AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957,
  • 15(4)(i) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1957
  • Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965
  • Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954,
  • Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rule 25
  • Rule 3 of Railway Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954,
  • 1965 Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal.) Rules, 1965
  • Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955
  • Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules
  • 1964 the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955
  • Rule 3 of 1955 Conduct Rules. Rule 3 of 1964 Rules
  • Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956
  • Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
  • India, Civil Rule No. 1988 (W) of 1966
  • Rule 3 sub-clauses (i), (ii)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957,
  • 15(4)(i) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1957
  • Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965
  • Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954,
  • Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rule 25
  • Rule 3 of Railway Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954,
  • 1965 Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal.) Rules, 1965
  • Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955
  • Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules
  • 1964 the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955
  • Rule 3 of 1955 Conduct Rules. Rule 3 of 1964 Rules
  • Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956
  • Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
  • India, Civil Rule No. 1988 (W) of 1966
  • Rule 3 sub-clauses (i), (ii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is an erstwhile Income-tax Officer who challenged multiple departmental actions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The orders impugned included: suspension dated 2 September 1965; a memorandum and charge-sheet dated 9 September 1965; orders dated 30 April 1966, 18 July 1966 and 3 October 1966; an enquiry report dated 29 March 1967; a show cause notice dated 29 April 1968; and an order of removal dated 10 February 1969.

Relevant employment chronology in the opinion: appointed to officiate as Income-tax Officer from 22 November 1954; made quasi-permanent in July 1959; confirmed on 8 April 1960; served in Special Survey Circle and other postings. The substantive allegations related to the period 9 August 1958 to 10 May 1961 and arose under Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955.

The charge-sheet contained two charges; in respect of the first charge there were three sub-clauses: (a) dishonest and mala fide assessments causing wrongful loss of revenue; (b) gross negligence and/or inefficiency in discharge of official duties; and (c) tampering with official records. The enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner of all charges; the disciplinary authority agreed with the exoneration on charges 1(a) and 1(c) and on charge 2, but found charge 1(b) (gross negligence/inefficiency) established and subsequently removed the petitioner.

Procedural steps included requests for inspection of documents (letters dated 6 December 1965 and 14 April 1966), refusal in part (letter of 30 April 1966), promulgation of new rules in November 1964 and November 1965 with savings provisions, refusal of the petitioner's request to engage a lawyer (letter dated 3 October 1966), hearings on 26 October 1966 and 7 February 1967, the enquiry report delivered on 29 April 1968, representations by the petitioner (28 September 1968 and 4 January 1969), and final removal on 10 February 1969. The petitioner obtained a rule nisi under Article 226; the court ultimately dismissed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charges levelled against the petitioner (particularly the charge of gross negligence/inefficiency under Rule 3, CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1955) were vague or sufficiently particularised to permit a fair defence.
  2. Whether Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 was vague or ultra vires (i.e., incapable of being the basis of a charge).
  3. Whether the repeal of the 1955 Conduct Rules by the 1964 Conduct Rules affected the department's ability to proceed for alleged misconduct occurring before 1964.
  4. Whether the petitioner was denied reasonable opportunity of defence by refusal of inspection of documents and by denial of permission to be represented by a lawyer.
  5. Whether there was substantial compliance with departmental procedure (Office Manual, Chapter X (c) Paras 41–43) including the rule against prosecuting stale matters.
  6. Whether consultation with the Union Public Service Commission was required for the punishment imposed.
  7. Whether the show cause notice(s) complied with Article 311(2) and relevant departmental rules.
  8. Whether the order of removal was a speaking order or otherwise defective for lack of reasons.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The charge (particularly the one on gross negligence/inefficiency) was vague and lacked particulars about duties breached, acts constituting negligence and the applicable standard of efficiency.
  • Rule 3 of the 1955 Conduct Rules was vague, amounted to a mere pious expression, and was therefore an improper basis for disciplinary charges.
  • The 1955 Conduct Rules had been repealed by the 1964 Conduct Rules and therefore could not be applied to past conduct.
  • Inspection of certain allegedly relevant documents was wrongly denied, thereby denying reasonable opportunity to prepare a defence.
  • Permission to engage legal representation (a lawyer) was refused unreasonably, depriving the petitioner of a fair opportunity.
  • There was non-compliance with the Office Manual (substantial compliance required), particularly that stale matters (events older than three years) should not have been revived for charges.
  • The disciplinary authority ought to have consulted the Union Public Service Commission.
  • The second show cause notice was biased/ prejudiced and inadequate because it addressed only penalty; the petitioner contended that a fresh show cause should have been issued when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the enquiry officer.
  • The order of removal was not a speaking order and therefore defective.

