P.R. Ramachandra Menon,J.
Constitutional validity of the Kerala Protection of River Banks and
Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 ('Sand Act' in short); the
Rules framed under Sec. 26 of the Said Act and the relevant
provisions of the Ordinance bearing No.38/10 whereby the provisions
regarding the confiscation and the further steps have been detailed
and incorporated as per Sections 23 and 23A to 23D, is under
challenge in most of these cases, particularly the Appeals and some of
the writ petitions; while the other cases have been tagged on with the
former group. The main contention is that, it is beyond power and
competence of the State, as the entire topic with regard to the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
legislation for minor minerals has been taken over by the Union as
enlisted under Entry No.54 of List I; giving no room for the State to
legislate on the same subject with reference to Entry No.23 of List II
of the 7th Schedule of the Constitut of India.
2. The challenge raised before this Court takes its origin from
the orders passed by the concerned District Collector of various
districts, pursuant to seizure of the vehicles, in which the river sand
was being transported, contrary to the relevant provisions of the
'Sand Act', arriving at a finding in this regard and making it known
under Rule 27(3) that the vehicle could be released on payment of
the amount, equal to the value of the vehicle as fixed by the
District Collector to the 'River Management Fund' (along with the
fine in some cases); lest it should lead to further proceedings.
3. In the concerned Writ Petitions which form the subject
matter of the relevant Writ Appeals, the challenge raised by the
petitioners, with regard to the power and competence of the District
Collector to order confiscation of the vehicles and also as to the power and
competence of the State to pass the 'Sand Act' and Rules thereunder,
which are allegedly ultra vires to the 'MMDR Act' [The Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation)Act,1957] and Rules made by
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the State invoking the power under Section 15 of the said Act (The
Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1967) was repelled by the
learned Single Judge, holding that the validity of the 'Sand
Act'/Rules stands already upheld by the decision rendered by this
Court as reported in Subramanian vs. State of Kerala (2009(1)
KLT 77). The appeals have been preferred stating that the
observations made by the learned Single Judge are not correct and
that the decision rendered by the learned single Judge in 2009(1)
KLT 77 (cited supra) requires re-consideration.
4. The arguments on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioners
were led mainly by learned Counsel Mr.Sunny Mathew and Mr. Babu
S. Nair, while the case of the respondents/State was asserted by Mr.
Renjith Thampan, the learned Addl. Advocate General. Both the
sides were heard at length, with reference to the facts, law and the
judicial precedents cited in support thereof.
5. As pointed out already, the challenge raised from the part
of the appellants/ petitioners is mainly that the 'Sand Act'/Rules is
beyond the legislative competence of the State, in view of the 'MMDR
Act' enacted to provide development and regulation of mines and
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
minerals under the control of the Union by virtue of Entry 54* of List I
of 7th Schedule of Constitution of India. It is also pointed out that
the power of a State to legislate on the subject involving mines and
minerals as provided in Entry 23** of List II of 7th Schedule, is
obviously subject to Entry 54 of List I and since the Parliament has
already declared the expediency in public interest to have the
legislation and control to be vested with the Centre ( by virtue of
the declaration under Section 2 of the MMDR Act), the entire topic
has been taken over by the Central Government, which is very
much inclusive of 'minor minerals' as well (as defined under Section 3
(e) of the MMDR Act) and as such, nothing is left out to be legislated by
the State, resorting to Entry 23 of the State List (List II of 7th Schedule),
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
54* Regulation of mines and minerals development to the extent
to which such regulation and development under the control of the
Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest.
23** Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the
provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development
under the control of the Union.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
submits the learned Counsel for the appellants/petitioners. Reliance
is sought to be placed mainly on the decisions rendered by the Apex
Court in Baijnath Kedia vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1970 SC
1436), India Cement Ltd vs. State of Tamilnadu [(1990) 1
SCC 12] & Orissa Cement Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (AIR
1991 SC 1676). It is further contended that, though the
preamble of the 'Sand Act' refers to protection of river banks/ river
beds, from large scale dredging of river sand and to protect their
bio-physical environmental system, the Statute essentially governs
the removal of river sand and the matters connected therewith and
hence it is a colourable exercise of power. Reliance is sought to be
placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Saurashtra
Cement and Chemical Industries vs. Union of India (AIR
2001 SC 8) as well.
6. It is argued from the part of the learned Counsel for the
appellants/petitioners that, even if the legislative competence is
held in the affirmative, referring to some or other source of power to
enact the 'Sand Act' and the rules, the relevant provisions,
particularly as to the 'confiscation' and to impose fine are beyond
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the competence, power and jurisdiction of the Revenue authorities.
It is stated that confiscation can only be pursuant to an order of the
competent Court and no such power can be exercised by the
District Collector without an order of conviction based on evidence
adduced before the Court, upon a 'complaint in writing' preferred
by the 'authorised officer' in this regard. Referring to the mandate
under Section 21 of the Central Act and Rule 59 of the Kerala Minor
Mineral Concession Rules ( framed by the State invoking the power
under Sec.15 of the 'MMDR Act'), it is contended that no Court shall
take cognizance of any offence punishable under the said Rules,
except upon a complaint in writing made by a person authorised by
the State Government in this behalf as published in the Gazette and
since such power is exclusively vested upon a competent Court, the
Scheme of the 'MMDR Act/Rules' (framed by the State under
Section 15 - 'KMMC Rules' in short) cannot be watered
down/modified/varied in any manner by the State conferring such
power upon the revenue authorities, substituting or dispensing with
the role of the Court in this regard.
7. It is contended that the revenue authorities do not have
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the power to impose any 'fine' or 'imprisonment' as punishment,
which power is vested with the Court. With reference to the Central
Act (MMDR Act) and 'KMMC Rules' made by the State, the learned
Counsel for the appellants/petitioners further submits that the
MMDR Act/Rules form a self-contained and exhaustive code, so as
to deal with the necessity for obtaining the requisite
permits/passes for raising or removal/transportation of the minor
minerals and also as to the consequences to follow, in case of any
violation. Specific reference is made to Section 21 of the 'MMDR Act'
prescribing the penalties and also to Rule 58 of the Kerala Minor
Mineral Concession Rules in this regard. It is stated that the
penalty prescribed under Section 20 of the 'Sand Act' is rather
otiose, in view of the position already taken care of by the 'MMDR
Act'/KMMC Rules. Similarly, it is contended that by virtue of Section
21(4A) of the Central Act, Section 23 of the State Act (now re-
numbered as Section 23A in Ordinance 38/10) providing for
confiscation is 'non est'. Reliance is sought to be placed on the
decision reported in AIR 2004 SC 2647 (Constitution Bench)
(Association of Natural Gas vs. Union of India.), particularly
paragraph 41 and 43 by the learned Counsel Mr. Babu S. Nair, who
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
made the submissions in this regard.
8. In response to various contentions raised from the part of
the appellants/petitioners, the learned Addl. Advocate General
submits that the idea and understanding of the
appellants/petitioners as to the scope of the 'Sand Act/Rules' and
the area occupied by the 'MMDR Act' with the rules framed under
Section 15 thereunder, are quite wrong and misconceived and that
they operate in two entirely different spheres. It is pointed out that
the 'Sand Act', as discernible from the preamble itself is an Act to
protect the river banks and river beds from large scale dredging
of river sand and to protect their biophysical environment system
and regulate the removal of river sand and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto; whereas the 'MMDR Act' ( Act 67 of
1957) is an Act to provide for the development and regulation of
mines and minerals under the control of the Union. Referring to the
necessity to preserve the virtues of Nature, applying the Public
Trust Theory and Precautionary Principle and also the specific
observations of the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath
[(1997)1 SCC 388] and in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
others [(2004) 12 SCC 118], it is pointed out that the purpose of
the enactment made by the State stands entirely on a different
pedestal, which is essentially to protect the river, river banks and
bio-physical environment, while the reclamation of river sand is
incidental, in turn, to be regulated. It is also stated that unlike the
mining activities contemplated under the 'MMDR Act' or the Rules
framed thereunder, the reclamation of river sand and regulatory
measures are in respect of the permissible activities which could be
pursued by the local authorities who are the owners; the rivers
(which term is inclusive of river beds) being vested with the
concerned local authorities by virtue of Section 218 of the Kerala
Panchayat Raj Act and Section 208A of the Kerala Municipality
Act. The right of the petitioners/appellants arises only on the sale
of the river sand by the concerned local authorities, on the
strength of valid passes and subject to control and regulatory
measures exercised by Kadavu Committee/District Expert
Committee etc .
9. The learned Addl. Advocate General, with reference to the
legislative history, submits that this Court had time and again
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
alerted the Government as to the necessity to bring about sufficient
regulatory measures to protect the rivers/river banks/environment
from ecological degradation/diversion/drying out and it was
accordingly, that appropriate Government Orders were issued in
1993 followed by other relevant orders in the due course. Later,
specific directions were given by a Division Bench of this Court as
per the decision reported in 2002(1) KLT 723 (Association for
Environment Protection (Regd. ) vs. State of Kerala). It was
taking note of all these turn of events that the State badly felt the
necessity to bring about an exhaustive enactment to protect the
rivers/river banks and the bio-physical environment system,
regulating the removal of the river sand in a systematic and
scientific manner, on the recommendation of the Expert Committee
to be constituted in this regard. The 'Sand Act' was enacted by the
State providing for the constitution of Expert Committees like
'District Expert Committee' (to be constituted with various
officers/authorities from different fields as mentioned in clauses (a)
to (o) of section 3) and 'Kadavu Committee' , (consisting of
different members specified under clause (a) to (i) of Section 4),
simultaneously prescribing the specific powers of the said
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Committees as provided under Section 9 and 11 respectively of the
Act. Reference is also made to the provisions like S.14 stipulating
the control on the sand price;. Sec. 15- obligations of the Local
authorities to maintain the Kadavu or river banks in safe condition;
Sec. 16 - River Bank Development Plan; Sec.17- River
Management Fund and issuance of passes; Section 19- providing to
transfer the funds collected by the District Collector to River
Management Fund; Sec. 29- Sand auditing, enabling the
Government to ensure protection of every river, by providing for
periodical measurement of the quantity of sand available for
removal by such methods and the manner as may be prescribed.
Further reference is made to other relevant provisions as well and it
is asserted that the source of power for the said enactments, is
mainly referable to Entry 17 of List II of 7th schedule, also read with
Entries 5 and 23 of the very same List . Referring to the scope of
the 'pith and substance' theory as explained by the Apex court in
Union of India vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers'
College (2002 (8) SCC 228) and the Entry 29 of 11th Schedule as
to the necessity for maintenance of community assets coupled with
powers and responsibilities of the local authority/Panchayat under
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Article 243G of the Constitution of India, the learned Addl.
Advocate General submits that the State enactment is perfectly
within the four walls of law and the decision rendered by the
learned single judge of this Court in 2009(1) KLT 77 (cited
supra), sustaining the validity of the Act/Rules thereunder, does not
call for any interference.
10. With regard to the contentions of the appellants/petitioners
that there cannot be any 'Confiscation' without an order of
conviction by a Court of law and also as to the power and
procedure under section 21(4A) of the 'MMDR Act (allegedly making
the power and procedure under Section 23 of the 'Sand Act' non
est), the learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the above
two provisions are not similar and that they do not operate in the
same field. While Section 21(4A) is rather of criminal in nature ( to
be pursued by a Magistrate on a complaint preferred by the
authorised officer in writing), the power and procedure under
Section 23 (now substituted by Sec.23A of Ordinance 38 /2010) are
quasi civil proceedings, which could be pursued by an Executive
Magistrate/Sub Divisional Magistrate without complaint and
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
irrespective of the fact whether prosecution has been initiated or
not. It is also pointed out that unlike Section 102 of the Cr.P.C., no
report needs to be filed before the Magistrate in the case of the
latter and the role of the Magistrate comes into picture only later.
Under the 'Sand Act', the matter could be compounded even before
filing any complaint by the authorised officer before the competent
Court. This is a markable deviation from other statutes like Section
22 (2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Section 53 (A)(2) of the
Kerala Abkari Act, Section 52 (2) of the Forest Act etc. where a
report is to be preferred before the Magistrate on seizure of the
property/vehicle; to be followed by the consequential proceedings.
