1. Counsel for the first respondent-plaintiff submits that the suit O.S No. 193 of 1989 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Kottayam in which the petitioners sought to get themselves impleaded has been decreed on December 12, 1989. This is not disputed by counsel for the petitioners. The question whether the lower court was right in rejecting the application to implead does not, therefore, survive for consideration at this stage. The revision petition is liable to be dismissed on this preliminary ground itself.

2. But there is no merit either in the revision petition. The suit is one for recovery of an amount of over rupees thirty one lakhs from respondents 2 and 3 by sale of the mortgaged properties, which include the establishment where the petitioners are stated to be working. This establishment is a factory “manufacturing” coffee powder. The petitioners are not parties to the mortgage transaction, nor are they liable for the whole or any portion of the amount claimed in the suit. But they sought to get themselves impleaded as parties on the allegation that they are workers in the establishment, their right to work therein was likely to be affected by the sale of the mortgaged properties, including the industrial establishment and therefore, they are proper parties to the suit. Reliance was placed on the decision of the High Court of Bombay reported in State Bank of India v. Podar Mills Ltd. AIR 1989 Bombay 215, as also on the decision of the Supreme Court in Workers v. Rohtas Industries Ltd. 1987 (2) SCC 588. It must be noted however that the petitioners have discreetly avoided taking any responsibility for discharge of the debt due to the plaintiff. Nor have they put forward any scheme for operation of the establishment or for discharge of the plaintiff's dues.

3. Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides that the court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon, or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any person, who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon, and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added as party to the suit.

4. The rule categorises parties to the suit into two necessary parties and proper parties. The distinction between the two was drawn by the Supreme Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786. It was stated that a necessary party was one without whom no decree can be made effectively. A proper party was one in whose absence, an effective order can be made, but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.

5. The petitioners have no claim that they are necessary parties to the suit. They seek to come on record only as proper parties.

6. A person may be impleaded as a defendant in a suit, though no relief may be claimed against him, if his presence is necessary for a complete and final adjudication of the questions involved in the Suit. It is well established that questions involved in the suit are those which arise between the parties to the suit. See Vaithilinga v. Sadasiva, AIR 1926 Mad 836, Somiah v. Amina Begum, AIR 1976 AP 182, among others. Only a person, who has a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation, whether it raises questions relating to moveable or immoveable property, can however be impleaded as a party. Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886. What is this “direct interest” Lindley LJ has explained it in Moser v. Marsden (1892) 1 Ch. 487 as a direct interest in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant. Only a person who is so interested can be impleaded as a defendant. Lord Greene M.R has further explained the nature of this interest in re I.G Farbenindustrie A.G Agreement (1943) 2 All ER 525 where he stated that in order that a party may be added as a defendant in the suit, he should have a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation — legal interest not as distinguished from an equitable interest, but an interest which the law recognises. The learned Judge went on to state that the court had no jurisdiction to add a person as a party to the litigation if he had no legal interest in the issue involved in the case. The matter was elaborately dealt with again by Devlin J. (as the learned Judge then was in the Queen's Bench Division) in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 273. The learned Judge reiterated that it was not enough that the intervener was commercially or indirectly interested; he must be directly or legally interested. A person is legally interested in the question involved in the suit only if he can say that it may lead to a result that may affect him legally, that is by curtailing his legal rights.

7. The ratio of the decided cases is that a proper party is one who has a defined subsisting direct and substantive interest in the issues arising in the litigation, an interest which will be cognisable in a court of law. That is an interest which the law recognises and which the court will enforce. A person who is only indirectly or commercially interested in the proceedings is not entitled to be added as a party. If he is a person who is not interested in the questions which arise between the parties to the litigation, that is, a question with regard to the right set up and the relief claimed by one side, and withheld by the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party. The raison d'etre is that the trial of the suit will be embarrassed and considerable prejudice caused to the contesting parties if irrelevant matters are allowed to be agitated or considered, by adding a new party whose interest in the litigation has no nexus to the subject matter of the suit. See Mahadeva Rice and Oil Mills v. Chennimalai Goundar, AIR 1968 Mad. 287.

8. The position of the petitioners vis-a-vis, the first respondent Bank is such that they have no claim as against the Bank. There is no interest liable to be agitated or adjudicated upon between them and the Bank. They are not directly interested in the issues arising between the plaintiff Bank and its debtors, the defendants. If at all their right is only against their own establishment represented by respondents 2 and 3, the defendants in the suit. The presence of these petitioners who do not owe or own up any liability to the plaintiff and who do not undertake to discharge the loan amount due to the plaintiff is not required for the purpose of adjudicating the dispute between the plaintiff and their debtors namely the defendants. The court can effectively and completely dispose of the suit even without the petitioners on record. The petitioners do not have any right which they could enforce against the plaintiff in law. In that event, their presence in the suit is unnecessary, and they are not entitled to be added as parties to the suit. Their petition for being impleaded was therefore misconceived and was rightly rejected by the court below.

9. However, the petitioners base their claim for being impleaded on the decision of the Supreme Court in Workers v. Rohtas Industries Ltd. (1987) 2 SCC 588, and of the Bombay High Court in State Bank of India v. Podar Mills Ltd., AIR 1989 Bombay 215. It is necessary to deal with them as considerable reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on these decisions. The first of these cases arose under the Bihar Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1981. The undertaking in question owed substantial amounts to its workers by way of wages and other benefits. The question arose as to how the products of the industry which were lying in stock should be dealt with. It was stated by the State of Bihar that the liability for payment of wages to the workers should be honoured. The Supreme Court accepted this submission stating that the workers had contributed their labour, and it was the result of their hard work that had produced the stock in question. Therefore, the wages and emoluments to be paid for the period up to the date of closure of the industry should rank in priority. It was so declared by the Supreme Court. But the question of impleading in a suit of this nature did not arise for consideration in that case, nor was it considered by the Supreme Court.