Respondent's Arguments / Factual Responses in Record

  • The charge-sheet was accompanied by a detailed statement of allegations with dates, file numbers, assessees' names and circumstances; hence the charges were not vague.
  • Rule 3 of the 1955 Conduct Rules reflected enforceable standards of integrity and devotion to duty and was not void for vagueness.
  • Rule 25 of the 1964 Conduct Rules repealed prior corresponding rules prospectively and preserved actions taken under the earlier rules by deeming them taken under corresponding provisions of the new rules; allegations referring to conduct prior to 1964 were governed by the 1955 rules.
  • All relevant documents had been made available for inspection; the enquiry record and order-sheet entries (26 October 1966 and 13 December 1966) and the enquiry report indicated that inspection was completed and that the petitioner elected not to examine witnesses.
  • The discretion to permit a lawyer under Rule 15(5) (1957 Rules) was exercised reasonably in the circumstances; refusal did not amount to denial of reasonable opportunity. The enquiry was primarily documentary and the petitioner was himself legally qualified (LL.B and M.A.).
  • There was substantial compliance with the Office Manual and investigation showed necessity to examine prior assessments, so revival of earlier matters was justified.
  • No requirement to consult the Union Public Service Commission arose because the President was not the disciplinary authority in this case.
  • The show cause notice conformed to Article 311(2) and to Rule 15(4)(i)(b) of the 1965 Rules.
  • The reasons for removal could be ascertained not only from the final order but from the related memorandum/letter of 29 April 1968 where the disciplinary authority recorded detailed reasons for disagreement with the enquiry officer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Ananthanarnyanan v. General Manager, Southern Rly., AIR 1956 Mad 220 That charges must be clear and specific. Court acknowledged the principle but observed the Madras decision concerned a differently worded Rule and noted the Madras view on indefiniteness had been disapproved by the Supreme Court in a later case.
P. Ballakotiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 Supreme Court disapproval of the Madras High Court’s view on indefiniteness of a similar rule. Court relied on this authority to reject the argument that Rule 3 (as applied) was indefinite.
Amulya Ratan v. Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Rly., AIR 1961 Cal 40 That charges must be specific and give particulars. Accepted as a correct proposition, but the court held specificity must be judged in the context of the particular facts; here the statement of allegations supplied particulars.
Surath Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752 A person must be told clearly and definitely the allegations and the statement of allegations should give necessary particulars to enable defence. Court distinguished that case because there the statement of allegations was never sent; in the instant case detailed statement of allegations was provided, so the precedent did not assist the petitioner.
Sripati Ranjan Biswas v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1964 Cal 415 Interpretation of Rule 3 (integrity and devotion to duty): not vague; integrity and devotion have intelligible content. Cited approvingly; court adopted the view that Rule 3 is not vague and does not offend Articles 14 or 19.
Harbilas Biswas v. Union of India, Civil Rule No. 1988 (W) of 1966 (Cal), judgment 26-3-1970 Refusal to allow lawyer in departmental enquiry did not necessarily amount to denial of reasonable opportunity in certain factual contexts. Court relied on the factual conclusion that refusal to permit legal representation did not deny reasonable opportunity in the circumstances of a largely documentary enquiry.
Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, 65 Cal WN 361 : AIR 1961 Cal 1 (SB) Observations about assistance of lawyer in departmental enquiries (facts differ). Court noted facts of that case were entirely different and did not require detailed consideration; it did not change the outcome here.
Sreedhariah v. Dist. Supdt. of Police, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 473 Compliance of show cause notice with requirements of Article 311/departmental rules. Cited in support of the proposition that the type of show cause issued in this case complied with constitutional and departmental requirements.
Ghanshyamdas Srivastava v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 Madh Pra 132 Support for validity of the contested show cause procedure. Used to reinforce that the show cause notice in this case was in compliance with the constitutional provision and departmental rule cited.
State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612 Authority referenced by petitioner on show cause issue (court found it did not support petitioner's contention). Court stated the decision did not support the petitioner's argument that the form of show cause issued was inadequate.
Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 868 : AIR 1971 SC 862 Quasi-judicial authorities should indicate reasons for their orders (need for speaking orders). Court accepted the general proposition but held that reasons could be discerned from the order read with other documents and thus the order was not defective for lack of formal reasons in the final order itself.
Mahabir Prosad v. State of U.P., (1970) 1 SCC 764 : AIR 1970 SC 1302 Support for requirement that quasi-judicial orders indicate reasons. Listed among authorities; court held that here the reasons were ascertainable from related documents and memorandum and so the lack of detailed reasons in the removal order was not fatal.
Mohinder Singh Babbra v. State of Punjab, 1971 Lab IC 554 (Punj) Cases concerning speaking orders and administrative reasons. Cited for general proposition; court relied on the availability of reasons in connected documents to uphold the removal order.
Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, AIR 1970 Guj 1 (FB) Case law on adequacy of reasons in administrative/quasi-judicial decisions. Applied as part of the corpus supporting that reasons may be found in connected records and need not be worded formally in the final order if ascertainable elsewhere.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded issue by issue, applying legal principles and the record to each contention raised by the petitioner. The analysis in the opinion was as follows:

