IPC: Citing Mahesh Prasad, the Court observed that it is irrelevant whether the public servant could or intended to perform the promised official act; the solicitation and receipt of illegal gratification itself completes the offence.

Offence under section 5(1)(d) Prevention of Corruption Act: Independently of section 161 IPC, the appellant had “grossly abused his position” to obtain pecuniary advantage, squarely attracting section 5(1)(d). The High Court’s factual findings supported this conclusion.

Sentence: Given the appellant’s status as a police officer and the extortion of both cash and a gold ring, the Court found no special circumstances warranting leniency. The two-year concurrent sentences were deemed appropriate and not excessive.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED – Conviction and two-year sentence affirmed.

Immediate consequence: Shiv Raj Singh remains convicted under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161 IPC, serving concurrent two-year rigorous imprisonment terms. The judgment reinforces the sufficiency of a reasoned sanction order and clarifies that abuse of office for pecuniary gain constitutes criminal misconduct even if the threatened official action is illusory. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision reiterates and applies existing principles on sanction and public-servant corruption.

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    Shiv Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration .

    http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5

    PETITIONER:

    SHIV RAJ SINGH

    Vs.

    RESPONDENT:

    DELHI ADMINISTRATION

    DATE OF JUDGMENT:

    01/05/1968

    BENCH:

    RAMASWAMI, V.

    BENCH:

    RAMASWAMI, V.

    VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

    CITATION:

    1968 AIR 1419 1969 SCR (1) 183

    CITATOR INFO :

    R 1976 SC1497 (22)

    ACT:

    Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1947), ss. 5(1) and 6 and Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 161-Sanction to prosecute-Sufficiency-Scope of s. 161 I.P.C. and s. 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    HEADNOTE:

    An unmarried woman gave birth to a child and on her request, her uncle and aunt made arrangements for the child being brought up by some one who wanted to adopt a child. The appellant, who was a police officer, accused the uncle and aunt of having disposed of an illegitimate child and demanded a bribe. The anti-corruption department was thereupon informed, a trap laid and currency notes which were given as bribe were recovered from the appellant. He was prosecuted and convicted for offences under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161, I.P.C. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentenced him to 2 years

    R.I.

    In appeal to this Court, HELD : (1) The order of sanction showed on the face of it what were the facts constituting the offence, that 'a prima facie case was made out, and that the sanctioning authority had fully and carefully examined the material Therefore,, the order of sanction fulfilled the requirements of s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [186 B, D] Gokukhand v. The King, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 82, distinguished.

    (2) (a) When a public servant is charged under s. 161 I.P.C. and it is alleged that illegal gratification was taken by him for doing or procuring an official act, it is not necessary for the court to consider whether or not the accused public servant was capable of doing or intended to do such an act. [186 F-G]

    Mahesh Prasad v. The State of U.P. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 965, followed.

    Therefore, though the concealment of the birth of an illegitimate child is not an offence and the appellant could not have prosecuted -any one, it could not be said that the obtaining of money by the appellant for refraining from an imaginary prosecution was not an offence under 161 I.P.C.

    1

    [186 E-F]

    (b) In any event, the appellant was guilty of an offence under s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, in that he grossly abused his position within the meaning of the section and thereby obtained for himself pecuniary advantage and so, the sentence imposed on him was not excessive [187 D, E]

    JUDGMENT:

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.124 of

    1966.

    Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 17, 1966 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 63-D of 1964.

    184

    M. C. Chagla E. C. Agarwala, Santosh Agarwala and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant.

    D. Narsaraju and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated February 17, 1966 in Criminal Appeal No. 63-D of 1964 affirming the conviction of the appellant under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947) and S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

    The case of the prosecution is that Miss Eylene (P.W. 2) used to live in 1962 with her father at Fazilka. She developed illicit connection with someone and became pregnant. In April 1963. she went to Ambala to her maternal aunt, who is employed as a sister in the Ambala Air Force Hospital, and give birth to a son there in July 1963. In August 1963 Miss Eylene along with her newly born son came to the house of her uncle Russel Nathaniel in Andrews Ganj, Delhi. Since Miss Eylene was unmarried and could not keep the son with her, she asked Russel Nathaniel and his wife to make arrangement for the bringing up of the child. Russel Nathaniel knew Roshan Lal who had no child of his own and wanted to adopt a child. Accordingly, on August 25, 1963 the child was handed over to Roshan Lal. After the child was handed over to Roshan Lal, Miss Eylene went to the house of her sister's husband, N. K. Lal, P.W. 11 and stayed there with her sister. It is alleged that on August 29, 1963 at about 9.30 or 10 P.m. the appellant went to the house of Russel Nathaniel in police uniform and accused Russel Nathaniel and his wife of disposing of the illegitimate child. The appellant further warned Mr. & Mrs. Nathaniel that if they wanted to save themselves they should make some settlement with him and demanded a bribe of Rs. 1,000/-. But Mr. Nathaniel paid him Rs. 90/- and agreed to pay later on a sum of Rs. 700/-. The appellant thereafter compelled Russel Nathaniel and his wife to execute a document in writing that they would pay him Rs. 700/- or agree to go to prison. It is said that the appellant asked Russel Nathaniel to bring to him Roshan Lal and when Roshan Lal was called, 'the appellant asked him to pay something to him. Roshan Lal ex. pressed his inability to pay anything whereupon the appellant removed a golden ring from his finger. On the same night the appellant contacted the girl, Miss Eylene and wished to record her statement. Russel Nathaniel and his wife expressed their reluctance to send Miss Eylene with the appellant to the police station and therefore the appellant interrogated the girl at the resi- dence of N. K. Lal, her brother-in-law. The appellant made

