1. The petitioner, a member of Delhi Higher Judicial Service, has in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sought quashing of the order dated 24th May, 1993 passed by respondent No.2 withdrawing entire judicial work and the order (Annexure-P.12) dated 1st June, 1993 passed by respondent No. 3 in exercise of the powers conferred by subrule (3) of Rule 16 of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 read with Rule 27 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970, compulsorily retiring him from service with immediate effect. The challenge to the impugned order has been made, inter alia, on the following grounds :-

2. The provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 16 of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, which has been made applicable to Delhi Higher Judicial Service suffers from non-application of mind and confers arbitrary powers and is violative of Articles 14, 16(1) and 311(2) of the Constitution; the impugned order is vitiated because of lack of material or no material to justify passing of the impugned order; the impugned order suffers from malice in fact and malice in law. For the year 1991 no remarks, adverse in any sense, were recorded in time, nor were communicated in time. The only material before the Screening Committee was an adverse entry recorded on 2nd December, 1992 and conveyed on 1st January, 1993. Recording of confidential report for 1991 towards end of 1992 is in itself unreasonable and contrary to the binding instructions. It is unreasonable to record an entry in confidential report belatedly. Communication of such an adverse entry recorded in contravention of all norms, without furnishing any relevant material deprived even the right to represent against it or in any case made the same a mere formality; the petitioner was senior most among the Scheduled Caste Judges of lower judiciary and the impugned order on the face of it is an innocuous order, foundation of which is the alleged mis-conduct and it casts stigma; the impugned order has been passed by way of punishment and is not an order simplicitor passed under Rule 16(3) of 1958 Rules; newspaper reports appearing prior to the passing of the impugned order clearly indicate that the foundation of the order is not bona fide; the order on the face records to retire the petitioner in public interest, but the foundation is the allegation of corruption for which there is no material on record. In the absence of any material, the impugned order is vitiated; the High Court deliberated on the petitioner's represented and on the issue of compulsory retirement on the same day and at the same time, for which also the impugned order is rendered illegal; the order rejecting the representation shows a closed mind. In the absence of any relevant material, it must be inferred that the decision was influenced by extraneous considerations. The communication dated 24th May, 1993, rejecting the petitioner's representation without any reasoned order is also bad in law. The procedure regarding recording confidential reports as well as the entry relating to integrity are contrary to Office Memorandum dated 21st September, 1965, which is applicable to members of Higher Judicial Service.

3. On 7th September, 1993, when the petition came up for preliminary hearing, one of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner was noted that he was informed, after he had been prematurely retired, of the rejection of his representation against communication of adverse remarks. Show cause notice in the first instance was directed to be issued to the respondents, limited to the question "if the rejection of representation was earlier in time or later than the impugned order".

4. In response to the aforementioned show cause notice, reply was filed by the High Court on the affidavit of Mr. B. Radhakrishna, Deputy Registrar, stating that Full Court in its meeting dated 31st October, 1992 recorded annual confidential remarks on the work and conduct of the petitioner for the years 1990 and 1991. By letter dated 22nd December, 1992, remarks were communicated to the petitioner through District Judge. The petitioner, to whom remarks were communicated on 2nd January, 1993, made his representation on 12th February, 1993 for expunction of those remarks. Petitioner's representation was considered by the Full Court in its meeting held on 22nd May, 1993 and the same was rejected. The Full Court in its meeting held on the same day firstly considered and decided to reject the representation and thereafter took a decision to make recommendation to the appointing authority to retire the petitioner in public interest. As such, according to the affidavit, the representation was rejected earlier in point of time. It was only after rejection of the representation that a decision was taken on which recommendation was made to the appointing authority to compulsorily retier the petitioner in public interest.

5. After Rule was issued, respondents filed their separate affidavits. We need not deal with reply of respondents 3 and 4 elaborately. It inter alia states that the recommendation of the High Court was received by the Lt. Governor, who after going through the record passed the impugned order retiring the petitioner in public interest.