Even under the MMDR Act, no such report needs to be made before
the Magistrate except under sub section 4 of section 22. Reference
is made to AIR 2004 SC 2915 (Karnataka Rare Earth vs. Sr.
Geologist, Dept of Mines and Geology).(Paragraph 7 ), 2004
(4) SCC 129 (State of W.B. and others vs. Sujit Kumar Rana)
(paragraphs 36 and 43); the decision rendered by a Division Bench
of this Court in Moosakoya vs. State of Kerala (2008(1) KLT
538) (paragraph No. 3 and 4), and the decision of a learned Judge
of this Court reported in 1999 (2) KLT 836 (Sasidharan vs.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Forest Range Officer) (paragraph 13)
11. With reference to Sec. 21(4) of the 'MMDR Act', the
learned Addl. Advocate General submits that no notification has
been issued by the Central Government notifying the officer or
authority specifically empowered to seize the material/tools/vehicles
on contravention of the statutory prescription and that similar
lacuna, inadequacy and inapplicability is very much there in the
'MMDR Act' and also in the Rules framed by the State under
Section 15 of the said Act, which in turn do not serve the situation
to meet the requirement as taken care of by the 'Sand Act'/Rules.
Even if any such notification has been issued by the Central
Government under sub section (4) of Section 21, it is argued that
the situations contemplated under the two enactments are entirely
different and that there is no encroachment by the State to the field
of the Union in any manner. It is also pointed out that, though
power is conferred on the State Government to make rules for
'preventing' illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals
by way of Sec. 23C (of the MMDR Act), such power does not provide
for any 'confiscation' and that the power of 'confiscation' is provided
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
only on committing the offence, when a complaint has to be filed
before the concerned Magistrate and 'confiscation' can only be as
ordered by the Court. Similarly, reference is also made to sub
rules (3) and (4) of Rule 58 dealing with the 'penalties' in the Kerala
Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1967, pointing out that the said
rules only refer to 'seizure' and no power of 'confiscation' is provided
anywhere therein, in respect of a Minor Mineral.
12. Referring to the observations made by the learned Single
Judge in 2009 (1) KLT 77 (cited supra), (paragraph Nos. 42, 43,
46 and 47) and the Scheme of the Constitution, the learned Addl.
Advocate General submits that the question of repugnancy is not at
all involved for the reason that such question will arise only when
the enactment is made by the Union as well as by the State with
reference to any entry as contained in the Concurrent list (List III of
7th Schedule of the Constitution of India), which is not the position
herein as the Central Legislation is with reference to Entry No.54 of
List I, while the State Legislation is based on the 'source of power'
as derived from Entry No.17 of List II read with Entry 5, 23 and 64
of the very same List, which hence stand on two different pedestals
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
without transgressing to the realm of the other, in any manner,
and hence liable to be sustained by virtue of their separate scope,
object and existence.
13. Mr. Sunny Mathew, the learned Counsel appearing for the
appellants/petitioners in some cases submits that the 'legislative
history' or 'legislative bonafides' is not a relevant factor on the
competence of legislature, as held by the Constitution Bench of the
Apex Court in K.C.G. Narayan Deo vs. State of Orissa (AIR
1953 SC 375) (paragraph 9). Reference is also made to the
decision of another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in
R.M.D.C.(Mysore) Private Ltd. vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1962
SC 594)(paragraph 14). The learned Counsel further submits that it
is not a matter of repugnancy, but a matter of total lack of
jurisdiction, as the entire topic of Minor Minerals has been taken
over by the Union under Entry 54 of List 1 and no residual extent is
left over to be dealt with by the State. Reference is made to the
decision of the Apex Court in B. Viswanathan & Co. vs. State of
Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 358 (paragraph 4 onwards and more
particularly, sub paragraph 14 of paragraph 5). In response to the
arguments made by the Addl. Advocate General with reference to
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Article 243G dealing with the power of the State to legislate on a
subject relating to the functions of Local Authority, it is stated that
the said power is always subject to the provisions of the Constitution
and in turn, the said Article is controlled by Article 246, asserting
that there cannot be any encroachment by the State into any
entry in List 1.
14. In the course of reply, Mr. Babu S. Nair, learned
Counsel appearing for some of the appellants/petitioners in the
concerned Writ Appeals/Writ Petitions submits that the challenge
raised by the concerned parties is mainly with regard to the power
and procedure for 'Confiscation', more particularly, brought in by
virtue of the amendment of the provisions as per the Ordinance
No.38/2010. The learned Counsel, referring to the meaning of the
word 'Confiscation', submits that it is not uniform as given in
various texts/Commentaries/Dictionaries like the 'Law Lexicon' (by
P. Ramanatha Aiyar), the Black's Law Dictionary, the Chambers'
Dictionary (20th Century Edition) etc. The learned Counsel submits
that Sec.21 (1) of the 'MMDR Act' deals with the punishment to be
imposed upon persons concerned, whereas Sec.21(4A ) deals with
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the proceedings against the properties (mineral, tool, equipment,
vehicle or any other thing ) seized under sub-section (4). It is also
pointed out that the Government has already issued a notification
under Section 22 of the 'MMDR Act', designating the officer
concerned, who is authorised to file complaint before the concerned
Court for taking cognizance of the offence (G.O.(Ms) 917/97). The
scheme of the Kerala Rules, as distributed among different Chapters
II, III, IV etc of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules framed
by the State, ( invoking the power under Section 15 of the 'MMDR
Act'), is also sought to be explained, contending that the entire field
in respect of the minor minerals was taken over by the 'MMDR Act'
and the 'KMMC Rules' framed by the State under the said Act and
this being the position, nothing remains further for the State to
have enacted the 'Sand Act' and Rules thereunder in respect of
'river sand', as it is a 'minor mineral' as defined under Section 3
(e) of the 'MMDR Act' and by the ordinary meaning of the term
'sand' as given in various dictionaries. Reference and reliance is
also placed on the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of
the Apex Court in AIR 2004 SC 2647(Association of Natural
Gas vs. Union of India.) (paragraphs 41 and 43) and also the Full
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Bench decision rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
reported in AIR 1995 (AP) 1 (Government of Andhra Pradesh
vs. Y.S. Vivekananda Reddy)(paragraph 29).
15. The submissions made from either side as mentioned
above have necessarily to be analysed and appreciated with
reference to the scheme of the two different Acts/Rules thereunder,
the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and the entries
under the relevant Lists of the 7th Schedule.
16. The State of Kerala, who is the first respondent in W.A.
No. 1493 of 2010 has filed a counter affidavit, (stated as filed as a
consolidated one, as regards all writ petitions and writ appeals
challenging the Kerala Protection of River Bank and Regulation of
Removal of Sand Act, 2001/Kerala Protection of River Banks and
Regulation of Removal of Sand Rules, 2002 and Ordinance No. 38 of
2010). As pointed out from the part of the State, the 'Sand Act' was
enacted by the State for the purpose of protecting the river banks
and river beds in the State of Kerala, especially when there has been
rampant exploitation of river beds in the State without any check
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
measures resulting in depletion of water level and silent death of
several rivers. The alarming situation as to the exploitation of river
beds and river banks, on the removal of the sand from the river was
noted by this Court in several public interest litigations and it was at
the instance of this Court, that the Government had originally issued
G.O. (P) No. 132/93/LSGD dated 29.06.1993 and some other
Circulars prescribing the method for protecting the river banks and
river beds etc., followed by other relevant Orders/Circulars. Then
came the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in
Association for Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala
(2002 (1) KLT 723), directing the State to formulate appropriate
regulations / guidelines in this regard. The 'Sand Act'/Rules were
brought into existence to meet the situation in the above
circumstances.
17. The river banks and river beds are vested in the
Panchayath/local authority in view of Section 218 of the Kerala
Panchayath Raj Act (208 A of the Kerala Municipality Act).
Originally, the right to remove the sand from the river beds was the
sole authority of the Panchayath. But it was found that, the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Panchayaths were not conducting the removal of sand from the
river beds in a sustainable manner and that there was
indiscriminate exploitation of rivers. It was also found
necessary that, while using the common assets like rivers and
river beds, there should be proper regulation in this regard and
it was with the above intent, that the 'Sand Act' was enacted
by the State, mainly in view of the power vested on the State
under 'entry No. 5* of the State list in the 7th schedule of the
Constitution of India, enabling the State to make laws regarding the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Entry No. 5 of List II of the 7th Schedule reads: "Local
government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of
municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards,
mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the
purpose of local self government or village administration.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
powers of the Local Self Government Department and further in view
of the power and competence of the State to enact such a legislation
under the legislative power mentioned in 'entry No. 17** of list II of
the 7th schedule. The various provisions in the Statute clearly show
that the purpose of the State enactment is principally to
ensure protection of river, river banks and river beds and unless
there is an effective machinery to over-see the removal of the sand
from the river beds/river banks, it would result in uncontrolled
exploitation of the same, leading to lowering of the water table and
the eventual death of the rivers.
18. Protection of the river, river beds and river
banks etc. is of course the duty of the State, which assumes
more role and significance with reference to the concept of
'sustainable development' as part of right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The State
enactment occupies an entirely different field and visualizes a
------------------------------------------------------------------------
**Entry No. 17 of List II of the 7th Schedule reads: Water, that is to
say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and
embankments, water storage and water power subject to the
provisions of entry 56 of list I.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
different situation with regard to the necessity to protect the river
beds, river banks and rivers while raising the river sand and the
procedures prescribed are rather incidental to serve the main
objective. The power of confiscation under the 'MMDR Act' [Section
21 (4A)] is in respect of the violation, pursuant to the orders passed
by the Court of competent jurisdiction, in a complaint in writing
preferred by the authorised officer in this regard; whereas the power
of confiscation under the 'Sand Act' is simultaneously vested upon
the 'Revenue' as well as on the 'Court'. The power so vested upon
the authorities of the 'Revenue' is irrespective of the fact whether
any prosecution proceedings have been initiated or not and it is
always for the authorized officer to decide whether any prosecution
proceeding is to be launched in respect of the contravention of the
statutory provisions. There can be various instances of violation of
the provisions of the 'Sand Act' (State Act), as can be seen from
Sections 9, 12, 13 and 17 of the said Act, which are totally
unconnected with the provisions of the 'MMDR Act' [Central Act] .
The scope of confiscation under the two different enactments is
entirely different. Even if a person is having the necessary permits
under the MMDR Act, if such person transports the sand in violation
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
of the 'Sand Act', the vehicle is liable to be confiscated under Section
23 A of the said Act. Similarly, even if a person has all the sanction
to transport under the 'Sand Act', if such person does not have any
transporting permit under the MMDR Rules, such vehicle is liable to
be confiscated under Section 21 (4A) of the MMDR Act.
19. Now, coming to the scheme of the two different
enactments and the rules framed thereunder, the Central Act (MMDR
Act), as observed already, is an Act to provide for development and
regulations of mines and minerals under the control of the Union.
Section 4 coming under the 'General Restrictions' on undertaking
Prospecting and Mining Operations stipulates that such operations
shall be under a licence or lease. Section 4A deals with termination
of prospecting licence or mining leases, wherein sub Section (1)
deals with the power of the Central Government to order closure of
premature termination of such licence/lease in respect of any
mineral "other than a minor mineral", in the manner specified
therein; while such power is conferred upon the State in respect of a
'minor mineral' as mentioned under Sub section (2) of Section 4 A,
making it clear that, if the State Government is of the opinion that it
is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
development, preservation of natural environment, control of floods,
prevention of pollution or to avoid danger to public health or
communication or to ensure safety of building, monuments or other
structures or for such other purpose, the power contemplated
therein can be exercised by the State. The other provisions related
to the general restrictions in the prospecting/mining operations are
Sections 5 to 13, which however are not applicable to 'minor
minerals', as specifically stated in Section 14 of the Central Act.
Section 15 says that the State Government is empowered to make
rules in respect of 'minor minerals' and it is in exercise of the said
power that the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1967 (KMMC
Rules) have been formulated by the State in this regard.
20. Ii is relevant to note that the Central Government wanted
to retain control in respect of any minerals underlying the ocean
within the territorial waters or the continental shelf of India, as
provided under Section 13 A of the Central Act (MMDR Act), enabling
the Government to make the Rules for the grant of prospecting
licence or mining lease in this regard. Obviously, no such power is
sought to be exercised with regard to the river beds, which
exclusively come within the ownership of the local authorities
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
concerned by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Kerala
Panchayath Raj Act/Municipality Act; nor with regard to such right, if
any, for the State in respect of such rivers/river beds.
