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  • sub clause (vii) of clause (1) of Section 17;(f) sum referred to in sub-clause (v) of clause (2) of Section 17;(g)
  • Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • clause (iv) or clause (v) of sub-section (1) of S. 36 and(i)
  • sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 40,
  • S. 2 (6c) (iii) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922,
  • sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of Section 17;(h)
  • Section 40 (a) (v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
  • Sections 40 (a) (v) and 40 (c) (iii),
  • provisions of Section 40 (a) (v)
  • Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971
  • FINANCE ACT 1965
  • clause (h) of rule 2
  • Section 40 (a) (v).19.
  • Section 40 (a) (v)
  • cl. (4) of Rule 2
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  • sub clause (vii) of clause (1) of Section 17;(f) sum referred to in sub-clause (v) of clause (2) of Section 17;(g)
  • Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • clause (iv) or clause (v) of sub-section (1) of S. 36 and(i)
  • sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 40,
  • S. 2 (6c) (iii) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922,
  • sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of Section 17;(h)
  • Section 40 (a) (v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
  • Sections 40 (a) (v) and 40 (c) (iii),
  • provisions of Section 40 (a) (v)
  • Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971
  • FINANCE ACT 1965
  • clause (h) of rule 2
  • Section 40 (a) (v).19.
  • Section 40 (a) (v)
  • cl. (4) of Rule 2
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Reference under Section 256(1) — D.P. Wadhwa, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench 'B', referred a question of law under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The referral arose from a dispute over deductions claimed by a company for reimbursement of medical expenses of its Managing Director, Shri Raj Bans Bahadur.

Facts: In July 1967 the Managing Director suffered partial paralysis and required extended medical care, including day-and-night nursing. In August 1967 the Board authorised reimbursement of the Managing Director's medical expenses. For an earlier year (year ending 31 March 1968) the company reimbursed Rs. 33,941; the Income-tax Officer rejected the claim, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed Rs. 9,408, and the Tribunal allowed the full claim on the basis that the payments were for legitimate business need.

For assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71 the company claimed deductions of Rs. 40,319 and Rs. 41,197 respectively for reimbursement of the Managing Director's medical expenses. Section 40(c)(iii) had been omitted effective 1-4-1969 and provisions re-enacted in modified form as Section 40(a)(v) from that date. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claims for the contested years; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner treated the payments as perquisites and limited allowance to one-fifth of salary and commission. The Tribunal accepted the Department's submission that the allowance should instead be limited to Rs. 1,000 per month (or 1/5th whichever was less) and restricted reimbursement to Rs. 12,000 for each assessment year, dismissing the assessee's cross-objections. The company sought a legal reference from the Tribunal which gave rise to the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances and on true interpretation of Section 40(a)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the reimbursement of medical expenses to the Managing Director was correctly restricted by the Tribunal to Rs. 12,000 for each of the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • The provisions of Section 40(a)(v) are inapplicable where the company makes cash payments to an employee; cash payments cannot be equated with "any benefit or amenity or perquisite".
  • Cash reimbursement should be treated as part of salary and governed by Section 17 of the Act rather than by the perquisite/disallowance provision in Section 40(a)(v).
  • Interpreting "benefit, amenity or perquisite" to include cash payments would render the phrase "whether convertible into money or not" redundant; statutory words must be given effect and not be rendered surplusage.
  • Reference to Section 40(a)(5) (and its two-part structure) demonstrates a legislative distinction between cash salary payments and non-cash benefits/perquisites.
  • The assessee relied on a line of High Court decisions (notably Calcutta High Court in C.I.T. v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. and cases following it) holding that direct cash payments to employees are not "perquisites" for purposes of the relevant provision.