6. The High Court in its reply stated that retirement of the petitioner is in public interest and is in accordance with law. The petitioner was a member of Delhi Higher Judicial Service, and by virtue of Rule 27 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 (in short "DHJS Rules") he was governed by All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 (in short AIS Rules"). The administrative control over the members of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service vests in the High Court. A Screening Committee of two Judges examined the cases of judicial officers for retirement from service in public interest. It considered the record, work and conduct of all the judicial officers, who had or would have completed the age of 50-55 years or 30 years of qualifying service for pension. The Committee gave its report on 21st May, 1993. It was laid before the Full Court on 22nd, May, 1993 for consideration. The Full Court, after considering the recommendation made by the Screening Committee and also the overall record, work, conduct and general reputation of the petitioner, decided that recommendation be made to the appointing authority (the Administrator of Delhi) to retire him from service forthwith in public interest and also to pay three months pay and allowances in lieu of three months notice. This recommendation, together with other relevant material, was sent to the Administrator on 24th May, 1993, who in exercise of powers conferred upon him, by order dated 1st June, 1993 retired the petitioner from service, in public interest, with immediate effect.

7. The reply further states that on 22nd June, 1993, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Administrator praying for supply of copies of all material placed before the Administrative Committee. The same was forwarded to the High Court under the forwarding letter dated 30th June, 1993 of the Secretary, Law and Judicial. Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The Full Court in its meeting held on 19th July, 1993, considered the aforesaid representation and recommended its rejection saying that Secretary, Law and Judicial, Government of NCT of Delhi, be informed that the representation of the petitioner was without merit.

8. The reply further states that the Full Court had recorded annual confidential remarks for the years 1990 and 1991, on the work and conduct of the petitioner, in its meeting held on 31st October, 1992. The remarks were communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner made representation which was considered by the Full Court but was rejected on 22nd May, 1993. On 29th May, 1993, the petitioner was informed of rejection of his representation. It was denied that the impugned order is based on misconduct or by way of punishment or it causes a stigma. No inquiry is envisaged under Rule 16(3) of the All India Service Rules, while retiring an officer in public interest.

9. On procedure as regards recording of annual confidential reports, it is stated by the High Court that the rule referred to by the petitioner is not applicable in the case of judicial officers of Delhi. The Delhi High Court has its own procedure of recording annual confidential reports of judicial officers, which is uniformally followed in cases of all judicial officers and has been followed in the case of the petitioner also. Rule 16(3) provides that a member of service may be retired in public interest on the day he completes 30 years of qualifying service or attains 50 years of age or on any day thereafter. As the petitioner had attained the age of 50 years., on 9th July, 1988, there is no violation of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The procedure prescribed by Rule 16(3) is neither oppressive nor arbitrary or unreasonable. The rule is valid and legal having the object of weeding out deadwood and ensuring efficiency in service.

10. We heard learned counsel for the parties at length and were also taken through the pleadings. Respondents also made available the entire service record of the petitioner.

11. In support of his submission on challenge to the vires of Rule 16(3) of AIS Rules, as applicable to Delhi Higher Judicial Service reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decisions in Gurdev Singh Sidhu Vs. The State of Punjab and another, , Balkar Singh Vs. Union of India and others, 1991 (1) SLR 799, U.P. State Mineral Development Corporation and another Vs. K.C.P. Sinha, and Sukhdeo Vs. Commissioner Amravati Division, Amravati and another, . It was urged that: (a) it ignores the fact that officers enter Delhi Higher Judicial Service between the age group of 35 to 45 years, in the case of general category candidates and upto the age of 50 years, in the case of candidates belonging to reserved category; (b) the rule empowers the competent authority to retire an officer who attains the age of 50 years. The Rule is arbitrary as it disregards fundamental principles of security of service since reasonably minimum period of service to show his worth or which would enable the authority to form a fair and objective opinion is not allowed to be completed; (c) the provision does not contain any guideline in regard to the mode of assessment of officers, who may have far less than ten years of qualifying service by the time they attain 50 years of age; and (d) officers belonging to reserved category have the benefit of relaxation upto five years in age. Under the impugned rule the minimum period of service, which such officer could have, will be of only five years. When the concept of retirement in public interest is to weed out inefficient, unsuitable and deadwood, the rule does not take into account insufficient time available to such judicial officer to acquire or reach upto certain standards, in discharge of his duties.

