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  • provisions contained in Sec. 11, Order 2, Rule 2, Order 9, Rule 9, and Order 23, Rule 1(4) of the CPC
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • Code of Civil Procedure Note 4 under Rule 1 of Order 23.
  • provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Sub-rule (2), the prohibition contained in Sub-rule (3)
  • SECTION 14 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 14(1)(a) and (e) of the DRC Act
  • Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rule (4) CPC.
  • provisions of Order 23 Rule 1
  • Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code.6.
  • Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rules (1)(2)
  • Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act
  • Order 23 Rule 1, CPC.7.2.4
  • Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC.
  • Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC
  • Order 23 Rule 1, CPC.
  • Rule 1 of Order 23
  • Order 23, Rule (1)
  • Sub-rule (1), or(b)
  • Section 14(1)(e).
  • Section 14(2).
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Sub-rule (1)
  • Sub-rule (3),
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions contained in Sec. 11, Order 2, Rule 2, Order 9, Rule 9, and Order 23, Rule 1(4) of the CPC
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT
  • Code of Civil Procedure Note 4 under Rule 1 of Order 23.
  • provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Sub-rule (2), the prohibition contained in Sub-rule (3)
  • SECTION 14 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 14(1)(a) and (e) of the DRC Act
  • Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rule (4) CPC.
  • provisions of Order 23 Rule 1
  • Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code.6.
  • Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rules (1)(2)
  • Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act
  • Order 23 Rule 1, CPC.7.2.4
  • Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC.
  • Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC
  • Order 23 Rule 1, CPC.
  • Rule 1 of Order 23
  • Order 23, Rule (1)
  • Sub-rule (1), or(b)
  • Section 14(1)(e).
  • Section 14(2).
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Sub-rule (1)
  • Sub-rule (3),
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Revision Petition against Eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges an order of eviction passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The landlord (respondent) claimed the tenant (petitioner) occupied four rooms, a kitchen and bath on the ground floor of H-22 (also referred in documents as H-82/H-82/H-22), Kirti Nagar, New Delhi, at Rs. 300 per month for residential purposes and sought eviction on the ground of bona fide need for occupation by himself and his family because he allegedly had no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

The tenant contested the eviction on multiple grounds: (a) earlier eviction petitions had been filed and withdrawn and therefore the present suit was barred by Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC; (b) costs payable on an earlier withdrawal had not been paid (alleged); (c) the premises were let for mixed residential-cum-commercial use; (d) the landlord had other accommodation; and (e) the requisite legal notice had not been served in accordance with the agreement. The Rent Controller decided all issues in favour of the landlord and granted eviction. The present revision sought to challenge that eviction order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present eviction petition was barred by Order 23 Rule 1 (sub-rule (4)) of the Code of Civil Procedure because of prior withdrawals of eviction petitions by the landlord.
  2. Whether the landlord had established bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and shown that he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
  3. Whether the premises were let for residential purposes only or for residential-cum-commercial (composite) purposes, and whether incidental commercial activity (such as receiving letters in a business name) changes the letting purpose.
  4. Whether the notice terminating tenancy was valid for the purposes of eviction proceedings.
  5. Whether the landlord's title/ownership was established and whether the tenant is estopped from disputing title (Section 116, Indian Evidence Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant / Revision Petitioner (as presented in the opinion)

  • The present petition is barred by Order 23 Rule 1 CPC because the landlord had earlier filed and withdrawn Petition No. 696/70 (with permission subject to payment of costs) and Petition No. 754/74 (withdrawn without permission), making the present suit impermissible.
  • The costs of Rs. 50 imposed on withdrawal were not paid (contention that costs were to be paid to defendant rather than deposited) and therefore the landlord should not have been permitted to file afresh.
  • No specific legal notice had been served in accordance with the tenancy agreement dated 21 July 1966.
  • The premises were let for residential-cum-commercial purposes (they were used for an office of Bharat Publicity Service and East Punjab Printing Works) and hence eviction under bona fide residential need was not maintainable.
  • The landlord had other accommodations (three-storeyed house No. 4497 Reghar Pura, premises No. D-457 and D-167 in Raghubir Nagar) sufficient for his family, and the claim of dependency and family size was disputed.