  1. On vagueness of the charges: the court observed that the charge-sheet was accompanied by a detailed statement of allegations listing specific assessments, dates, file numbers, names of assessees and circumstances. Given those particulars, the court held the question of vagueness must be judged in context and concluded the charges were not vague or indefinite. The court distinguished authority where a statement of allegations had not been supplied.
  2. On the contention that Rule 3 of the 1955 Conduct Rules was vague or a "pious wish": the court reviewed earlier authority (notably Sripati Ranjan Biswas), adopted a commonsense interpretation of "integrity" and "devotion to duty," and held that Rule 3 embodied enforceable standards and was not void for vagueness or contrary to Articles 14 or 19.
  3. On repeal and applicability of later Conduct Rules: the court referred to Rule 25 of the 1964 Conduct Rules (the repeal and saving clause). It interpreted the provision to mean that the 1964 Rules operate prospectively (they apply to government servants to whom those rules apply from their commencement) and that actions taken under repealed rules are saved by deeming them to have been taken under corresponding provisions of the new rules. As the alleged misconduct related to the period before commencement of the 1964 Rules, the 1955 Rules governed the charges; in any event, there were corresponding provisions in the 1964 Rules that mirrored the substance of Rule 3 of 1955.
  4. On denial of inspection of documents: the court examined the enquiry records and order-sheet endorsements. The order-sheet recorded that documents Nos.1–6 were admitted relevant and should be made available, and later entries indicated the petitioner completed inspection on 13 December 1966 and elected not to examine witnesses. The enquiry officer's report recorded that arrangements had been made, sample files could be inspected and that inspection had been completed. On that factual basis the court concluded relevant documents had been made available and that there had not been a denial of reasonable opportunity through denial of inspection.
  5. On refusal to permit legal representation: the court noted that Rule 15(5) of the 1957 Rules vested a discretion in the disciplinary authority to permit legal representation and that such discretion must be reasonably exercised. The court observed that whether refusal of a lawyer denies reasonable opportunity is essentially a question of fact; relying on analogous authority, and on the documentary nature of the enquiry (limited scope for oral testimony), together with the petitioner's own legal qualifications, the court concluded the refusal did not amount to denial of reasonable opportunity.
  6. On compliance with the Office Manual and staleness of charges: the court acknowledged the Office Manual's guidance that stale matters should not be revived but observed that, given the nature of the assessments under inquiry, it was necessary to investigate prior assessments to determine impropriety. The court found there had been substantial compliance with the departmental procedure in Chapter X(c).
  7. On consultation with the Union Public Service Commission: the court found no rule or provision requiring such consultation in the circumstances; consultation is required only where the President is the disciplinary authority, which was not the case here.
  8. On sufficiency and bias of the show cause notice: the court held that the second show cause notice complied with Article 311(2) and with Rule 15(4)(i)(b) of the 1965 Rules, and therefore the petitioner's contention that another show cause should have been issued or that the notice was biased was rejected.
  9. On adequacy of reasons (speaking order): the court accepted that quasi-judicial authorities should indicate reasons, but held that an order should not be struck down if the reasons can be ascertained from the order itself read with other documents. The court found that the Commissioner’s detailed memorandum/letter of 29 April 1968 explained the grounds of disagreement with the enquiry officer and that the final order of removal, read with those documents and the petitioner's representations, constituted sufficient reasons.

The court repeatedly grounded its factual findings in direct entries from the enquiry record (order-sheet entries dated 26 October 1966 and 13 December 1966, the enquiry report) and in the documentary sequence of show cause, representation and final order. Where the court cited case law, it did so to explain legal propositions (e.g., standards of specificity, interpretation of Rule 3, and the need for reasons) and to distinguish or align the present facts with prior authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Article 226 was dismissed; the rule nisi was discharged; any interim order was vacated. The court directed the department to file correct copies of certain order-sheets and, by consent, stayed operation of its dismissal for six weeks. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties: the removal order stands, subject to the six-week stay by consent; the petitioner's challenge was unsuccessful on all grounds argued in the opinion.
  • The court found there was no denial of reasonable opportunity in relation to inspection, legal representation and show cause procedure on the particular facts and documentary record in this case.
  • The court clarified (on the facts) that Rule 3 of the 1955 Conduct Rules is not void for vagueness and that corresponding provisions in later Conduct Rules operate prospectively while saving actions taken under repealed rules.
  • No broader novel legal precedent was established by this opinion; the court applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts and concluded that the departmental processes here were not vitiated.

