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  • Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (Act)
  • Section 16 and Rule 8
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (Act)
  • Section 16 and Rule 8
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns elections to the Committee of Management of the “Bharat Silk Filature Factory and Industries Co-operative Society Ltd.”, Malavalli, Mandya District, registered on 29 March 1983. A calendar of events announced on 25 August 1990 fixed the election for 12 September 1990, with a voters’ list finalised on 28 August 1990. The Government superseded the Managing Committee on 11 September 1990 under Section 30A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, appointing a Special Officer.

Supersession was challenged in the Karnataka High Court (W.P. Nos. 19670-19679/1990). On 19 March 1991, the High Court quashed the supersession and the Special Officer’s appointment but directed him to conduct elections within three months. Instead of proceeding on the existing voters’ list, the Special Officer enrolled 696 new members on 17 May 1991.

Appellant T. Ramegowda filed Arbitration Case No. 1/1991 before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies seeking elections on the earlier voters’ list; the petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (2 August 1991) set aside that dismissal and directed elections based on the voters’ list antecedent to 17 May 1991.

The High Court, via W.P. Nos. 18929-18931/1991 (24 September 1991), quashed the Tribunal’s order, holding that the 696 newly enrolled members had not been heard, and remitted the matter to the Arbitrator. The present Supreme Court judgment arises from an appeal against that High Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Special Officer, whose appointment had been quashed by the High Court on 19 March 1991, retained authority to exercise full powers under Section 30A of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act—specifically, the power to enrol new members after that date.
  2. Whether the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal was required to afford the 696 persons purportedly enrolled by the Special Officer an opportunity of hearing before directing elections on the old voters’ list.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court focused on the legal effect of the High Court’s earlier judgment dated 19 March 1991, which had:

  • Quashed the supersession of the Committee and the appointment of the Special Officer.
  • Continued the Special Officer solely for the limited purpose of conducting elections.

Interpreting that order, the Court held that once the Special Officer’s substantive appointment was quashed, his status under Section 30A was “denuded”—he could not exercise the full range of powers of a Special Officer, including the power to admit new members. His role was confined to organising elections on the pre-existing voters’ list.

Consequently, any membership enrolments made by him on 17 May 1991 were ultra vires. The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the 696 purported members were entitled to be heard, reasoning that the validity of a power cannot be tested by the consequences of its unlawful exercise. Because the Special Officer lacked authority ab initio, the enrolments were a nullity, and no audi alteram partem requirement arose in favour of the persons so enrolled.

The Court restored the Tribunal’s decision, which had correctly limited the election process to the voters’ list as it existed before 17 May 1991 and recognised the Special Officer’s restricted mandate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the Karnataka High Court’s order dated 24 September 1991 is set aside, and the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 2 August 1991 is restored. Elections already conducted on the earlier voters’ list are declared valid, and the ten successful candidates are to be inducted forthwith.

Implications: The judgment underscores that when a court limits an official’s mandate after quashing an appointment, any act exceeding that narrowed mandate is void. No new precedent is set, but the decision clarifies the consequences of acting without authority under Indian co-operative society law. The Court also provided equitable directions: individuals among the 696 claimants may file fresh membership applications, to be considered by the new managing committee within two months.

    T. Ramegowda v. R. Krishnamurthy And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. We have heard learned Counsel on both sides. Special Leave granted.

    The appeal is against the Judgment and order dated 24th September, 1991 of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 18929-18931 of 1991. The Division Bench withdrew writ petitions to itself passed the Judgment under appeal quashing the orders of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal dated 2nd August, 1991 in Appeal No. 309 of 1991 before it.

    2. The controversy relates to the elections to the Committee of Management of a co operative society called the "Bharat Silk Filature Factory and Industries Co-operative Society Ltd." (Society) Malavalli, Mandya District, which was registered on the 29th of March, 1983. Its first Board of Directors was constituted by the Government.

    Appellant, T. Ramegowda, raised a dispute before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, (DRCS) Mandya in Arbitration Case No. 1 of 1991 under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (Act) seeking a direction to the Special Officer, respondent No. 5 in this appeal, to hold elections to the committee of management on the basis of the voters list existing as on 28th August, 1990 without enrolling further members. The Deputy Registrar by his order dated 3rd June, 1991 dismissed the petition against which appellant brought up an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal operative part of which is in terms following:

    The appeal is allowed. The order of the lower authority is set aside and respondent No. 1 is hereby directed to hold election within stipulated time on the basis of the voters list existed antecedent to 17-5-91.

    3. Necessary and material facts leading to the dispute are these:

    The Society had resolved to hold elections to the Committee of Management and had issued a calendar of events of 25th August, 1990 and the elections were scheduled for 12th of September, 1990. Pursuant thereto a Voters' List was announced on 28th August, 1990. But the then Managing Director of the Society appears to have decided to postpone the elections. Subsequently on 11th of September, 1990 the Managing Committee was superseded by the Government under Section 30A of the Act and a Special Officer appointed. The order of supersession was challenged by the appellant and certain other directors of the Society before the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 19670-19679 of 1990. On 19th March, 1991, the High Court allowed the writ petitions and set aside the order of supersession. The order appointing the Special Officer was also quashed. The Special Officer was directed by the High Court to hold the elections to the committee of management within a period of three months and handover the charge to the newly elected committee.