10. The latter case is however directly in point. In that case, the State Bank of India had filed a suit for recovery of moneys due under a mortgage from the Poddar Mills Ltd. While the suit was pending, a trade union of the workers of the company sought to get themselves impleaded as party to the suit, under Order I Rule 10(2). That was granted by the trial court and the matter was taken up in revision to the High Court. The High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in National Textile Workers Union v. Rama-krishnan, AIR 1983 SC 75, where the Supreme Court had held that the workers of a company had a right to be heard in relation to an application for the winding up of the company. It was stated therein that the future of the workers was at stake, and the right to work was in jeopardy as a result of the presentation of the winding up petition. They were so tied up with their interests for survival; the well-being of the company is much more than the interests of the share holder. It was in those circumstances that the Supreme Court allowed the workers to be heard in the winding up proceedings. Based on this decision and others, Guttal, J. observed that the question whether a person has interest in the subject matter of the suit cannot be considered in vacuum. The nature of the reliefs, their impact on the person seeking to be added as a party, and the context in which the claim to be joined arises, are factors of fundamental importance. It was stated that the nexus between the claim of the workers and the reliefs in the suit was established. Suppose the workers succeeded in their efforts to revive and rebuild the industry, they will be able to produce the goods and increase the wealth of the defendant, in which event the plaintiff will be able to realise the debt without selling the security. With these observations the learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay confirmed the impleading of the trade union of the workers.

11. A civil court is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It can exercise only those powers which are conferred on it expressly or which inhere in it for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The nature of the power to be exercised in the matter of impleading is circumscribed by the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2), The civil court cannot travel beyond these provisions and pass orders of its own, having regard to its own notions or philosophy in a particular matter. The civil court cannot pass orders which are not otherwise permitted by any provisions of law or by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this respect, the jurisdiction of the civil court is considerably limited, and varies from those exercised by the specialist tribunals functioning under the Industrial Disputes Act. A Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal functioning under that Act stands on a different footing and it can adjudge rights of parties dehors the law of Contract and dehors the ordinary law. It was stated as follows as early as in 1949 by Mahajan, J. in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, (1949) 1 LLJ 245 (FC):—

“The award of the tribunal may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no court could order if it was bound by ordinary law, but the tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations.”

This was reiterated by Mukherjea, J. in these words in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. (1950) LLJ 921 : (AIR 1950 SC 188):—

“In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace.”

This special jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts vis-a-vis the civil courts was re-affirmed in emphatic terms recently by the Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath v. Empire of India and Cylone Tea Co., AIR 1990 SC 255. These Tribunals are thus enabled to create new rights and liabilities and new relationships which an ordinary civil court is powerless to do. For instance, specific performance of a contract of service is unknown to the civil law and the civil court cannot grant such a relief, but it is an attribute of industrial adjudication that such relief is freely granted, and reinstatement with or without backwages ordered having regard to the facts of a particular case. Even assuming that the workers can put forward any scheme for the revival of the undertaking or otherwise, the civil court functioning under the Code of Civil Procedure will be powerless to act upon any such scheme or grant relief or issue directions based thereon, its jurisdiction in the matter being limited to adjudication of the dispute between the parties and not others. Any foray outside these limits will be treated as totally without jurisdiction and arbitrary. The civil courts cannot be allowed to run astray or outside the limits set for them in the matter of adjudication of disputes before them. They are bound by the principles of law as well as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in such adjudication.

12. It is not clear from the Bombay decision as to what exactly will be the benefit that could accrue by impleading the labour unions as parties to the proceedings. True, the labour unions can put forward schemes for revival which they can do even without being parties to the litigation. The fact that they are impleaded and are parties to the suit does not confer greater sanctity for any proposal for revival or for discharge of the debts put forward by them. The Court cannot take cognisance of such proposals or act upon them; its duty is only to adjudicate on the questions arising between the parties to the suit in accordance with law and the provisions of the Code. The Court cannot for that matter compel the creditor to accept any such proposals and act upon them. And, what is to be done in case of multiple unions or workers getting themselves impleaded with varied proposals or schemes for rehabilitation of the industry? Is the Civil Court to enquire into all this and practically settle a scheme for rebuilding the industry? I do not think the Civil Court is empowered to do it. If that be so, what is the purpose of impleading all these unions and workers? Their presence in the array of parties is quite unnecessary for a decision of the suit. Even without being parties to the proceedings, it will be open to the unions or workers to place their proposals and impress upon the creditor to accept those proposals and act upon them. Their presence in the suit is unnecessary for any such purpose. It will only complicate the issues arising between the parties by bringing in extraneous matters, which the Court cannot deal with or decide upon.

13. For these reasons, I express my dissent from the view take by the Bombay High Court in the State Bank of India case. It is true that the workers do have better rights than they had previously. But that is not to say that they are necessary or proper parties to a suit, the proceedings in which are to be governed strictly by the Code of Civil Procedure.

14. I have therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners herein were not necessary parties to the suit and that their application was rightly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge.

The revision petition is therefore dismissed, without however any order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.