Landlord / Respondent (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner is a tenant of the specified rooms and the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his and his dependent family members' residence, having no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
  • The costs of Rs. 50 imposed on withdrawal of Petition No. 696/70 had already been deposited (Ex. A.8 dated 23 July 1974).
  • The subsequent Petition No. 754/74 was dismissed because the respondent could not deposit the process fee, not because of any bar under Order 23 Rule 1.
  • The requisite notice under law had been served and the premises were let only for residential purposes (Agreement dated 21 July 1966 described the premises as a "house").
  • Ownership is supported by sale deed Ex. P.1 and partition deed Ex. P.2; the tenant inducted by the landlord is estopped from disputing title.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagat Ram v. Dwarka Pershad, 1972 RCR 128 Payment of costs as condition to institute fresh proceedings after withdrawal; Order 23 Rule 1 applies to proceedings before the Controller. The Court relied on Bhagat Ram to hold that the order permitting withdrawal subject to payment of costs must be complied with and noted that costs had in fact been deposited (Ex. A.8), rejecting the tenant's contention on non-payment.
Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 785 : AIR 1975 SC 2130 Discussed in context of eviction and consequences where tenant deposits rent under Section 15(6); cited among authorities on applicability of procedural rules. Referenced as authority among cases dealing with eviction procedure and in support of the view that Order 23 Rule 1 applies to proceedings before the Rent Controller when such issues arise.
Prahlad Dass v. Bhagirath Lal, AIR 1977 Delhi 129 Held that provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 are applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controller. Cited by counsel and relied on by the Court to support the proposition that the restriction on presenting a fresh suit after withdrawal applies to cases before the Controller, subject to exceptions for change of circumstances.
Mehtab Singh v. Tilak Raj Arora, AIR 1989 Punjab & Haryana 12 Explained Sangram Singh and discussed principles of procedure and res judicata; maxim nemo debet bis vexari. Used as background authority for procedural maxims and to emphasize that procedural rules preventing re-litigation are grounded in natural justice; Court noted these principles but also considered exceptions.
Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 Maxim that a person should not be vexed twice over same cause; cited as part of broader rules (Sec.11, Order 2, Rule 2, Order 9, Rule 9, Order 23 Rule 1(4)). Referred to for the general doctrine against multiplicity of proceedings; Court accepted the rule but held it is not absolute in the rent-control context where change in circumstances may permit a fresh petition.
Lal Chand (dead) by LRs v. Radha Kishan, (1977) 2 SCC 88 : AIR 1977 SC 789 Observations about Section 11 CPC and the public interest in finality of litigation; principle of res judicata. Quotations from this decision were used to explain the public interest behind barring multiplicity of proceedings; the Court balanced that principle against factual changes permitting a fresh eviction petition.
Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Saigal, 1976 RLR (SN) 43 Held that a second eviction petition may be maintainable if there is a change of circumstances (example: return of an adult son who is dependent). Cited as authority for the proposition that change in family circumstances can make a subsequent eviction petition maintainable; Court relied on this to accept that change in circumstances can defeat a bar under Order 23 Rule 1(4).
S.K. Chatterjee v. Subrata Biswas, 25 (1984) DLT 124 Reaffirmed that a landlord who failed earlier on ground of personal requirement can file another petition on the same ground if circumstances have changed. Relied upon to support the Court's approach that bona fide need is fact-specific and a subsequent petition can be allowed where change in circumstances appears from material on record.
Mehra Mehra v. Dr. (Mrs.) Sant Kaur Grewal, 1982 (1) RCJ 564 Where tenant used dwelling and received letters in a business name, incidental activities do not necessarily change letting purpose from residential to commercial. Applied by the Court to hold that receiving letters in business name at the premises does not by itself convert the letting nature to commercial; supported the Rent Controller's finding of residential letting.
Abdul Salam v. Somwati Devi, 1982 RLR (Notes) 23 Similar principle that incidental business activity does not alter residential letting. Used with other authorities to support the conclusion that incidental vocation or receipt of business correspondence did not change the letting purpose.
Ajit Singh v. Inder Saran, 1979 (1) RCJ 152 Authority on incidental use of residential premises not altering letting purpose. Referred to along with other cases for the same effect; Court used it to uphold the factual finding of residential letting.
P.N. Khanna v. T.P. Balakani, 1972 (4) RCR 22 Authority on distinguishing incidental business activity from composite letting. Included among authorities to support the Rent Controller's conclusion that the premises remained residential in nature despite incidental business-related activity.
Shri Chandu Lal Gupta v. Shri Sri Ram Nagar, 1983 (1) RCJ 352 Authority for the proposition that an earning son can be dependent on his father for the purpose of residence. Cited by the Court to justify accepting that earning sons can still be dependent for residential accommodation and thereby support the landlord's claim of family size/dependency.
Swadesh Ranjan v. Hardev Bannerjee, 1992 RLR (SC) 392 Support for the proposition that a tenant inducted by the landlord is estopped from disputing the landlord's title (Section 116, Evidence Act). Relied upon to uphold the Rent Controller's finding of ownership and to reject the tenant's challenge to the landlord's title.
B. Bannerjee v. Ramesh Mahadevan, 1996 (5) AD 92 Also cited in support of the estoppel principle under Section 116, Indian Evidence Act. Used to reinforce the Court's conclusion that the tenant could not dispute the landlord's title where the tenant had been inducted by the landlord.
V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214 : AIR 1979 SC 1745 Reconsidered earlier authority and held that a notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act is not a necessary pre-condition for eviction on grounds other than non-payment of rent; Section 106 notice became surplusage for certain eviction grounds. Invoked by the Court to hold that the notice served in this case was acceptable and that strict compliance with Section 106 is not necessary for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Posad Roy Chowdhury, (1967) 1 SCR 475 Earlier authority discussed in V. Dhanpal Chettiar on the need for termination under Section 106; V. Dhanpal Chettiar reconsidered the approach taken in Manujendra Dutt. Mentioned by the Court as part of the jurisprudential background on Section 106 notices; the Court followed the later approach from V. Dhanpal Chettiar that Section 106 notice is not essential in the present context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis addressing the principal contentions raised by the tenant and considering the evidence and authorities relied upon by both sides.