12. Similar submissions were considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. P.S. Dhillon , in which case the order of compulsory retirement had been passed before completion of 10 years of qualifying service. Fundamental Rule 56(j) empowered the Government to compulsorily retire an officer on attaining the age of 50 years if he was appointed before he completed the age of 35 years and an officer who was appointed after attaining the age of 35 years on completing the age of 55 years. Reference in the said decision was also made to the earlier decision in Gurdev Singh Sidhu's case (supra) in which case Article 9.1 of Pepsu Service Regulation had been struck down. It was held that FR 56(j) cannot be equated with Article 9.1 of Pepsu Service Regulation because it provides for compulsory retirement at the age of 50-55 years, and it cannot be said that period provided for is not a reasonably long period of service. It was also held that merely because period of service rendered was less than 10 years which is a minimum period required as qualifying service for pensionery benefits, it cannot be said that Rule is discriminatory or that it was an order of removal from service but not an order for compulsory retirement.

13. In this case also there is no question of any arbitrariness as all judicial officers are considered alike. The mere fact that there is relaxation of age, at the time of entry into service, in case of Scheduled Castes candidates, the same will not make any difference, in as much as the petitioner opted with open eyes to join service, knowing fully well of Rule 16(3) of AIS Rules and of the possibility of being retired compulsorily on attaining a particular age. Thus the challenge to the rule on the grounds alleged is baseless.

14. Next challenge to the impugned order is the illegality in recording of confidential reports, namely, non-existence of any rules, instructions and procedure for recording confidential reports. It is urged that the High Court has not followed any fair procedure.

15. In the matter of annual confidential reports, the stand of the High Court is that it has uniformly followed a practice of recording of annual confidential report and such matter are not governed by any rules and regulations framed by the Government.

16. It is not shown on behalf of the petitioner that the Government instructions are applicable to the High Court. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decisions of the Supreme Court in M.S. Sharma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 1981 (3) SLR 760, Shri M.M. Valand Vs. The State of Gujarat and another, 1978 (1) SLR 489, Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and another, , S. Ramachandra Raju Vs. State of Orissa, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 424 and V.D. Gaur Vs. State of Haryana, 1991 (4) SLR 132.

17. The control over the courts as envisaged under Article 235 of Constitution of India is wide enough, which empowers the High Court to follow its own procedure in the matter of recording of annual confidential reports. The Constitution vests in the High Court administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over members of judicial service. Disciplinary control means not merely jurisdiction to award punishment but it also embraces power to determine whether the record of a member of service is satisfactory so as to entitle him to continue in service. If the Full Court in its meetings considers the assessment made in respect of an officer as regards his judicial work and conduct, which procedure is uniformally followed in respect of each judicial officer, the mere fact that there are no guideline or rules will not make such a procedure arbitrary and irrational especially when power is exercised by all the Judges of the High Court collectively, after the Judge-in-Charge has given his own assessment.

18. On the question of violation of principles of natural justice, suffice it to say that in Baikunth Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, it was held that principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. In the said case it was held that an action to compulsorily retire need not await disposal or final disposal of representation of the concerned employee against adverse remarks. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of recent years are not communicated or if communicated, representations received in that behalf may be pending consideration. The Court observed that there was no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the Government, if it choses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that the adverse remarks are not communicated to the Government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if the representation made by the Government servant is there, it shall be taken into consideration. The court remarked

we may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in Government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remained uncommunicated and yet they are made primary basis of action.

19. The aforementioned remarks are fully applicable to the instant case inasmuch as the Full Court, after it has rejected petitioner's representation against the remarks communicated to him, took into consideration the report of the screening committee and took a decision to make recommendation to compulsorily retire the petitioner, after it considered the overall record of the petitioner, which include record prior to the two years in question. There is no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in the instant case.

20. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. E.G. Nambudiri, AIR 1991 SC 1353 and S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, in support of the submission that the impugned orders are vitiated as the same are unreasoned. No doubt that what was held in S.N. Mukherjee's case (supra) that except in case where requirement of communicating reasons has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record reasons for its decision. It was also reiterated in the said decision that the requirement that reason be recorded does not require that reason should be elaborate as is the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons should be clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy.

21. The record do suggests in the instant case that reasons are recorded though in brief, while rejecting the petitioners representation. On 19th July, 1993, petitioner's representation dated 22nd June, 1993, praying for withdrawal of order dated 1st June, 1993 retiring him from service and for supply of copies of all material placed before the Administrator along with the letter of Secretary, Law and Judicial, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, requesting the view of the High Court, was considered in the Full Court meeting held on 19th July, 1993. The Secretary, Law and Judicial, NCT of Delhi was directed to be informed that representation of the petitioner is without merit and the Full Court recommends rejection of the same. Record further reflects that before the Full Court entire material was placed including the annual confidential reports of the petitioner. The impugned orders thus are not bad on the ground that reasons were not communicated to the petitioner.

