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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 258
  • provisions of the Rent Control Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • 1979 Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 258
  • provisions of the Rent Control Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • 1979 Rent Control Act
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlady let premises at S-41, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi, to the tenant on 7 March 1974. She and her elderly, ill husband wished to move from Srinagar to Delhi to live near their son, but the tenant declined to vacate. She therefore filed an eviction application on 4 February 1980 under Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. [1][2]

The tenant sought leave to contest, alleging that the premises were let for residential-cum-commercial purposes, that the eviction proceedings were motivated by a demand for increased rent, and that the premises were not genuinely required. He later sought to raise an objection concerning the extension of the Rent Control Act to Greater Kailash. The Rent Controller rejected these contentions and allowed eviction. [3]

The tenant challenged that order in a revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Act. [4]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the premises were let for residential purposes alone or for residential-cum-commercial purposes. [5][6]
  2. Whether the Delhi Rent Control Act applied to the premises in Greater Kailash when the eviction petition was filed. [7]
  3. Whether the landlady’s stated requirement was mala fide and motivated by a desire to obtain increased rent. [3][8]

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments

  • The premises had been let for residential-cum-commercial purposes, and leave to contest should have been granted. [3][5]
  • The rent had been increased from Rs. 1,550 to Rs. 2,000, and the eviction petition was allegedly filed because the tenant refused a further increase. [3]
  • The landlady and her husband lived in Srinagar, the premises were not needed throughout the year, and the Rent Control Act did not apply when the premises were originally let. [3][7]

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the lease deed as a whole. It noted that the premises were a house in a residential colony and that the deed expressly stated that they were to be used only for residential purposes. Clauses 8, 10 and 11 reinforced that conclusion: the tenant was to use the premises for his own use, comply with local-authority regulations, and could install domestic appliances. [5][9][10][11]

The Court rejected the claim of commercial letting despite some portions being used for export purposes. Clause 10 required compliance with local regulations, which included the restriction against commercial establishments in residential colonies. The reference to “domestic appliances” in clause 11 also indicated domestic, rather than commercial, use. [6]

The Court next rejected the objection regarding applicability of the Rent Control Act. It accepted that the village containing Greater Kailash-I was urbanised in 1979 and that the Act was extended there in that year. Since the eviction petition was filed in 1980, the tenant was protected by the Act, and the landlady’s remedy was to proceed under it rather than bring a civil suit. [7]

The allegation that the eviction petition was motivated by rent enhancement was rejected because the landlady was residing in Delhi with her son. Her advanced age and ill health were supported by the record. The Court held that her previous residence in Srinagar did not disprove her need for accommodation in Delhi; even her admitted winter visits to Delhi were sufficient to demonstrate need where she had no alternative accommodation. [8]

Holding and Implications

Revision petition dismissed with costs. The Court upheld the Rent Controller’s order allowing eviction. [12][13]

The direct effect was that the tenant’s challenge failed and the eviction order remained in force. The opinion discusses no broader implications and sets no new precedent.

    Mehra Mehra v. Dr. (Mrs.) Sant Kaur Grewal .

    B.N Kirpal, J.:— In this revision petition filed by the tenant the order of the Rent Controller allowing the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord is being assailed.’

    2. On 7th March, 1974 the premises No. S-41, Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi, were let by the landlady to the tenant. The landlady was a medical practitioner in Jammu and Kashmir where her husband was also employed. She has two sons, one of whom is living in a rented accommodation in Greater Kailash, New Delhi.” The son's house is stated to have been let out for a period of four years. The landlady and her husband who were in their eighties and were ill desired to shift to Delhi to live with their son here. The tenant was requested to vacate the premises. He declined to do so. On 4th February, 1980 the landlady filed an application under Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 258 for eviction of the tenant from the said house. The requirement indicated in the application inter-alia was as follows:—

    “For some time past it has become quite impossible both for the petitioner and her husband who are already in thieir eighties to pass their winters in Srinagar and to bear its bitting cold. This apart, the petitioner is a heart patient and gets frequent attacks. Her detailed prescriptions and electric cardiogram recording made on different dates are furnished herewith. The only son, who could look after his parents in their old state of health, is living at Delhi but he is also short of accommodation and that too he has been asked to vacate and his own tenancy is in peril. The petitioner cannot have her residence away from her son. Left with no other alternative the petitioner along with her husband has decided to shift to Delhi and to occupy the suit premises bonafidely as her residence.”