Disposition and Miscellaneous Orders

  • The application was dismissed.
  • The rule nisi was discharged.
  • Any interim order was vacated.
  • There was to be no order as to costs.
  • The court directed the department to file correct copies of the order-sheets dated 26 October 1966 and 13 December 1966 and to lodge them as exhibits.
  • By consent of the parties, the operation of the dismissal was stayed for six weeks from the date of the order.

    Hari Prasad Singh v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal And Others Opposite Parties.

    1. This is an application by an erstwhile Income-tax Officer under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of suspension dated 2nd September, 1965, the memorandum dated 9th September, 1965 containing the charge-sheet against the said officer, the orders dated 30th April, 1966, 18th July, 1966, 3rd October, 1966, the enquiry report dated 29th March, 1967, the show cause notice dated 29th April, 1968 and the order of removal on the said officer dated 10th February, 1969. The petitioner was appointed to officiate as an Income-tax Officer, Class II Grade III of the Income-tax Department, Calcutta, with effect from 22nd November, 1954 Thereafter from 1956 to 1959 the petitioner served in various capacities in the districts of Bengal as Income-tax Officer as well as in Calcutta. In July, 1959 the petitioner was made quasi-permanent and with effect from 8th April, 1960 the petitioner was confirmed as the Income-tax Officer. On the 17th August, 1960 the petitioner was posted as the Income-tax Officer ‘E’ Ward, Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta. The petitioner also served the Special Survey Circle in various capacities as also in other districts of the Income-tax Department in Calcutta. In October, 1963 the petitioner was transferred to hold the charge of D and E Wards of District III-A, Calcutta. It will be relevant at this stage to state that with effect from 30th November, 1964 the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 were repealed by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The significance of this date would be evident later on. On the 2nd September, 1965 the order of respondent No. 1 was passed under Rule 12(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1957 placing the petitioner under suspension. This is one of the orders which is under challenge in this application. On the 9th September, 1965 the petitioner was charge-sheeted for violation of Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. It would be relevant at this stage to refer to the said charge-sheet. There were two charges against the petitioner. It was stated firstly, that the petitioner while functioning as Income-tax Officer in the Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta during the period from 9-8-58 to 10-5-61 contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, inasmuch as,

    (a) the petitioner made assessments in several cases in a dishonest and mala fide manner causing wrongful loss of revenue to the Government;

    (b) the petitioner displayed gross negligence and/or inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties; and

    (c) the petitioner tampered with the official records.

    As a result of the enquiry by the enquiring officer the petitioner was exonerated of all the charges under several heads mentioned above by the enquiring officer. The disciplinary authority however disagreed with the findings of the enquiring officer in so far as sub-clause (b) of charge 1 referred to hereinabove, that is to say, that the petitioner displayed gross negligence and/or inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties. The disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the said charge had been established. The second charge against the petitioner was that while functioning as Income-tax Officer in Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta during the period 9th August, 1958 to 10th May, 1961 he failed to comply with the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax regarding procedure to be followed in making the assessments and thereby contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. The enquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner in respect of this charge. The disciplinary authority has also agreed with the said finding of the enquiry officer. On the 17th September, 1965 the petitioner asked for inspection of certain documents. Thereafter on the 21st of September, 1965 the petitioner was asked to contact the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Head Quarters for inspection of documents. On the 20th November, 1965 Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal.) Rules, 1965 were promulgated by the President and the said Rules came into force on the 1st December, 1965. By the 1965 Rules the 1957 Rules were repealed. It would be necessary later on to refer to the terms in which the said Rules have been repealed in order to appreciate one of the contentions raised in this application. Between 6th December, 1965 and 14th April, 1966 the petitioner asked for inspection of certain documents. The said prayers of the petitioner are contained in two letters dated 6th December, 1965 which is Annexure F to the present petition and the letter dated 14th April, 1966 which is also Annexure F to the said petition. On the 30th April, 1966, the respondent No. 1, the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal I, refused to give the petitioner inspection of certain documents specified in the letters mentioned before on the ground that either these were not relevant or these were not available at that moment with the department. The said order of respondent No. 1 is contained in Annexure G to the present petition. On the 18th July, 1966 one Mr. G.B Seth, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range IV, Calcutta was appointed to present the case before the enquiry officer against the petitioner. On the 18th July, 1966 the respondent No. 1 appointed respondent No. 3 under Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 as the enquiring authority. Thereafter on the 30th September, 1966 the petitioner requested the respondent No. 1 to permit him to engage a lawyer for representing the petitioner's case and the said prayer was refused. It would be relevant again to refer later on to the terms in which the said prayer has been refused to appreciate certain contentions raised in this application. On the 26th October, 1966 the first hearing took place before the enquiry officer and on the 7th February, 1967 the second hearing took place. On the 29th April, 1968 the petitioner received from respondent No. 1 a copy of the enquiry report submitted by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 1. In the said report respondent No. 3 found the petitioner innocent of all the charges, as mentioned hereinbefore. In the said notice, however, it was stated by respondent No. 1 that he agreed with the findings of respondent No. 3 in so far as it related to charges 1(a) and 1(c) and charge No. 2. The respondent No. 1, however, intimated to the petitioner he had provisionally come to the conclusion that No. 1(b) had been proved differing from the finding made by the respondent No. 3. The petitioner was given an opportunity of making representation. The petitioner showed cause on the 28th September, 1968. There was a further representation by the petitioner on the 4th January, 1969. On the 10th February, 1969 the respondent No. 1 passed the order removing the petitioner from service. Thereafter this application was moved under Article 226 of the Constitution and a rule nisi was obtained

