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  • section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short the Act).
  • provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 40(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • provisions of section 28(iv)
  • section 36(1)(iii)
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citation codes
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  • section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short the Act).
  • provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 40(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • provisions of section 28(iv)
  • section 36(1)(iii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.P. Wadhwa, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two reference applications relating to assessment year 1976-1977 were presented to the Court (I.T.R. No. 298/82 for Ravinder Singh-HUF and I.T.R. No. 299/82 for Joginder Singh-HUF). Each reference posed the question whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was correct in applying section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act and sustaining specific additions (Rs. 24,885 for Ravinder Singh-HUF and Rs. 51,320 for Joginder Singh-HUF) to the assessees' incomes.

The assessees had applied for reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act. The ITAT, Delhi Bench, furnished a statement of case for the Court's opinion on the specified questions of law.

The factual matrix (set out for one assessee, Ravinder Singh-HUF) was: the assessee was a partner in a registered firm (M/s. Dharam Singh Babek Singh) which carried on various businesses. The ITO found a debit balance of Rs. 2,76,500 in the assessee-HUF's capital account in the firm and preliminarily concluded that the assessee had utilised those overdrawn amounts without paying interest, thereby deriving a benefit arising from being a partner. The ITO applied section 28(iv), computed an imputed benefit at 9% (Rs. 24,885) and included it as business income. The assessment order was completed on 25 September 1979 under section 143(3)/144B.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (CIT(A)) upheld the ITO's application of section 28(iv). The ITAT also dismissed the assessee's appeal, agreeing that the assessee had derived the benefit of non-interest-bearing funds to the extent of the debit balance.

Subsequently, in related proceedings concerning the firm itself, the ITAT deleted an interest disallowance the ITO had made under section 36(1)(iii). The Court notes that the deletion in the firm's case undermines the basis on which section 28(iv) was invoked against the partners in the assessee's case. The Tribunal in later years deleted additions to the assessee's income and refused further references in some years; the fate of outstanding I.T.C. applications depends on the answers given in these reference matters.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in upholding the applicability of the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act and sustaining the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 24,885/- to the income of the assessee (Ravinder Singh-HUF)?
  2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in upholding the applicability of the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act and sustaining the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 51,320/- to the income of the assessee (Joginder Singh-HUF)?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Rajendra)

  • It was immaterial that the ITAT in the firm's case disagreed with the ITO on applicability of section 36(1)(iii); the Court should consider the applicability of section 28(iv) in the assessees' cases independently of the firm's assessment.
  • Under section 2(24) of the Act, "income" includes the value of any benefit or perquisite taxable under clause (iv) of section 28; therefore, the imputed value of the benefit should be includible.
  • The Revenue's counsel argued that if the firm had not advanced tax-free amounts to partners, the firm could have borrowed less on interest, implying a consequential financial effect supporting the imputation of benefit to partners.
  • Counsel referred to V.P. Warrier v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Madhya Pradesh High Court) as a supporting decision where perquisites provided by a firm to a partner (use of premises, car, telephone) were valued and included under section 28(iv).

The opinion does not contain a detailed statement of the assessees' specific legal submissions beyond the procedural steps they took (appeals and references).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bihar v. Ramniklal Kothari, (1969) 74 I.T.R. 57 (SC) Proposition that business carried on by a firm is business carried on by the partners and profits of the firm are profits earned by all the partners. The Court cited this authority to support the general proposition that the firm's business and profits relate to partners collectively; it used this as background to consider whether benefits to a partner could be treated as business income under section 28(iv).
Instalment Supply P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, (1984) 149 I.T.R. 457 Interpretation of the phrase "whether convertible into money or not" (in the context of a related provision) showing that "benefit or amenity or perquisite" cannot relate to cash payments. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that section 28(iv) applies to non-cash benefits or perquisites and not to pure cash payments.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-I v. Alchemic Pvt. Ltd., (1981) 130 I.T.R. 169 (Gujarat) Held that if the receipt is money (cash), clause 28(iv) does not apply; section 28(iv) applies only where the benefit or perquisite is not cash or money. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that section 28(iv) is inapplicable where the alleged benefit is effectively monetary in character, reinforcing its analysis that the imputed addition under section 28(iv) was inappropriate.
V.P. Warrier v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1990) 181 I.T.R. 303 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) Example where perquisites provided by a firm (use of residential premises, car, telephone) were valued and included in a partner's income under section 28(iv). The Revenue relied on this decision by way of analogy; the Court observed the decision but stated it was "not quite relevant" to the facts of the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from the factual findings and the legal character of section 28(iv). The ITO had treated the debit balance in a partner's account (overdrawals without interest) as a benefit or perquisite arising from the partnership and computed an imputed benefit at 9% on the overdrawn amount, including that sum as business income under section 28(iv). CIT(A) and the ITAT in the assessee's appeal sustained that approach, on the basis that the partner had used non-interest-bearing funds of the firm to his advantage.