21. With regard to the 'penalties' prescribed under Section 21
of the 'MMDR Act' (Central Act) read with Rule 58 of the Rules
framed by the State (invoking the power under Section 15 of the
said Act) and the penalties prescribed under Section 20 of the 'Sand
Act' (State Act), it is to be noted that they do not relate to or govern
the same field as alleged by the appellants/petitioners, so as to
render the provisions of the State Act otiose in any manner. Sub
section (1) of Section 21 of the MMDR Act refers to the punishment
in respect of contravention of Sub Section '1' or Sub Section '1A' of
Section 4; while any contravention of the 'Rules' is taken care of by
Sub Section (2) of Section 21. The proceedings in respect of the
material / tools / equipments / vehicles used for raising the mineral
without any lawful authority is dealt with under Sub Sections 4, 4A
and 5 (of Section 21). The main attack by the appellants/petitioners
against the State Act ('Sand Act') particularly as to the penalty under
Section 20 and the power to confiscate as provided under Section 23
(now substituted as 23 A by virtue of the Ordinance) and the Rules
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
framed under the State Act, is with reference to 'Sub Section 4 A' of
Section 21 of the MMDR Act, contending that, the power to
confiscate is already provided under the Central Act and that such
power can only be exercised by the competent Court, pursuant to
an order passed in a complaint preferred by the authorised officer in
this regard.
22. The proposition mooted by the petitioners/appellants does
not appear to be correct for many a reason. First of all, the power of
confiscation mentioned in Sub Section 4 A of Section 21 of the
MMDR Act (Central Act) is with specific reference to the contents of
Sub Section 4. Sub Section 4 and 4A of Section 21 read as follows:
4. Whenever any person raises, transports or causes to be
raised or transported, without any lawful authority, any mineral
from any land, and for that purpose, uses any tool, equipment,
vehicle or any other thing, such mineral tool, equipment, vehicle
or any other thing shall be liable to be seized by an officer or
authority specially empowered in this behalf.
4A. Any mineral, tool, equipment, vehicle or any other thing
seized under sub-section (4) shall be liable to be confiscated by
an order of the court competent to take cognizance of the
offence under sub - section (1) and shall be disposed of in
accordance with the directions of such court.
Going by the contents of sub Section 4, it is clear that the seizure of
the tools, equipments, vehicles or any other thing used by the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
person concerned is for raising, transporting or for causing to be
raised or transported the concerned mineral without lawful authority
from "ANY LAND", which does not specifically visualize a situation
involving any such activity from a river or river bed. The
confiscation under sub Section 4 of any such material / tool /
equipment / vehicle is only in respect of such item used for such
activity with specific reference to the land. The power of confiscation
under Section 4 A of Section 21 may not be available to meet the
requirement in respect of similar activity when it relates to 'river /
river bed'. Similarly, the right of recovery of the mineral/its value (if
already sold) from the person concerned, as provided under Sub
Section 5 of Section 21 of the MMDR Act is also with specific
reference to the 'land' and may not be attracted when it comes to a
'river or river bed'.
23. There is a contention for the appellants/petitioners that,
by virtue of the compounding provision under Section 23 A of the
MMDR (Central Act) stipulating that the offence could be
compounded by paying such amount (which shall not exceed the
maximum amount of fine, as prescribed for that offence) and once
the said amount is paid, no further proceedings can be pursued, as
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
stipulated in sub Section 2 of Section 23 A. In other words, it is
contended that, once this compounding fee is paid, there is no
justification for realizing the value of the vehicle.
24. The very idea of the petitioners/appellants that the
maximum amount that could be levied as the compounding fee
under the Central Act for compounding the offence shall not exceed
the maximum fine does not appear to be correct or proper. Section
23A of the Central Act (MMDR Act) reads as follows:
23A Compounding of offences : (1) Any offence punishable
under this Act or any rule made thereunder may, either before
or after the institution of the prosecution, be compounded by
the person authorised under section 22 to make a complaint to
the court with respect to that offence, on payment to that
person, for credit to the Government, of such sum as that
person may specify:
Provided that in the case of an offence punishable with
fine only no such sum shall exceed the maximum amount of
fine which may be imposed for that offence.
(2) Where an offence is compounded under sub-section (1), no
proceeding or further proceedings, as the case may be, shall be
taken against the offender in respect of the offence so
compounded, and the offender, if in custody, shall be released
forthwith.
The proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 23 A says that, the
stipulation that no sum shall exceed the maximum amount of fine
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
which may be imposed for that offence is applicable in the case of an
offence punishable only with fine. But, Section 21 of the MMDR Act
prescribing the penalties; read with Rule 58 of the 'KMMC' Rules,
makes it punishable with imprisonment (for the term as prescribed)
or with fine or with both. The position is almost similar with regard
to the offences and penalties as prescribed under the State Act
(Section 20 of the Sand Act), which clearly suggests that, the
compounding fee could very well exceed the maximum fine
prescribed, since the offence is not liable to be punished with fine
alone.
25. As discussed herein before, the penalties under Section
21 of the Central Act, read with Rule 58 of the Rules framed by the
State under the Central Act stand entirely on a different footing,
whereas the penalties under Section 20 of the 'Sand Act' of the State
are to meet the specific circumstances, as prescribed in the said Act,
with the basic object of protecting the river/river bank/river bed and
the biophysical environmental system of the river; including the
circumstances contemplated under sub Sections 4 and 5 of Section
12 prescribing the general conditions. So also, there is black and
white difference between the circumstances envisaged under Section
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
4(1)/1(A) read with Section 21(4)/(4A) of the Central Act and those
contemplated under Section 23 of the State Act. Under the former
Act, the removal of the mineral from the "land" is sought to be dealt
with, while in the case of the latter, it is in respect of the "kadavu".
Under the Central Act, the emphasis is with regard to the 'raising of'
the minerals and the commercial sphere; whereas under the State
Act, removal of river sand is rather 'incidental' as the emphasis is
with regard to the 'protection of' the river / river bank / river bed
and the management of the biophysical environment system of the
river.
26. The scheme of the State Act (Sand Act), as much
relevant, provides for constitution of a 'District Expert Committee'
and a separate 'Kadavu Committee' as contemplated under Sections
3 and 4, which are extracted below for ready reference.
3. Constitution and Composition of the District Expert
Committee:- (1) As soon as may be, after the
commencement of this Act, the Government shall, by
notification constitute an Expert Committee for each district
in the State with effect from such date, as may be specified
in the notification.
(2) Every District Expert Committee shall consist of the
following members, namely :-
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
(a) the District Collector -- Ex-officio;
(b) a representative nominated by the Government
from among the members of the District Panchayath
representing any area abutting any river of the district.
(c) the District Labour Officer - Ex - Officio
(d) the Superintendent of Police in charge of Law and
Order in the district - Ex-officio:
(e) the Deputy Director of Panchayath - Ex - Officio;
(f) a Municipal Chairman/Chairperson from among the
Chairman/Chairpersons of the Municipal Councils abutting
any river in the district - to be nominated by the
Government;
(g) two persons from among the Presidents of the
Grama Panchayath abutting any river in the district - to be
nominated by the Government.
(k) an Engineer not below the rank of an Executive
Engineer of the Kerala Water Authority working in the district
- to be nominated by the Government.
(l) two environmentalists associated with river
protection activities - to be nominated by the Government.
(m) an Engineer (Roads and Bridges) of the Public
Works Department, not below the rank of an Executive
Engineer and working in the district to be nominated by the
Government.
(n) the Geologist/District Officer, Department of
Mining and Geology - Ex-officio
(o) one Divisional Forest Officer - to be nominated by
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the Government.
(3) The District Collector shall be the Chairman and the
Executive Engineer of the Irrigation Department shall be the
Convenor of the District Expert Committee.
(4) The District Expert committee shall meet at such times
and at such places as the Chairman may decide and exercise
such powers and functions as may be conferred under this
Act and the rules made thereunder.
4. Constitution and Composition of Kadavu Committee
--
(1) For the purpose of regulating the removal of sand in
every Kadavu or river bank situated in a district, the District
Collector shall constitute for each Kadavu or river bank a
Kadavu Committee called by the name of that place where
the Kadavu or river bank is situate, consisting of the
following members, namely :-
(a) the President of the Grama Panchayat or the
Chairman/Chairperson of the Municipality of the concerned
Kadavu - Ex-officio;
(b) the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat or the
Secretary of Municipality of the area - Ex-officio;
(c) the Assistant Labour Officer of the area - Ex -
officio;
(d) the Grama Panchayat Member or the Municipal
Councillor of the area - Ex-officio;
(e) The Assistant Engineer of Irrigation Department
having jurisdiction in the area - Ex - officio;
(f) the Assistant Engineer (Roads and Bridges) of the
Public Works Department having jurisdiction in the area --
Ex-officio
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
(g) the Assistant Engineer of the Kerala Water
Authority having jurisdiction in the area - Ex-officio;
(h) the Village Officer having jurisdiction in the area -
Ex-officio
(i) two Environmentalists to be nominated by the
District Collector.
(2) The President of the concerned Grama Panchayat or, as
the case may be, the Chairman/Chairperson of the
Municipality shall be the Chairman of the Kadavu Committee
and the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat or, as the case
may be, the Secretary of the Municipality shall be the
Convenor of the Kadavu Committee.
(3) The Kadavu Committee shall meet at such times, and
at such places as the Chairman may decide and exercise
such powers and functions as may be conferred under this
Act and the rules made thereunder.
The aforesaid committees consisting of different authorities,
including the technical experts of various/different fields and the
administrative heads/authorities of the different faculties/bodies,
are vested with specific powers and duties to be discharged to, give
effect to the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
27. The powers and functions of the 'District Expert
Committee' and that of the 'Kadavu committee' are enumerated
under Sections 9 and 11 of the State Act as extracted below:
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
9. Power and Functions of the District Expert
Committee :- Subject to the other provisions of this Act
and the rules made thereunder, the District Expert
Committee shall have the following powers and functions,
namely :-
(a) to identify the Kadavu or river bank in a district in
which sand removal may be permitted;
(b) to fix the total quantity of sand that can be
removed from a Kadavu or river bank giving due
regard to the guidelines of expert agencies like the
Centre for Earth Science Studies and Centre for Water
Resources Development and Management;
(c) to control the transportation of sand from a
Kadavu or river bank to another area;
(d) to close a Kadavu or river bank opened for sand
removal;
(e) to ensure the protection of river banks and keep
them free from encroachment;
(f) to consider the opinion of the Kadavu Committee
and take suitable measures to achieve the objectives
of this Act;
(g) to ensure that the Kadavu Committees of the
District are performing their powers and functions
conferred on them by this Act;
(h) to advise the Government on the measures to
protect the biophysical environmental system of the
river banks;
(i) to recommend to the Government the necessity to
ban sand removal from any river or Kadavu during any
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
season of the year;
(j) to carry out the Directions given by the
Government, from time to time;
(k) to exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties as are conferred on it by this Act and
rules made thereunder;
(l) to advise on any other matter to carry out the
provisions of this Act.
11. Powers and Functions of the Kadavu Committee
-- Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules
made thereunder, the Kadavu Committee shall supervise
and monitor all activities of sand removal and recommend
to the District Expert Committee on the following matters
namely :---
(a) the suitability of the Kadavu or river bank for sand
removal;
(b) the quantity of sand that may be removed from a
particular Kadavu;
(c) the additional measures to be taken for protection
of the Kadavu or river bank;
(d) the necessity to ban sand removal during any
season of the year;
(e) to recommend to the Grama Panchayats and the
Municipalities for publication of list of country boats
used for and labourers engaged in sand removal
operations;
(f) to carry out the instructions issued by the
Government and the District Expert Committees, from
time to time; and
(g) advise on any other matter to carry out the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
provisions of this Act.