    2. Counsel for the petitioner raised several contentions in this case. The first contention that requires consideration is that the charges are vague, specially the charge in respect of which the petitioner has been found guilty. As mentioned hereinbefore the said charge was that the petitioner had contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 inasmuch as he had displayed gross negligence and inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties. It was contended that no particulars had been given of what was his duty and what acts he committed which might be termed as negligent. It was also urged that it had not been clearly stated what was the standard of efficiency and duty. I am unable to accept this contention. The said charge-sheet was sent along with the statement of allegations. The statement of allegations have detailed instances of several assessments and the circumstances under which the said assessments had been made. From the facts enumerated in the said statement of allegations which gave particulars of the dates of assessments, the file numbers, the names of the assessees and the circumstances as appearing from the documents. The said facts were the basis upon which the charge of negligence was based. The question whether the charges were vague or not, cannot be judged in isolation. It was urged that there was no standard of duty or efficiency. I am of opinion that such standard of duty or efficiency, must be judged from a common-sense point of view prevalent in a particular office or a particular department. Counsel for the petitioner referred me to several decisions. He first drew my attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of R. Ananthanarnyanan v. General Manager, Southern Rly., AIR 1956 Mad 220. There it was observed by the learned Judge that charges must be clear and specific. In so far as that proposition is concerned no exception can be taken to that proposition. In the aforesaid decision the Madras High Court was concerned with the charge made in the context of Rule 3 of Railway Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954, The said Rule was differently worded from the present Rule with which I am concerned in this application. Furthermore, in so far as the Madras High Court expressed the view that the said Rule 3 was indefinite even when read in the context of expression ‘national security’, the game view has not been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ballakotiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232. Counsel for the petitioner then referred me to the decision of Sinha J. (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Amulya Ratan v. Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Rly., AIR 1961 Cal 40. There Sinha J. expressed the opinion that the charges must be specific and must give all particulars. That is a proposition which is well-settled and I respectfully agree with the said observation. But whether charges are specific and give all particulars must be judged on the context of a particular charge and particular set of facts. Reliance was then placed on the decision in the case of Surath Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCC 548 : AIR 1971 SC 752. There the Supreme Court observed that if a person was not told clearly and definitely what the allegations were on which the charges preferred against him were founded, he could not possibly by projecting Ms own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that might be to contemplation of authorities to be established against him. The Supreme Court observed that the whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations was to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence, There, it is to be noted, that the statement of allegations was never sent to the delinquent in that case. In the instant case, as mentioned herein-before, the charges were supported by a statement of allegations where detailed facts have been stated. Therefore, in my opinion, the aforesaid decision cannot help the petitioner. Having considered the propositions of law mentioned herein-before and having considered the charges in this case, as well the fact that in the instant case the charges were supported by statement of allegations wherein detailed facts of several assessments had been given, I am of opinion that the charges in respect of which the petitioner had been found guilty cannot be termed as vague or indefinite. The next contention that was urged was that Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 was vague and as such ultra vires. It was secondly contended that the said rule contained an expression of pious wish and could not be the subject-matter of any charge.

    3. R. 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956 states as follows:—

    “Rule 3. General— Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty.”

