Bhandari, C.J:— This petition raises a short point upon the interpretation of section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The facts of the case are simple and not in dispute. On the 21st December, 1948 one Shadi Lal brought an action against the Bharat Nidhi Limited for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 on account of damages sustained by the plaintiff for being dispossessed of a ginning factory during the period 25th September, 1947 to the 4th December, 1948. While this suit was pending in Court the plaintiff brought another suit for damages on similar grounds in respect of the period 21st December, 1948 to the 21st September, 1950.
3. The decision of the trial Court in the prior action was hotly contested and the appeals preferred by the plaintiff and the defendant are pending in this Court. On the 7th November, 1952 the defendant made an application that as the matters in controversy in both the suits were exactly the same, the second suit should be stayed, under the provisions of sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court declined to accede to the request and consigned the application to the Record Room. The defendant is dissatisfied with the order and has come to this Court in revision.
4. It is a well known rule of practice that a Court is at liberty to stay proceedings in a suit on account of pendency of another action when the parties, the subject-matter, the issues involved and the relief claimed in both the actions are substantially the same and when the judgment in one case will effectually dispose of the matters in controversy in the other. This rule has been accorded statutory recognition by the enactment of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code which is in the following terms:—
“10. No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in the Provinces having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of the Provinces established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before his Majesty in Council.”
5. The expression “matter in issue” appearing in this section is wide enough to embrace all matters in controversy between the parties including the relief claimed. In Jamini Nath Mallik v. Midnapur Zemindary Company . 1923 27 C.W.N 772., Rankin C.J, expressed the view that when two suits are for the recovery of cesses due for different periods, there is no substantial identity of the subject-matter. He observed as follows:—
“But it must be observed that a judgment for the recovery of subsequent cesses does not not differ merely as being for a different form of relief. It is the same kind of relief for an entirely separate subject-matter namely, a debt which was not in existence at all at the time of the previous suit. It does not follow, because the words ‘the same relief’ are no longer in section, that section 10 is applicable to suits for recovery of successive rents.”
6. The above view has been endorsed by the High Courts at Lahore and Madras and by the Chief Court of Oudh in Roshan Din v. Mst. Malan Bibi . A.I.R 1938 Lah. 502., Mohd. Afzal v. Mst. Sardar Begum . A.I.R 1949 Lah. 69., Velur Munuswami Mudaliar v. Darwaja Raghupati . A.I.R 1940 Mad. 7. and Chanan Kuer v. Sahdeo Singh . A.I.R 1929 Oudh 341.. As pointed out by Achhru Ram, J., in Dwarka Das v. Governor General of India in Council . A.I 1947 Lah. 28., in order to attract the provisions of section 10, there must be a complete identity of the entire subject-matter of the two suits or in other words, that every matter in dispute in one suit should be directly and substantially in issue in the other. As the matters in issue in the two suits now under consideration are not substantially the same the reliefs claimed in the two suits are for different periods and as the decision in the one action will not determine all the questions in the other, it seems to me that the provisions of section 10 do not apply and the petitioner was not entitled to claim as of right that the proceedings in the second suit should be stayed.
7. Mr. Bahl, who appears for the petitioner, invites my attention to a number of decisions in which it has been held that even though the provisions of section 10 do not apply, it is within the power of the Court, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 151, to grant a stay of proceedings on the ground of pendency of another action, vide Dwarka Das v. Governor General of India in Council, Kodumal Jethanand v. Tilak Ram . A.I.R 1929 Lah. 12. and Dhanraj Yugulkishore & Co. v. Babulal Ramchandra . A.I.R 1943 Bom. 206.. Following these decisions I am of the opinion that the proceedings in the second suit instituted by the plaintiff should be stayed until such time as the appellate Court has given its decision in regard to the matters in controversy arising in the first suit. I would order accordingly.
8. In view of this order Civil Revision No. 169 of 1953 is infructuous and is hereby dismissed.
9. There will be no order as to costs.
10. Order accordingly.