On the bar under Order 23 Rule 1(4) CPC:

  • The Court examined the order permitting withdrawal of Petition No. 696/70 (Ex. RW2/6) which allowed withdrawal "with permission to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action and subject-matter subject to payment of Rs. 50/- as costs" and noted that the costs had been deposited (Ex. A.8 dated 23 July 1974). Relying on Bhagat Ram v. Dwarka Pershad, the Court held that the condition was to be strictly complied with and, since costs were deposited, the objection on this ground failed.
  • Regarding Petition No. 754/74 which was dismissed as withdrawn (Ex. RW2/7), the Court reviewed pleadings and evidence addressing why it had been withdrawn and the legal effect. The Court accepted the settled position in the case-law that Order 23 Rule 1 and its sub-rules apply to proceedings before the Rent Controller, but that the bar is not absolute: a subsequent petition can be maintainable if there is a demonstrable change in circumstances or material facts differentiating the later claim from the earlier one (relying on Krishan Kumar and S.K. Chatterjee among others).
  • The Court found that evidence on record showed family size increasing over time and other indicia (e.g., date of notice) such that the later petition was not barred merely because an earlier petition had been withdrawn; consequently the tenant's submission on this point was rejected.

On the nature of the letting (residential vs composite):

  • The Court examined the rent/agreement (dated 21 July 1966, Ex. RW2/1) which described the premises as a "house" and the second paragraph explicitly referred to the rented portion as part of "House No. H-82". Witnesses for the landlord (AW1, AW2, AW3) consistently stated the premises were let for residential purposes.
  • The tenant relied on evidence such as letters delivered in the name of "East Punjab Printing Works" and the presence of a nearby printing press. The Court held that mere receipt of letters in a business name or incidental vocational activities would not convert the nature of the letting into commercial, particularly where the tenant/landlord admitted the printing press was not operated from the premises and there was no license for such activity. The Court relied on authorities (Mehra Mehra; Abdul Salam; Ajit Singh; P.N. Khanna) to support this conclusion and upheld the Rent Controller's finding of residential letting.

On bona fide need, dependency, and availability of alternative accommodation:

  • The landlord gave evidence that his family consisted of a large number of members (15 at the time of his statement). The Court accepted that this family size was not seriously disputed and observed that dependency may include earning sons (citing Shri Chandu Lal Gupta). The Court therefore found the Rent Controller's assessment of dependency to be justified on the facts presented.
  • The Court examined the evidence about alternative accommodation relied upon by the tenant (properties in Raghubir Nagar and Reghar Pura). Based on witness statements and documentary evidence, the Court concluded that the tenant/defendant did not have sufficient suitable accommodation to house the landlord's large family and accepted the Rent Controller's factual conclusion that available alternative accommodation was inadequate.

On ownership/title and estoppel:

  • The Court observed documentary evidence (sale deed Ex. P.1, partition deed Ex. P.2) and statements of the landlord and his witnesses. It applied the principle under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act (cited cases Swadesh Ranjan and B. Bannerjee) to hold that a tenant inducted by the landlord is estopped from disputing the landlord's title absent any subsequent change in situation, and therefore accepted the Rent Controller's finding on ownership.

On validity of notice terminating tenancy:

  • The Court reproduced the language of the notice and found that it clearly conveyed an intention to terminate tenancy and gave options to the tenant regarding the month of tenancy as per the tenant's claim. The Court held the notice was not vague and was valid.
  • Relying on V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (and the reconsideration of the earlier Manujendra Dutt decision), the Court observed that strict compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary for eviction on bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act; thus the notice served was sufficient.

Conclusion of the analysis:

After evaluating the pleadings, documentary evidence, oral testimony and relevant authorities, the Court found no reason to interfere with the Rent Controller's findings on the several contested issues (bar under Order 23, nature of letting, bona fide need, alternative accommodation, ownership and notice). The Court therefore dismissed the revision petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed, and the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Controller under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is upheld. The dismissal was made without any order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the eviction order stands and the landlord may proceed in accordance with the trial court's order; a copy of the judgment and trial court record was ordered to be sent to the Trial Court and the Rent Control Tribunal for information and further action as required by law.
  • The Court applied and reconfirmed existing lines of authority on (a) the applicability of Order 23 Rule 1 to proceedings before the Rent Controller and (b) the circumstances in which a subsequent eviction petition may be maintainable when there is an apparent change in circumstances. The judgment relied on established precedents rather than laying down a novel legal principle; no new binding precedent was proclaimed beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.
Petition dismissed.

    D. Rani Puri v. Chanan Lal .

    S.N Kapoor, J.— This revision petition is directed against an order of eviction passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the ‘Act’ for short).