Revenue's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • The revenue raised a preliminary objection that the reference was not maintainable because it did not arise out of the assessee's cross-objections but from the revenue's appeal to the Tribunal. The Court rejected this objection, observing that the appeal and cross-objections were disposed of by one order and that the Tribunal could refer questions arising from that order under Section 256(1).
  • Substantively, the revenue relied on contrary authorities including a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in C.I.T. v. Commonwealth Trust Ltd. which treated certain allowances (house rent allowance in that case) as perquisites and considered it immaterial whether the benefit was convertible into money.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.I.T. v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. (1979) 119 ITR 431 (Calcutta) Held that cash payments directly made to an employee cannot be considered a "perquisite" within the meaning of the provision corresponding to Section 40(a)(v); the phrase "whether convertible into money or not" excludes cash paid directly. The Court expressly agreed with this decision and followed its reasoning: cash reimbursements to the Managing Director do not fall within "benefit, amenity or perquisite" under Section 40(a)(v).
Indian Leaf Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. (Calcutta) (1982) 137 ITR 827 Applied Kanan Devan: monetary payment for reimbursement of medical expenses did not constitute a perquisite under Section 40A(5). The Court noted this as supportive authority and treated it as part of the line of cases favouring the assessee's position.
C.I.T. v. National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. (1984) 145 ITR 457 (Calcutta) Followed the Calcutta High Court's view that cash reimbursement of medical expenses is not a perquisite for the purpose of disallowance under Section 40/40A. The Court recorded that this decision followed Indian Leaf Tobacco and regarded it as part of the supportive precedent for the assessee's position.
C.I.T. v. Venkataraman (1978) 111 ITR 444 (Madras) Held that a "benefit or perquisite" contemplated by the provision cannot be money itself; the section distinguished between benefits/perquisites and sums paid in cash. The Court cited and accepted this reasoning as reinforcing the view that cash payments fall outside the term "benefit, amenity or perquisite".
C.I.T. v. Manjushree Plantations Ltd. (1980) 125 ITR 150 (Madras) Held that a leave allowance was not a perquisite and that payments in cash under a contract of service are not perquisites for the purpose of Section 40(a)(v), following Kanan Devan and related Madras decisions. The Court noted this decision as consistent with the line of authority that cash payments do not constitute perquisites and relied upon it in reaching its conclusion.
C.I.T. v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. (1984) 145 ITR 24 (Andhra Pradesh) Held that payments made directly to an employee (e.g., club fees, medical bills paid directly) do not fall within the meaning of "perquisite" for disallowance purposes. The Court recorded this case as part of the authorities supporting the assessee's interpretation and adopted its conclusion.
C.I.T. v. Mysore Commercial Union Ltd. (1980) 126 ITR 340 (Karnataka) Observed that "whether convertible into money or not" relates to benefits in kind (convertible or not), not to cash payments; held cash bonus payment was not a perquisite under Section 40(a)(v). The Court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that cash payments are outside the scope of "benefit, amenity or perquisite".
C.I.T. v. Commonwealth Trust Ltd. (1982) 135 ITR 19 (Kerala Full Bench) Took a contrary view: treated house rent allowance paid by the company to its employee as a perquisite and held it immaterial whether the benefit/perquisite was convertible into money. The Court explicitly disagreed with this Full Bench decision and rejected its reasoning as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase and with the other High Court decisions favouring the assessee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory language of Section 40 and its relevant clauses as they stood for the assessment years in question, and by reviewing the factual finding that the payments were made for commercial expediency (a position not disputed before the Court).

Key elements of the Court's analysis:

  • Statutory construction: The Court focused on the phrase "any benefit or amenity or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not" in Section 40(a)(v). It reasoned that if "benefit or amenity or perquisite" were interpreted to include cash payments, the subsequent phrase "whether convertible into money or not" would be redundant. That redundancy would be contrary to principles of statutory interpretation which require giving effect to all words in a statute.
  • Distinction between cash payments and perquisites: The Court adopted the line of authority which treats "perquisite" as something other than a direct cash payment; in other words, cash payments are ordinarily part of salary (governed by Section 17) rather than being non-cash benefits or perquisites covered by Section 40(a)(v).
  • Precedential support: The Court relied on and followed the reasoning in the Calcutta High Court's Kanan Devan decision and other High Court decisions (Indian Leaf Tobacco, National and Grindlays, Venkataraman, Manjushree, Warner Hindustan, Mysore Commercial Union) which held that direct cash payments to an employee do not fall within the scope of "benefit, amenity or perquisite" for the purpose of disallowance under the relevant provision.
  • Rejection of contrary Full Bench view: The Court considered the Kerala Full Bench decision in Commonwealth Trust Ltd. (which had taken the contrary view that cash allowances could be perquisites and that convertibility was immaterial) and explicitly disagreed with its reasoning, concluding that the Full Bench approach made the statutory language incoherent and improperly rendered words redundant.
  • Application to facts: Applying this construction, the Court held that reimbursement of the Managing Director's medical expenses — being cash payments made to the employee — did not result "directly or indirectly in the provision of any benefit, amenity or perquisite ... whether convertible into money or not" within the meaning of Section 40(a)(v). Accordingly, the statutory limit imposed by Section 40(a)(v) did not apply and there was no statutory ceiling (such as Rs. 12,000) to be imposed on the reimbursements under that provision.
  • Maintainability: The Court rejected the revenue's preliminary objection on maintainability of the reference, observing that the Tribunal's single order disposed of both the appeal and cross-objections and that a reference under Section 256(1) may validly arise from the Tribunal's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Question answered in the negative. The Court held in favour of the assessee and against the revenue: Section 40(a)(v) is inapplicable to cash payments made by a company to its employee and therefore the Tribunal was incorrect in restricting the reimbursement of the Managing Director's medical expenses to Rs. 12,000 for each of the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71.