    3. An application for leave to contest along with an affidavit was filed by the tenant. It was contended that the premises had been let for residential cum commercial purposes. It was also submitted that in September, 1979 the rent had been increased from Rs. 1550 to Rs. 2,000/- and the landlady was asking for increase in rent and the present petition had been filed because the tenant had refused to increase the rent further. It was also stated that the petitioner and her husband reside in Sringar and that the premises in dispute were not required by her for the whole year. During the course of the trial the tenant filed an application seeking to raise additional grounds. One of the grounds which was sought to be raised was that the premises in dispute were situated in Greater Kailash which was a place which had not been urbanised and the Delhi Rent Controller Act had not been extended to Greater Kailash. The Rent Controller by his order dated 31st March, 1980 held that the Delhi Rent Control Act had been extended to Greater Kailash and, therefore, there was no force in the objection which was sought to be raised by way of an amendment. With regard to the purpose of letting the Rent Controller referred to the lease dead executed between the parties on 7th March, 1974. It was observed that according to the lease deed the house had been taken by the tenant for his own use. It was held that the nature of the premises and its location shows that the premises were residential and had been let to the tenant for residential purpose. In this connection it was also observed that the use of the word house’ connotes ‘residence’ which was coupled with the fact that this would be used by the tenant for its own use which shows that the premises were let for residential purposes only. With regard to the increase in rent it was observed that both the landlady and her husband were living in Delhi along with their son. Though it was not specifically stated by the Rent Controller, it appears that he took this factor into consideration in coming to the conclusion that the demand of the landlady for the house was not malafide with a view to increase the rent as has been alleged by the tenant.

    4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the present revision petition has been filed under Section 25B(8) of the Act.

    5. Before me also the first contention which has been raised is that the premises were let for residential cum commerciel purposes and that the leave to contest should have been granted. Admittedly the premises were let by lease deed dated 7th March, 1974. What was let by the said lease deed was house situated in a residential colony. The landlady has placed on record the deed of conveyance whereby the land was sold to her by the colonizer. In the said document it is clearly stripulated that the land is situated in a residential colony. In the lease deed it has been specificalty stated that the premises will be used only for residential purposes. The lease deed, however, has to be read as whole. Reading the lease deed as a whole there can be no manner of doubt that the premises were let for residential purposes alone. Three of the clauses of the lease deed which are relevant are clauses 8, 10 and 11 which are extracted below:—

    Clause 8: that the lesseee shall use the premises for his own use.”

    Clause 10: that the lessee shall comply with all the rules and regluations of the local authorities whatsoever with relation to the demised premises.

    Clause 11: that the lessee shall not carry on any constructional additions or alterations to the building, layout fittings without the written consent of the lesser, but have the right to install the domestic appliances where-ever and whenever necessary at their own cost and also have the right to remove the same at or before the time of termination of the lease.”

    6. Admittedly one of the partners of the firm is residing in the premises. The contention, however, is that portions of the premises are being used for export purposes. Clause (10) referred to above clearly pestulate that the lessee will comply with all the rules and regulations of the local authorities. It is well known that in residential colonies commercial establishments cannot be opened. The fact that some of the residential houses are being used for commercial purposes cannot detract from the full meaning and import of the aforesaid clause 10. The purpose of insertion of clause 10 was that the tenant was required to comply with all the rules and regulations of the local authorities which obviously included that the premises will not be used for commercial purposes. Furthermore the use of the words domestic appliances' in clause (11) also clearly indicates that the premises were let only for domestic purpose. If the premises were let for residential cum commercial purposes then the word’ ‘domestic’ would not have been inserted in Clause (11). Furthermore, I am in agreement with the reasoning of the trial court that the very nature of the premises namely a residential house would indicate to that the same was let for residential purpose though in clause (a) it was specifically provided that the tenant will use the premises for his own use. The purposes of letting is thus clearly spelt out from the lease deed itself and, therefore, there was no merit in this ground which was raised by the tenant.

    7. It was contended that in 1979 Rent Control Act was extended to Greater Kailash because the village in which the colony was situated was urbanised in that year. The submission of the tenant is that at the time when the premises were let the provisions of the Rent Control Act were not applicable. It was submitted that the amendment should have been allowed. I find that though the amendment was not formally allowed the Rent Controller nevertheless dealt with this aspect of the case. It has been admitted at the bar today that the village in which Greater Kailash-I was situated was urbanised in 1979. It is also admitted that the Rent Control Act stood extended in the year 1979. The present petition for eviction was filed in 1980. At that time the tenants had obtained the protection of the Rent Control Act. The landlady, even if she so desired, could not have filed a civil suit for the possession of the premises. Her only remedy was to take recourse to the previsions of the Rent Control Act. This being so there is no merit in this petition of the tenant.

    8. With regard to the allegations that the landlady wanted increase in rent the same are belied by the fact that admittedly she has been now residing in Delhi along with her son. Her Husband I understand has expired since the filing of the eviction petition. The fact that she is old and of ill health is amply born from the documents filed on record. It is not open to the tenant to contend that because the landlady has been living in Sringagar all these years she does not required the premises in Delhi. Even assuming that she comes to Delhi during the winter months as is admitted by the tenant, himself, that itself, would be sufficient to show the need of the landlady when she has no other alternative accommodation available to her in Delhi. I see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Rent Controller in this respect. No other contention was raised before me.

    9. For the aforesaid reason the revision petition is dismissed with costs.

    10. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mehra Mehra v. Dr. (Mrs.) Sant Kaur Grewal .
    (Dec 8, 1981)