AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 10 read with section 151, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 10 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Indian Partnership Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 10 read with section 151, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 10 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Indian Partnership Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Mahajan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges an order of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Ludhiana, which refused an application by the defendants under section 10 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a stay of a suit instituted in the Ludhiana Court.

Messrs C. Raman & Company (a partnership firm, registered under the Indian Partnership Act, with its registered office in Bombay) filed a suit in the Bombay High Court on 15 November 1968 against Messrs Modern Motor Works (a partnership firm at Ludhiana) and its partners J.N. Gupta and R.N. Gupta. The Bombay suit sought recovery of Rs. 74,656.80 (with specific claims and interest) and arose out of a distributorship/agency relationship (agreement dated 26 August 1961 and a distributors' appointment dated 26 May 1965) involving propeller shafts and spare parts manufactured by Ex-Cello India Ltd. The plaintiffs alleged termination of the distributorship by letter dated 29 August 1967.

The defendants in the Bombay suit filed a written statement in that court (filed 12 November 1969) contesting the plaintiffs' claims and indicating that, on accounting, the plaintiffs would be found indebted to the defendants. Pursuant to that assertion, the defendants filed a separate suit in the Ludhiana Court on 31 August 1970 (adding Ex-Cello India Ltd. and others as parties), claiming recovery of Rs. 1,82,414 with a four-part breakdown of that total.

The petition before D.K. Mahajan, J. is a revision petition directed against the refusal by the trial Court to stay the Ludhiana suit under section 10 and section 151 CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Ludhiana suit should have been stayed under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure because a prior suit was pending in the Bombay High Court dealing with substantially the same matter.
  2. Whether section 10 requires complete/absolute identity of the subject-matter between two suits before it can be applied, or whether a substantial identity suffices.
  3. Whether, applying the "parallel suits" or "substantial identity" tests, the claims in the Ludhiana suit are substantially the same as issues pending in the Bombay suit so as to warrant a stay.

Arguments of the Parties

C. Raman & Company (Petitioner) — Arguments

  • The written statement filed by the defendants in the Bombay suit is, in effect, the plaint of the Ludhiana suit — i.e., the Ludhiana suit is essentially a counterblast to the Bombay proceedings.
  • The substratum of both suits is the distributorship agreement; the key question in both suits is whether that distributorship agreement was validly terminated.
  • Because the dispute about the distributorship is common to both suits, the Ludhiana suit is "parallel" to the prior Bombay suit and should therefore be stayed under section 10 CPC.

Respondents (Defendants in Bombay / Plaintiffs in Ludhiana) — Arguments

  • The respondents contended (through their learned counsel) that section 10 requires complete identity of the subject-matter in both suits before it can apply; because there is no such complete identity here, section 10 should not operate to stay the Ludhiana suit.
  • The respondents relied upon earlier decisions (Roshan Din v. Mt. Malan Bibi; The Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Shri Shadi Lal; Golwala Preme Chand... v. Kundan Lal Raw Lal) to support the proposition that different/independent transactions or suits covering different periods do not fall within section 10.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Durgaprasad v. Kantichandra Mukherji, ILR 61 Cal. 670 Section 10 does not prevent the court, in its discretion, from staying proceedings in a subsequently instituted suit at a stage earlier than trial. The test of "parallel" suits: if the first suit were determined, matters raised in the second would be res judicata by reason of the prior decision. The court applied this test and concluded that items Nos. 3 and 4 of the Ludhiana claim would fall if the Bombay Court held the distributorship validly terminated; the first two items correspond to counterclaims that would be determined in accounting. Thus, the court found the matters substantially the same.
Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 117 Section 10 requires that the matter in issue in the two suits be "directly and substantially the same" — not necessarily identical in every particular; there must be substantial identity of subject-matter and field of controversy. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that section 10 requires substantial identity rather than complete/formal identity, reinforcing its view to stay the later suit.
Roshan Din v. Mt. Malan Bibi, AIR 1938 Lah. 502 (Relied upon by respondents) Cited by the respondents for the proposition that section 10 requires complete identity of subject-matter between suits. The court held this decision distinguishable from the present facts and therefore not decisive in preventing application of section 10 here.
The Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Shri Shadi Lal, AIR 1954 Punj. 114 (Relied upon by respondents) Cited as an authority where suits covered different periods and section 10 was held not to apply. The court found this precedent distinguishable on its facts and not directly applicable to the present case.
Golwala Preme Chand Bhai Kali Dass Allayawadi v. Kundan Lal Raw Lal, 1966 68 PLR 172 (Relied upon by respondents) Authority dealing with different and independent transactions where one suit could not be stayed by reason of another. The court considered this case distinguishable and not bearing on the facts now before it.
Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal. 727 The principal matter in issue in one suit can be directly and substantially in issue in another; unnecessary duplication and risk of conflicting decisions justify staying the later suit. The court found the present case more in line with this decision and relied on it to justify staying the Ludhiana suit to prevent duplication and conflicting orders.
Wahid-un-Nessa Bibi v. Zamin Ali Shah, ILR 42 All. 290; Luxmi Bank Ltd. v. Hari Kissan, ILR 1941 Nag. 403 These authorities were cited for the interpretation that the phrase "same parties" in section 10 means the parties "as between whom the matter substantially in issue has arisen"; complete identity of parties or subject-matter is not required. The court relied on these authorities (as noted in the opinion) to support a flexible interpretation of "same parties" and to reinforce that substantial identity suffices under section 10.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise fashion, focused on the correct interpretation and application of section 10 CPC:

