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  • S. 2(ia), (h), (i), 7(i) and 7(v) read with S. 16(1-A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and R. 44-A and R. 80 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
  • S. 19 of the Food Adulteration Act and under S. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • S. 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • S. 2(ia), (h), (i), 7(i) and 7(v) read with S. 16(1-A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and R. 44-A and R. 80 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
  • S. 19 of the Food Adulteration Act and under S. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • S. 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The sixth accused in C.C No. 755 of 1997 filed a Miscellaneous Case (M.C) petition to quash the order (Annexure-C) passed by the Magistrate, which impleaded him as an accused and initiated proceedings against him. The case arose from a complaint by the Food Inspector, Corporation of Cochin, alleging that Toor dhall sold by the first accused was adulterated. The first accused traced the source of the food article through a chain of bills involving the second to fifth accused, including manufacturers and dealers. The fifth accused filed a petition under Section 19 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to implead the petitioner (sixth accused) as an additional accused. The Magistrate allowed this petition and issued summons to the petitioner, who then sought revision to quash the order and proceedings against him.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate was justified in impleading the petitioner as an accused under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act during the trial.
  2. Whether the proceedings initiated against the petitioner before the commencement of trial in a summons case are valid.
  3. The scope and timing of impleading a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer as an accused in a summons case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The manufacturer's name and brand mentioned in the mahazar and complaint differ from those in the petition and order impleading the petitioner.
  • The Toor dhall seized was not the article sold or manufactured by the petitioner, as the brand names differ.
  • The petition filed by the fifth accused states the seized sample is different from the petitioner’s product and suggests another person should be impleaded instead.
  • The order impleading the petitioner was passed before the trial commenced; since this is a summons case, trial begins only after framing of charge, which had not occurred.
  • Therefore, the Magistrate’s order is illegal and contrary to CrPC provisions.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of India (1997 (1) KLT 366) to argue trial commencement timing.

Court's Observations on Arguments

  • The court found no material difference in the manufacturer’s identity despite typographical errors and rejected the petitioner’s argument on this ground.
  • Materials such as the mahazar, complaint, and bills sufficiently connected the petitioner to the offence, justifying impleading him.
  • The subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act to implead a manufacturer is sufficient.
  • The argument that trial had not commenced was rejected based on precedents indicating that proceedings before framing charges can be treated as trial for the purposes of Section 20A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of India (1997 (1) KLT 366) Defines commencement of trial in warrant cases under CrPC. The court distinguished this precedent, holding that it does not apply to the special provision under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Bhagawan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration ((1975) 1 SCC 866 : AIR 1975 SC 1309) Supports joinder of manufacturer as co-accused in joint trial under Section 20A. Used to support the principle that a manufacturer can be impleaded initially or subsequently if allegations justify it.
Chandak v. Food Inspector (1990 (1) KLT 572) Trial for purposes of Section 20A includes proceedings before framing of charge. Supported the view that trial commences earlier for Section 20A, validating impleading before formal charge framing.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P ((1995) 6 SCC 62) Section 319 of CrPC allows joinder of accused during trial; Section 20A overrides sub-section (3) of Section 319. Confirmed that joint trial including manufacturer under Section 20A is permissible at any stage.
State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar ((1983) 2 SCC 384 : AIR 1983 SC 545) Emphasizes public welfare importance of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and cautions against quashing prosecutions on flimsy grounds. Supported the court's approach to uphold prosecution to protect public health and reject hypertechnical pleas.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, particularly Section 20A, which empowers the Magistrate to implead a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer as an accused if satisfied they are concerned with the offence at any time during trial. The subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate was deemed sufficient for impleading the petitioner. The court examined the documentary evidence including the mahazar, complaint, and sale bills, concluding that there was adequate material to connect the petitioner to the offence.

Regarding the timing of impleading the petitioner in a summons case, the court relied on Supreme Court and High Court precedents which clarified that trial for the purpose of Section 20A includes proceedings before formal framing of charges. Thus, the Magistrate’s order impleading the petitioner before charge framing was not illegal. The court rejected the petitioner’s hypertechnical contentions about differences in brand names and manufacturer identity as unsustainable. It emphasized the public interest in preventing food adulteration and the necessity of not quashing prosecutions on trivial grounds.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the order (Annexure-C) passed by the Magistrate impleading the petitioner as the sixth accused was justified and lawful. The petition to quash the order and the proceedings against the petitioner was dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is the continuation of the prosecution against the petitioner as an accused under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the application of Section 20A and related principles. The ruling underscores the court's commitment to upholding public health laws and resisting quashing of prosecution on technical or flimsy grounds.

    Omprakash Sivaprakash v. Kuriakose

    K.A Mohamed Shall, J.:— The sixth accused in C.C No. 755 of 1997 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-I, Ernakulam has filed this M.C to quash Annexure-C order passed by the Magistrate and entire proceedings initiated against him.