    2. Brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as under:

    According to the landlord/respondent, the petitioner is a tenant in respect of four rooms, kitchen, bath on the ground floor of premises No. H-22, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- for the purpose of residence. The landlord/respondent claimed that he requires the premises bona fide for occupation of his residence and the residence of his family members dependent upon him, since he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. According to the respondent/landlord, the family of the petitioner comprised of 12 members, i.e petitioner, his wife, his elder son Ashok Kumar, second son Vinod Kumar, Som Parkash 15 years, Jawahar Lal 13 years, daughters Santosh of 11 years and Renu of 9 years. Petitioner wanted to marry Ashok, Vinod Kumar and Kamal Nain and therefore needed additional accommodation to accommodate him. Other children were studying. His oldest son Ashok Kumar is an Advocate and his other son Kamal Nain has also started business of commercial typewriting institute. The petitioner has accommodation as per site plan Ex. P.1, and he has no other suitable accommodation in his occupation. It is claimed that requisite notice to vacate the premises has already been given.

    3. The eviction petition has been contested by the tenant/revision petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner earlier filed a Petition No. 696/70 under Section 14(1)(a) and (e) of the DRC Act and that petition was withdrawn after obtaining permission of the Court, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 50/- on 27th September, 1973 but the said costs had not been paid. On 21st February, 1974, the petitioner filed another Eviction Petition No. 754/74 on the ground of bona fide need which was also withdrawn without obtaining any permission from the Court to file afresh. Since the present petition is based on the same cause of action, it is barred under Order 23 Rule 1 of CPC. No legal notice has been served in accordance with the agreement dated 21st July, 1966. In addition to these two preliminary objections, it is also contended by the tenant/revision petitioner that the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes for running the office of Bharat Publicity Service and East Punjab Printing Works. Claims of landlord/respondent about his ownership of the property, his bona fide need and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation, have been denied. According to the petitioner, the respondent/landlord has under his occupation three-storeyed house No. 4497 Reghar Pura, Karol Bagh, Delhi, three rooms, kitchen, bath, latrine on the ground floor and two rooms and terrace on the first floor in property No. D-457, Raghubir Nagar and in occupation of three rooms, courtyard, kitchen, bath and latrine etc. in house No. D-167, Raghubir Nagar, New Delhi. It is denied that his son Ashok Kumar is dependent on the petitioner and is living with respondent/landlord. The tenant also has denied that the petitioner has a family of 12 members and that Ashok Kumar, Vinod Kumar and Kanwal Nain are dependent upon the petitioner for residential purpose. The respondent/landlord wants to let out the premises on higher rent in view of prevalent higher rates of rent and has been bringing the property brokers.

    4. In replication, the landlord has claimed that the costs of Rs. 50 imposed on the petitioner in Petition No. 696/77 has already been deposited in the Court. While it is virtually admitted that the petitioner filed another Eviction Petition No. 754/74 on the ground of bona fide need, by stating the suit was dismissed for the respondent could not deposit the process fee. However, it is claimed that the petition is not barred under Order 23 Rule 1, CPC. It is claimed by the respondent that the requisite notice required under law has already been served. It is reiterated that the premises were let out only for residential purposes and not for composite purpose. It is denied that the petitioner has in his occupation three storeyed property bearing No. 4497, Regharpura, Karol Bagh, Delhi which is neither owned nor occupied by him. It is also denied that the wife and children of petitioner has sufficient and suitable accommodation in property No. D-457, Raghubir Nagar, New Delhi. It is further denied that premises No. D-167 was in occupation of his wife and children. It was a shop in which his son Kanwal Nain is running a commercial typewriting institute.

    5. The learned Rent Controller has decided all the five issues framed in the matter in favour of the petitioner/landlord.

    6. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner Mr. M.L Lonial contends that the petition was barred under Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC specially in the absence of pleading and proving any change in circumstances after the withdrawal of the Eviction Petition No. 754/74 and that in view of the order Ex. RW2/6 the petitioner should not have been allowed to pursue the matter as the costs were not paid to the tenant petitioner. He also contends that there was no reason to hold that the Petition No. 754/74 might not be under Section 14(1)(e) for this was not the stand even of the landlord himself. He has also assailed the finding on the ground of a sentence in the statement of AW.1, the landlord, that “I need the premises in dispute for my own business and the residence of my family members”. He has also half-heartedly contended that the sale deed Ex. P.1 has not been duly proved. He has further contended that seeing the circumstances—use of the other properties in the block for composite purpose and his own statement regarding his own requirement of the suit property for his own business as well—would indicate that the premises were let out for residential as well as commercial purposes. According to Mr. Lonial, bona fide requirement has not been established nor has it been established on record that he had no other reasonably suitable accommoation.

    7.1.1 In the light of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, first point in issue required to be considered is whether the suit is barred under Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rule (4) CPC. The said rule reads as under:

    “Where the plaintiff—

    (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under Sub-rule (1), or

    (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in Sub-rule (3), shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim.”

    7.1.2 So far as withdrawal of the first Petition No. 696/70 is concerned, the following order was passed vide Ex. RW2/6:

    “…I permit the petitioner to withdraw the petition with permission to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action and subject-matter subject to payment of Rs. 50/- as costs. Payment of cost shall be pre-condition before filing the fresh petition. The file be consigned.