  1. The court rejected a formalistic approach and emphasised that the "substratum" or substance of the dispute must be examined rather than mere form. Additional or differing reliefs do not automatically remove a case from the ambit of section 10 unless the matters are "so divergently opposed" that they cannot be said to be substantially the same.
  2. The court applied the "parallel suits" test (as articulated in Durgaprasad): a subsequently instituted suit may be stayed if the issues in it would be res judicata upon determination of the earlier suit.
  3. Applying that test to the facts before it, the court considered each component of the Ludhiana claim. It concluded that:
    • Items Nos. 3 and 4 (compensation/damages for abrupt termination and stock-related losses) would be negated if the Bombay High Court found that the distributorship was validly terminated.
    • Items Nos. 1 and 2 correspond to outstanding claims and price differentials that arise in the accounting between the parties and would be resolved when accounting is undertaken pursuant to the Bombay proceedings.
    Therefore, the court found a substantial identity between the disputes in the two suits.
  4. The court considered and distinguished authorities relied upon by the respondents (Roshan Din, Bharat Nidhi, Golwala) on the ground that those cases involved different factual matrices (e.g., independent transactions or claims covering different periods) and thus did not control the present situation.
  5. The court found the present case to be factually aligned with decisions such as Shorab Merwanji Modi and Jai Hind Iron Mart, which support staying a later suit where the principal matter in the earlier suit is directly and substantially in issue in the later one.
  6. The court also took into account the conduct and chronology: the Bombay suit was instituted on 15 November 1968 and the defendant's written statement was filed in November 1969, whereas the Ludhiana suit was filed on 31 August 1970 — apparently a "counter blast" — and this chronology informed the exercise of discretion in favour of a stay.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The petition is allowed. The court quashed the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and directed that the Ludhiana suit be stayed until the Bombay suit is disposed of. The petitioner (C. Raman & Company) is entitled to its costs.

Implications

The immediate legal consequence is that the Ludhiana proceedings are suspended pending the outcome of the earlier-filed Bombay suit, thereby avoiding duplication of litigation and the risk of conflicting decisions between the two fora.

The opinion does not announce or claim to establish any new legal precedent; it applies established authorities and discretion under section 10 CPC to the facts at hand. The decision's practical effect is limited to the parties before the court: the Ludhiana suit is stayed and the petitioner is awarded costs.


This summary is limited to the information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Messrs C. Raman And Co. Bombay And Others v. Messrs Modern Motor Works, Ludhiana .

    D.K Mahajan, J.:— This petition for revision is directed against the decision of the Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Ludhiana, rejecting the application of the defendants under section 10 read with section 151, of the Code of Civil Procedure for stay of the suit.