21. Now taking up the next point of the extent of judicial review in Union of India Vs. Col. J.N. Sinha and another, , it was held that if the appropriate authority forms the requisite opinion bona fide to pass an order of compulsory retirement, its opinion cannot be challenged before the courts though it is open to the aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or that it is based on collateral ground or that it is an arbitrary decision.

23. A three Judge's bench of the Apex Court, in Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, , on an analysis of number of decisions examined the question that whether it is permissible to the Government to order compulsory retirement of a Government Servant on the basis of material which includes uncommunicated adverse remarks; whether it amounts to punishment and the extent of judicial review and culled out the following five principles:-

(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.

(ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government.

(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short; if it is found to be a perverse order.

(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee) as the case may be shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the latter years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.

(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstances by itself cannot be a basis for interference.

Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This object has been discussed in paras 29 to 31 above.

24. The bench observed that interference was permissible only on grounds that the order passed is malafide or (b) it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material.

25. An order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. Subrule (3) of Rule 16 of All India Services Rules, 1958 empowering to retire compulsory reads:-

The Central Government may, in consultation with the State Government concerned and after giving a member of service at least three months previous notice in writing, or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice require that member to retire in public interest from service on the day on which such member completes 30 years of qualifying service or attains 50 years of age or on any day thereafter to be specified in the notice.

26. The above Rule read Rule 27 of DHJS Rules, authorises the High Court to review working of Judicial Officers at a particular stage, namely, on attaining the age of 50 years or on completion of 30 years of service and empowers it to require the Judicial Officer to retire from service, if in its opinion public interest call for such an order. Whether the conduct of Judicial Officer is such as to justify such a conclusion, is primarily for the High Court to decide. It will not be permissible in writ jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of such power, if arrived at bona fide and on the basis of material available on record. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the service record disclosed no material, which would justify such an action to be taken against him. Safely on the entry made on 31st October, 1992, while recording annual confidential reports for the years 1990 and 1991, action was taken to compulsorily retire. For making the entry that the petitioner does not enjoy good reputation for integrity or that his integrity is doubtful, there was no material disclosed or available on record.

27. On behalf of respondent it was urged that may be that for the years 1990 and 1991, when for those years entry was made by the Full Court on 31st October, 1992, there is no material disclosed or is available on record but that alone will not be a good ground to interfere with the impugned order. There was enough material on record, which otherwise is sufficient for making recommendation to compulsorily retire the petitioner inasmuch as the object to compulsorily retire, in the words, of the Supreme Court in J.N. Sinha's case (supra) is to enable the Government to energies its machinery and to bring efficiency by compulsorily retiring those who, in its opinion, should not be there in public interest. The Full Court also took into consideration the overall performance of the petitioner as a Judicial officer. Considering the nature and work of a Judicial Officer, his reputation is an important trait, which must be above board. In most of the cases concrete instance may not be available, but general reputation cannot be lost sight of.

28. Reliance was also placed by the respondents in Posts and Telegraphs Board and others, Vs. C.S.N. Murthy, , wherein it was held that when there was material which showed that efficiency of the employees was slackening in the last two years of the period under review, the conclusion of the department that compulsory retirement was warranted cannot be faulted as being mala fide, perverse, arbitrary and unreasonable.

29. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that in P.S. Dhillon's case (supra); and in H.G. Venkatachaliah Setty Vs. Union of India and others was held even a solitary remark can provide basis to warrant compulsory retirement including uncommunicated adverse remarks. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdas Singh, , it was held that any adverse entry prior to earning promotion or crossing of efficiency bar or picking up of higher rank is not wiped out and can be taken into consideration, while considering the overall performance of the employees during whole of his tenure of service, whether it is in public interest to retain him in service. The whole record will include even uncommunicated adverse entries as well.

30. On the scope and extent of Judicial review apart from Baikunth Nath's case (supra) in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India., , it was held that the modern trend points judicial restraint in administrative action. The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The court will not substitute its own decision as that of the authority, when decision of the authority is the possible view, which could be taken on the basis of material which was before it.