The Court noted, however, that in the firm's own appeal the ITAT deleted the ITO's disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) (i.e., the ITO's premise that the firm had borrowed on interest while advancing interest-free funds to partners was undermined). The Court emphasised that the deletion meant the firm's available non-interest-bearing funds exceeded the advances to partners — a factual stance inconsistent with the basis on which the addition under section 28(iv) had been made in the partners' assessments.

The Court further analysed the scope of section 28(iv) through relevant authority. It observed that the statutory phrase "the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not" has been interpreted to indicate that clause (iv) is directed at non-cash benefits or perquisites rather than cash payments (citing Instalment Supply and Alchemic). The Court held that where what is received is money, section 28(iv) is not the appropriate provision for valuation and taxation as a perquisite.

Combining these strands, the Court reasoned that (i) the factual foundation for imputing a perquisite in the assessee's case disappeared once the firm's assessment showed that non-interest-bearing funds exceeded partners' borrowals, and (ii) as a matter of law section 28(iv) applies to non-cash benefits and is not the correct vehicle to tax a purely monetary advantage. The Court also observed that it seemed the ITAT in the assessee's case had not had before it the relevant order of the ITAT in the firm's case when deciding the partners' appeals.

On that basis, the Court concluded that the ITAT was not correct in upholding the applicability of section 28(iv) in the present cases.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred questions in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the additions under section 28(iv) sustained by the ITAT (as set out in the references) are not supportable on the facts and law presented and are therefore rejected in these references.
  • The opinion notes that the fate of subsequent I.T.C. applications (where similar issues arise) will depend on the answers provided in these reference applications.
  • The Court's decision was reached by applying existing authority on the scope of section 28(iv) and on the factual finding about the firm's financial position; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond that application.

This summary is limited strictly to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond what the opinion itself states.

    Ravinder Singh (Itr 298/82). v. Joginder Singh (Itr 299/92)

    D.P WADHWA, J::— Statement of case in the both the reference applications is same and pertain to the assessment year 1976-1977. Referable questions in each of these applications are as under:—

    I.T.R No. 298/92: (Assessee Ravinder Singh-HUF)

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in upholding the applicability of the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act and sustaining the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 24,885/- to the income of the assessee?”

    I.T.R No. 299/82; (Assessee Joginder Singh-HUF)

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in upholding the applicability of the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act and sustaining the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 51,320/- to the income of the assessee?”

    2. It were the assessees who sought reference of these questions on applications filed under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench, New Delhi, sent in the statement of the case to this Court for its opinion on the aforesaid questions of law.

    3. At the out set we may note that for subsequent assessment years the assessees succeeded in their appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and it was the Revenue which sought reference on the same questions, but the Appellate Tribunal declined its applications under section 256(1) of the Act as in its opinion no question of law arose for determination by this Court. For those subsequent assessment years the Revenue has filed applications under section 256(2) of the Act in this Court seeking a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to state a case and to refer to this Court the aforesaid question of law. The fate of those I.T.Cs will depend upon the answers which we give in the present reference applications.