    2

    her sign a paper and took the same with him. On September

    4,

    185

    1963 Russel Nathaniel and N. K. Lal decided to refer the matter to the anti-corruption department. Accordingly, Russel Nathaniel went to D.S.P. Mukatdhari Singh who recorded his statement and called two witnesses to witness the proceedings. Russel Nathaniel produced seven currency notes of the denomination of Rs. 100/- each. The numbers of those currency notes were noted and Russel Nathaniel was then instructed to pass on the money to the appellant. Russel Nathaniel contacted the appellant and asked him to come to the house of N. K. Lal. They arrived at the house of N. K. Lal at about 7.30 or 7.45 P.m. The appellant sent for the girl because he wanted to reprimand her and there- after he asked for the payment of the agreed amount. Russel Nathaniel handed over the currency notes to the appellant who put them in the left side pocket of his trousers. Russel Nathaniel then gave a signai and immediately D.S.P. Mukatdhari Singh turned up and recovered the currency notes from the pocket of the appellant. On being questioned the appellant told the D.S.P. that he never asked for bribe and that the money was paid to him in repayment of the loan by him to Russel Nathaniel. The appellant produced in the witness box Dharam Vir, F. C. Ram Saran, H. C. Jai Parkash and A. S. Kapur. After conclusion of the trial the Special Judge, Delhi accepted the prosecution case as correct and convicted the appellant of the charged framed against him and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5001- or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and to two years rigorous imprisonment under s. 161, Indian Penal Code and ordered the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the Punjab High Court. The High Court maintained the conviction of the appellant under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161, Indian Penal. Code and also the sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years awarded to the appellant on each count. The High Court. however, set aside the order with regard to the payment of fine or imprisonment in default. In support of this appeal Mr. Chagla submitted in the first place that the order of sanction was bad in law as all the relevant papers and materials were not placed before the D.I.G. Police, Mr. M. P. Singh who, was the sanctioning authority. Reference was made in this connection to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gokulchand v. The King(1) in which it was held that a sanction which simply names the person to be prosecuted and specifies the provision of the Order which he is alleged to have contravened is not a sufficient compliance with cl. 23. Mr. Chagla

    (1) A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 82.

    10 Sup.C.I-68-13

    186

    also referred to the evidence of P.W. 9, Sub-Inspector, Ascharaj Lal who said that "all the papers relating to the case were sent to the D.I.G." When cross-examined, he- could not say which were the documents which were sent to the D.I.G. because they were in a sealed cover. In our opinion, there is no substance in the argument put forward by Mr. Chagla on behalf of the appellant. The Order of sanction dated December 10, 1963 shows on the face of it what were the facts constituting the offence charged and that a prima

    3

    facie case was made out against the appellant. The Order also further recites that Mr. M. P. Singh, D.I.G., "after fully and carefully" examining the material before him in regard to the "aforesaid allegations" in the case, considers that a prima facie case is made against the appellant. It is manifest that the decision of the Judicial Committee has no application to the present case, for the order of sanction in that case was much more cryptic and materially different. We are satisfied that the order of sanction in the present case fulfils the requirements of S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Chagla on this aspect of the case. It was then contended that the concealment of the birth of an illegitimate child was not an offence under the Indian Penal Code or any other criminal statute and if the appellant had obtained money from Russel Nathaniel, it cannot be said that the appellant had obtained a gratification for doing or forbearing -to do any official act, or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any per- son. In other words, the argument was that the appellant could not prosecute either Miss Eylene or Russel Nathaniel or anybody else for any offence and obtaining of money by the appellant for refraining from any such imaginary prosecution cannot be said to be an offence under S. 161, Indian Penal Code or S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. When a public servant is charged under s. 161, Indian Penal Code and it is alleged that the illegal grati- fication was taken by him for doing or procuring an official act, it is not necessary for the Court to consider whether or not the accused public servant was capable of doing or intended to do such an act: see the decision of this Court in Mahesh Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1). In the second place, the charge against the appellant is also under s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which states

    "5.(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct-

    (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R.965.

    187

    (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage or,"

    Section 5(2) states :

    "(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to, fine

    X X

    :

    Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year."

    Upon the facts which have been found by the High Court to be proved there can be no doubt that the appellant was guilty of grossly abusing his position as public servant within the meaning of s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and thereby obtained for himself a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, and the charge under that section is established. We are therefore of the opinion that Mr. Chagla is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case also.

    4

    Lastly, Mr. Chagla submitted that the sentence of imprison- ment was excessive. We are unable to accept this contention. Upon the finding of the High Court in this case it is manifest that the appellant grossly abused his position as a police officer and extorted money from Russel Nathaniel and his wife and also a gold ring from Roshan Lal. The appellant in his official capacity as a police officer was expected to maintain a high standard of integrity and to uphold the maintenance of law. Instead them proved facts disclose that there was a gross abuse of his official position on the part or the appellant and in the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the sentence imposed is not excessive.

    For the reasons expressed we affirm the judgment of the High Court of Punjab dated February 17, 1966 in Criminal Appeal No. 63-D of 1964 and dismiss this appeal.

    V.P.S.

    188

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    Shiv Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration .
    (May 1, 1968)