31. Insofar as the facts of the instant case are concerned, the service record of the petitioner was duly reviewed by two learned Judges, who submitted their report. It says:-

"this officer has put in about seven-and-half years of service but has not made improvement in his work. He was termed as Average officer as per the report of the Inspecting Judge dated August 7, 1987 and it was found that his judgments and orders are unnecessary, lengthy and they require improvement in language. In the inspection note dated November, 9,1987, a remark was made that he needed improvement. Same remark was recorded in the inspection note dated April 27, 1989. In the inspection note dated October 30, 1992, his knowledge of law and procedure was found to be poor. His judgments were found to be badly written and he was found to have poor knowledge of law. His annual confidential report for the year 1990 was termed as 'C' (below average) with the remark that he did not enjoy good reputation for integrity and similar assessment was made for the year 1991.

Keeping in view the overall record of the officer, we recommend that he be retired in public interest after giving him three months notice in accordance with rules."

32. The annual confidential reports for the years 1986-87 rated the petitioner 'B' (satisfactory). Report for 1987-88 rated him as 'B' (average). Remarks of the Inspecting Judge dated 9th November, 1987 suggest that his judgments and orders were average including knowledge of law and procedure needing improvement in disposal of cases and that he lacked experience on civil side. For 1988 (1.4.1988 to 31.12.1988) he was rated as 'B' (average) with fair knowledge of law and procedure. In 1989 he was rated as 'Good' B+ with knowledge of law and procedure as satisfactory. It was reported that his disposal had improved a lot and he was working hard. For 1990 again he was rated as B and an efficient judicial officer by the Inspecting Judge. These remarks had been recorded by the Inspecting Judge on 6th April, 1992 but the confidential report was finalised on 31st October, 1992 by Full Court in which he was rated as 'C' (below average) "does not enjoy good reputation for integrity". For 1991 Inspecting Judge gave his report on 30.10.1992 and on 31.10.1992, the Full Court rated him as 'C' (below average) stating that he "does not enjoy good reputation for integrity".

33. Within the limits of power of judicial review on the principles laid down in Baikunth Nath Das case (supra) as have been approved in High Court of Punjab and Haryana Vs. Ishwar Chand Jain and another , the case of the petitioner is to be examined.

34. Annual confidential reports for the years 1990 and 1991 were also taken into consideration, while making recommendation to compulsory retire the petitioner. According to the petitioner the same appears to be the sole ground for taking action against him. For this reason alone last submission was made to challenge the impugned order, namely, malice in law for which reliance was placed on the decision of Supreme Court in The State of Punjab Vs. Ramji Lal and others, , Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. and others Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1886 SC 872, The State of Haryana and others Vs. Rajendra Sareen, , S. Partap Singh Vs. State of Punjab, and Smt. S.R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India and another, .

35. It was contended that the petitioner was senior most among the Scheduled Caste Judges. The Scheduled Caste Parliamentary Forum Constituting 106 Members of Parliament in its meeting held on 16th June, 1992 was critical about the Government in not appointing any member belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe to Delhi High Court. This resolution was given publicity and had irked respondent No. 2 as a result thereof an attempt was made to get rid of the petitioner by one stroke of pen by recording annual confidential reports for two years, recording therein about petitioner's integrity to be doubtful, without there being any material and thereafter in rejecting petitioner's representation against the said remarks and simultaneously taking a decision to compulsorily retire him. Respondent No.2 has denied expressly the allegations of mala fide on affidavit. From record also we do not find any support to this submission of the petitioner. Decision was taken only on the basis of overall assessment of the entire service record of the petitioner including his work and conduct. Full Court took decision after considering report of the Committee, which was constituted to examine the case of those officers who were about to complete 50 years of age or the qualifying service. Petitioner's was not a case in isolation, which was examined by the Committee. There being no material in support of the submissions, therefore, the apprehensions of the petitioner that the decision is due to any malice in law are ill founded and have no substance.

36. The only point now remains to be considered is that the order of premature retirement of the petitioner is not based on sound legal principles and is punitive in nature by taking into consideration the A.C. Rs. for 1990 and 1991. The petitioner's argument is that the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct. This submission is refuted on behalf of the respondent.

37. Undoubtedly when an the order is under challenge, it is permissible to go behind the form and to ascertain about the true nature and character of the same. In Madan Mohan Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar, , the order of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer was struck down, holding that there was no material on the basis of which an opinion could have reasonably been formed that it would be in the public interest to retire the judicial officer from service permanently. The Apex Court also held that the entries recorded "at one go" for three years could hardly have been taken into consideration. Reliance in the said case was placed on an earlier decision in Registrar High Court of Madras Vs. R. Rajiah . It was held that the High Court in its administrative jurisdiction has the power to recommend compulsory retirement of the member of judicial service in accordance with the Rules framed in that regard but it cannot act arbitrarily and there has to be material to come to a decision to compulsorily retire the officer.