    4. Rules of conduct may and do vary from time to time. They, however, at a particular point of time reflect the enlightened conscience of a society. Simply because, however, such rules are variable from age to age it cannot be said that at a particular point of time they become either non-existent or vague. They must at all times be judged from a robust commonsense point of view on a reasonable standard. In this connection it may be appropriate to refer to the observations of Banerjee, J, in the case of Sripati Ranjan Biswas v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1964 Cal 415 at p. 417. Considering the same identical Rule, that is to say, Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules B.N Banerjee, J, observed:

    “Integrity is uprightness, honesty or purity. Devotion to duty is faithful service. Modern approaches to life have changed many ideals, which used to be held sacred. Such approaches have also worked a change in our sense of the sublime. But even then the idea of right and wrong has not been forgotten and the difference between honesty and dishonesty, fidelity and faithlessness wholly lost. It is sometimes argued with sophistry that it is difficult to prescribe the outside limits of integrity in a complex system of modern administration, in which considerations of expediency occasionally outweigh other considerations. Considerations of expediency may be irresistible at times but their evils are merely to be put up with and not to be extolled or prescribed as standards of life and work. If a public officer is required to maintain integrity and to be devoted to duty, he is merely asked to keep within the bounds of that administrative decency, which goes by the name of civilized administration. In my opinion, no vagueness or indefiniteness attaches to the language used in Rule 3 above quoted. A public Officer is not at liberty to amass fortune by taking illegal gratifications, even though willingly given. In the view taken by me, Rule 3 does not offend against Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.”

    5. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. Counsel for the petitioner in this connection also referred me to the decision in the case of AIR 1956 Mad 220 for the argument that the Rule was vague. It must, however, be remembered that in so far as the Madras High Court expressed the opinion of indefiniteness about the Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954, the same has been disapproved by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to hereinbefore. In view of what has been said hereinbefore and the rule read in the manner I have indicated above it appears to me that the said rule does not contain a mere pious hope but a clear mandate for the rule of conduct, and as such is not void on the ground of vagueness.

    6. Counsel for the petitioner next contended that the Conduct Rules of 1955 were repealed by Conduct Rules of 1964 and, as such, the same became inoperative. Rules of 1964 came into effect on the 30th November as mentioned hereinbefore. It was, therefore, urged that the petitioner could not be proceeded for breach of 1955 Conduct Rules in the manner as had been done. To consider this argument it would be relevant to refer to Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rule 25 provides as follows:

    “25. Repeal and Saving— Any Rules corresponding to these rules in force immediately before the commencement of these rules and applicable to the Government servants to whom these rules apply are hereby repealed;

    Provided that any order made or action taken under the rules so repealed shall be deemed to have been made or taken under the corresponding provisions of these rules.”

    7. It would be apparent from the terms of the repeal that only rules applicable to the government servants after coming into operation of 1964 rules have been repealed. Rules of 1964 cannot be operative in respect of government servants for their past conduct. The significant words are ‘to whom these apply’. Rule is operative in future. It is prospective. It does not deal with the past conduct of the government servants. Therefore, strictly it does not apply to the government servants in respect of conduct prior to 1964. Therefore, from that point of view, in this case as the allegations of the charges related to period prior to the coming into operation of the 1964 rules, the said rules of 1964 would not apply and the petitioner would be governed by the 1955 rules. The second aspect of the matter is that if any action is taken under the repealed rules that action shall be deemed to have been taken under the corresponding provisions of the new rules. Under the new rules there is a corresponding provision. Rule 3 sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together provide the same thing in substance as Rule 3 of 1955 Conduct Rules. Rule 3 of 1964 Rules is in the following terms:

    “3. General— (1) Every Government servant shall at all times—

    (i) maintain absolute integrity;

    (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and

    (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.

    (2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority;

    (ii) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and shall, where he is acting under such direction, obtain the direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon thereafter as possible.”

    8. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention on behalf of the petitioner.