    (R.P Gupta)

    Announced.Add. Rent Controller,

    Dated 27.8.73Delhi.

    7.1.3 It is established that the cost had already been deposited vide challan Ex. A.8 dated 23rd July, 1974.

    7.1.4 The contention of Mr. M.L Lonial that the costs were to be paid to the defendant and was not to be deposited, appears to be totally devoid of any force. It may be mentioned that in Bhagat Ram v. Dwarka Pershad, 1972 RCR 128, our own High Court observed thus:

    “7. With regard to the second contention, I have quoted the order of Mr. Chowdhary, Additional Controller by which he had granted permission to withdraw the petition subject to payment of costs. On a construction of the order, it appears that the payment of costs was a condition for the institution of fresh proceedings. What is the effect of non-payment of costs on the institution of fresh proceedings has been the subject-matter of wide divergency of views amongst the various High Courts in this country and the same has been noticed to length in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure Note 4 under Rule 1 of Order 23. On a construction of the statutory provisions and the various authorities, my conclusion is as follows:

    1. The order of the Controller imposing terms upon withdrawal of the petition with liberty to file another is to be strictly complied with and the ordered cost must be paid at the time of the filing of the second petition, even where no time has been fixed for its payment.

    2. The first petition which has withdrawn cannot revive upon failure to carry out the terms of such order and the same stands disposed of finally.

    3. Failure to punctually pay the costs does not effect the inherent jurisdiction and competence of the Controller to entertain the fresh petition and the same merely amounts to an irregularity in the initial procedure which can be conduced.”(Emphasis supplied)

    7.1.5 There does not appear anything which should make me to take a different view from what has been taken by the learned Rent Controller for it could not be disputed that the costs had been deposited. Consequently, I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. M.L Lonial in this regard, and reject the same.

    7.2.1 As regards the fact that the Petition No. 754/74 was dismissed as withdrawn vide Ex. RW2/7, the relevant portion of Ex. RW2/7 reads as under:

    “Application for eviction of tenant.

    Under Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act.

    Application presented on the 2.12.74

    As per the statement, the petition is dismissed as withdrawn.

    (V.S Aggarwal)

    Addl. Rent Controller: Delhi.

    Announced in Court.”

    7.2.2 The petitioner/tenant specifically pleaded in para 2 of his preliminary objections in his written statement as under:

    “…On 21st February, 1974, the petitioner filed another eviction application No. 754/74 against the respondent on the ground of bona fide need for occupation as the residence for himself and members of his family. On 14th March, 1975, the petitioner withdrew the said eviction application without obtaining the permission of the Court for liberty to file a fresh eviction case in respect of the subject-matter of the said Eviction Case No. 754/74…”.

    7.2.3 In replication, its reply reads as under:

    “para 2 of the preliminary objections is wrong and denied. The remaining part of this para is a matter of record. However, it is submitted that the petitioner could not file the process fee because in January, 1974 two samples of Haldi and honey were lifted by MCD and father and brother of the applicants were involved in the false cases and the petition being a near relation was mentally concerned with those cases and had been persuing the same and therefore could not pay proper attention to that case, the petitioner being placed in diversity and unfortunate circumstances. The petition is not barred under Order 23 Rule 1, CPC.”

    7.2.4 Mr. M.L Lonial, on the basis of the above pleadings has submitted that in absence of the specific denial, it should be deemed to be admitted that the petition No. 754/74 was filed on the ground of bona fide requirement despite the fact that the order Ex. RW2/7 did not specifically indicate that the petition related to Section 14(1)(e). He has further contended that even the landlord had not taken the stand which had come in the erroneous finding of the learned Rent Controller that the Petition No. 754/74 might not be under Section 14(1)(e). In this regard, the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the statement of the landlord. Chaman Lal AW. 1 in cross-examination has certainly stated that:

    “…I must have filed 3 or 4 suits against the respondent prior to this suit. It is correct that in all those suits I have given my address as resident of 4497, Regharpura, Karol Bagh, Delhi…”.

    7.2.5 He also referred to the statement of RW. 2, Girdhari Lal Puri. He stated that the petitioner had filed two eviction cases on the ground of bona fide need. The two cases were 696 of 1070 in the Court of Shri R.P Gupta and Suit No. 454/74 in the Court of Shri V.S Aggarwal, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. The first suit No. i.e 696/70 remained pending for three years and the petitioner withdrew the same and the copy of the order is Ex. PW2/6. The certified copy of the order passed by Shri V.S Aggarwal is Ex. RW2/7. The tenor of his statement is that Eviction Suit No. 454/74 was also filed on the ground of bona fide need. In these circumstances, to say that earlier petition might not have been filed under Section 14(1)(e) was not born out from the record.