Chapter III of the 'Sand Act' dealing with the protection of the river
banks and biophysical environment systems of the river, contains
Section 12 which prescribes the general conditions for sand removal
operations in the 'kadavu'. Power is vested upon the
Government/District Collector to order closure of a 'kadavu' or a
river bank as given under Section 13. Specific obligation has been
cast upon the local authorities to maintain the 'kadavu' or river
banks in safe condition, as provided under Section 15. To upkeep
the biophysical environment, the District Expert Committee, subject
to general or special orders of the Government, if any in this behalf,
is to prepare the 'river bank development plan' for establishing,
co-ordinating and protecting the river banks within the district in
such a manner and pertaining to such particulars as may be
prescribed for the upkeep of the biophysical environment of the river
banks, as provided under Section 16. Power is vested with the
Government under Section 27 to call for the reports and to examine
the proceedings of the District Expert Committee or the Kadavu
Committee or the local authority under the Act/Rules and to give
directions to the Chairman of the Expert Committee; simultaneously
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
making it clear under Section 28 that provisions of the Act & Rules
made thereunder shall have effect, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being
in force. As borne by Section 29, it is with specific intent to ensure
protection of every river that, the power is vested with the
Government to provide for periodical measurement of the quantity
of the sand available for removal by such method and in such a
manner, as may be prescribed.
28. Going by the various provisions of the 'Sand Act' and the
Rules framed by the State under the Sand Act, there cannot be any
doubt that, the enactment has been made by the State not in
promotion of any 'commercial activities' as to the reclamation of
river sand/minor mineral, but more as a measure to protect the
river/river banks/river beds and the biophysical environment system
of the river. The regulation imposed with regard to the removal of
the river sand is with the above specific objective and hence
incidental. By the way, it is also to be noted that Section 22 of the
Sand Act clearly stipulates that, nothing in this Act shall prevent any
person from being prosecuted under any other law for the time
being in force for any act or omission is punishable under this Act.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
This being the position, it cannot be said that, the State has resorted
to parallel legislation, by encroaching into the field of the Union with
regard to the legislative powers referable to 'entry 54' of the list I
under the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India.
29. With regard to the contention of the petitioners/appellants
that, there is no power for confiscation of the vehicle under Section
23 of the Sand Act, (as it only refers to 'seizure') and hence that the
course provided under Rule 27 (3) is liable to be declared as
ultravires, it is to be noted that, the 'Sand Act' was originally passed
by the Legislature in 'Malayalam' and it was later translated into
'English'. The appropriate word used in the original text in
Malayalam was 'kandukettal'/'IWvSqsI+B' in the 'heading' as well as
in the 'body' of Section 23. But, when the provision was translated
into English later, though the 'heading' was correctly translated
using the word 'confiscation', it happened to be shown in the body as
'seizure' in the place of 'confiscation'. Since the actual word used in
the original text in Malayalam was 'kandukettal'/'IWvSqsI+B', it
could only be 'Confiscation' and nothing else. It was to give effect
to the above statutory prescription that the rules were framed,
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
particularly, by providing the requisite measures under Rule 27 (3)
of the Rules. When the words used in English and Malayalam
versions are in conflict, one has to use the external aids for
interpreting and understanding the intention of the legislature. As
such, every effect has to be given to the original 'Malayalam version'
which was considered by the legislature, who passed the enactment
in Malayalam. This is the sum and substance of the decision
rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Samad Vs.
State of Kerala (2007 (4) KLT 473).
30. The necessity to protect the environment, which includes
the 'Flora & Fauna', the Rivers, Streams and the necessity to
maintain the ecological balance of the environment has been
highlighted on many a time by the Apex Court and by the High
Courts in India. The observations made by the Apex Court in M.C.
Metha Vs, Kamal Nath (1997 (1) SCC 388) (paragraph 23
onwards and particularly in 34, 35, 36, 37 and the conclusion
reached in paragraph 38 are very relevant. The said observations
have been made with specific reference to the 'Public Trust
Theory'. Similarly, in the subsequent M.C. Metha's case (2004
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
(12) SCC 118), the Supreme Court added something more,
explaining the scope of 'Sustainable Development' and the
'precautionary principle', pointing out in unequivocal terms that ,
Environment concerns take precedence over economic interests.
31. No doubt, to protect the environment, strict measures
have to be adopted, lest it should affect the right to life guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as observed by a
Division Bench of this Court in Jomi C Nidheeri Vs. Elanji
Gramapanchayath (2007 (2) KHC 174). It has been held by
this Court in Soman Vs. Geologist (2004 (3) KLT 577), that any
developmental activity without considering the rights of future
generations is not a sustainable use of the land. Naturally, the
resources cannot be extracted at a rate faster than the nature's
capacity to regenerate them and it is absolutely necessary that the
basic qualities of the land have to be maintained for the succeeding
generations. As mentioned hereinbefore, river is vested in the local
authority as per Section 218 of the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act and
Section 208 A of the Kerala Municipality Act and there is statutory
duty on the local authorities to maintain the rivers; which naturally
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
includes protection of the river beds and proper maintenance of the
river banks. The 'Sand Act' has been enacted by the State mainly
with this intent, making the local authorities to discharge their
functions and duties in this regard and proper regulatory measures
have been stipulated under the said Act/Rules. Thus the source of
power for the enactment is very much referable to Entries 5 and
17 of list II of the 7t schedule of the Constitution of India ,
h
read with Entry No. 29* of the 11th schedule. As it stands so, it
cannot be said that there is a transgression of power by the State to
the realm of the Union , in respect of 'regulation of the mines and
minerals' under Entry No. 54 of the Ist list.
32. True, under the Central Act (MMDR Act), confiscation is
contemplated, as provided under Sub Section 4 A of Section 21,
referring to the circumstances mentioned in sub Section 4 of Section
21, which stands entirely on a different footing (as pointed out
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entry No. 29 of the 11th Schedule reads : Maintenance of community assets.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
already), involving raising or transportation of any mineral, without
any lawful authority, from any land, which is not the situation
contemplated under Section 23 of the Sand Act (now replaced by
Section 23 A of the Ordinance No. 38/2010). The proceeding under
Section 21 (4A) is pursuant to the orders passed by a Magistrate on
a complaint preferred by the authorised officer in respect of the
offence involved and it is rather criminal in nature, whereas the
proceedings contemplated under Section 23/23A of the Sand
Act/Ordinance is a quasi civil proceedings, which could be
pursued by the Revenue Authorities, even without a complaint or
notwithstanding any prosecution proceedings. It is also true
that in respect of the confiscation proceedings ordered by the
Revenue Authorities under the 'Sand Act' there was no provision for
any appeal earlier. But, this by itself cannot vitiate the Statute as
held by this Court in Alavi P.K. vs. District Collector and others
[ILR 2007 (4) Kerala 221 ]. By virtue of the Ordinance No.
38/2010, the powers and procedures as to the confiscation and
further steps have been distinctly stated, also providing the remedy
by way of 'Revision' and 'Appeal'. Section 23, as it now stands
under the Ordinance, refers to the power of 'seizure' by the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
concerned officers. Section 23 (A) provides for Confiscation of the
sand, vehicle etc. by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Section 23 (B)
provides a remedy by way of 'Revision' before the District Collector
against the order of confiscation passed by the Sub Divisional
Magistrate and Section 23 (C) refers to further remedy by way of
'Appeal' to the District Court. Section 23 (D) deals with the return
of the confiscated article or the amount paid in lieu of the
confiscation, based on the orders to be passed by the District
Collector under Section 23 (B) or that of the District Court under
Section 23 (C). These provisions are rather enabling provisions,
( but for Section 23 A which was already there in the form of old
Section 23 of the Sand Act), whereby the aggrieved party is
provided with a remedy to agitate the matter further in the manner
as specified and there is nothing 'ultravires' to the Constitution in
this regard. This being the position, the challenge raised by the
concerned appellants/petitioners against the above provisions in the
Ordinance does not hold any water at all. More so, when power is
vested with the State under Article 243 G of the Constitution to
endow the Panchayath, by law, of course subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, with such powers and authority as may be
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
necessary to enable them to function as Institutions of Self-
Government. Similar powers with respect to the Municipalities are
provided under Article 243 (W) of the Constitution of India.
33. It is however relevant to note that, the provision to
compound the offence is rather optional, for the offender. Rule 27
(3) of the 'Sand Rules' stipulates that the vehicle may be returned if
the owner of the vehicle or the possessor remits an amount towards
the River Management Fund Equal to the price fixed by the District
Collector with fine within 7 days of seizure. Similarly, it has been
stated in the 'first proviso' to sub Section 3 of Section 23 A of the
Ordinance 38 of 2010 that the owner of the article seized or the
person having its control shall be given the freedom to reclaim, in
lieu of the confiscated articles except sand, by remitting an amount
equal to the value of the confiscated articles, as fixed by the
Collector. The only difference between the position as it existed
earlier and the one as now prevails is that, the party concerned was
liable to remit the value of the vehicle, as fixed by the District
Collector 'with fine' as stipulated in Rule 27 (3) of the Rules to the
River Management Fund to get the vehicle returned, whereas, by
virtue of the Ordinance, the necessity to satisfy the element of 'fine'
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
has been taken away and the vehicle has to be returned in lieu of
confiscation, on remitting the amount equal to the value of the
confiscated vehicle, as fixed by the Collector.
34. With regard to the contention of the appellants/petitioners
that there is no power for the Revenue authority to impose 'fine', as
exclusively vested with the Court; it appears that, the terminology in
Rule 27 (3), as to the satisfaction of the value of the vehicle along
with fine (maximum of which is stipulated as ` 25,000/- in respect of
the offences under the 'Act' as given in Section 20 does not suggest
any adjudication process in this regard and it is on the 'will and
pleasure' of the party concerned to avail the benefit of sub Rule 3 of
Rule 27 to have the vehicle returned, satisfying the requirement as
mentioned above. In other words, it is more as a measure of
'option' and there is absolutely no compulsion to have availed the
benefit, satisfying the maximum fine.
35. However, coming back to the question whether the District
Collector could have imposed the fine, being a Revenue authority,
the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sanjayan
Vs. Tahasildar (2007 (4) KLT 597) holds it in the negative.
Since, a different view was taken by another Division Bench of this
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Court in Alavi P.K. Vs. District Collector (ILR 2007 (4) Ker.
221), this issue was 'referred' by another Division Bench of this
Court as per order dated 08.02.2008 in W.A. 2806 of 2007, 3005 of
2007 and 284 of 2008. A Full Bench of this Court considered the
said issue and as per order dated 23.07.2008, it was observed that
the decision rendered by the Division Bench in Alavi P.K. Vs.
District Collector was already stayed by the Apex Court and as
such, it might not be proper on the part of the Full Bench, to take a
decision one way or the other. It was observed in paragraphs 3 &
4 as follows.
"3. Since the order passed by a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Alavi P.K Vs. District Collector and
others (ILR 2007 (4) Ker. 221) is stayed by the Apex
Court, it may not be proper for the Full Bench of this Court
to take a decision one way or the other or consider the
correctness or otherwise of the decisions rendered by two
Division Benches of this Court.
4. Therefore, we refer back these matters to the
Division Bench for consideration and decision".
When the Full Bench found it not proper to take a decision one way
or the other, it is equally applicable and binding on the Division
Bench as well. Since it is not brought to our notice that the Apex
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Court has finalized this issue, we leave it open.
36. The validity of the 'Sand Act' had come up for
consideration before this Court earlier in Subramanian vs. State
of Kerala (2009(1) KLT 77). Almost all the contentions now
raised by the appellants/writ petitioners before us were raised
before the learned Single Judge as well. The learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties were also mostly the same. After
analysing the scope of the enactment, it was held that the reference
made by the State to 'Entry No.23' of List II of the 7th Schedule as a
source of power for enactment of the 'Sand Act' was not correct or
sustainable. Placing reliance on the decision rendered by the
Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Baijnath vs. State of
Bihar (AIR 1970 SC 1436), it was held by the learned Judge that,
by virtue of the declaration made by the Central Government under
section 2 of the Central Act (MMDR Act), the whole of the topic of
'minor mineral' became a 'Union subject'. To that extent, it was held
that there was an abstraction of the legislative power of the State
Legislature in Entry 23 of List II of 7th Schedule. However,
analysing the scheme of the Statute, it was held that, in pith and
substance, the 'Sand Act' could be sourced to Entry 17 of List II of
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the 7th Schedule . Though some of the provisions would have the
effect of interdicting the removal of a minor mineral like sand, it
was held as intended only as a measure of regulating the upkeep
and maintenance of vital water sources like rivers and lakes and
that the same will not even amount to an incidental encroachment
into a territory occupied by a central legislation like the 'MMDR Act'.