    4. To understand the rival contentions, facts in the case of only one assessee may be set out. The assessee-HUF (ITR 298/82) was a partner in a firm M/s. Dharam Singh Babek Singh (‘the firm’ for short). It was a registered firm under the Act. The firm carried on business of financing purchase of automobiles on higher (hire?) purchase system, dealing in tyres and tubes, vehicles, sale and purchase of petrol and other allied products. During the course of assessment proceedings of the firm the Income-tax Officer (I.T.O) found a debit balance of Rs. 2,76,500/- in the capital account of the assessee-HUF. The I.T.O at the stage of draft assessment order came to a preliminary conclusion that the assessee-HUF utilised that amount of overdrawals disclosed in its capital account of the firm and utilised the same without paying any interest to the firm. The I.T.O was of the opinion, therefore, that the assessee derived the abovesaid benefit by virtue of his being a partner of the firm, and he, therefore, proposed application of provisions of section 28(iv) of the Act and held that this was certainly a benefit or perquisite and could arose only because the assessee-HUF was partner of the firm. The I.T.O further held that considering the facts and circumstances of the assessee-HUF and taking into consideration the market rate of interest which fluctuated between 9% to 24% he arrived at a figure of Rs. 24,885/- as the benefit (9% of Rs. 2,76,500/-) obtained by the assessee and included this amount as part of the income of the assessee-HUF under section 28(iv) of the Act. The assessment was completed and the assessment order was passed on 25 September 1979 under section 143(3)/144B of the Act. The amount of Rs. 24,885/- was treated as business income of the assessee-HUF being the benefit obtained on the account of utilisation of the amount of the firm without paying interest.

    5. The assessee appealed. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by his order dated 10 March 1980 held the provisions of section 28(iv) were attracted as the benefit of “non-interest-bearing funds” had been clearly availed of by the assessee to the extent of the debit balance in his account in the firm and whereas if there was no such debit balance, the benefit of the “non-interest-bearing funds” would have gone to the firm itself by way of substantial further income on investment of the same. The order of the I.T.O was upheld. Further appeal was filed by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal referred to the assessment order of the firm for the assessment years 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 which were placed on record before it. The Tribunal found that during the previous year relevant to the assessment year in question a total credit of Rs. 24,76,000/- was shown as available to the firm on which no interest needed to have been paid. A sum of Rs. 22,40,000/- was stated to be total of the debit balances in the accounts of the partners including the assessees and their relatives over which no interest was charged. The Tribunal agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the C.I.T (Appeals) who had held that the assessee had availed the benefit of such “non-interest-bearing funds” to the extent of debit balance in his account in the firm and so the provisions of section 28(iv) were attracted, and if there was no such debit balance the whole of the benefit of “non-interest-bearing funds” would have gone to the firm itself and the firm would have earned income over the same and thus the income of the firm would have been appreciated considerably. Referring to the assessment years of the firm for the two assessment years 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 the Tribunal said that I.T.O had found that the firm used to pay interest at the rate of 12% to its creditors and used to charge from its debtors. Reference was made to the interest charged and interest paid by the firm. The I.T.O, it appeared, disallowed interest payment made by the firm under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act as claimed by the firm. The Tribunal, therefore, held that in view of I.T.O's findings in the case of the firm for the two assessment years aforementioned, it could not agree with the contention of the assessee that the overdrawals in the account of the assessee in the firm represented interest-free credits. Even though the assessee was not an employee of the firm but was a partner, the Tribunal nevertheless held that in its view the benefit derived by the partner could be taken to be profit and gains of business under section 28(iv) of the Act. The appeal of the assessee was, therefore, dismissed by the Tribunal.

    6. We are told on an appeal filed by the firm the Tribunal deleted the disallowance made by the I.T.O under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. We do not appear to have on our record the order of the Tribunal in the case of the firm for the assessment year 1976-1977, but we do have on our record the order of the Tribunal on reference application of the firm for the assessment year 1977-1978 where the Tribunal declined to state the case on the question as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the interest payment of Rs. 1,94,310/- was not disallowable as for non-business purposes. We have also on our record order of this Court under section 256(2) of the Act refusing to call for any case on this question from the Tribunal. The whole basis for invoking the provisions of section 28(iv) in the case of the assessee would, therefore, appear to fall. In the subsequent years the Tribunal deleted the addition to the income of the assessee as benefit under section 28(iv) of the Act on account of debit balance in the firm on which no interest had been paid. The Tribunal also refused to state the case on an application filed by the assessee under section 256(1) of the Act, and, as noted above, applications for all the subsequent assessment years under section 256(2) of the Act are pending in this Court.