    7.2.6 Now one may appreciate the impact of withdrawal of Suit No. 454/74, without permission to file afresh. According to Mr. M.L Lonial, the subsequent suit being barred by the provisions of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23 could not be filed. He placed reliance on Prahlad Dass v. Bhagirath Lal, AIR 1977 Delhi 129 to support his contention that provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 are applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller. In that case, it was held that this provision undoubtedly applies to the proceedings before the Controller under the Act. If there were any doubts relating to it, reference may be made to a judgment in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 785 : AIR 1975 SC 2130. In that case, eviction suit was dismissed after the tenant deposited the rent under Section 15(6) of the Act and consequently, the tenant had become entitled to the benefit under Section 14(2). The learned Counsel further relied upon Beli Rant v. Gurbachan Singh, 1978 (2) Rent Law Reporter 377. In that case, permission to withdraw the application was sought but was not given for bringing any application on the same cause of action in the absence of any provision in East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1948 and the petition was ultimately dismissed. This is of no assistance as that situation does not arise in this case. He also relied upon Mehtab Singh v. Tilak Raj Arora, AIR 1989 Punjab & Haryana 12. In that case, on the basis of authority in Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425, the Court observed as under:

    “5….the laws of procedure are grounded on principles of natural justice. The procedure embodied in these rules is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends and enacted with a view that endeavour should be made to avoid swamp decisions and to afford litigants a real opportunity in fighting out their cases fairly and squarely. One of the maxims which governs all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings whether in a Court, Tribunal or before persona designata, is nemo debet bis vexaripro una et eadem causa, i.e no man should be vexed twice over the same cause of action. The provisions contained in Sec. 11, Order 2, Rule 2, Order 9, Rule 9, and Order 23, Rule 1(4) of the CPC are, inter alia, the various manifestations of the same maxim. Even though, the provisions of Sec. 11 of the CPC would not apply in terms to the proceedings before any Tribunal or a persona designata, which is not a Court, still the trial of any matter or any issue which has been previously settled between the parties, would be barred by the general doctrine of res judicata which is of universal application and governs all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings…”.(Emphasis supplied)

    7.2.7 In this regard, one may also refer to Lal Chand (dead) by LRs v. Radha Kishan, (1977) 2 SCC 88 : AIR 1977 SC 789 and may note the following observations of the Supreme Court in para 19 in regard to Section 11:

    “19. The principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue…”.

    7.2.8 The Punjab High Court ultimately took the view that in case the principle of Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC is held to be not applicable, to the proceedings before the Rent Controller. The landlord after a full trial at the stage of arguments feeling that the petition is likely to fail would get it dismissed as withdrawn and institute a fresh one again on the same cause of action and he would be able to repeat the same process time and again.

    7.2.9 In Shri Bhagat Ram v. Dwarka Pershad, 1972 RCR 128, following observations of this Court are also notable:

    “5. …Mere withdrawal of a suit does not operate as res judicata Sub-rule (2) cannot aid unless the Court exercises its powers under Sub-rule (2) or the petitioner withdraws his claim under Sub-rule (1) and all the three sub-rules are an integrated whole dealing with the same subject. It is obvious that if the Court has no power to allow a petition to be withdrawn with or without liberty, as provided by Sub-rule (2), the prohibition contained in Sub-rule (3) cannot conceivably apply. I am, therefore, of the view that Order 23, Rule (1) including all the three sub-rules, applies to proceedings before the Controller. The provisions contained in this rule are of general application and are so fundamentally inherent in the exercise of jurisdiction of any Court or Tribunal to permit a suit before it to withdraw the proceedings with or without liberty to file another, subject to the law of limitation and other statutory provisions, that it is impossible not to concede to the Controller the powers mentioned in Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code.”

    “6. …In the present case, we are concerned with the application of Rule 1 of Order 23 for withdrawal of the petition for eviction with liberty to file another. It is obvious that the party has a legal right to withdraw the petition filed by it and if Sub-rules 2 and 3 should not apply there would be no end to filing of successive petitions since a withdrawn petition cannot be said to have been heard and finally decided and neither any rule of res judicata nor any other provision or principle of law would bar its entertainment. Consequently, I have no hesitation in repelling the first contention of the appellanttenant and I hold that Order 23 Rule 1, Sub-rules (1)(2) and (3) apply to the proceedings before the Controller.”(Emphasis supplied)

    7.2.10 On this basis, the learned Counsel for the appellant justly argued that this situation should not be allowed to happen.

    7.2.11 In Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Saigal, 1976 RLR (SN) 43, the eviction petition filed in 1961 was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court. In 1964 after the return of his son who was still dependent, the owner filed a new suit for eviction for his tenant. The first eviction petition on the ground of bona fide requirement was filed in the year 1961 when the elder son of the petitioner was abroad and his younger son and daughter were at school. That eviction petition was dismissed. He fared no better before the Rent Control Tribunal and in the High Court. In 1964, after the return of his elder son who was still his dependent, the owner applied anew for eviction of his tenant. He again failed both before the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal but his second appeal to the High Court was allowed and the case was remanded to the Rent Controller for taking further evidence. The matter was rejected again by the Rent Controller as well as by the Rent Control Tribunal. The appellant then filed FAO in High Court. It was held that the younger daughter of the landlord was living with him and the Tribunal committed an error by mistaking her for the elder daughter who was living in England. As the finding of fact was wrong it could be agitated in second appeal. Rent Controller's decision and that of Tribunal were unrealistic and based on supposition and were wrong. Law does not expect a landlord to sacrifice his comforts and live a crowded life in his own house when he can have better comfort. His present need of additional accommodation was genuine and claim was honest and he should not have been denied relief. That due to change in circumstance the decision in first petition does not operate as res judicata and second petition was maintainable.