    2. Messrs C. Raman and Company, a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act and having its registered office at 79, Apollo Street, Bombay, filed a suit against Messrs Modern Motor Works, a partnership firm having its office at G.T Road, Ludhiana and its two partners, J.N Gupta and R.N Gupta. This suit was filed as far back as 15th November, 1968 and the defendants filed a written statement in the Bombay High Court. In this suit claim was made for recovery of Rs. 74,656/80 with future interest on Rs. 70,630,98 at the are of 9% per annum from the date of the suit till judgment and thereafter at the rate of 6% per annum till payment. In the plaint in the suit, it is stated that in pursuance of an agreement dated 26th August, 1961, entered into with Ex-Cello India Ltd., C. Raman and Company, the plaintiffs, acted as the sole selling agents for propeller shafts and spare parts manufactured by the said company. According to the plaintiffs, prior to 1964, they were selling to the defendants as dealers and traders automobile parts and from 1961 onwards the plaintiffs also started selling to the defendants propeller shafts manufactured by Ex-Cello India Ltd. In May, 1965, negotiations took place between the plaintiffs and the defendants for the appointment of the defendants as the distributors of the said propellor shafts and spare parts manufactured by the said concern for the territory of the north zone comprising of Delhi, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir. On 26th May, 1965, the plaintiffs appointed the defendants in Bombay as distributors of the said propeller shafts and spare parts manufactured by Ex-Cello India Ltd. Under this agreement the defendants placed orders with the plaintiffs from time to time and supplied the same to the Delhi office as well as the Ludhiana office of the defendant firm. As according to the plaintiffs, certain accounts were not cleared by the defendants, the plaintiffs by their letter dated 29th August, 1967 informed the defendants that from 31st August, 1967, the distributorship agreement for the said propeller shafts and spare parts would stand terminated. As the disputes between the plaintiffs and the defendants were not settled the plaintiffs filed a suit in the Bombay High Court.

    3. The defendants filed their written statement in the Bombay suit and controverted the allegations of the plaintiffs and pleaded that on accounts being taken between the plaintiffs and the defendants it will be found that the plaintiffs are indebted to the defendants to a large extent, for recovery of which the defendants proposed to file a separate suit. An indication was given in the written statement about the amounts that are alleged to be due by the plaintiffs to the defendants. In view of their statement that they will file a suit to recover the amount due to them, the defendants filed a suit on 31st August, 1970, in the Ludhiana Court. Besides the plaintiffs, they impleaded Messrs Ex-Cello India Ltd., Bombay, as one of the defendants and the other two defendants, besides Messrs C. Raman & Co., are the partners of the said company.

    4. The suit in the Ludhiana Court was for recovery of Rs. 1,82,414/- and the break of this amount is as follows:—

    1. Amount of outstanding claims/bills of the plaintiffs as detailed in Annexure ‘A’ of this plaint. Rs. 9,223.16 2. Amount refundable to the plaintiffs on account of prices of Ex-Cello Products charged in excess than the fixed prices as per details given in Annexure ‘B’ of this suit: Rs. 40,876,00 3. Amount claimed as compensation by way of damages suffered by the plaintiffs in respect of stocks of Ex-Cello Products held by the plaintiffs on 31st August, 1967 by way of difference in the old rates prevailing on the date of termination of plaintiffs Zonal Distributorship/agency and the new rates reduced immediately after the termination of plaintiffs distributorship occasioned to the plaintiffs in consequence of abrupt termination of their Distributorship. Rs. 82,316.00 4. Compensation by way of damages on account of abrupt termination of plaintiffs Distributorship by defendant No. 2 (C. Raman and Co.) without any prior notice. Rs. 50,000,00

    5. The present petition for revision has been filed against the order of the trial Court refusing to stay the Ludhiana suit.

    6. The learned counsel for C. Raman & Co., urges that the written statement in the Bombay High Court is virtually the plaint in the Ludhiana suit. However, the crux of the matter is that the basis of the claim by C. Raman & Co., in the Bombay suit and by Messrs Modern Motor Works in the Ludhiana suit is the distributorship agreement, the question whether the distributorship agreement has been validly terminated or not, is a matter in issue in the Bombay suit and that is again a matter in issue in the Ludhiana suit. In one sence, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is correct that there is no complete identity of the subject matter in dispute in both the suits. But then if the legal position is, as is contended for by the learned counsel for the respondents that there must be complete identity of the subject matter before section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure will corns into play, the petition must fail. But if that is not the requirement of section 10, the petition must succeed.