    2. On the basis of Annexure A1 complaint, filed by the Food Inspector, Corporation of Cochin, Ernakulam ‘accused 1 to 5 who are the respondents 2 to 6 herein, were standing trial for the offences punishable under S. 2(ia), (h), (i), 7(i) and 7(v) read with S. 16(1-A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and R. 44-A and R. 80 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The allegation made in the complaint is that the Toor dhall was purchased by the complainant from the first accused exposed and exhibited by him for sale to public for the purposes of analysis and after analysis the same was found to be adulterated. The first accused informed the Food Inspector that he purchased the food article from the second accused as per Bill No. 5197 dated 26.6.1995 The second accused is a partnership firm and third accused is the Managing Partner, who is in charge of the business of the firm. As the second accused informed that they purchased the food article in question, from the fourth accused firm, as per bill No. 40978, dated 27.5.95, the fourth accused firm and the fifth accused, its Managing Partner were implicated. Even though it is stated in the mahazar prepared by the Food Inspector as well as in Annexure A1 complaint that it was inscribed in Hindi on the sack where from the sample was taken the name as Omprakash Sivaprakash, MITCH, Phase 3, Plot No. AKOLA and also brand name as 24 CARATCOLBRAND, the Food Inspector did not implicate him as an accused stating that the other accused did not indicate whether the above name holder is a licensed manufacturer and the details such as, whether it is having a valid PFA licence etc., or whether it is a proprietary concern, firm or a company, etc. After they appeared before the court, the fifth accused filed a petition before the court under S. 19 of the Food Adulteration Act and under S. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to implead the petitioner herein, as an accused in the case. The learned Magistrate, by the impugned order dated 23.1.1998 allowed the petitioner to be impleaded as an accused in this case and directed to issue summons to him. Hence the petitioner has preferred this revision petition before this Court to quash the order passed by, the Magistrate and the entire proceedings initiated against him.

    3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the manufacturer's name stated in the mahazar and in the Annexure A1 complaint is entirely different from the person sought to be impleaded as per Annexure-B petition and impleaded as per Annexure C order. He also pointed out that the brand name mentioned in the mahazar prepared by the Food Inspector and in the Annexure A1 complaint filed by him is entirely different from the brand name of the product manufactured and marketed by the petitioner, as stated in Annexure B petition. The manufacturer sought to be imp leaded is entirely different from what is mentioned by the Food Inspector in the mahazar as well as in the complaint On perusal of the recitals made in the mahazar prepared by the Food Inspector and the bills produced by the accused 1 to 5 before the Food Inspector and the court, copies of which are shown to me, I find no difference in the person mentioned as manufacturer and person sought to be imp leaded as per Annexure B petition. The petitioner cannot make much of the slight typographical error committed in the complaint, with regard to his description. Therefore, this submission of the petitioner is not sustainable.

    4. The petitioner vehemently contended that in the petition filed before the learned Magistrate, by the fifth accused, it is stated that “The sample Toor dhall seized from the accused No. 1 is not an article sold by the petitioner. The mark of the Toor dhall sold by the petitioner is “24 carat marks”, but the sample seized from accused No. 1 is having brand name “24 CARAT COLBRAND” which is not sold by the petitioner. It is not known whether M/s. P.K Jacob & Company had actually sold the self same article which was purchased from the petitioner. In any case, the Toor dhall which is sold by the petitioner is procured from M/s. Omprakash Sivaprakash, Ltd., Kiranabazar, Akola 4440001, which is represented by Sri. Sanjay Kumar and it is highly necessary that he should be imp leaded as accused in this case, for the interest of justice”. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the above averments made in the petition clearly show that the Toor dhall sold in this case is entirely different from what is sold by the fifth accused to the second accused and what is manufactured and marketed by the petitioner. Therefore, on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the learned Magistrate is not at all justified in imp leading the petitioner in this case.

    5. Proviso to S. 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act lays down “a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of sale of any article of food given by Manufacturer or distributor or dealer in such article to the vendor thereof, shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer under this section.” In this case, the first accused has produced the bill issued by the second accused and the second accused has produced the bill issued by the fourth accused for purchase of the article. The fourth accused contended that the article sold by them is manufactured and marketed by the petitioner herein. S. 20 A of the Act deals with power of the court to implead the manufacturer which reads as follows:

    “where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor ordealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (3) of S. 319 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in S. 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S. 20”.

    6. Therefore, it is clear that S. 20A of the Act empowers the Magistrate to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, if he is satisfied that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence, at any time, during the trial of any offence under the Act The subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate trying the offence punishable under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, to the effect that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the crime is sufficient to implead him in the case, under S. 20 A of the Act The question whether the articles purchased by the Food Inspector for analysis in this case is the very item of food article manufactured and marketed by the petitioner which was sold to the fourth accused, who in turn sold to the second accused and finally sold by them to the first accused vendor, are matters to be considered by the trial court, after adducing evidence. From the materials available on record, especially the mahazar prepared by the Food Inspector, Annexure A1 complaint filed by him, the receipts issued with regard to the sale of the article, are sufficient to establish that the petitioner is concerned in the offence alleged in this case, so as to implead him as an accused. Therefore, the argument of the learned senior counsel that the averments made in the petition filed by the fifth accused in this case provided negative evidence, as far as the implication of the petitioner in this case is concerned, as he has stated that he has not sold the food, article in question, though he has stated that he has sold the article purchased by him from the sixth accused is not acceptable.