    7.2.12 Similarly, in S.K Chatterjee… v. Subrata Biswas…., 25 (1984) DLT 124, again the view taken above was re-affiremed and this Court observed as under:

    “5. …A landlord who fails earlier on the ground of personal requirement, can file another petition on the same ground on change of circumstances. If the landlord's claim is genuine, he cannot be denied relief…”.

    7.2.13 In view of the consistent view taken by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, I do not see any reason to deviate. Bona fide need appears like everchanging quick sand for it increases with births, marriages of sons, growing ages of young family members, migrations and transfers of sons, etc. to the city and decreases with deaths, marriages of daughters, migrations and transfers and migrations of sons outside, or acquisitions of property and consequential separations and partitions in the family of the landlord. While it is true that ratio of Sangram Singh (supra) as explained in Mehtab Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra) are applicable to proceedings before Rent Controller under the Act, yet it appears in view of Krishna Kumar (supra) and S.K Chatterjee (supra) that this rule cannot be accepted as an absolute rule. Accordingly, I hold that the present petition could not be dismissed solely on the ground that the earlier petition was got dismissed, provided it is established that the change in circumstances are evident on the face of the material on record and facts making out cause of action in subsequent suit are different from that of earlier suit. Three things are notable here in this case. It is evident that size of the family of the petitioner has ben increasing year after year seeing the ages of the sons and grandchildren. Notice to quit which formed the basis of cause of action in such matters was given on 18th April, 1977. Moreover, if the petitioner/tenant wished to take it to a reasonable conclusion, he should have at least filed a copy of the petition to show that need had not increased and remained static. Consequently, I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Lonial in this regard.

    8. The learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. M.L Lonial has further assailed the finding that the premises were let out for residence-cum-commercial purposes on the grounds that, (a) the letting purpose is not mentioned in the copy of the rent deed Ex. RW2/1; (b) there, are two shops in the front side; and (c) in the locality, the premises are being used for residential-cum-commercial purpose.

    8.1 The fact that in the locality other premises are being used for residential-cum-commercial purposes neither proved that all the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purpose, in absence of evidence of landlords and tenants of those premises nor it appears to be relevant in view of the circumstances mentioned hereinafter. If the premises were let out for residence as well as office or shop, the same could have been mentioned as shops in the rent deed. As per the language used in the Agreement dated 21st July, 1966 Ex. RW2/1, the premises No. H-82 has been mentioned as “house”. The second para of the Agreement is material and reads as under:

    “The tenant has requested the landlord to rent out his 4 rooms set with kitchen, latrine, bath, independent ground floor of House No. H-82, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi-15 which the landlord has agreed and rent out the said portion of H-82”.

    (Emphasis supplied)

    8.2 AW1 Chanan Lal had stated that he had let out the premises for residential purposes and that he never carried out any business in the premises. AW 2 Ved Prakash also stated that the premises were residential and were used for residential purposes. AW. 3 Haveli Ram also stated that premises were being used for residential purposes. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. M.L Lonial referred to the statement of Girdhari Lal RW2, Purushottam Chand RW3 and Bishan Dayal RW4 as well as RW1 Tara Chand, postman. The statement of RW1 Tara Chand, postman to the effect that he was “delivering the letters in the name of ‘East Punjab Printing Works’ at H-82, Kirti Nagar for the last 12 or 13 years”, would go to show that the letters were received by the respondent in those names. This by itself would not convert the premises into a commercial premises. The printing press was admittedly non-being in the premises for the defendant/respondent admitted that he has no licence in respect of these premises to run the printing press and that the printing press was being run at some distance from H-82. So far as the statement of RW.4 Bishan Dayal is concerned, he just saw bags of grain in front rooms and cement bags in the other room. He also did not say that the printing press was being run in the premises. However, he also admitted that telephone was in the name of the proprietor and the letters were received on H-82, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi and the employees were working at the press which was situated at short distance from H-82. He further admitted that he was an employee of the respondent. In the afore-mentioned circumstances, the view taken by the learned Rent Controller is not unjustified and I have no reason to reverse the finding. His view further found support from Mehra Mehra… v. Dr. (Mrs.) Sant Kaur Grewal…., 1982 (1) RCJ 564, Abdul Salam v. Somwati Devi, 1982 RLR (Notes) 23, Ajit Singh v. Inder Saran, 1979 (1) RCJ 152, P.N Khanna v. T.P Balakani, 1972 (4) RCR 22. In all these cases, it has been held that where the tenant used a building for his dwelling purposes and used the same for receiving letters, it would not change the nature of letting purpose of the building even if incidentally he was following his vocation from those premises also.