The learned Single Judge observed that the question of repugnancy
did never arise, as the two different enactments were with reference
to the different entries contained in List I and List II respectively and
not with regard to a matter contained in List III i.e. Concurrent List.
The penal provisions contained in the Sand Act were held as
relatable to the source of power of the State Legislature, in view of
Entry 64 of the List II; simultaneously holding that the power of
confiscation (though under Central Act, exclusively vested upon the
Court, pursuant to an order of conviction), was different under the
'Sand Act', where it vested equally on the Court as well as on the
Revenue authorities. Validity of the 'Sand Act'/Rules was upheld
accordingly. We are in full agreement with the finding and reasoning
given by the learned Single Judge in this regard.
37. However, another important aspect to be noted is, as to
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the scope of penalties prescribed under Section 21 of the Central Act
(MMDR Act) read with Rule 48A and Rule 58 framed by the State
invoking the rule making power under Section 15 of the said Act on
one hand; and the penalties prescribed under Section 20 of the
'Sand Act' (Kerala Act) on the other hand. Some observations have
been made by the learned Single Judge, particularly with reference
to Rule 48, 48A, 58 and 60A of the KMMC Rules in paragraph 20
and 21 of the decision cited supra. The penalty prescribed under
Rule 58(1) of the Said Rules, providing the punishment of simple
imprisonment for a period upto one year or with fine up to `.5000/-
or both, is in respect of contravention of any provision of the said
Rules. The circumstance contemplated under 'Rule 48A' is with
regard to the necessity to have a licence for the dealer, making it
clear that nobody else without having the requisite permit/licence
shall stock, sell or offer for sale of the concerned minor minerals.
This Rule does not take care of the raising or transportation of the
minor minerals, which in fact is taken care of by sub-section (1) of
Section 21 of the Central Act itself, providing for simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to "two years or with
fine which may extend to ` 25,000/- or both". As discussed
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
hereinbefore, the stipulation under sub section (2) to (6) of Section
21 are in respect of the specific circumstances contemplated therein
and it does not take care of a situation of removal of river sand from
the river or river banks, ultimately leading to a diversion or
premature death of river or endangering the bio-physical
environmental system by virtue of such activities.
38. With regard to the legislative competence of the State, it
is worthwhile to mention that the legislation could be a composite
legislation with provisions deriving the source from different
legislative entries. It has been categorically held in AIR 1957 SC
297 (A.S. Krishna vs. State of Madras) that legislative entries by
themselves do not solely constitute the source of power for
legislation, but that they deal with the specific areas of legislation,
which are to be given a wider meaning and liberal construction. This
is reiterated in 2002 (8) SCC 228 (Union of India Vs. Shah
Goverdhan L.Kabra Teachers' College) as well. Reading the Act
as a whole, when the legislation, by its pith and substance, is
attributable to a source under the legislative entry applicable to the
Legislature, then, it cannot be held as incompetent or devoid of any
jurisdiction/competence, even if there is some incidental
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
encroachment upon a field occupied by another legislature as made
clear by the Apex Court in Kartar Singh v. State Of Punjab.
[ (1994 )3 SCC 569].
39. Coming back to the object of legislation of the 'Sand Act',
as mentioned already, the threat, that has been caused to the rivers
and river banks from various corners, also adversely affecting the
environmental and ecological aspects, had come up for
consideration before this Court as well as before the Apex Court,
when the State/Central machinery was alerted on all such occasions
to give prime/utmost importance to secure and preserve the same,
also for the benefit of the generations to come. The threat caused
to the river banks and river beds is a matter of more concern,
rather than the development of a minor mineral (river sand). The
necessity to take adequate measures to save the Nature and its
wealth was being highlighted by the Apex Court as well as by this
Court, at a time when the Central Act (MMDR Act ) 1957 was very
much in force, having brought into existence, four decades ago.
Obviously, the scheme of the Statute passed by the Central
Government (MMDR Act 1957) deals with the 'commercial phase'
in dealing with the mines and minerals, whereas the scheme of the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
State Act (Sand Act) is with regard to the onerous duty upon the
State to cause protection of river banks, river beds and the bio-
physical environment system by providing the 'remedial
measures'. The sale of river sand, with authority to fix the sand
price, is only an incidental aspect, while the tooth and nail provided
under the Act, giving shape to the District Expert Committee,
Kadavu Committee, River Management Fund, Sand Audit etc, are
obviously with a view to achieve the goal as aforesaid.
40. With regard to the legislative power of the State, under
Entry 23 of the List II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and the
scope and extent of power of the Union with reference to Entry 54
of List I, the position has to be examined with reference to various
decisions rendered by the Apex Court right from AIR 1961 SC 459
(Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa), AIR 1964
SC 1284 (State of Orissa vs. M.A. Tulloch and Co.), 1990 (1)
SCC 12 (India Cement Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu), AIR 1991
SC 1676 (Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of Orissa) & AIR 2001
SC 8 (Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries vs. Union
of India), which are mainly cited from the part of the
appellants/petitioners. The first two decisions have been referred to
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
and dealt with by the Constitution Bench in AIR 1970 SC 1436
(Baijnath vs. State of Bihar) and the remaining three decisions
have very much placed reliance on the decision in AIR 1970 SC
1436 (cited supra).
41. The issue involved in AIR 1970 SC 1436 (cited supra)
was mainly with regard to the challenge raised against the validity
of the second proviso to Sec.10(2) added by the Bihar Land
Reforms (Amendment)Act, 1964 and also as to the operation of the
second sub rule of Rule 20, added on the 10th December, 1964 by a
notification of the Governor in the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 1964. The factual position in the said case was that the
appellant had derived his rights and interests in respect of the lease
of a quarry from one Jyoti Prakash Pandey who had obtained such
lease rights on 23.03.1955 from the original lessees. In fact, the
lease was for the period from 01.11.1954 to 31.10.1984, i.e. for 30
years. After obtaining the rights, Mr. Jyoti Prakash Pandey sold his
rights, title and interest by a registered sale deed dated
09.09.1963 to the appellant and the rent under the terms of the
original lease was deposited upto September, 1965.
42. On passing the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the 'ex
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
landlords' ceased to have any interest from the date of vesting and
in their place, the State of Bihar became the lessor under Section 10
(1) of the Land Reforms Act. The State of Bihar in turn, as the new
lessor, recognised the lease for the quarrying of stones for the
remaining period and the lease rent in respect of the remaining
period was sought to be obtained accordingly.
43. Later, by virtue of the amendment incorporating the
second proviso to Section 10(2) of the Land Reforms Act, it was
stipulated that the lease rent payable in respect of such existing
lease would stand modified as per the terms and conditions available
under the relevant provisions of the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession
Rules 1964. Sub rule (2) was also added to Rule 20 of the said
Rules on 10th December, 1964 in this regard and by virtue of the
above amendment, the balance amount was demanded requiring the
lessee to continue to pay the lease rent at such enhanced rates,
which was challenged in the above proceedings.
44. The scope of amendment to the Bihar Land Reforms Act
and the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules with regard to the
terms and conditions of the mining lease was sought to be justified
from the part of the State of Bihar with reference to Entry 23 of List
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
II of the 7th Schedule. Referring to the law declared by the Supreme
Court in AIR 1961 SC 459 and AIR 1964 SC 1284, it was
observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 14 of the judgment, that,
once the declaration as contemplated under Entry 54 of List I is
made by the Parliament as per law and the extent is laid down, the
subject of legislation, to the extent laid down, becomes an exclusive
subject for legislation by the Parliament. Any legislation by the
State after such declaration encroaching into the field disclosed in
the declaration must necessarily be unconstitutional because that
field is abstracted from the legislative competence of the State
Legislature.
45 . It was then pointed out (as observed in para 20) that
Sec. 4 to 14 (presumably Sec.5 to 13) were categorically declared
as not applicable in the case of 'Minor Minerals' by virtue of the
mandate under Section 14 of the Central Act/(MMDR Act). It was
accordingly contended that the said provisions did not envisage any
control over the Union, which was a condition precedent for ousting
of the jurisdiction under Entry 23 of List II. The answer given by the
Supreme Court in paragraph 20 is as follows:
"Obviously Mr. Lal Narain Sinha reads Union as
equivalent to Union Government . This is erroneous.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Union consists of its three limbs, namely, Parliament ,
Union Government and the Union Judiciary. Here the
control is being exercised by Parliament, the legislative
organ of the Union and that is also controlled by the
Union. By giving the power to the State Government
to make rules, the control of the Union is not negatived.
In fact, it establishes that the Union is exercising the
control. In view of the two rulings of this Court referred
to earlier we must hold that by enacting S.15 of the Act
67 of 1957 the Union has taken all the power to itself
and authorised the State Government to make rules
for the regulation of leases. By the declaration and the
enactment of S.15, the whole of the field relating to
minor minerals came within the jurisdiction of
Parliament and no scope was left for the enactment of
the second proviso to S.10 in the Land Reforms Act.
The enactment of the Proviso was, therefore, without
jurisdiction."
46. After observing that the second sub rule added to Rule 20
of the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules in December, 1964 was
also of no consequence (as the vested rights could not be taken
away except under an authority of law and mere rule making power
without support of a legislative enactment is not capable of
achieving such an end), the Apex Court held that the whole of the
topic of minor minerals had become a Union subject and that State
Legislature was totally incompetent to have legislated anything in
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
this regard referring to Entry 23 of the II List. This being the
position, we find that the reference made to entry 23 of the State
List as the source of power for enacting the State Act (Sand Act) is
not correct or sustainable.
47. The right of the public at large, as the beneficiary of the
public resources like sea shore, running water, air, forest and
ecologically fragile lands was declared by the Apex Court in
unequivocal terms in the decision rendered in M.C. Mehta vs.
Kamal Nath and others (1997) 1 SCC 388. It was a case where
the attempt made by the lessee, who had put up a Motel on the
banks of the 'River Beas', to divert the river by blocking the natural
relief/spill channel of the river, allegedly to save the Motel from
future floods, was brought up before the Supreme Court. The
'Doctrine of Public Trust' (theory propounded and developed by
ancient Roman Empire, as noted by the Apex Court) was
highlighted there, asserting the right of the public at large to enjoy
the natural resources like air, sea, water, forest etc. It was held
by the Court that the doctrine calls upon the Government to protect
the resources for such enjoyment of the public rather than to
permit their use for private ownership or commercial purpose. It
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
was observed that the 'Public Trust doctrine' under the English
Common Law extended only to certain traditional uses such as
navigation, commerce and fishing, while the American Courts had
expanded the concept so as to protect all ecologically important
lands, fresh waters, wet lands etc. It was also observed that our
legal system, based on English Common Law, included the 'Public
Trust doctrine' as part of its jurisprudence and hence that the State
is a trustee of all such natural resources, which are by nature meant
for public use and enjoyment. The State was declared as a trustee
having a legal duty to protect the natural resources. The Supreme
Court also observed that the aesthetic use and pristine glory of the
natural resources, the environment and eco system of our country
cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any
other use, unless the Courts find it necessary in good faith, for the
public good and in public interest to encroach upon the said
resources. The 'polluter pays principle', so as to reverse the
damage caused by the acts of the polluter as asserted in Vellore
Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647
was reiterated in the aforesaid decision, giving appropriate directions
with regard to further steps to replenish the damage to the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
rivers/river banks /eco system. Forensic probe of the 'Sand Act'
made by the State of Kerala has to be done in the above
background.
48. In M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and others,
reported in ( 2004) 12 SCC 118, the Apex Court further considered
the need to have the environment protection and fundamental duty
cast upon the State by virtue of Article 51 A(g) and other relevant
provisions of the Constitution of India. Highlighting the 'polluter
pays principle', it was held that the natural resources of air,
water and soil cannot be utilised if the utilisation results in
irreversible damage to the environment and that life, public
health and ecology have priority over unemployment and loss
of revenue. The principle of 'sustainable development' and the
'precautionary principle' were reiterated and explained, making it
clear that development and protection of the environment are not
enemies and that a balance has to be struck; however, categorically
asserting that in case of doubt, environment concerns take
precedence over economic interest. The 'Sand Act' made by the
State of Kerala, when analysed in the above background, reveals
that such enactment, in pith and substance, is concerned with the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
bounden duty of the State to protect the natural resources like river,
river banks, river beds and bio-physical system of environment,
rather than the 'commerce' involved in connection with the removal
of the river sand from the 'kadavu', which is rather incidental.