    7. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the proceedings initiated by the first respondent, Food Inspector and pending before the court is a summons case, the order passed by the learned Magistrate to implead the petitioner as sixth accused in this case is illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to him, the trial in a summons case will commence only when the charge is framed by the court against the accused concerned and in this case, no evidence is recorded nor any charge is framed against the accused and therefore, the trial is not commenced. Therefore, according to him, the impugned order passed before the commencement of trial by the Magistrate is illegal. S. 20A of the Act empowers the Magistrate to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer as the case may be, at any time during the trial of any offence under the Act Therefore, according to him, since the trial has not started, the petitioner cannot be impleaded as an accused, being manufacturer of the food article in question. The learned senior counsel relied upon Common Cause, A Regd. Society through Its Directory v. Union of India 1997 (1) KLT 366, wherein a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “In cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under S. 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under S. 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”.

    8. Therefore, the learned senior counsel argued, that this case being treated as summons case, the trial before the learned Magistrate will commence only when charge is framed by the court against the accused after examining the witnesses. Therefore, according to him, Annexure-C order impleading the petitioner as accused in this case being illegal is liable to be quashed.

    9. In the decision reported in Bhagawan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration ((1975) 1 SCC 866 : AIR 1975 SC 1309), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “We are in agreement with the view of the Delhi High Court that these special provisions do not take away or derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law which enable separate as well as joint trials of accused persons in accordance with the provisions of the old Ss. 233 to 239 of Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, there seems no logically sound person why if a distributor or a manufacturer can be subsequently impleaded, under S. 20A of the Act, he cannot be joined as a co-accused initially in a joint trial if the allegations made justify such a course”.

    10. In the decision reported in Chandak v. Food Inspector (1990 (1) KLT 572) a Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows:

    “It could be said that when the case is tried as a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the trial commcnces only when the charge is framed after compliance with S. 244. But, as held in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandy (AIR 1957 SC 389) followed in Pure Ice cream Pvt. Ltd. v. Narendra jitsingh (1975 (2) PFA Cases 385), trial in S. 20 A or even under certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be understood to mean proceedings after framing of charge alone. The proceedings even before that could be treated as trial for the purpose of S. 20-A and evidence adduced at that stage also may be sufficient”.

    11. In the decision reported in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P ((1995) 6 SCC 62, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

    “In fact for general offences, S. 319(1) of the Code empowers the court where during the course of enquiry or trial of an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, to proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. In view of the langiiage of S. 20-A of the Act, whatever is contained in sub-s. (3) of S. 319 of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to proceed at a trial against any person, ie., the original accused and against others mentioned in S. 20-A. In other words, joint trial for the same offence is permitted.”

    12. It is clear from the above noted decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that the manufacturer can be impleaded at any stage of the trial and it need not be after framing charge under S. 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the case is tried as a summons case, instituted otherwise than on a police charge. Therefore, the arguments advanced by the senior counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the decision of the two judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while considering the commencement of trial under general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, has no application to the commencement of trial of a case for the purpose of the special provision in S. 20-A of the PFA Act Hence the contention of the petitioner that Annexure-C order passed by the learned Magistrate, impleading him as accused before commencement of the trial in this case is not sustainable is of no force.

    13. In the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar ((1983) 2 SCC 384 : AIR 1983 SC 545), the Supreme Court observed as follows:

    “Adulteration and misbranding of food stuffs are rampant evils in our country. The Act is brought into force to check these social evils in the larger public interest for ensuring public welfare. In certain cases, the Act provides for imposition of penalty without proof of a guilty mind. This shows the degree of concern exhibited by Parliament in so far as public health is concerned. While construing such food law courts should keep in view that the need for prevention of future injury is as important as punishing a wrong doer after the injury is actually inflicted. Merely because a person who has actually suffered in his health after consuming adulterated food would not be before court in such cases courts should not be too eager to quash on slender grounds the prosecutions for offences, alleged to have been committed under the Act”

    14. Therefore, it is clear that in cases of adulteration of food articles, which is rampant in our country and a grave menace to the health of general public, the prosecution of the offenders cannot be slightly interfered by invoking the provisions of S. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on flimsy for trivial grounds. It is clear from the contentions raised by the petitioner that he has been seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against him on flimsy and hypertechnical grounds, which cannot be countenanced by this Court to exercise the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. From my foregoing discussions, it is clear that there were sufficient materials before the learned Magistrate to implead the petitioner as sixth accused, by invoking the provisions of S. 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Annexure-C order passed by the learned Magistrate, arraying the petitioner as sixth accused in this case is perfectly justified. Therefore, no interference is called for by this Court against Annexure C order passed by the learned Magistrate. Hence, the order passed by the Magistrate is confirmed and the Criminal Miscellaneous case is dismissed.

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    Omprakash Sivaprakash v. Kuriakose
    (Jun 10, 1999)