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  • Art. 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter called the Act),
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code.12.
  • sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of O. II of the Code,
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code,
  • Section 10 of the Code,
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citation codes
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  • Art. 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter called the Act),
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code.12.
  • sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of O. II of the Code,
  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code,
  • Section 10 of the Code,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision Petition against Trial Court's Order (Aug. 12, 1981)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, M/s Grindlays Bank Limited, filed a suit on Sept. 25, 1978 seeking recovery of Rs. 16,74,596.98 (Rs. 11,57,684.17 principal plus Rs. 5,16,912.82 interest). The Bank alleged that defendant-respondent No. 2 was a partnership firm and defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were partners and guarantors. The Bank further alleged that the defendants had furnished securities: (a) pledge/hypothecation of goods and machinery and (b) a mortgage by deposit of title deeds of immovable property (the property being situated at Faridabad). The Bank sought a preliminary mortgage decree for the full amount and ultimately a final mortgage decree for sale of the mortgaged property if the decree was not satisfied.

In their written statement (filed Nov. 29, 1978) the defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the suit should be stayed because the same matter was directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit (Suit No. 107 of 1975) pending in the Delhi High Court. They also contended that the subsequent suit at Faridabad was barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), because the plaintiff had given up the relief for sale of the mortgaged property in the previous suit.

The trial Court framed two preliminary issues:

  1. Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Civil P.C.?
  2. Whether the suit is liable to be stayed for the reasons stated in paragraph No. 1 of the written statement (i.e., by virtue of Section 10 CPC)?

The defendants placed Exhibits D.1 to D.4 on the file; otherwise no other evidence was led. The trial Court held (under Issue No. 1) that the suit was not barred by O. II, R. 2 because the mortgaged property was situated at Faridabad and the earlier suit in Delhi could not have produced relief in respect of that property; and (under Issue No. 2) that the suit was not liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC. The defendants (the present petitioners) moved this revision challenging those decisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequent suit instituted at Faridabad (seeking recovery on the basis of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds) is barred by Order II, Rule 2(3) CPC because a previous suit concerning the same loan was pending in the Delhi High Court.
  2. Whether the subsequent suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC on the ground that the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit between the same parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • Both preliminary issues were wrongly decided by the trial Court: the subsequent suit at Faridabad was barred by O. II, R. 2(3) CPC and, in any event, was liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC.
  • The cause of action in both suits was the same (recovery of the same loan), so omission to claim a relief in the earlier suit precluded claiming it later under O. II, R. 2(3).
  • Even if reliefs are framed differently, the cause of action is the same and thus the bar under O. II, R. 2(3) applies.
  • Relied on multiple precedents (including Mohammad Khalil Khan, Manubothula Rama Rao, and others) to urge that the subsequent suit was barred or should be stayed under Section 10 CPC.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's / Bank's) Arguments