    7. In every case before section 10 is applied, one has to see what is the substratum of the dispute, i.e, the substance of the matter has to be seen and not its form. It is, however, well-settled that additional reliefs will not take put the case from the ambit of section 10 but if the two matters are so divergently opposed to ohs another that it cannot be said that the matter in dispute is substantially the same, s. 10 will not apply. It has been held in Durgaprasad v. Kantichandra Mukherji . ILR 61 Cal. 670., that “section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code does not prevent the court, in its discretion, from staying the proceedings in a subsequently instituted suit at a stage earlier than the actual trial. If it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the second suit is ‘parallel’ to the first suit, then the best course for everybody concerned would be to put a stay upon, or arrest altogther, the second suit, at the earliest possible moment. The test wether a previously instituted suit and a subsequently instituted suit are ‘parallel’ is that if the first was determined, the matters raised in the second suit would be res judicata by reason of the decision of the prior suit.” If this test is applied, it will be clear that items Nos. 3 and 4 of the claim in the Ludhiana suit would fall if the Bombay High Court holds that the distributorship agreement was validly terminated and so far as the first two items are concerned, they are the counter claims that arise vis-a-vis the suit filed by the plaintiff firm in Bombay, i.e, C. Raman & Company and these matters will also get settled when accounting between the parties as to what is due from one to the other takes place. It, therefore, appears that substantially the claims in both the suits are the same.

    8. In Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas . A.I.R 1953 Bom. 117., Chagla C.J and Gajendragadkar J., (as he then was), while dealing with section 10 observed as follows:—

    “Section 10 does not contemplate an identity of issues between the two suits, nor does it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be entirely the same or identical. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same and proper effect must be given to the language used by the Legislature in section 10 that the identity required is a substantial identity. There must be an identity of the subject-matter, the filed of controversy between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the identity contemplated and the field of controversy contemplated should not be identical and the same in every particular, but the identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same.”

    9. This view is again in absolute accord with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Durgaprasad's case.

    10. The learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the basic requirement of section 10 is that there must be complete identity of the subject matter in both the suits and as in the present case, there is no such identity section 10 will not apply. For his contention, he relies upon Roshan Din v. Mt. Malan Bibi . AIR 1938 Lah. 502., The Bharat Nidhi Ltd., Delhi… v. Shri Shadi Lal…. . AIR 1954 Punj. 114. and Golwala Preme Chand Bhai Kali Dass Allayawadi v. Kundan Lal Raw Lal . 1966 68 PLR 172.. These decisions are distinguishable and do not deal with a situation as has arisen in the present case. Where there are different and independent transactions between the parties, a suit qua one transaction cannot be stayed when a suit qua the second transaction is filed. That was the case in Golwala's case. In Bharat Nidhi's case again the suits were for two different periods and in Roshan Din's case, the suit related to two different periods for recovery of rent and it was held that in such circumstances section 10 would not apply. As already said, none of these cases has any bearing so far as the facts of the present case are concerned.

    11. The present case is more in line with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors . AIR 1957 Cal. 727. where Chakravartti C.J, who spoke for the Court, observed:—

    “In my view, the principal matter in issue in the Calcutta suit is directly and substantially in issue in the Bombay suit, which is a suit previously instituted and that an unnecessary duplication of proceedings with the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered will occur, if the Calcutta suit is not stayed.”

    12. While dealing with section 10, the learned Judge observed:—

    “It is true that the section speaks of ‘same parties’, but it has been held that the ‘same parties’ mean ‘the parties as between whom the matter substantially in issue has arisen and has to be decided’. Complete identity of either the subject matter or the parties is not required.”

    13. The learned Chief Justice relied on Wahid-un-Nessa Bibi v. Zamin Ali Shah . ILR 42 All. 290. Jai Hind Iron Mart's case and Luxmi Bank Ltd. v. Hari Kissan . ILR 1941 Nag. 403., besides Durpaprasad's case. After considering the pros and cons of the matter and the conduct of the plaintiffs in filing the Ludhiana suit long after the Bombay suit, it appears to me that the interests of justice would be best served by staying the Ludhiana suit. The Bombay suit was filed as far back as 15th November, 1968. The written statement was filed by the defendants in that suit on 12th November, 1969 and the Ludhiana suit was filed on 31st August, 1970, it seems, as a counter blast to the Bombay suit.

    14. For the reasons recorded above, I allow this petition, quash the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and direct that, the Ludhiana suit be stayed till the Bombay suit is disposed of. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs.

    15. Petition allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Messrs C. Raman And Co. Bombay And Others v. Messrs Modern Motor Works, Ludhiana .
    (Nov 29, 1972)