49. As mentioned hereinbefore, it is the fundamental duty of
the State, as enunciated under Article 51 A (g) to protect and
improve the natural environment including the forest, lakes, rivers
and wild life and to have compassion for living creature. With that
object in mind, needs the theory of 'Sustainable Development'
(which as a concept came to be known for the first time in the
'Stock Holm Declaration' of 1972) to be scrutinized. As observed
by the Apex Court, the said concept was given a definite shape in
1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development,
pursuant to the report popularly known as 'Brundtlant Report'.
This was followed by, various other deliberations, leading to the 'Rio
Summit' in 1992, which finally led to signing of two conventions,
one on biological diversity and the other on climate change (signed
by 153 nations). During the two decades from Stock Holm to Rio,
the concept of sustainable development came to be accepted as a
viable concept to eradicate poverty and to improve the quality of
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting
ecosystem.
50. The concept of 'Sustainable Development' as defined by
the 'Brundtlant Report' means:
"development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of the future generations to meet
their own needs".
It was after referring to the above vital aspects of the concept, that
the Apex Court held in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forrum Vs.
Union on India 1996 (5) SCC 647 that "the Precautionary
principle" and "polluter pays principle" are essential features of
Sustainable Development; making it clear that, the
"Precautionary principle", in the context of Municipal Law,
means:
(i) Environmental measures - by the State Government
and the statutory authorities - must anticipate, prevent
and attack the causes of environmental degradation.
(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as
a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
(iii) The "onus of proof" is on the actor or the
developer/industrialist to show that his action is
environmentally benign.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
When we come to the question of legislative competence, with
reference to the various entires in the three different lists under the
7th Schedule to the Constitution, it is to be borne in mind that, the
power to legislate is not by virtue of the 'Entry' in the lists, but by
virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution of India. The entries in the
three lists are the different fields of legislation and wide
interpretation has to be given to the entries, subject to the condition
that the meaning of the words should not be extended beyond their
reasonable connotation and that the construction should not be so
wide as to override or render another otiose, as held by the
Supreme Court in Union of India Vs Shah Goverdan L Kobra
Teachers' College (2002 (8) SCC 228). It has also been pointed
out by the Apex Court that, in case of conflict between two entries,
the true character of the impugned enactments as a whole including
its object, scope and effect should be examined and the principle of
'Pith and Substance' should be applied.
51. With regard to the 'Pith and Substance theory', the
position as above has been explained by the Supreme Court on
many an occasion. It is held by the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in E. V. Chinnalath Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
(AIR 2005 SC 162) ( paragraph 31) as follows :
"One of the proven methods of examining the legislative
competence of an enactment is by the application of doctrine
of pith and substance. This doctrine is applied when the
legislative competence of a Legislature with regard to a
particular enactment is challenged with reference to the
Entries in various lists and if there is a challenge to the
legislative competence the Courts will try to ascertain the
pith and substance of such enactment on a scrutiny of the
Act in question. In this process, it is necessary for the Courts
to go into and examine the true character of the enactment,
its object, its scope and effect to find out whether the
enactment in question is genuinely referable to the field of
legislation alloted to the State under the constitutional
scheme".
The purpose of the Kerala enactment ('Sand Act') is obviously to
protect the river banks, river beds and the biophysical environmental
system and to regulate the removal of the sand, which objects have
to be achieved by the working of the Act/Rules in a synchronized
manner.
52. The factual scenario as it existed before the enactment is
discernible from the sequence of events narrated in the decision
rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Association of
Environment Protection Vs. State of Kerala (2002 (1) KLT
723). Referring to the original petitions filed with regard to the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Panchayaths and their depredatory activities along the banks of the
'River Periyar", the Bench started with the observation that "this
State, popularly called 'Gods own country' has been endowed
bountifully by nature; that men shall not cause wasteful
depletion thereof, should be the objective of right thinking
citizens, and this Court". Taking note of all the relevant aspects
including the newspaper reports that the bridges were in dangerous
condition due to the excessive sand mining and water pumps
(produced as Ext. P6 in the concerned writ petitions); the earlier
directions given to constitute an "Expert Committee" to look into the
matter, State's taking over the control of 9 rivers from the
Panchayaths under Section 82 (1) of the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act
1960 and the reports filed by the concerned authorities in the
meanwhile, direction was issued to the Centre for Earth Science
Studies (CESS) to make an urgent inspection of the River Periyar
and to give a report. The Committee submitted an interim report,
stating that, the bridges were in dangerous condition and
indiscriminate scooping of the sand from the river channel was not
only a threat to the stability of the bridges, river banks and
religiously & culturally significant sand bodies, but also aggravated
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the rate of lowering river beds and also drastic changes in river bed
configuration, which in turn led to salt water ingression . This led
to an interim order passed by this Court, imposing 11 conditions on
the basis of the report of the Expert Committee and the State was
directed to impose these conditions on all the rivers, lest the
indiscriminate and unregulated removal of the sand from major
rivers should cause large scale land sliding, loss of property and
disturbance to the biophysical environment system of the river beds.
When the writ petitions mostly filed as 'Public Interest Litigations'
came up for final hearing before the Bench, the steps being taken by
the State to have a compact and comprehensive legislation on the
subject was brought to the notice of the Court. Accordingly, it was
observed in paragraph 10 as follows.
"At this stage, when these Original Petitions came up for final
hearing, we learned from the learned Additional Advocate
General that the State of Kerala is considering bringing forward
a comprehensive legislation to give ample powers to the State
Government to make detailed rules and regulations which
would carry forward the object projected in the original
petitions and the desire expressed by this Court through its
interim orders from time to time. We are also of the view that
in a matter like this a comprehensive legislation is the only
remedy as the court cannot make interim orders continuously
and supervise the situation, though for a lapse on the part of
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the executive, the court has to step in from time to time to see
that the situation did not go out of control. We are happy that
the State Government is forward thinking and desires to bring
forward a comprehensive legislation on the subject."
It was observed by the Bench that, the problem could be resolved
only by way of comprehensive legislation (which was cited as the
only remedy) and accordingly, the proceedings pending before the
Court were disposed of, without prejudice to the right of the State
Government to bring forth a comprehensive legislation on the
subject; simultaneously giving some directions to be operative
during the interregnum, till such legislation came in to force. It was
in the said background, that steps were pursued by the State to
bring forth an exhaustive legislation on the subject, giving shape to
the 'Sand Act', the constitutional validity of which is under challenge
now before this Court.
53. Regarding the alleged repugnancy between the State Act
and the Central Act, it is contended that the entire field of 'mines
and minerals' has been taken over by the Union and nothing remains
to be dealt with by the State. The necessity to obtain the requisite
permit/licence, the various conditions/parameters and the offences/
penalties having been prescribed under the Central Act, it is stated
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
as no more open to the State to have enacted the State Act, with
respect to the raising, transportation, storage and sale of river sand,
prescribing penalty in respect of the offences and also as to the
power to confiscate the sand and the vehicle.
54. Referring to the mandate under Article 254 of the
Constitution, it has been held by a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India (AIR
1979 SC 898) that repugnancy between a law made by a State
and by the Parliament may result from the following circumstances
(para 8):
"(1) Where the provisions of a Central Act and a
State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent
and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will
prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the
repugnancy .
(2) Where however if law passed by the State
comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament
on an entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall
prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the
provisions of the Central Act would become void
provided the State Act has been passed in accordance
with Cl. (2) of Art..254. .
3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature
while being substantially within the scope of the entries
in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the Central List, the constitutionality of the law may be
upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if
on an analysis of the provisions of the Act,it appears
that by and large the law falls within the four corners of
the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely
incidental or inconsequential.
4. Where, however, a law made by the State
Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent
List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous
law made by Parliament , then such a law can be
protected by obtaining the assent of the President
under Art.254(2) of the Constitution. The result of
obtaining the assent of the President would be that so
far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the
State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in
their applicability to the State only. Such a state of
affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time
make a law adding to, or amending, varying or
repealing the law made by the State Legislature under
the proviso to Art.254.
55. How the repugnancy is to be determined, has also been
stated in the very same verdict in the following terms(para 35):
"1. That in order to decide the question of repugnancy
it must be shown that the two enactments contain
inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they
cannot stand together or operate in the same field.
2. That there can be no repeal by implication
unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two
statutes.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
3. That where the two statutes occupy a
particular field, but there is room or possibility of both
the statutes operating in the same field without coming
into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.
4. That where there is no inconsistency but, a
statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct
and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises
and both the statutes continue to operate in the same
field. "
56. Analysing the scheme of the Constitution under Article
245, 246 and 254 and the legislative competence of the State
Legislature, it has been held by the Apex Court in State of A.P
and others vs. Mcdowell and Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709) (which
has been reiterated in the subsequent decision in [(2001) 4 SCC
642] (State of Rajasthan vs. Vatan Medical & General
Stores) as well, that legislative competence of the State
Legislature has to be determined applying the test on the basis of
'pith and substance' rule and by applying the said rule, once a
legislation exclusively falls under any of the entries in List II of 7th
Schedule, no further question arises and the attack upon the ground
of legislative competence shall fail. On such situation, the
Parliament's competence is excluded and the State's competence
cannot be challenged, even on the ground that State's power under
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Clause (3) of Article 246 is subject to Parliament's power under
clauses (1) and (2) thereof. It has also been made clear in
unequivocal terms that any incidental trenching will not amount to
encroaching upon the field desired for parliament, though the
extent of trenching beyond the competence of the legislating body
may be an element in determining whether the legislation is
colourable. Further, with reference to Entry 54 of List I and Entry 5
of List II, it has been observed by the Apex Court in Western
Coalfields Vs. Special Area Development Authority (AIR 1982
SC 697 - Para 25) that, while the State Legislature as to the
regulation of mines passes over to Parliament to the extent of the
declaration made by Parliament to the extent of the declaration
made by Parliament under Entry 54 of List I, the State Legislature
would not thereby be demanded of its power over Municipal
Administration or to levy taxes for the purpose of its effectively
discharging that function; adding that Entry 54 of List I does not
contemplate the taking over of municipal functions by the Union.
Applying the test as above, to the present case, it cannot but be
held that the State enactment is within the four walls of the law .
57. The rules of interpretation of different Lists and analysis of
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the legislative competence had come up for consideration before the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 SC 1044
(Calcutta Gas Company vs. State of West Bengal) wherein, it
has been held that the power to legislate is given to the appropriate
legislature by virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution, while the
entries in the three different Lists are only the relevant legislative
heads or fields of legislation, which demarcate the area over which
the appropriate legislatures can operate and that wide
interpretation has to be given to the entries. Some of the entries in
the different Lists or even in the same list may overlap or appear
to be in direct conflict with each other and then, it is the duty of the
Court to reconcile the entries and bring about the harmony between
them. The underlying principle in such cases, as held, is that a
general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of
a particular power conferred by the same Constitution and operating
in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted
sense, effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural
meaning. The Apex Court has alerted that every attempt should be
made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries, not only of
different lists but also of the same lists and to reject that
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content
and make it nugatory.
58. The above principles were highlighted in the subsequent
decision of the Supreme court in (2002) 8 SCC 228 (Union of
India and others vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers'
College). What should be the approach and attitude of the Court
while judging the constitutionality of the statute has been further
explained by the Supreme Court in (2008) 5 SCC 33 (Hinsa
Virodhak Sangh vs. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat and others).
It has been held that the Court should exercise judicial restraint in
such circumstance; that there is presumption of constitutionality of
statute and that only in a case of clear violation of the
constitutional provision, that a statute can be declared as
unconstitutional. So was held again, by the Apex Court in AIR 2008
(SC) 1640, (the Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P.
Lakshmi Devi), that the Court is supposed to take great restraint
while deciding the constitutional validity of a statute. It has been
made explicitly clear that every effort is to be given to uphold the
validity of the statute and the attempt shall never be to defeat the
same.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
59. From the above discussions, applying the principle of
'pith and substance theory' and the interpretation of the entries in
the relevant lists, it is quite clear that the power of the State to give
shape to the objective by enacting the 'Sand Act'/Rules is referable
to Entries 5, 17 and 64 of list II of the 7th schedule and hence is very
much in conformity with the constitutional mandate, which is in no
way transgressive to Entry No. 54 of list I of the same schedule.