    But the Special Officer instead of holding the elections which obviously elections meant on the basis of the subsisting Voters List as on 19th March, 1990 started taking steps to enrol new members. He claims to have enrolled 696 members this way. It is against this action of the Special Officer that on 31st May, 1991, appellant raised a dispute before the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies seeking directions to the Special Officer to obey the mandamus issued by the High Court. The DCSR, however, dismissed the dispute even without ordering notice on it to the respondents.

    4. Before the Tribunal, appellant contended that the Special Officer, after the Judgment of the High Court quashing his appointment, merely continued as an authority specially authorised to conduct the elections in terms of the High Court's order. The Special Officer, it was contended, did not have all the powers under Section 30A which he would otherwise have had inasmuch as he was merely continued for the purpose of conducting the elections. In regard to the scope of his powers referable to the order of the High Court of the 19th March 1991, the Tribunal observed:

    Once his appointment is quashed and he is directed to hold election by a particular date his duties and functions are restricted and therefore he cannot exercise all the functions of a Committee when his appointment is to continue only for a limited purpose even though, however, he may attend to some of the routine work and business of the society, in addition to the specified tasks of holding election. Therefore, at the outset we feel there is no justification for respondent No. 1 to insist that before holding election he shall be permitted to enroll new members and without admitting new members, he cannot hold the election ....

    On the question whether the enrollment of 696 members which the Special Officer in the meanwhile had made was valid or not-even assuming the Special Officer had such power-the Tribunal had occasion to comment:

    Even assuming for a moment that he is entitled to enroll new members, in his capacity as Administrator, he is expected to admit the new members, after following the procedure prescribed under Section 16 and Rule 8 by entertaining their applications and admitting the members thirty days prior to the date of Annual General Meeting. He has not followed any of these procedures while admitting the 696 members on 17-5-91 and therefore, the enrollment of members on 17-5-91 and therefore, the enrolment of membership made by him on that day cannot be considered as valid and in accordance with the law.

    The Tribunal also cast serious doubt on the very genuine claim of the Special Officer that on 17-5-1991 he could enroll the members.

    5. This order of the Tribunal was set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court which thought that the 696 members purported to be enrolled by the Special Officer were entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the Tribunal. The High Court said:

    We are pained to note that the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, before directing deletion of 696 members from the list of eligible voters, had not even taken care to see whether they were given notice. Therefore, on the singular ground of violation of principles of natural justice, the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is set aside. Equally, the order of respondent 2-Arbitrator is set aside. Now the matter shall go back to respondent 2-Arbitrator who shall hear both the petitioners and the contesting respondents on merits and orders passed. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits whether 696 members are entitled to be on the list of eligible voters....

    6. We have heard Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel. We are of the view that the High Court was in error that the 696 members purportedly enrolled by the Special Officer on 17-5-1991 were entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the Tribunal. The question before the Tribunal was whether the Special Officer was competent to exercise all the powers of a Special Officer under Section 30A of the Act after the High Court had quashed the supersession his own appointment as Special Officer. That order not having been appealed against had become final and binding. The question turned on the interpretation of the order of the High Court. It was clear that the Special Officer did not retain his status as Special Officer under Section 30 A of the Act after 19th March, 1991 and his status and authority as such had been denuded by the quashing of his appointment. He was merely continued for a limited purpose. In the particular facts and circumstances of this case the question really was one as to how the earlier order of the High Court in relation to his powers was required to be construed. The Special Officer, obviously without authority, went on enrolling members. To say that all those whom he inducted were entitled to be heard is to test the existence and validity of the power by the consequences of its exercise. This is erroneous.

    7. Accordingly this appeal is allowed; the order of the High Court set aside and that of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal requires to be and is hereby restored.

    8. As to the consequential directions to be issued, we must notice subsequent events. In the meanwhile pursuant to the interlocutory directions of the High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 18929-18931 of 1991 the elections were held as directed by the Tribunal. But soon thereafter the Tribunal's order was quashed. The elections were held without the inclusion in the voters' list of the 696 members enrolled by the Special Officer. That elections must be held to be valid. Pursuant to the orders of this Court the Returning Officer has since completed the counting and has submitted a report showing the 10 members who have secured the first ten places in the election. These members are required to be declared elected. They shall be inducted into the office by the Government and the Special Officer without further delay.

    9. There is one other direction which requires also to be issued. Those who claimed to have been enrolled by the Special Officer claim that a deposit collectively of Rupees 76,372.50 had been made by them towards their share of subscriptions. Such amongst them as claim to seek to have their applications for membership considered and who claim to have made subscriptions towards this sum of Rs. 76,327.50 may make fresh applications for membership. One Shri Chandershekar Murthy who was said to be the Chief Promoter and who claims to have Collected these subscriptions at his request, is permitted to furnish all such material as may be in his possession to correlate the applications for enrolment to be made by the 696 persons and their alleged earlier deposits. It will be proper for the new managing committee to process these applications and take appropriate decision one way or the other about the granting of membership to them. This shall be done expeditiously. This we direct them to do within two months from the date of filing of the applications by them.

    10. This appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    T. Ramegowda v. R. Krishnamurthy And Others
    (Jul 24, 1992)