  • Order II, Rule 2(3) CPC is not attracted because the cause of action in the two suits is distinct: the previous suit in Delhi was based on pledge/hypothecation of goods, whereas the subsequent suit at Faridabad was based on mortgage by deposit of title deeds (an independent security).
  • The Delhi High Court could not have granted a decree based on the mortgaged property because that property lay outside its territorial jurisdiction; accordingly the plaintiff had to amend its earlier plaint to delete that relief.
  • The pledging of goods and the creation of a mortgage are independent obligations and therefore provide separate causes of action and separate remedies (including distinct limitation periods: Art. 1 v. Art. 62 of the Limitation Act as invoked in argument).
  • Because the reliefs and causes of action differ, a decision in the earlier suit would not operate as res judicata over the subsequent suit and Section 10 CPC would not require a stay.
  • Relied on authorities (including Kishan Narain, Sidrammappa, Ma Kyi) to show distinctness of causes and remedies and to support maintainability of the subsequent suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 Principles on what constitutes the same cause of action and the application of O. II, R. 2 (notably para 61 discussing whether claims in successive suits arise from same cause of action; evidence difference indicates different causes). The Court relied on its articulation of "cause of action" (every fact necessary to be proved) and used it as a guiding test to determine that distinct securities producing different evidence give rise to distinct causes of action.
Abnashi Singh v. Smt. Lajwant Kaur, (1976) 78 Punj LR 828 : AIR 1977 Punj 1 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of the proposition that the subsequent suit was barred under O. II, R. 2(3) CPC. The Court recorded that this and similar authorities were cited by the petitioner, but found them distinguishable on the facts because the plaintiff here had two separate securities.
Haryana Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Gupta Ram Supply Company, (1976) 78 Punj LR 313 : AIR 1976 Punj 117 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of the bar under O. II, R. 2(3). The Court acknowledged reliance but treated the authorities as distinguishable in the circumstances where distinct securities existed.
Manubothula Rama Rao v. Manubothula Venkayamma, AIR 1931 Mad 705 Relied upon by the petitioner to show that relinquishment of a relief in an earlier suit may bar a later suit where the cause of action is the same. The Court considered this authority (wherein the plaintiff relinquished a charge on property in one jurisdiction and later sued elsewhere) and held it distinguishable — in the present case the earlier court could not have provided mortgage relief because of territorial limits.
Kempe Gowda v. Lakkegowda, AIR 1952 Mys 99 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of O. II, R. 2(3) application (as cited in the petitioner's list of authorities). The Court noted the reliance but did not base its decision on this case; the Court's analysis focused on cause of action and territorial/instrumental distinctions in securities.
Jai Narain v. Syed Ali Murtaza, AIR 1951 Pat 190 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of O. II, R. 2(3). Noted by the Court as cited by the petitioner; the Court found the present facts distinguishable and upheld the trial Court's view that O. II, R. 2 was not attracted.
Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal 727 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of the contention that the subsequent suit was liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC. The Court recorded citation but concluded Section 10 did not apply because the matters in issue and the reliefs in the two suits were not directly and substantially the same.
C. Raman & Co., Bombay v. Modern Motor Works, Ludhiana, (1973) 75 Punj LR 529 : AIR 1973 Punj 454 Relied upon by the petitioner on the question of stay under Section 10 CPC. Cited by petitioner; Court treated authorities as distinguishable on the factual matrix (separate securities and different reliefs).
Kedar Nath v. Firm Hira Lal Brothers, (1975) 77 Punj LR 250 Relied upon by the petitioner in relation to stay under Section 10 CPC. Cited by petitioner; Court did not adopt it as dispositive because it found differences in cause of action and reliefs between the two suits here.
Channabasappa Kamadal and Sons v. Kishan Chand and Co., AIR 1972 Mys 112 Relied upon by the petitioner for stay under Section 10 CPC. Cited but distinguished by the Court on the ground that the present suit involves a distinct security (mortgage) and different reliefs than the earlier suit.
Kishan Narain v. Pala Mal, AIR 1922 PC 412 Authority for the proposition that a mortgage (if providing an independent obligation) can give rise to a cause of action distinct from a personal obligation; a suit for one relief (e.g., interest) need not bar subsequent suit for principal when obligations are independent. The Court relied on this case to support its conclusion that separate securities (pledge and mortgage) constituted distinct causes of action and that the subsequent suit was not barred by O. II, R. 2.
Sidrammappa v. Rajashetty, AIR 1970 SC 1059 Explanation of O. II, R. 2: 'cause of action' and its relation to the claim; where the earlier suit's cause does not form the foundation of the subsequent suit, later suit is not barred. The Court cited and applied the formulation to hold that because the earlier suit could not found the mortgage-based relief sought later, O. II, R. 2 did not bar the subsequent suit.
Ma Kyi v. P.R.M.A.C T V R Chettyar Firm, AIR 1935 Rang 365 Authority addressing when separate documents or securities give rise to distinct causes of action. The Court and trial Court relied upon Ma Kyi to support the view that separate instruments (here, distinct securities) can constitute distinct causes of action; the petitioner attempted to distinguish but Court found the analogy applicable.
Gulabchand Makanji v. Motapondha Vibhag Tenants' Co-op Agri Society Ltd., AIR 1962 Guj 296 Relied upon by respondent for the proposition of distinct remedies/causes when different securities are involved. Cited by the respondent and considered in the context of separate securities; the Court used the general principle to find separate causes of action.
Mandal & Co. v. Fazul Ellahie, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 825 : AIR 1915 Cal 126 Relied upon in the respondent's list of authorities concerning separability of remedies/causes. Cited in support of the respondent's contention; the Court treated it as part of the body of authority that distinguish separate securities as distinct causes.
S.A. Anantanarayana Iyer v. Savithri Ammal, (1913) ILR 36 Mad 151 Relied upon by respondent for historical/supporting authority on cause of action distinctions. Cited in the respondent's list; the Court considered such authorities collectively to conclude distinct causes were present.
Smt. Naurati v. Mehma Singh, AIR 1972 Punj & Har 421 Relied upon by respondent to support that Section 10 does not apply where final decision in previous suit would not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. The Court expressly invoked this principle: Section 10 cannot apply where the earlier decision would not operate as res judicata; used to support refusal to stay the subsequent suit.
Sankhla Industries v. Hiralal Pukhraj, AIR 1973 Raj 306 Relied upon by respondent in support of the non-application of Section 10 when matters are not directly and substantially the same. Noted among authorities relied on; Court concluded Section 10 was not attracted for the reasons given (distinct cause/relief).
Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Bholanath Madanlal Rherwala, AIR 1975 Cal 411 Authority on the meaning of "matter in issue" under Section 10 CPC; that mere identity of some issues is insufficient — the decision must be capable of operating as res judicata in the other suit. The Court cited this decision (referred to as Bholanath Madanlal Sherawala's case) and applied its teaching: because a decision in the Delhi suit would not necessarily operate as res judicata on mortgage issues, Section 10 did not mandate a stay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the core question as whether the relief sought in the mortgage-based suit at Faridabad arose from the same cause of action as the earlier suit in Delhi (based on hypothecation/pledge of goods) or whether the mortgage-based suit embodied a separate and distinct cause of action.