60. In the above facts and circumstances, it is hereby
declared that, the challenge raised by the appellants/petitioners
against the constitutional validity of the Kerala Protection of River
Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act 2001; the Kerala
Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Rules
2002 and also the relevant provisions of Ordinance No. 38 of 2010
fails. The Act/Rules/Ordinance No. 38 of 2010 are held as not
ultravires to the Constitution. The validity is upheld, confirming the
verdict passed by the learned Single Judge in Subramanian Vs.
State of Kerala (2009 (1) KLT 77).
The merits of each case now pending before us have to be
examined in the light of the above declaration.
I. W.P.(C)No. 4847 of 2008
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
i.) This Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the
validity of the provisions of the 'Sand Act' and the Rules thereunder,
when his vehicle bearing No. KL10 B 7769 was seized by the first
respondent under the aforesaid Act/Rules as borne by Ext. P2
mahazar. Some additional grounds as to the validity of the
Act/Rules have been sought to be incorporated by filing I.A. No.
16358 of 2010, by way of amendment. The main prayer in the Writ
Petition is to declare the Act/Rules as ultravires and to direct the
concerned respondent to release the vehicle.
ii). When the matter was admitted by this Court on
15.02.2008, the vehicle was ordered to be released (after assessing
the value of the vehicle by a competent officer of the Motor Vehicle
Department), if the petitioner furnished bank guarantee for the
requisite amount. The subsequent events have not been brought to
the notice of this Court including as to whether any final order has
been passed by the statutory authority, pursuant to Ext. P2. Since,
the main prayer as to the challenge against the Act & Rules has
already been answered against the petitioner, the Writ Petition fails
and interference is declined. However, it is made clear that, if the
proceedings are still pending before the statutory authority, the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
same shall be finalised in accordance with law, within six weeks from
the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
II. W.A.No. 3005 of 2007
i) Though several grounds are raised in the Writ Appeal
challenging the constitutional validity of the 'Sand Act'/Rules and
such other provisions, no such challenge was raised in the Writ
Petition and as such, the challenge raised for the first time in this
appeal is not liable to be entertained (which however stands
declared against).
ii) With regard to the merits involved, a clear finding has
been rendered by the learned Single Judge that transportation of
the river sand at the relevant time (when it was seized on
18.10.2007) was without a valid pass. 'Ext.P3 pass' produced by
the petitioner was dated 08.10.2007, validity of which was already
over. The reliance placed on Ext. P4, P5 and P6 bills, referring to
the delay occurred on account of the alleged mechanical defect of
the truck was also rightly turned down by the learned Single Judge,
for the reason that these bills were dated 10.10.2007 and
17.10.2007, thus sustaining Ext.P10 order passed by the third
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
respondent, which does not call for any interference.
iii) As per the interim order dated 19.12.2007, in the appeal,
the third respondent was directed to release the vehicle on
satisfaction of the due amount, subject to the result of the Writ
Appeal. However, taking note of the fact that the issue as to the
power and competence of the Revenue authorities to impose 'fine'
is pending before the Apex Court (as stated in the order dated
23.07.2008 of the Full Bench of this Court passed in this appeal and
connected cases), this issue is left open. However, this Court
cannot, but arrive at a finding that the amount of ` 50,000/-
sought to be realised as fine is without any statutory backing, in so
far as the maximum amount of fine as prescribed under Section 20
of the Sand Act, is only ` 25,000/-. This being the position, the
excess amount of ` 25,000/- if realised pursuant to Ext. P10 shall
be returned to the petitioner/appellant forthwith, at any rate, within
three months. It is also made clear that if the question of law
stated as pending before the Apex Court as to the competence of
the revenue authorities to impose fine is answered in favour of the
appellant, it will be open for the appellant to seek return of the
above said amount and face prosecution proceedings to be
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
launched in accordance with law. Ext. P10 stands modified to the
said extent and the Writ Appeal is disposed of.
III. W.A.No. 300 of 2008
i) Non interference with Ext. P6 order passed by the
respondent ordering release of the vehicle, found as transporting
river sand without any valid pass on the relevant date, only on
condition that a sum of ` 55,000/- was remitted towards the River
Management Fund (as equal to the value of the vehicle) along with
a further sum of ` 50,000/- as fine, is the issue in this appeal.
There is a clear finding in the impugned judgment that the
transportation was without any valid pass and that the reliance
placed on Ext.P2 pass in the Writ Petition was only an after thought,
more so since there was no such case in the earlier representation
dated 19.09.2007 preferred by the petitioner before the
respondent. There was no such case for the petitioner in the earlier
W.P.(C) No. 26784 of 2007 as well, which was disposed of as per
Ext. P3 judgment, leading to Ext. P6 order. Obviously, Ext.P2 pass
is dated 31.08.2007 and the validity was only for a period of 'four
hours' from 1.20 p.m., whereas the vehicle carrying river sand was
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
seized on the next day. Though there is a case for the
petitioner/appellant that the delay was due to damage of gear box
and the repair necessitated, no tangible material/document has
been produced along with the writ petition or even with the writ
appeal, but for the bald averment, which cannot be accepted. As
such, interference is declined.
ii) In view of observation of the Full Bench of this Court as per
the order dated 23.07.2008 in W.A.No.3005 of 2007 and
connected cases, the issue, as to the power and competence of the
Revenue authorities to impose fine, (which is stated as pending
before the Apex Court) is left open.
iii) Though Ext. P6 order imposed a fine of ` 50,000/- in
respect of the offence, when the matter was admitted on
11.02.2008, the release of the vehicle was ordered on satisfaction of
a sum of ` 25,000/- as 'fine' along with value of the vehicle as
stated in Ext.P6. Since the maximum amount liable to be imposed
as 'fine' under Section 20 of the 'Sand Act' is only ` 25,000/-, the
interim order passed by this Court on 11.02.2008 is made absolute
as to the extent of fine. It is also made clear that if the question of
law stated as pending before the Apex Court as to the competence
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
of the revenue authorities to impose fine is answered in favour of
the appellant, it will be open for the appellant to seek return of the
above said amount and to face prosecution proceedings to be
launched in accordance with law. Ext. P6 order stands modified to
the above extent and the Writ Appeal is disposed of.
IV. W.A.No. 201 OF 2008
i) The appellant is the unsuccessful writ petitioner, who
challenged Ext.P3 order directing to satisfy a sum of ` 50,000/-
(an amount equal to the value of the vehicle) towards River
Management Fund and a sum of ` 50,000/- as fine for having the
custody/release of the vehicle, lest further proceedings should
follow under the relevant provisions of the 'Sand Act'/Rules. After
considering the materials on record, a clear finding has been
rendered by the learned Single Judge holding that transportation of
the river sand was per se illegal, in so far as there was an order
prohibiting collection of river sand in the District on the day when
the vehicle was seized, as revealed from the impugned order itself
and that the said finding in the impugned order (Ext.P3) was not
disputed in the writ petition. The averment as to the alleged denial
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
of opportunity of hearing has also been held as not correct, as the
impugned order itself disclosed that, on 03.11.2007, the
appellant/petitioner had appeared before the first respondent and
further that the learned Counsel had no contention that he was not
heard on that day. In the above circumstances, no interference is
warranted.
ii) Though as per the impugned order (Ext. P3) a sum of ` ,
50,000/- was imposed as fine in respect of the offence, when the
appeal was admitted on 12.02.2008, release of the vehicle was
ordered on satisfaction of a sum of `25,000/- as fine, along with
value of the vehicle as stated in Ext.P3. Since the maximum amount
liable to be imposed as fine under Section 20 of the 'Sand Act' is
only ` 25,000/-, the interim order passed by this Court on
12.02.2008 is made absolute as to the extent of fine payable.
iii) In view of observation of the Full Bench of this Court as
per the order dated 23.07.2008 in W.A.No.3005 of 2007 and
connected cases, the issue, as to the power and competence of the
Revenue authorities to impose fine, (which is stated as pending
before the Apex Court) is left open. It is also made clear that if
the question of law stated as pending before the Apex Court as to
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the competence of the revenue authorities to impose fine is
answered in favour of the appellant, it will be open for the appellant
to seek return of the above said amount and to face prosecution
proceedings to be launched in accordance with law. Ext. P3 stands
modified to the above extent and the Writ Appeal is disposed of.
V. W.A.No. 1628 OF 2008:
i) Besides challenging Ext.P4 order passed by the 2nd
respondent, the prayer in the Writ Petition was to declare Rules 27
and 28 of the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of
Removal of Sand Rules as 'ultra vires' to the Kerala Protection
of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001. (The
validity of the 'Act'/'Rules' has already been upheld and there is no
challenge against the Act as well). The 'Act' very much confers
power to order confiscation and the Rules have been framed to
subserve the 'Act', invoking the rule making power under Section
26. As such, the challenge raised against the rules, contending that
they are not in conformity with the provisions of the 'Act', fails.
ii) With regard to the challenge against Ext. P4 imposing a
fine of ` 25,000/- by the third respondent , in view of observation of
the Full Bench of this Court as per the order dated 23.07.2008 in
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
W.A.No.3005 of 2007 and connected cases, the issue, as to the
power and competence of the Revenue authorities to impose fine,
(which is stated as pending before the Apex Court) is left open. It
is also made clear that if the question of law stated a pending
before the Apex Court as to the competence of the revenue
authorities to impose fine is answered in favour of the appellant , it
will be open for the appellant to seek return of the above said
amount and to face prosecution proceedings to be launched in
accordance with law.
iii) However, the fact remains that the vehicle has been
released pursuant to the orders passed by this Court . There is a
clear finding in the impugned order that the seizure of the vehicle
was at 7.00 a.m. , while the 'pass' sought to be relied on was issued
only at 8.00 a.m. The learned Single Judge has arrived at a finding
in para 4 of the impugned judgment that the above finding in Ext. P4
order was not challenged from the part of the writ petitioner. Still,
the learned Single Judge proceeded further to hold that the amount
of fine ordered in Ext. P4 for releasing the vehicle could be treated
as the amount payable to the 'River Management Fund'. The Act
and Rules contemplate release of the vehicle only on satisfaction
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
of the amount equal to the value of the vehicle, towards the River
Management Fund . The vehicle involved was a lorry and the value
of the vehicle could not be less than ` 25,000/-, as on the relevant
date and the offender is actually liable to face prosecution
proceedings in respect of the offence (which is liable to be punished
either by imprisonment for a period of two years or with fine which
may extend to ` 25,000/- or with both as provided under Section
20 of the 'Sand Act'). Since the petitioner /appellant has now been
enabled to have release of the vehicle on payment of a sum of `.
25,000/- by virtue of Ext.P4 order, the said amount having been
ordered to be converted as amount payable to the 'River
Management Fund' as per the judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge and since the State has not preferred any appeal, we
do not find it necessary to disturb the said finding or to make the
petitioner/appellant to suffer any larger/wider consequence . It is
suffice to say that no interference is warranted and the appeal is
dismissed accordingly.
VI. W.A.No.1128 OF 2009
i) The vehicle belonging to the petitioner/appellant was seized
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
on 05.01.2009 for illegal transportation of river sand without any
valid pass . As per Ext. P2 order, it was ordered that the vehicle
could be released on payment of a sum of `. 75,000/- as the
amount equal to the value of the vehicle and also a sum of `
25,000/- as fine, lest it should lead to further proceedings under
the relevant provisions of the 'Sand Act'/Rules. The said order
was challenged, contending that, it was without any proper
application of mind and that the District Collector had no power to
impose fine. After considering the merits involved, the learned
Single Judge observed in paragraph 2 of the judgment, that the
petitioner was heard by the District Collector and that Ext.P1 'pass'
sought to be relied on was never produced before the District
Collector as evident from Ext. P2 order. Accordingly, the challenge
raised against Ext.P2 in this regard was rejected; however
observing that the District Collector did not have the power to
impose fine. Interference was made to the above limited extent
and the imposition of fine of ` 25,000/- was set aside.
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
ii) When the appeal came up for consideration before this
Court, the custody of the vehicle was ordered to be released on
17.11.2009, on depositing a sum of ` 50,000/- and on executing a
bond with two sureties, undertaking to produce the vehicle or to
remit the balance amount as and when directed . We do not find any
reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge. Appeal is dismissed.