Direct implications and consequences:

  • The reimbursement of medical expenses paid in cash to the Managing Director is not a "benefit or amenity or perquisite" within Section 40(a)(v) and hence is not subject to the statutory limit under that provision.
  • Accordingly, the Tribunal's restriction to Rs. 12,000 per assessment year was set aside; the assessee's position that the reimbursements were allowable was accepted.
  • The Commissioner of Income-tax was ordered to pay costs of the reference to the assessee company.
  • The Court expressly followed the line of High Court authority (notably the Calcutta High Court in Kanan Devan and related decisions) and rejected the contrary Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court; the opinion applies those authorities to resolve the statutory interpretation question before the Court.

The opinion confines itself to interpretation and application of Section 40(a)(v) to cash reimbursements in the circumstances of this case and announces the result in favour of the assessee; it addresses only the direct effect on the parties (reversal of the Tribunal's restriction and award of costs) as set out above.

    Instalment Supply Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. v. Cit

    D.P Wadhwa, J.:— The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench ‘B’ has referred to this Court under Section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the following question of law in respect of assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71.

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances and on true interpretation of Section 40 (a) (v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 reimbursement of the medical expenses to the managing director has been correctly restricted by the Tribunal to Rs. 12,000/- for each of the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71?”
    2. The facts of the case may be stated briefly. Shri Raj Bans Bahadur, Managing Director of the assessee company was taken ill in July 1967. He suffered partial paralysis and was admitted to a nursing home. He remained in the nursing home for sometime, but even after his discharge he required medical treatment which included the services of a qualified nurse who was attending on him day and night. In August 1967, the Board of Directors of the assessee company decided to reimburse such medical expenses of the Managing Director as may be incurred by him. For the assessment year 1967-69 (year ending on 31st March, 1968) the assessee company reimbursed medical expenses of Rs. 33941/- which comprised payments to the nursing home, doctors, nurses and purchase of medicines. The Income-tax Officer had rejected the claim of the assessee company as he was of the view that such payment was hit by the provisions of Section 40 (c) (iii) of the Act, but on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner restricted the allowance to Rs. 9408/-. On further appeal, the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee company in its entirety holding that the payments were made to fulfill the legitimate need of the business of the company and they were neither excessive nor unreasonable.
    3. For the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71, the assessee company had claimed deductions of Rs. 40319/- and Rs. 41197/- about the medical expenses reimbursed to its Managing Director. It may be noted that S. 40 (c) (iii) was omitted by Finance Act of 1965 with effect from 1-4-1969 but its provisions were re-enacted with certain modifications under clause 40 (a) (v) which were inserted with effect from 1-4-1969 and this clause 40 (a) (v) was omitted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971 with effect from 1-4-1972 and its provisions were re-enacted with modifications in S. 40A (v) which Section was inserted by the same Act with effect from the same date. The relevant provisions of these clauses which place limit on allowance in respect of perquisites, etc. may be reproduced here at this stage:
    40. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 39 the following amounts shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession,
    . . . . . . . .
    . . . . . . . .
    (c) In the case of any company —
    . . . . . . . .
    . . . . . . . .
    (iii) Any expenditure incurred after the 29th day of February, 1964 which results directly or indirectly assessment in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite whether convertible into money or not, to an employee (including any sum paid by the company in respect of any obligation which but for such payment would have been payable by such employee) to the extent such expenditure exceeds one-fifth of the amount of salary payable to the employee for any period of his employment after the aforesaid date.
    (a) In the case of any assessee —
    (v) any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, to an employee (including any sum paid by the assessee in respect of any obligation which but for such payment would have been payable by such employee) or any expenditure or allowance in respect of any assets of the assessee used by such employee either wholly or partly for his own purposes or benefit, to the extent such expenditure or allowance exceeds one-fifth of the amount of salary payable to the employee or an amount calculated at the rate of one thousand rupees for each month or part thereof comprised in the period of his employment during the previous year, whichever is less:
    Provided that in computing the aforesaid expenditure or allowance, the following shall not be taken into account, namely:
    (a) any payment by way of gratuity;
    (b) the value of any travel concession or assistance referred to in clause (5) of S. 10;