38. In M.S. Bindra Vs. Union of India and others, it was held that when the concerned employees had an impeccable record of service sudden adverse entry made against him should be on cogent material. The doubt should of such a nature, as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. The order of compulsory retirement was quashed as arbitrary being without cogent material.

39. In Ishwar Chand Jain's case, (supra) Madan Mohan Choudhry's case and R. Rajiah's case were duly considered. Order of compulsory retirement was set aside by the High Court. The said decision was approved holding that the inspecting note of the Inspecting Judge recording the integrity of the officer to be doubtful was flawed and could not have formed the basis for the Full Court also to record the integrity to be doubtful and to grade him "C". As regards the object of inspection of subordinate court's and its importance, it was held:-

"Since late this Court is watching the specter of either judicial officers or the High Courts coming to this Court when there is an order prematurely retiring a judicial officer. Under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court exercises complete control over subordinate courts which include District Courts. Inspection of the subordinate courts is one of the most important functions which the High Court performs for control over the subordinate courts. The object of such inspection is for the purpose of assessment of the work performed by the Subordinate Judge, his capability, integrity and competency. Since Judges are human beings and also prone to all the human failings inspection provides an opportunity for pointing out mistakes so that they are voided in future and deficiencies, if any, in the working of the subordinate court, remedied. Inspection should act as a catalyst in inspiring Subordinate Judges to give the bet results. They should feel a sense of achievement. They need encouragement. They work under great stress and man the courts while working under great discomfort and hardship. A satisfactory judicial system depends largely on the satisfactory functioning of courts at the grass-roots level. Remarks recorded by the Inspecting Judge are normally endorsed by the Full Court and become part of the annual confidential reports and are foundations on which the career of a judicial officer is made or marred. Inspection of a subordinate court is thus of vital importance. It has to be both effective and productive. It can be so only if it is well regulated and is workmen-like. Inspection of subordinate courts is not a one day or an hour or a few minutes affair. It has to go on all the year round by monitoring the work of the court by the Inspecting Judge. A casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial system. It does more harm than good. As noticed in the case of R. Rajiah there could be ill-conceived or motivated complaints. Rumour mongerind is to be avoided at all costs as it seriously jeopardizes the efficient working of the subordinate courts."

40. Needless to add that in petitioner's case ACR's for 1990 and 1991 also formed part of the material, which was considered by the Committee and the Full Court. In Baikuntha Nath Das's case (supra) it was observed that it may not be possible that in all cases evidence would be forthcoming about the doubtful integrity of a Judicial officer and at time the Full Court has to act on the collective wisdom of all the judges. But without even a complaint from any quarter or any instance or circumstance as to the conduct, which led the Full Court to say about integrity, it has to be held that the ACRs were flawed, which alone could not have formed the basis to brand the petitioner of doubtful integrity and to grade him 'C'. Before the two reports, which were recorded on the same day the petitioner had a good record as regards integrity. There is no answer to the question that in the absence of any complaint from any quarter how the petitioner was doubted to be an officer having doubtful integrity. It will be a case of absolute lack of material, which is almost equivalent to a situation that from the available material no reasonable man would reach to such a conclusion. In M.S. Bindra's case (supra) dealing with such a situation, it was held :

"While viewing this case from next angle for judicial scrutiny i.e. want of evidence or material to reach such a conclusion, we may add that want of any material is almost equivalent to the next situation that from the available materials no reasonable man would reach such a conclusion. While evaluating the materials the authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in which the officer was held till recently. The maxim "Nemo Fruit Repented Turpissimus" (no one becomes dishonest all on a sudden) is not unexceptional but still it is a salutary guideline in judge human conduct, particularly in the field of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an officer into the puddle of "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man in entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to ram an officer with the label "doubtful integrity".

41. As the two reports for 1990 and 1991 were also taken into consideration, the impugned order on the ratio of M.S. Bindra's case (supra) is vitiated as being without any material and the same is liable to be struck down.

42. Consequently the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed and set aside holding the petitioner to have continued in service till attaining the age of superannuation with all consequential benefits. Parties are left to bear their respective costs.