Key analytical steps and legal principles applied by the Court:

  1. Definition and test for "cause of action": The Court relied on the formulation in Mohammad Khalil Khan's case and Sidrammappa's case that "cause of action" comprehends every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to obtain relief. If the evidence required to sustain two claims is different, the causes of action are different. The cause of action is the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
  2. Distinction between relief and cause of action: The Court emphasized that it is not the character of the relief prayed for that determines identity of cause; rather it is whether the foundation facts (and the evidence necessary) are the same.
  3. Application to the facts: Although the loan may be the same, the defendants furnished two separate securities — pledge/hypothecation of goods on the one hand; and deposit of title deeds creating a charge/mortgage on immovable property on the other. Each security therefore constituted a separate instrument giving rise to separate causes of action, comparable to the reasoning in Kishan Narain and Ma Kyi where separate instruments or independent obligations gave rise to distinct causes.
  4. Territorial and procedural limitation: The Court took into account that the Delhi High Court could not, because of territorial limits, have granted relief in respect of the Faridabad immovable property. The plaintiff had in fact amended its earlier plaint and deleted the mortgage relief in the Delhi suit on that basis. Consequently, the earlier suit could not have afforded the mortgage-based relief now sought at Faridabad.
  5. Conclusion on Order II, Rule 2(3) CPC: On the above foundations, the Court concluded that O. II, R. 2(3) was not attracted because the cause of action underlying the Faridabad suit was not the same as that which formed the foundation of the earlier suit in Delhi; the earlier court could not have granted the mortgage relief.
  6. Section 10 CPC analysis: The Court observed that Section 10 is aimed at preventing concurrent courts from adjudicating the same cause/subject matter and relief so as to avoid contradictory verdicts. Relying on authorities (including Shaw Wallace / Bholanath Madanlal), the Court held that Section 10 does not apply unless the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same in both suits and the decision in one would operate as res judicata in the other. Because the reliefs and foundational facts differ (pledge vs. mortgage), Section 10 did not mandate a stay of the Faridabad suit.

The Court therefore affirmed the trial Court's findings on both preliminary issues: O. II, R. 2(3) CPC did not bar the subsequent suit and Section 10 CPC did not require its stay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed.

Explicit consequences set out by the Court:

  • The trial Court's decisions on the two preliminary issues (that the subsequent suit at Faridabad is not barred by O. II, R. 2 CPC and is not liable to be stayed under Section 10 CPC) are upheld.
  • The revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
  • In view of this decision, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4332-CII of 1981 is also dismissed.