    7. We may set out the relevant provisions of sections 28(iv) and 36(1)(iii) of the Act as under:—

    “28. The following income shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”, -

    xxxxxx

    (iv) the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, arising from business or the exercise of a profession.

    xxxxxx

    “36.(1) The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in section 28 -

    xxxxxx”

    (iii) the amount of the interest paid in respect of capital borrowed for the purposes of the business and profession;

    Explanation: Recurring subscription paid periodically by shareholders or subscribers in Mutual Benefit Societies which fulfil such conditions as may be prescribed shall be deemed to be capital borrowed within the meaning of this clause;

    xxxxxx”

    8. It does appear to us that it was in view of the findings of the I.T.O in the case of the firm that provisions of section 28(iv) were invoked in the case of the assessee. The Tribunal in the case of the firm was of the view that there was no justification on the part of the I.T.O for making any disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) as the non-interest-bearing funds available with the firm exceeded the non-interest-bearing advances which had been given by the firm to its partners. In this view of the matter the very basis on which the Tribunal in the present case decided against the assessee disappears. In all subsequent years the Tribunal found that non-interest-bearing funds available to the firm exceeded the borrowals made by its partners. The Tribunal, thus, held that the I.T.O was not justified in making any addition to the income of the assessee under the provisions of section 28(iv) of the Act. Since the disallowance out of interest made by the I.T.O under section 36(1)(iii) had been deleted by the Appellate Tribunal in the case of the firm, it is difficult to see how in the facts and circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was correct in upholding the applicability of section 28(iv) of the Act in the present case. It does appear to us that the order of the Tribunal in the case of the firm was not before it when it decided the case of the assessee. It is a known proposition that business carried on by a firm is business carried on by the partners. Profits of the firm are profits earned by all the partners in carrying on the business, [see Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bihar v. Ramniklal Kothari (1969) 74 I.T.R 57 (SC)].

    9. Mr. Rajendra, learned counsel for the Revenue, said that it was immaterial if the Appellate Tribunal in the case of the firm did not agree with the I.T.O on the applicability of section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and that we are only concerned with the applicability of section 28(iv) irrespective of the assessment in the case of the firm, and that under section 2(24) of the Act income would include the value of any benefit or perquisite taxable under clause (iv) of section 28. Mr. Rajendra also said that if the firm had not advanced tax free amounts to the partners the firm could have borrowed less interest carrying loans. He referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in V.P Warrier v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1990) 181 I.T.R 303, in this case the assessee was a partner in a partnership firm carrying on business and the assessee was allowed by the firm to the use of its residential premises, car and telephone. The I.T.O valued these perquisites at Rs. 15,000/- and added the same to the income of the assessee under section 28(iv) of the Act. In appeal, the value of the perquisites were reduced to Rs. 3,600/-. The court held that on facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that a sum of Rs. 3,600/- was includible in the income of the assessee under section 28(iv) of the Act. We do not think this judgment is quite relevant for our purposes as we shall presently see.

    10. In the present case the very basis of addition under section 28(iv) falls after the Tribunal in the case of the firm for the same assessment year deleted the disallowance made by the I.T.O which he had made on the ground that while the firm had borrowed funds on interest, it had advanced monies to its partners without charging any interest. The Tribunal found in the case of the firm that non-interest-bearing funds available to the firm exceeded the borrowals made by the partners.

    11. Then there is another aspect of the matter. Section 28(iv) can be invoked only where the benefit or persquite is other than the cash. Value of a thing would be the amount of money that it is worth. Valueless is what is worthless. In Instalment Supply P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, (1984) 149 I.T.R 457, this Court examined the term “whether convertible into money or not” as appearing in section 40(a)(v) of the Act when the following question of law had been referred to it for decision for the assessment years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971:—

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances and on a true interpretation of section 40(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, reimbursement of the medical expenses to the managing director has been correctly restricted by the Tribunal to Rs. 12,000 for each of the assessment years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971?”

    12. This Court held that use of the words “whether convertible into money or not” goes to show that the term “benefit or amenity or perquisite” cannot relate to cash payments.

    13. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-I v. Alchemic Pvt. Ltd, (1981) 130 I.T.R 169 (Gujarat), the term “benefit or perquisite” arising from business as appearing in section 28(iv) fell for consideration. The court held that if what was received either by way of benefit or perquisite was money, there was no question of considering the value of such monetary benefit or perquisite under clause (iv) of section 28. It held that it was only if the benefit or perquisite was not in cash or money that section 28(iv) would apply.

    14. We, therefore, answer the questions in favour of the assessees and against the revenue.

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    Comments

    Ravinder Singh (Itr 298/82). v. Joginder Singh (Itr 299/92)
    (Mar 22, 1993)