    9. According to the landlord, at the time of his statement, his family consisted of 15 members. Petitioner, his wife, his sons Ashok, Vinod and Kanwal Nain, two daughters-in-law Madhu Bala and Suman Bala, Kotia Rani daughters aged 19 years, Santosh 14 years and Santo 10 years and Shanti of 5 years, sons Som Prakash 17 years, Jawahar Lal aged 15 years and Sanjay Kumar of 8 years. The size of the family has not been disputed as the respondent stated that he did not know that there were 15 members in the family of the petitioner. During the pendency of this revision petition for the last over a decade, the family must have further increased. So far as the dependency of the earning sons is concerned, the view taken by the learned Rent Controller is absolutely justified in the light of Shri Chandu Lal Gupta v. Shri Sri Ram Nagar, 1983 (1) RCJ 352. Now, it appears to be settled law that even an earning son can be dependent on his father for the purpose of residence.

    10. Now, the accommodation available with the petitioner may be seen. There is serious dispute in this regard. According to the respondent, he has got just three rooms in Raghubir Nagar which were insufficient for him and the members of his family. He has got no other house in Delhi. There is another premises, a shop No. D-167 which is a commercial typewriting institute. He did not own any house in Karol Bagh. In the cross-examination, it has been stated that Mr. Desraj, his father is the owner of a double-storey house No. 4497 built on an area of 50 sq. yds. having a Barsati floor on the second floor and there are two shops on the ground floor. According to the petitioner, the respondent was in possession of two residential rooms in this house on the first floor and one room on the second floor. The respondent was also in possession of premises No. 457, Raghubir Nagar, Delhi comprised of three rooms on the ground floor, one Varandah, two rooms on the first floor and one room on the second floor. However, AW.4 Mr. Inder Prakash stated that the respondent had got four rooms as he had constructed two rooms later. According to AW.4 Inder Prakash and AW.1 Chanan Lal in House No. 4497, Regharpura, Karol Bagh, Chanan Lal was running a shop. The house belonged to his father Lala Desraj. According to AW.4, there is one room, one kitchen, bathroom and latrine on the first floor and small Barsati on the second floor. It is notable that AW.2 Mr. Ved Prakash brother of the respondent also stated that house No. 4497 belonged to his father Lala Desraj and in that premises parents of the petitioner were residing. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that premises No. 4497, Reghar Pura were available for residence of the petitioner. D-167, Raghubir Nagar was used as a shop. Consequently, it is evident that there are only four rooms available for the family of the petitioner comprising of 15 members. And as such, the view taken by the learned Rent Controller was justified.

    11. As regards the point of ownership, firstly there is more than sufficient evidence on record in the shape of statements of AW.1 Chanan Lal, his brother Ved Prakash as well as the documentary evidence in the shape of sale deed Ex. P.1 and partition deed Ex. P.2 Secondly, a tenant inducted by the landlord, is estopped and could not dispute the title of his landlord in view of the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act without there being any subsequent change in the situation. In such circumstances, there is no reason to say that the finding given by the learned Rent Controller was not justified in this respect specially in view of Swadesh Ranjan v. Hardev Bannerjee, 1992 RLR (SC) 392 and B. Bannerjee v. Ramesh Mahadevan, 1996 (5) AD 92.

    12.1 There appears nothing wrong with the notice served on the tenant for terminating the tenancy in view of the following language:

    “You are therefore hereby called upon to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the aforesaid premises on 19th day of May, 1977 or on the day expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy which you claim and which would fall on any day after 15 days of the receipt of this notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy which you claim or on the day which would be the last day of the period of notice which you claim to be entitled and in case of non-compliance of this notice my client shall be compelled to file eviction proceedings against you at your cost and risk.”

    12.2 This notice virtually gave an option about the tenancy month as per the tenant's own claim, if he had any such claim. Notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act has to be seen not with an idea to find fault with it, but just to find out clear intention to terminate the tenancy. By just giving the aforesaid option notice would not be bad in law on the ground of vagueness. Probably for this reason, Mr. M.L Lonial had not argued with his usual vehemance on this point.

    12.3 Incidentally, it may be noticed that in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214 : AIR 1979 SC 1745, the Supreme Court had to re-consider its own earlier judgment specially in Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Posad Roy Chowdhury, (1967) 1 SCR 475, delivered earlier on the point wherein it was held that the landlord could not secure an order for eviction without first establishing that he had validly terminated lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that notice under Section 106 terminating tenancy, unless expressly provided being just a surplusage, was no more required to be served. Accordingly, for eviction on any ground other than under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent, being surplusage, is no more necessary. Therefore, firstly, the tenancy was validly terminated and secondly, this kind of notice is no more necessary for evictionon on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

    13. Taking into consideration the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the impugned judgment, the evidence before the learned Trial Court, I feel that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order of eviction. The revision petition is dismissed accordingly, however, without any orders as to costs.

    14. A copy of this judgment alongwith the Trial Court record, be sent to the learned Trial Court concerned through the learned District Judge and learned Rent Control Tribunal, for information and to proceed in accordance with law.

    Petition dismissed.
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