Broader implications: The opinion confines its reasoning to the facts before it—holding that separate securities (pledge/hypothecation vs. mortgage by deposit of title deeds) can constitute separate causes of action for purposes of O. II, R. 2 and Section 10 CPC. The Court did not state that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond applying established authorities; the direct effect is to permit the mortgage-based suit at Faridabad to proceed.

Order: Petition dismissed.

    Mohinder Singh Jubbal v. M/S. Grindlays Bank Ltd. And Others

    This revision petition is directed against the order of the trial Court dated Aug. 12, 1981, whereby the two preliminary issues, arising in the suit for the recovery of Rs. 16,74,596.98, out of which the present revision petition has arisen, have been decided against the defendant-petitioner.

    2. M/s. Grindlays Bank Limited, the plaintiff-respondent, filed a suit on Sept. 25, 1978, on the allegations that defendant-respondent No. 2 was a partnership firm while defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 3 were its partners and had been carrying on the business in their factory at Faridabad and that defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were also the guarantors for the re-payment of the amount due to the plaintiff from defendant-respondents No. 2. It was also alleged that the defendants had been taking loans from the plaintiff from time to time and, thus the total amount of Rs. 11,57,684.17 was due to the plaintiff from the defendants. It was also alleged that a sum of Rupees 5,16,912.82 was due to the plaintiff as interest and that the total amount due to it, thus, came to Rs. 16,74,596.98. Since the petitioner created mortgage over his property by depositing the title deeds of his property with it, it was prayed that on that basis, a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. 16,74,596.98, be passed in its favour. It was also pleaded that a final mortgage decree for the sale of the mortgaged property be passed in the event of the defendants failing to satisfy the preliminary decree and that the sale proceeds thereof be paid to it towards the payment of the decretal amount. In the written statement filed on Nov. 29, 1978, it was inter alia pleaded that the suit was liable to be stayed as the matter in issue in the suit was also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, (suit No. 107 of 1975), pending in the High Court at Delhi. It was further pleaded that in the previous suit, the plaintiff had originally prayed for the recovery of Rs. 11,57,684.17, on the basis of the pledge of goods by hypothecation, the pledge of the machinery and the alleged mortgage of the property in suit, but subsequently, the plaintiff gave up the relief for the sale of the mortgaged property in that suit and as such, the suit out of which this revision petition has arisen, was barred under O. 2, R. 2 of the Civil P.C (hereinafter called the Code). The other pleas taken in the written statement are not relevant at this stage. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following two preliminary issues:

    1. Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of O. 2, R. 2 of Civil P.C?

    2. Whether the suit is liable to be stayed for the reasons stated in paragraph No. 1 of the written statement? The defendants placed on the file, the copies of the documents, Exhibits D.1 to D.4 No other evidence was led by either side. Under issue No. 1, the learned trial Court held that the suit was not barred by the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Code. The reason given for the same was that since the mortgaged property was situated in Faridabad, the subsequent suit, for the recovery of the amount, on the basis of the mortgage of the property, could only be filed at Faridabad and not at Delhi. Under Issue No. 2, it was held that the subsequent suit was not liable to be stayed under the provisions of S. 10 of the Code. Dissatisfied with the same, the defendant-petitioner has come up in revision to this Court.