    9. The main contention that requires consideration in this case is whether reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioner to defend himself at the enquiry. Counsel for the petitioner urged several points in support of his argument that no reasonable opportunity had been given. He first urged that in denying inspection, particularly Inspection of the documents as mentioned hereinbefore, there had been denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. As I have mentioned before by a letter dated the 6th of December, 1965 the petitioner had asked for inspection of certain documents. These were additional documents, namely, additional to the documents which had been relied on by the prosecution to prove the alleged guilt of the petitioner. The said documents, that is to say, the documents which the prosecution wanted to rely have been given inspection. By another letter dated 14th April, 1966, the petitioner again asked for several other documents. By the letter dated 30th April, 1966, inspection of certain documents was allowed by the Commissioner but certain documents were refused inspection on the ground that some of these were not available at that moment and some of these were irrelevant. Looking at the list of the documents, it appears to me that the claim made by the petitioner in respect of some of these was exaggerated. Even, however, there were certain documents which prima facie appear to me to be relevant. The petitioner has alleged in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the petition that the petitioner had not been given inspection of all the relevant and necessary documents. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents it has been stated that all relevant and necessary documents had been given inspection and some of the documents which were not allowed inspection were irrelevant. In this state of affairs counsel for the department produced before me the records of the enquiry. It appears from the said records produced that on the 26th October, 1966, the petitioner made another application for inspection including some of the documents which he had claimed previously. On the 26th October, 1966, in the order sheet there was an endorsement by the enquiry officer that documents Nos. 1 to 6 were admitted to be relevant by the officer and should be given inspection and so far as other documents were concerned, certain other directions were given. Thereafter it is recorded in the order sheet that on the 13th December, 1966, the petitioner had completed inspection of the documents and had said that he did not wish to examine any witness. In this connection it would be also relevant to refer to the enquiry report which appears at page 105 of the present petition. In paragraph 5 the enquiring officer has stated that on the 26th October, 1966, that is to say, when he made the application, the petitioner was heard in person in presence of the presenting officer regarding the relevancy of the documents and the petitioner had stated that he wanted only 453 files to prove from them that the orders made by the other officers in the same district were similar to those made by the petitioner which formed the subject matter of the enquiry. It was suggested to the petitioner that he could inspect certain sample files and then he was asked to give a list of such files to the presenting officer for making arrangement for inspection. On the 13th December, 1966, in the enquiry report it has been stated by the presenting officer that Shri Singh had completed the inspection of the documents. Therefore, it appears to me that reading the enquiry report in the context of the entries in the order sheet the petitioner had inspection of all the relevant documents — documents which he considered relevant for inspection and which he insisted for production at the time of the enquiry. There was some argument by counsel for the petitioner that these documents were not the original documents mentioned in the letters previously referred to hereinbefore. However, I am not able to appreciate this contention. The list of the documents had been mentioned and reading the letter of the 26th October in conjunction with the entries in the order sheet and in conjunction with the remarks of the enquiry officer in the enquiry report it is clear to me that all relevant documents had been given for inspection to the petitioner. I must further observe that the petitioner had not stated in this petition the fact that the petitioner had made further prayers for inspection during the enquiry and that he was allowed inspection of certain documents. Such conduct on the part of the petitioner does not disclose a free and frank approach to the Court.

    10. The next contention of counsel for the petitioner on the ground of reasonable opportunity was about the fact that the prayer for being represented by a lawyer had been refused unreasonably. Under Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, there was a discretion with the disciplinary authority to permit the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer in certain contingency. That discretion must always be carefully exercised. In this case firstly a contention was raised that that discretion had not been exercised at all inasmuch as in refusing the prayer by the letter dated the 3rd of October, 1966, the respondent No. 1 had completely misdirected himself. But reading the letter dated 3rd October, 1966. I am unable to accept that contention. My attention was drawn to a decision by Anil Kumar Sen, J. in the case of Harbilas Biswas v. Union of India, Civil Rule No. 1988 (W) of 1966 — judgment delivered on 26-3-1970 (Cal). There the enquiry was held against a delinquent officer more or less under similar circumstances and the delinquent in that case had been refused the assistance of a lawyer. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that there was no denial of reasonable opportunity in the facts and circumstances of that case. Whether by refusal of the assistance of a lawyer there is any denial of reasonable opportunity is essentially a question of fact. It must, however, be emphasized that the rule enjoins for the officer to exercise a discretion and before exercising the discretion the officers must consider the complexity of the case and the nature of the case. I must observe that practically in all the departmental enquiry cases that have come up before me I have hardly come across any instance where representation by a lawyer has been permitted. It is sometimes urged that the rule had been made nugatory by the manner in which the discretion was being exercised in refusing the assistance by a lawyer to the delinquents in the departmental enquiries. Such impression should not be created and must be attempted to be avoided. In this case, however, the enquiry was in respect of certain assessments. It was in respect certain assessment in the Income-tax Department and the most relevant fact was the general method of doing assessment in the department, there was hardly any scope of oral testimony. Taking these factors into consideration and taking into consideration the fact that as a result of the enquiry proceedings, the delinquent was found not guilty, I am unable to accept the contention that the petitioner, was, in this case denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself by refusal of the assistance by a lawyer, it has to be remembered that in his representation to the respondent No. 1, the delinquent had not chosen to ask for a personal hearing or to be represented by a lawyer. It also appears from the records that the delinquent himself was a qualified person. He has a degree of the Bachelor of Law and also a degree of Master of Arts, University of Calcutta. Reference may be made to the first annexure of the affidavit in reply from which the aforesaid qualifications of the delinquent would appear. Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the observations of the Special Bench in the case of Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, 65 Cal WN 361 : (AIR 1961 Cal 1) (SB). The facts of that case were entirely different and, therefore, it is not necessary for me to consider the said aforesaid decision in detail. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there has been no denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner by not affording to him the assistance of a lawyer in the enquiry proceedings.