    (c) passage moneys or the value of any free or concessional passage referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (6) of S. 10;
    (d) any payment of tax referred to in sub-clause (vii) of clause (6) of S. 10;
    (e) any sum referred to in sub clause (vii) of clause (1) of Section 17;
    (f) sum referred to in sub-clause (v) of clause (2) of Section 17;
    (g) the amount of any compensation referred to in sub section (i) or any payment referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) of Section 17;
    (h) any payment referred to in clause (iv) or clause (v) of sub-section (1) of S. 36 and
    (i) any expenditure referred to in clause (ix) of subsection (1) of Section 36:
    Provided further that nothing in this sub-clause shall apply to any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite to an employee whose income chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’ is seven thousand five hundred rupees or less.
    Explanation I — The provisions of this sub-clause shall apply notwithstanding that any amount not to be allowed under this sub-clause is included in the total income of the employee.
    Explanation II. — In this sub-clause the word ‘salary’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (h) of rule 2 of Part A of the Fourth Schedule.”
    (5) (a) Where the assee —
    (i) incurs any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the payment of any salary to an employee or a former employee, or
    (ii) incurs any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any perquisite (whether convertible into money or not) to an employee or incurs directly or indirectly any expenditure or is entitled to any allowance in respect of any assets of the assessee used by an employee either wholly or partly for his own purposes or benefit.
    then, subject to the provisions of clause (b) so much of such expenditure or allowance as is in excess of the limit specified in respect thereof in clause (c) shall not be allowed as a deduction:
    Provided that where the assessee is a company, so much or the aggregate of —
    (a) “the expenditure and allowance referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of this clause; and
    (b) the expenditure and allowance referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 40, in respect of an employee or a former employee, being a director or a person who has a substantial interest in the company or a relative of the director or of such person as is in excess of the sum of a seventy two thousand rupees, shall in no case be allowed as a deduction. . . . . . . . .”
    4. As stated above, the assessee company again claimed deduction of these amounts of Rs. 40319/- and 4197/- on account of medical expenses reimbursed to the Managing Director, but the Income-tax Officer disallowed the entire claim as not relevant to the Company's business need. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner treated the medical expenditure as perquisite of the Managing Director and restricted the allowance to 1/5th of the salary and commission paid to him. The revenue went in appeal before the Tribunal and the assessee company also filed cross objections. The Tribunal held, relying on its earlier decision for the assessment year 1968-69, that the assessee company was justified in reimbursing the medical expenses to the Managing Director. This position is not in dispute in the reference before us. After making a comparative study of both Sections 40 (a) (v) and 40 (c) (iii), the Tribunal was of the view that S. 40 (c) (iii) did not lay any limit beyond which expenditure was to be allowed. The Tribunal held that S. 40 (a) (v) which came into effect from 1-4-1969 prescribed a limit over and above which any expenditure on providing amenities, benefits or perquisites to an employee had to be disallowed. The Tribunal was of the view that what was to be allowed was 1/5th of salary or Rs. 1,000/- per month whichever was less. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepted the submission of the Department that the allowance of reimbursement of medical expenses had to be restricted to Rs. 12,000/- for each of the assessment years in question and not 1/5th of the salary and commission paid to the Managing Director as was held by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal thus partially accepted the appeal of the revenue and dismissed the cross objections of the assessee company. At the instance of the assessee company this reference was made.
    5. The learned counsel for the revenue raised a preliminary objection that the present reference was not maintainable, as it did not arise out of the cross-objections filed by the assessee company and was only against the appeal filed by the revenue before the Tribunal. We think this objection is merely stated to be rejected. Under section 256 (1) of the Act, reference has to be made to the High Court on any question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal. Cross-objections are filed in appeal under Section 253 (4) of the Act, though memorandum of cross-objections is to be disposed of by the Tribunal as if it were an appeal. The appeal of the revenue as well as cross-objections of the assessee company have been disposed of by one order and we fail to appreciate the argument of the counsel, for the revenue as to how the present reference is incompetent.
    6. It is not disputed that the expenses in question were incurred by the assessee company for commercial expediency. As already noticed, the Tribunal in its decision for earlier year did hold that the medical expenses in the present case were incurred on the principle of commercial expediency and, in fact, the revenue does not contain before us.