    3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contended that both the preliminary issues, referred to above, have been wrongly decided by the trial Court. The subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff at Faridabad, was barred under O. II, R. 2 of the Code and, in any case, it was liable to be stayed under S. 10 of the Code. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel is that it was the same loan for which the previous suit had been filed in the Delhi High Court and for the recovery of which, the subsequent suit, has been filed at Faridabad. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the cause of action is the same in both the suits and, therefore, in view of the provisions of O. II, R. 2(3) of the Code, the plaintiff was debarred from suing for any relief which he so omitted in the previous suit, filed in the Delhi High Court. The argument proceeds that even though the relief claimed may be separate in both the suits, yet the cause of action for claiming the relief is the same in both the suits and, therefore, the case was fully covered by the provisions of O. II, R. 2(3) of the Code. In support of his contention, that the subsequent suit was barred under O. II, R. 2(3) of the Code, the learned counsel placed reliance on Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78; Abnashi Singh v. Smt. Lajwant Kaur, (1976) 78 Punj LR 828 : (AIR 1977 Punj 1); Haryana Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Rohtak v. Joint Hindu Family Firm styled as Gupta Ram Supply Company, (1976) 78 Pun LR 313 : (AIR 1976 Punj 117); Manubothula Rama Rao v. Manubothula Venkayamma, AIR 1931 Mad 705; Kempe Gowda v. Lakkegowda, AIR 1952 Mys 99 and Jai Narain v. Syed Ali Murtaza, AIR 1951 Pat 190. Reliance was placed on Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal 727; C. Raman and Co., Bombay v. Modern Motor Works, Ludhiana, (1973) 75 Punj LR 529 : (AIR 1973 Punj 454); Kedar Nath v. Firm Hira Lal Brothers, (1975) 77 Punj LR 250 and Channabasappa Kamadal and Sons v. Kishan Chand and Co., AIR 1972 Mys 112, by the learned counsel in support of the proposition that the subsequent suit was liable to be stayed by the trial Court under Sec. 10 of the Code. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the provisions of O. II, R. 2(3) of the Code are not attracted in the present case because the cause of action in both the suits is quite distinct and separate, and different reliefs have been claimed in both the suits. The previously instituted suit in the Delhi High Court is for the recovery of the money simpliciter on the basis of the goods pledged with the plaintiff Bank by the defendants, whereas the subsequent suit at Faridabad has been filed on the basis of the mortgage created by them for the payment of the loan advanced. Thus, there are two distinct causes of action. Moreover, according to the learned counsel, it was on the objection of the defendants in the Delhi High Court that the plaintiff was required to amend his plaint because the Delhi High Court was not competent to pass any decree in the previous suit on the basis of the mortgaged property as the same was situated outside its territorial jurisdiction. The learned counsel also contended that though the loan may be the same, yet the pledging of the goods for the recovery of the said loan and the creating of the mortgage on the immoveable property of the defendants by deposit of the title deeds of the property, are independent obligations and, therefore, both the suits, as such, are competent and maintainable. It was further submitted that the limitation for the recovery of the loan simpliciter was three years under Art. 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter called the Act), whereas the limitation to enforce the payment of the money secured by mortgage or otherwise charged upon immoveable property was 12 years under Art. 62 of the Act, from the date when the money sued for becomes due. Thus, the legislature itself has made a distinction and has provided two separate remedies with different periods of limitation. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon Kishan Narain v. Pala Mal, AIR 1922 PC 412, Sidrammappa v. Rajashetty, AIR 1970 SC 1059; Ma Kyi v. P.R.M.A.C T V R Chettyar Firm, AIR 1935 Rang 365, Gulabchand Makanji v. Motapondha Vibhag Tenants' Co-operative Agricultural Society Ltd., AIR 1962 Guj 296; Mandal and Co. v. Fazul Ellahie, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 825 : (AIR 1915 Cal 126) and S.A Anantanarayana Iyer v. Savithri Ammal, (1913) ILR 36 Mad 151. On the question of the stay of the subsequent suit under Sec. 10 of the Code, it was contended that any decision, given in the previously instituted suit in the Delhi High Court, would not operate as res judicata in the subsequently instituted suit at Faridabad, and the relief claimed in both the suits being separate and distinct, the provisions of S. 10 of the Code, are not attracted. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Smt. Naurati v. Mehma Singh, AIR 1972 Punj and Har 421; Sankhla Industries v. Hiralal Pukhraj, AIR 1973 Raj 306 and Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. v. Bholanath Madanlal Rherwala, AIR 1975 Cal 411.

    4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a great length and have also gone through the judgement cited at the bar.

    5. The main question for determination in this petition is whether the relief claimed in the suit filed, on the basis of the mortgage created by the deposit of the title deeds of the immovable property, at Faridabad, provides a separate and distinct cause of action, or the cause of action is the same in both the suits, i.e, to recover the loan advanced to the defendants, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Order II, R. 2 of the Code reads,—

    “2. Suit to include the whole claim.— (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

    (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.— Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

    (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.— A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of the reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

    Explanation.— For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.”