    11. The next contention about the denial of reasonable opportunity was the non-compliance with the provisions of the Office Manual. It was urged that the said Office Manual if not mandatory was directory and there should have been substantial compliance with the said procedure for holding departmental enquiry laid down in the Office Manual. My attention was drawn to Ch. X (c) to Paras 41, 42 & 43. The only point that was urged in respect of breach of the Office Manual was that the charges should have been related to the offences of recent origin. It was urged that events which had taken place more than three years prior to the framing of the charges should not have been the basis for the framing of the charges. Looking at the nature of the charges it appears to me that the rule enjoined in substance that stale matters should not be revived. In this case after the assessments had been made, in order to find out whether these had been improperly made it was necessary to find that out by proper investigation before framing the charges. Taking that factor into consideration I am of the opinion that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the procedure for departmental enquiry as laid down in Chapter X (c) of the Office Manual.

    12. It was next contended that there was a violation of the rights of the petitioner in not consulting the Union Public Service Commission in respect of this punishment. I am unable to agree. It was only when the President was the disciplinary authority, consultation with the Union Pulic Service Commission was required. In this connection no rule or provision of law has been shown to me which enjoys consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.

    13. Next contention of counsel for the petitioner was that the 2nd show cause notice mentioned hereinbefore indicated that the same was biased and prejudiced. No grounds in support of this contention was advanced. I am unable to accept this contention.

    14. Next contention of counsel for the petitioner was that there should have been another show cause notice, because, counsel for the petitioner contended that it was the disciplinary authority who was disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. Counsel further contended that the 2nd show cause notice was against the penalty proposed and, therefore, it did not offer any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. I am, however, unable to accept this contention. Article 311 of the Constitution, sub-clause (2) specifically provides for this kind of show cause notice. This is in compliance with Article 311(2). Reference may be made to the observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sreedhariah v. Dist. Supdt. of Police, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 473 at para 18, and to the case of Ghanshyamdas Srivastava… v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh…., AIR 1968 Madh Pra 132. The said show cause notice was also in compliance with R. 15(4)(i) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that there should have been another show cause notice in the facts and circumstances of this case. I am also unable to accept the contention that the show cause notice was bad because it was only against the penalty proposed. Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the case of State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, AIR 1963 SC 1612. I am, however, of the opinion that the aforesaid decision does not support the said contention of counsel for the petitioner.

    15. Next contention of counsel for the petitioner was that the order of removal was not a speaking order and, as such, was bad. He drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 868 : AIR 1971 SC 862, to the decision in the case of Mahabir Prosad v. State of U.P, (1970) 1 SCC 764 : AIR 1970 SC 1302, to the decision in the case of Mohinder Singh Babbra v. State of Punjab, 1971 Lab IC 554 (Punj) and to the decision in the case of Testeels Ltd. v. N.M Desai, AIR 1970 Guj 1 (FB) and to the decision in the case of AIR 1960 Andh Pra 473. It is true that the quasi judicial authorities should indicate in the orders the reasons for making the orders. In this case, however, the final order of removal, that is, Annexure ‘C’ cannot and should not be considered in isolation. It is not necessary for me to refer to the aforesaid decisions in detail because in so far as the aforesaid decisions lay down the proposition that the quasi judicial authorities should indicate the reasons, I am in respectful agreement with the said proposition. But if the reasons can be found out either from the order itself or from other documents it would not be proper to strike down the order merely because the formal reasons had not been recorded in the order itself. In the instant case the order of removal cannot and should not be read in isolation. This has to be considered along with the letter dated 29th of April, 1966 whereby the Commr. had given detailed reasons for disagreement with the enquiring officer. If annexure ‘A’ is read in conjunction with annexure ‘L’, then it would be apparent what are the reasons that impelled the Commissioner to pass the final order.

    16. Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the order dated 10th of February, 1969, the Commissioner has stated that a representation had been made and he had considered the representation and that was the representation of the petitioner in which the petition had stated that the finding that the disagreement with the enquiring officer was merely based on suspension, surmise, conjecture and presumption. The Enquiring Officer has considered that contention and has not been able to accept the same. The disciplinary authority has referred to his reasons recorded in the Memorandum dated 29th of April, 1968. Read in the aforesaid light, it cannot be said that the order for removal passed by the disciplinary authority did not state the reasons and it suffered from the infirmity that it was not a speaking order. I am, therefore, unable to accept this last contention of counsel for the petitioner.

    17. This application as, therefore, dismissed.

    18. Rule nisi is discharged.

    19. Interim order, if any, is vacated.

    20. There will be no order as to costs.

    21. I direct the Dept, to file a correct copy of the order sheets dated 26th of October, 1966 and 13th of December, 1966. Let the correct copies of the order sheet along with the correct copy of the letter dated 26th of October, 1966 be kept as exhibits in this Court.

    22. By consent of parties, there will be a stay of operation of this order from date for six weeks.

    23. Application dismissed.

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    Hari Prasad Singh v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Jul 1, 1971)