VII. W.A.No. 648 OF 2009:
i) The vehicle belonging to the petitioner was found involved
in illegal transportation of the river sand and was seized on
17.12.2008 leading to Ext.P1 order dated 08.01.2009 passed by the
second respondent . The said order was challenged in the Writ
Petition, disputing the constitutional validity of the 'Sand Act'/Rules
and contending that the revenue authorities did not have any power
to impose fine. Validity of the Act/Rules stands upheld.
ii) As obvious from Ext. P1, the District Collector has not
imposed any fine in respect of the offence, but for ordering payment
of a sum of ` 75,000/- as equal to the value of the vehicle to the
River Management Fund. As such, the reference and reliance sought
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
to be placed on Sanjayan vs. Tahsildar, Mallappilly Taluk
(2007(4) KLT 597) is not at all relevant. Further, the issue is
stated as pending consideration before the Apex Court as observed
by a Full Bench of this Court in the order dated 23.07.2008 in W.A.
3005 of 2007 and connected cases.
iii) Coming to the merits of the case involved, it is borne out
from Ext. P1 itself that the river sand was sought to be transported
quite in an illegal manner to the destination in 'Kallai' without any
valid pass. Though the vehicle was sought to be stopped by the
'Squad' for inspection, it was never stopped and was driven away
fast. Later, the 'Squad' chased the vehicle and got it stopped,
followed by the scrutiny of the relevant documents, which brought
the actual position to light. There is no proper explanation from the
part of the petitioner/appellant as to the incriminating facts, but for
some bald averments, without any supporting materials. The
challenge raised against the provisions of law having already been
answered against the petitioner/appellant, this Court does not find
any reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge. Valuation of the vehicle was never a point mooted by
way of specific pleading in the Writ Petition. The appeal fails and it
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
is dismissed accordingly.
VIII. W.A.Nos. 1488,1493, 1911 & 1945 OF 2010:
i) All these appeals arise from the concerned Writ Petitions
which were dismissed as per a common judgment. The writ
petitions were sought to be amended by filing necessary I.As
incorporating the challenge against the relevant provisions of the
'Ordinance No.38/2010', which in fact were allowed by the learned
Single Judge, however declining interference in the writ petitions.
ii) Almost similar grounds have been raised in the writ
petitions as well as in the writ appeals. The factual challenge is
contained in Ground 'A' of the writ petitions, stating that Ext.P1
order was passed by the concerned District Collector
(i) in a mechanical manner
(ii) merely based on the mahazar and
(iii) without granting sufficient opportunity .
The legal grounds are that :
(1) the impugned provisions of the State
enactments/Rules/Ordinance are ultra vires to
the Constitution of India
(2) there is no power for the revenue authorities
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
to order confiscation which is vested only upon
the Court
(3) confiscation orders shall precede an order of
conviction ordered by the Court
(4) there is no power for the revenue authorities
to impose fine and that it is exclusively vested
with the Court.
The legal grounds, as aforesaid, have already been considered and
the constitutional validity of the Act/Rules/Ordinance has been
upheld herein before.
iii) Coming to the challenge raised on factual grounds, in
W.A.No. 1945 of 2010, it is seen from Ext. P1 that, pursuant to
the notice of hearing issued, the petitioner/appellant had appeared
in person on 04.05.2010 and during the course of the proceedings, it
was admitted by him that the seizure of the vehicle was in the
course of illegally transporting the river sand; that no valid 'pass'
was there at the relevant time and further that the vehicle might be
released, imposing a small amount as fine. It was accordingly, that
the matter was considered based on the available materials on
record, passing Ext. P1 order directing the petitioner/appellant to
deposit a sum of 2.5 lakhs as equal to the value of the vehicle, to
the River Management Fund; lest further proceedings as
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
contemplated under the Act/Rules should follow. There is no specific
pleading in the writ petition that the aforesaid observations made
by the District Collector in Ext.P1 are wrong. So also, the
petitioner/appellant has not chosen to produce copy of any valid
pass or such other materials either before the learned Single Judge
or even in the appeal. In the said circumstance, no interference is
warranted with the finding rendered by the learned Single Judge.
iv) Coming to W.A.No. 1911 of 2010, it has been observed
by the District Collector in Ext. P1 order that, pursuant to the
judgment dated 11.12.2009 in W.P.(C) No. 35883 OF 2009, the
matter was taken up and interim custody of the vehicle was ordered,
despite which, the petitioner / appellant had not chosen to avail the
benefit, satisfying the condition. In connection with the passing of
the final orders, the petitioner/appellant was also heard as stated in
Ext. P1 and he admitted the offence and made a submission that the
vehicle was having huge financial liabilities. It was taking note of
the undisputed facts as to the illegal transportation of the river sand
without any valid 'pass', that Ext. P1 order was passed directing the
party to deposit a sum of ` 2 lakhs towards River Management
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
Fund, lest further proceedings should follow as provided under the
Act/Rules. There is no case for the petitioner/appellant anywhere in
the writ petition, that the factual observation made by the District
Collector as aforesaid is wrong or perverse in any manner. So also,
the petitioner has not chosen to produce copy of any valid pass
either in the writ petition or in the appeal. As such, no interference is
warranted.
v) With regard to W.A.No. 1493 of 2010, Ext. P1 order
passed by the District Collector shows that transportation of the
river sand was not supported by any valid document. Though
interim custody of the vehicle was ordered on condition, as per
proceedings dated 01.12.2009 ( pursuant to the judgment in W.P.(C
) 31508/.09), the petitioner/appellant did not comply with the
condition. However, at the time of final hearing held on 03.03.2010,
the petitioner/appellant appeared in person and admitted that the
vehicle was seized while unloading the sand from a big vehicle to a
small vehicle and requested to impose a nominal fine and to release
the vehicle as stated in Ext.P1. It was also observed by the District
Collector in Ext. P1 that the same vehicle was seized earlier by the
Tahsildar, Kozhikode on 23.03.2009 for the same offence and it was
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
released after payment of fine. It was considering the above
materials on record, that Ext. P1 order was passed directing the
petitioner/appellant to deposit a sum of ` 1 lakh as equal to the
value of the vehicle towards River Management Fund; lest further
proceedings should follow under the Act/Rules. There is no case for
the petitioner/appellant that the above finding on facts is wrong or
perverse in any manner. So also, the petitioner has not chosen to
produce copy of any valid pass either in the writ petition or in the
appeal. Challenge fails on the factual grounds as well.
vi) In W.A. No.1488 of 2010, the vehicle was intercepted in
the course of illegal transportation of river sand by the 'Squad' of
Tahsildar, Tirur on 19.01.2010 as stated in Ext.P1. It is clear from
Ext.P1 that the petitioner/appellant, at the time of hearing held on
15.02.2010, conceded that, though the sand was transported on the
strength of a pass, it was omitted to stick 'cello tape' at the
relevant place stipulating the time of commencement of journey, as
prescribed. The petitioner/appellant requested to release the
vehicle cursing his ignorance. On analysing the facts and figures,
the District Collector observed that, apart from non-pasting of the
'cello tape' on the pass, as prescribed, there was no entry in the
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
relevant records, particularly in the 'Kadavu Register' as to the
vehicle bearing No. KL-08/AG 5115. Similarly, 'white colour pass'
(to be kept in authorised Kadavu and to be entrusted to the
Panchayath office) was also traced out from the vehicle during the
course of inspection; which revealed that the vehicle was not taken
to the 'Kadavu' for taking sand and that it was transporting sand
several times using a single pass (which was not in the requisite
form-Form P). It was accordingly, that the proceedings were
finalised, passing Ext. P1 order, directing the petitioner /appellant
to deposit a sum of ` 3 lakhs, as equal to the value of the vehicle to
the River Management Fund. The finding and reasoning given by
the District Collector in Ext. P1 is proper and beyond challenge. So
is the finding of the learned Single Judge as well.
vii) Since the District Collector has not chosen to impose any
'fine' for the offence committed by the petitioner /appellant, the
question whether the revenue authorities are justified in imposing
fine, does not come up for consideration in these four appeals. All
these four appeals fail and they are dismissed accordingly.
IX. W.A.Nos. 998, 999 and 1004 OF 2010
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
i) In these cases, the issue involved stands confined to
granting 'interim custody' of the vehicles which were seized
alleging illegal transportation of river sand. In relation to
W.A.No.998 of 2010, the grievance was that, Ext. P2 application
for interim custody was sought to be considered and finalised, while
the subject matter of W.A.No. 999 of 2010 was the challenge
against the final order (Ext. P3), which in turn was set aside and the
matter was directed to be re-considered as per the impugned
judgment, also directing to pass appropriate orders regarding
interim custody. In W.A.No. 1004 OF 2010, the grievance
involved was in relation to Ext. P10 order passed by the District
Collector pursuant to the verdict of this Court in W.P.(C) 14491 of
2010, imposing certain conditions (which were stated as onerous).
The Writ Petition filed was disposed of directing to release the
vehicle subject to conditions stipulated by the Division Bench in
District Collector, Malappuram vs. Abdul Kasim [2010 (1)
KLT SN.31 (Case No.38)]. The said decision has been ordered to
be followed while considering the question of 'interim custody' in
the former two cases as well. All the appellants are stated as
aggrieved of the direction to satisfy 50% of the liability and to meet
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
the requirements as specified.
ii) When the matters came up for consideration before another
Division Bench, a common interim order was passed on 18.06.2010
observing that, because of the conflicting orders passed by co-ordinate
benches, as to the condition to be satisfied for 'interim custody' and that
the matters stood referred to the Full Bench, the District Collectors were
ordered to release the vehicles, after unloading the sand, on remitting `
25,000/- each, for each vehicle seized, after making endorsement in the
RC books of the vehicles that the release is subject to adjudication by the
District Collector and that no transfer of the vehicle shall be permitted
before disposal of the writ appeals.
iii) It is brought to our notice that the Full Bench has already
finalised the matter as borne by the decision reported in 2010 (3) KLT
413 (F.B.) (Shan vs. State of Kerala), whereby the earlier decision
rendered by the Division Bench in W.A.No. 499 of 2010 ordering 'interim
custody' on satisfying ` 25,000/- was overruled and it was held that
before releasing the custody of the vehicle, the full value of the vehicle
must be ensured, so as to safeguard the interests of the State. It was
also declared that the owner of the vehicle had to deposit 30% of the
value of the vehicle as determined by the appropriate authority under
the M.V. Act in cash and to furnish security, either in the form of 'bank
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
guarantee' or as immovable property, for the balance amount for having
interim custody.
iv) In the above circumstance, these three appeals are disposed of,
directing the first respondent to pass appropriate orders regarding the
interim custody, if still pending, in tune with the directions given by the Full
Bench of this Court as aforesaid. In any view of the matter, the
adjudication proceedings shall be finalised in accordance with law as
expeditiously as possible ( if the same are still to be finalised), at any rate,
within 'six weeks' from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.
X. W.A.No. 1584 OF 2010
i) This appeal was admitted on 21.12.2010 and it was heard in
detail on the same day, as suggested by the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, in view of the very same nature of challenge raised in the
connected matters, which were finally heard and taken up for judgment on
the previous day.
ii) The appellant is challenging the judgment dated 13.07.2010 in
W.P. (C) 21618 of 2010, whereby interference was declined and the writ
petition was dismissed for the long delay. Obviously, the
petitioner/appellant filed W.P.(C), challenging Ext. P2 order dated
11.01.2008 passed by the second respondent under the relevant
provisions of the 'Sand Act', in connection with the illegal transportation of
W. A. Nos. 3005 OF 2007 and connected cases
river sand contrary to the relevant provisions of the 'Sand Act'/Rules. The
challenge was raised, mainly on the constitutional validity of the 'Act' and
Rules (which however stands now answered against the petitioner as
discussed earlier). With regard to the factual position, it is evident
that the vehicle was seized on 06.12.2007 leading to Ext.P2 order dated
11.01.2008. The petitioner chose to challenge the said order by filing writ
petition only on 09.07.2010 (after 30 months) and absolutely no legally
acceptable reason has been offered for the callous inaction/inordinate
delay. No materials, including any valid pass is produced as well. In the
said circumstance, the learned Single Judge Judge perfectly justified in
declining interference. We do not find any tenable ground to call for
interference in the appeal. Appeal fails and the same is dismissed
accordingly.
J. CHELAMESWAR,
CHIEF JUSTICE.
P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON,
JUDGE.
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