    6. It is the common case of the parties that it is sub-rule (3) of R. 2 of O. II of the Code, which is relevant for the determination of the present revision petition. In order to attract the said provisions, a person must be entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action. If on the same cause of action, the same relief could not be had in the suit instituted earlier, then it could not be disputed that the bar under O. II. R. 2(3) of the Code, is not attracted. Reference in this respect by both the parties, has been made to Mohammad Khalil Khan's case, (AIR 1949 PC 78) (supra). In para 61 of the judgement in the said case, certain principles have been laid down by the Privy Council in order to attract the applicability of the provisions of O. II R. 2 of the Code, in a given case, and one of the principles laid down is whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded upon a cause of action distinct from the one which was the foundation of the former suit. The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgement. If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different. The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. The cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence that may be set by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Thus, it is clear that the ‘cause of action’ refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at conclusion in his favour. It is the common case of the parties that the suit, in the Delhi High Court, had been filed for the recovery of the loan, on the basis of the goods pledged by hypothecation with the plaintiff Bank whereas the subsequent suit, under O. XXXIV of the Code, has been filed for the recovery of the amount of the loan advanced, by sale or otherwise of the property mortgaged in its favour. It may be that the loan is the same which was advanced by it to the defendants, but admittedly, two separate distinct securities were furnished by them for the recovery of the loan. One of the securities was by way of pledge by hypothecation of the goods to the plaintiff whereas the other security furnished was by deposit of title deeds of the immovable property, thus, creating a charge thereon. Even if the loan is the one and the same as stated earlier, but there are two distinct and separate securities furnished by the defendant for the same. The plaintiff has, under these circumstances, two different causes of action to maintain both the suits. Reference in this respect may be made to Kishan Narain's case, (AIR 1922 PC 412) (supra) wherein it has been held that if the mortgage provided, as mortgagee always do in England, for an independent obligation to pay the principal and the interest then a suit brought to obtain a personal judgement in respect of the interest alone, would not prevent a subsequent claim for payment of the principal. In such a case the cause of action would be distinct. The matter is, however, different if the non-payment of the interest causes the principal money to become due, as in that case the cause of action - the non-payment of the interest - gives rise, to two forms of relief which the Code provides shall not be split. In Sidramappa's case, (AIR 1970 SC 1059) (supra), the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Code, were again considered by the Supreme Court and it was held therein that the requirement of O. II, R. 2 of the Code is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. ‘Cause of action’, means the ‘cause of action for which the suit was brought’. Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings. Where the cause of action on the basis of which the previous suit was brought does not form the foundation of the subsequent suit and in the earlier suit the plaintiff could not have claimed the relief which he sought in the subsequent suit, the plaintiff's subsequent suit is not barred by O. II, R. 2 of the Code. Reference in this behalf has also been made to Kishan Narain's case (supra).

    7. Applying the abovesaid principles to the facts of the present case; it is quite evident that the cause of action, on the basis of which the previous suit has been filed in the Delhi High Court, i.e, the, suit for the recovery of the loan on the basis of the hypothecation of the goods belonging to the defendants does not form the foundation of the subsequent suit filed at Faridabad, as in the earlier suit, the plaintiff could not claim the relief which he is seeking in the subsequent suit filed at Faridabad. It is not disputed that the Delhi High Court could not pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the earlier suit, on the basis of the mortgaged property, because the same is situated outside its territorial jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, it was on that account that an objection was taken by the defendants in that suit, on which the plaintiff amended his plaint and deleted the said relief from the original plaint. In coming to the conclusion that the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Code are not attracted to the present case, reliance has been placed on Ma Kyi's case, (AIR 1935 Rang 365) (supra), in this Court, and it was relied upon by the trial Court as well. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner, distinguished this case on the ground that in the said case, each document constituted a distinct cause of action, because the loan in that case, was split up and for separate amounts, two separate and distinct securities were furnished. It may be so, but as observed therein, though the original obligation is single and entire, but when one party has chosen to execute separate documents for portions of the obligation and the other party has chosen to accept the said documents, each document constitutes a distinct cause of action. Similarly, in the present case, though the original obligation is the same, that is, the taking of the loan from the plaintiff Bank, but for the same loan, the defendants have furnished two distinct and separate securities and the plaintiff has accepted the same. Thus, each document constitutes a distinct cause of action.