    7. It was contended by Mr. Ved Vyas, learned counsel for the assessee company, that the provisions of Section 40 (a) (v) are inapplicable when the payment is made by the company to its employee in cash and any cash payment cannot be equated to “any benefit or amenity or perquisite”. According to him, any cash payment made by the company to its employee would be part of the salary and be referred to the provision of Section 17 of the Act in this regard. It was further contended that the words “any benefits, or amenity or perquisite” if equated with cash payment would make the words “whether convertible into money or not” redundant and that would be against all principles of interpretation of statute. All the words in the enactment have to be given full effect. When the legislature uses some words, the interpretation should not be, to make these words either redundant or a mere surplusage.
    8. The counsel also drew our attention to the relevant provision as contained in section 40 (a) (5) which limit the allowance and is in two parts, where expenditure incurred by the company results directly or indirectly in the payment of any salary to its employee and, where the company incurs any expenditure which results ‘directly or indirectly, in the provision of any perquisite, “whether convertible into money or not” to an employee. This, according to the counsel, is a clear pointer to the fact that the earlier provisions, as contained in clause (c) (iii), and clause (a) (v) of S. 40 of the Act did not include any cash payment made by the company to its employee within the meaning of the words “any benefit, amenity or perquisite”.
    9. In support of his contentions, Mr. Ved Vyas referred to various decisions which may be noticed:
    10. In C.I.T v. Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. (1979) 119 ITR 431 (1), the Calcutta High Court held that any cash payment directly made to the employee cannot be considered to be a perquisite within the meaning of Section 40 (c) (iii) of the Act, which provision corresponds to Section 40A (5). The question before the Court was whether the overseas allowance, managing allowance, devaluation allowance and transport allowance did not fall within the expression “benefit, amenity or perquisite” within the meaning of Section 40 (c) (iii) of the Act. The Court observed as follows: —
    In our view, in their ordinary meaning, the words “which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite whether convertible into money or not” in cl. (c) (iii) of S. 40 excludes cash paid directly to an employee as there is no question of convertibility to money where cash would be paid. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that originally the said sub-section contained the expression “remuneration” which was specifically excluded by the amendment introduced in 1964 which also introduced the clause “whether convertible into money or not”.
    In sub-clause (i) of the said cl. (c) the expression “remuneration” was retained along with the other expressions ‘benefit’ and ‘amenity’ even after the amendment. This would show that the Legislative had in view the distinction between the said expressions and yet chose to delete the expression “remuneration” from the said cl. (iii).
    The phrase “whether convertible into money or not” in our opinion does not govern only the expression “perquisite”. The words in the section are “any benefit or amenity or perquisite”. If the phrase “whether convertible into money or not was intended to govern only the word “perquisite” then the correct grammatical form would have been “any benefit or amenity or any perquisite whether convertible into money or not.”
    11. In Indian Leaf Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T (Cal) (1982) 137 ITR 827 (2), the Court was concerned with the question as to whether monetary payment made by the Company to its employee for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by the employee represented expenditure resulting directly or indirectly in the provision for any benefit or amenity or perquisite to the said employee within the meaning of Section 40A (5) of the Act. The Court following its earlier decision in CIT v. Kanan Devan Hills (1979) 119 ITR 431 (1) held that, the direct payment to the employee did not come within the scope of expenditure resulting directly or indirectly in the provision for any perquisite to an employee whether convertible into money or not for the purpose of working out disallowance under S-40A (5).
    12. The Court therefore held that the expenditure incurred by the company for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by the employee could not be treated as perquisite of the employee for the purpose of making disallowance under Section 40A (5).
    13. In another case of Calcutta High Court reported in (1984) 145 I.T.R 457 (3), C.I.T v. National and Grindlays Bank Ltd., the question was whether the cash payments on account of reimbursement of medical expenses of the employees of the company could not be included in the value of benefits, amenities or perquisites for the purpose of disallowance in excess of the limits laid down under Section 40 (c) (iii) or Section 40 (a) (v) of the Act. The Court answered the question in favour of the assessee following its decision in Indian Leaf Tobacco Co. (supra).
    14. In C.I.T v. Venkataraman (1978) 111 ITR 444 (4) the Madras High Court had occasion to consider a similar provision as contained in S. 2 (6c) (iii) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, which defined income as including “the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not obtained from a company”. It was held that “from this language it is clear that the benefit or perquisite” contemplated cannot be money itself. If it is money the question of its value being taken into account or the benefit or perquisite being converted into money will not arise”.