    8. It appears that in the trial Court, a reference was made to O. XXXIV, R. 14 of the Code, but the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, fairly conceded that the provisions of R. 14 of O. XXXIV of the Code, were not applicable to the facts of the present case. The main burden of his argument is, that the suit at Faridabad has been filed on the basis of the mortgage whereas the suit in the Delhi High Court has been instituted on the basis of the goods pledged with the plaintiff Bank. Once it is so held, then, all the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are distinguishable.

    9. In Manubothula Rama Rao's case, (AIR 1931 Mad 705) (supra), strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the plaintiff, in a suit for maintenance against her husband, did not ask for the relief that any amount that would be decreed to her, should be made a charge on the husband's property for the reason that the husband has no property in the jurisdiction of the Court where the suit is instituted. A second suit by her in the Court within whose jurisdiction the property of the husband was situated was held to be incompetent, as she must be held to have relinquished the particular relief which might have been open to her of getting a charge on the husband's property situated in different jurisdiction. Thus, the cause of action in both the suits, in that case, was the same and, therefore, it was rightly held in that case that the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Code, were attracted. As observed earlier, in the present case, there is no such situation. Thus, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that it has been rightly held by the trial Court, under preliminary issue No. 1, that the subsequent suit instituted at Faridabad, was not barred under the provisions of O. II, R. 2 of the Code.

    10. More or less, the answer to the above issue decides the date of the other preliminary issue as well. Once it is held that the cause of action in both the suits is separate and distinct and the decision in the earlier suit filed in the Delhi High Court, would not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit filed in the Court at Faridabad, then the provisions of Section 10 of the Code, would not be attracted. The object of Section 10 of the Code, as observed in Smt. Naurati v. Mehma Singh, AIR 1972 Punj and Har 421, is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of the same cause of action, the same subject-matter and the same relief and to obviate the possibility of two contradictory verdicts by one and the same Court in respect of the same relief. It has also been held therein that Section 10 cannot apply when the final decision in the previous suit would not operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. It is true that in Section 10, the words “cause of action” have not been used. What it contemplated is that no Court shall proceed with the trial of a suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. Thus, what is to be seen is whether the matter in issue in both the suits is directly and substantially the same? Once it is held that the relief as well as the cause of action is different in both the suits, then, it is obvious, that the matter in issue, is also not the same either directly or substantially, in both the suits. In the previous suit, the controversy between the parties is: whether the plaintiff Bank advanced any loan to the defendants and for that purpose certain goods were pledged with it by the defendants by way of security, to recover the said loan, whereas in the subsequent suit, the main question is: whether the plaintiff Bank is entitled to recover the loan by way of sale of the mortgaged property, or not? In other words; whether the defendants mortgaged the property with the plaintiff Bank by way of security, for the realisation of the loan advanced to them or not?

    11. It has been observed in Bholanath Madanlal Sherawala's case, (AIR 1975 Cal 411) (supra), that the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 10 has reference to the entire subject-matter in controversy between the parties and a mere identity of some of the issues in both the suits is not sufficient to attract Section 10 and unless the decision of the suit operates as res judicata in the other suit, it cannot be said that the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same in both the suits, that is to say, the decision in one suit must fail the other suit before it can be said that the matter in issue in both the suits is directly and substantially the same. Even if the Delhi High Court dismisses the plaintiff's suit on the ground that no goods were pledged by way of security with the plaintiff for the loan advanced by it to the defendants, the plaintiff would still be entitled to prove independently in the subsequent suit filed at Faridabad, that the property was mortgaged with it by the defendants to enable it to recover the said loan. In this view of the matter, the preliminary issue No. 2, has also been correctly decided by the trial Court holding that the subsequently instituted suit at Faridabad was not liable to be stayed under the provisions of Section 10 of the Code.

    12. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. In view of the decision in the main revision petition, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4332-CII of 1981 also stands dismissed.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Mohinder Singh Jubbal v. M/S. Grindlays Bank Ltd. And Others
    (Dec 18, 1981)