    15. It was also observed that the same section made a distinction between ‘benefit or perquisite’ on the one hand ‘any sum paid’ on the other indicating that the benefit or perquisite contemplated by the Section was other than money.
    16. In C.I.T v. Manjushree Plantations Ltd. (1980) 125 ITR 150 (Madras) (5), the question was whether the leave allowance was not perquisite and, therefore, the allowance of the same would not fall to be restricted in terms of Section 40 (a) (v) of the Act. The Court referred to the decision of Calcutta High Court in Kanan Devan case and also an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Venkta Raman (1978) 111 ITR 444 (4), and held that in order to term a payment as perquisite, it had to be a payment other than a cash payment in pursuance of a contract of service.
    17. In C.I.T v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. (1984) 145 ITR, 24 (AP) (6), the question was as to whether the club fees and medical bills should be taken into account as perquisite for the purpose of disallowance under Section 40A (5) of the Act. Relying on the decision of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, it was held that payments made directly to an employee do not fall within he meaning of the expression “perquisite”.
    18. In CIT v. Mysore Commercial Union Ltd. (1980) 126 ITR 340 (7), the Karnataka High Court was of the view that the expression “whether convertible into money or not” occurring in Section 40 (a) (v) is something apart from money such as something in kind, which may be convertible into money or not and that this expression would not be appropriate when one considers a payment in cash. It, therefore, held that payment of bonus to its employee in cash was not a perquisite and could not be disallowed under Section 40 (a) (v).
    19. Mr. Wazir Singh, appearing for the revenue, however, referred to a Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in CIT v. Commonwealth Trust Ltd. (1982) 135 ITR 19 (8). This decision took a contrary view. In this case the house rent allowance paid by the assessee company to its employee was treated as perquisite by the Income-tax Officer. On appeal, the Tribunal held that the house rent allowance should not be treated as part of the perquisite. The question turned on what exactly the term “benefit or amenity or perquisite” meant. The Court was concerned with S. 40 (a) (v) of the Act as it stood during assessment year 1971-72. The Court referred to the definition of salary as given in cl. (4) of Rule 2 of Part A of the IV Schedule to the Act which was referred to in Explanation 2 to Section 40 (a) (v). Under this the salary includes the dearness allowance, if the term of employment so provides, but excludes all other allowances and perquisites. The Court was, therefore, of the view that when sub-clause uses the term salary it has to be understood as excluding all allowances and perquisites other than dearness allowance. That the term “benefit, amenity or perquisite” is opposed to salary evidently indicated that these together would exhaust what an employee would obtain in terms of the return for his services. The Court thus differed with the view of other High Courts and observed: “It is immaterial whether the benefit, perquisite or amenity may or may not be convertible into money”.
    20. With respect we are unable to agree with the line of reasoning adopted by Kerala High Court. The term ‘benefit or amenity or perquisite’ cannot mean to include cash payment otherwise the words immediately following this term become redundant such type of construction has to be avoided. As a matter of fact the use of words ‘whether convertible into money or not’ goes to show that the term ‘benefit or amenity or perquisite’ cannot relate to cash payments. Any cash payment could well be part of the salary as given in Section 17 of the Act. It cannot certainly be a ‘benefit or amenity or perquisite whether convertible into money or not’. Definition of salary given in Section 40 (a) (v) is restricted in its applicability to only this clause for the purpose of calculation of he value of the benefit, amenity or perquisite when it is to be restricted to 1/5th of the amount of salary payable to an employee. Thus, reimbursement of medical expenditure to Managing Director by the assessee company is not an expenditure by the assessee company which results directly of indirectly in the provision of any benefit, amenity or perquisite whether convertible into money or not to the Managing Director of the assessee company. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Kanan Devan Hill Produce Co.'s case (supra) and followed in other cases mentioned above.
    21. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 40 (a) (v) is in applicable where the employee is given cash payments by the company, as cash payments would not come within the scope of term “benefit, amenity or perquisite” as used in the Section. In that view of the matter there could not be any limit on the allowance given by the assessee company to its Managing Director to meet his medical expenses, and the Tribunal was not correct in restricting the reimbursement of the medical expenses to Rs. 12,000 for each of the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative i.e in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner of Income-tax will pay costs of this reference to the assessee company.
    Question answered in the negative.
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    Instalment Supply Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. v. Cit
    (May 14, 1984)