P.K Bahri, J.—This is a civil revision petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by the landlord for setting aside the judgment dated August 28, 1985, of Shri Ajit Bharihoke, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, by which he dismissed the eviction petition brought by the petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement for tesidence covered by clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Controller Act (for short ‘the Act’).

2. The findings of the Additional Rent Controller that the petitioner is the landlord co-owner of the property in question and the premises which comprises of only one room one the ground floor of house No. 9/6544, Gali No. 2, Dev Nagar, New Delhi stands let out to the respondent-tenant for residential purposes only are not disputed before me. It is also indeed not disputed that the family of the petitioner comprises of herself, her husband and four daughters out of whom one stands married during the pendency of the eviction case and admittedly is presently residing with her husband in Delhi. The other three daughters of this petitioner at the time of the filing of the petition were studying in 10th, 7th and 3rd classes. The petition was filed in May 1983. said daughters have now grown in ages and are aged now 20, 25 and 12 years respectively. The married daughter is now aged about 24 years. It was also not disputed before me that there is an almost inhabitable tin-shed measuring about 4′×5′ at the top floor of the house which cannot be treated as a room. Ex. A1 is the map of the property in question and admittedly the petitioner and her family members are in possession of the whole of the first floor comprising of two bed rooms of average size and portion of the ground floor comprising of drawing room measuring 13′-6′×9′ and a covered verandah measuring 13′-6′×6′-10′ besides kitchen, bath and W.C Respondent is the only tenant in the house in a room marked ‘A’ on the ground floor which has separate entrance from the back lane. Respondent has been the tenant in the said room since 1945. The petitioner became owner of this property in the year 1975. In the eviction petition the petitioner pleaded that she needed one separate bed room for her eldest daughter and another bed room for the other three daughters and one bed room for her husband and herself and there is no dining room available and the petitioner's husband, being Manager (Accounts) in a reputed company, namely, Usha International Limited, has to hold meetings in the house with different officials and thus, there is no sufficient reasonably suitable accommodation available to the petitioner and her family members dependent on her for residence purpose. The learned Additional Rent Controller after recording the evidence gave a finding that the petitioner and her family members are in possession of reasonably suitable residential accommodation and thus, he negatived the ground of eviction, There was not present any iota of convincing evidence on the record that the petition had been brought actuated by any malafide reasons. The petitioner had become owner-landlady of the respondent since 1975 but she brought this eviction petition only in June 1983. Earlier her daughters were young, the petitioner did not think of setting up this ground of bonafide requirement for residence. It is not the case of the respondent that any other litigation was brought by the petitioner to put pressure on the respondent to vacate the premises earlier. Even the Additional Rent Controller has not given any finding that the petitioner had demanded any increase in rent from the respondent at any time or the petitioner had any intention of selling the property in question after getting it vacated from the respondent; rather the statement of the petitioner's husband, who appeared as attorney of the petitioner, as AW4, that petitioner and her family members have no other house in Delhi had remained unchallenged, it was really far-fetched plea taken by the respondent that the petitioner has intention of selling the property in question. Even the learned counsel for the respondent did not advance any arguments imputing any malafide to the petitioner in filing the eviction petition. His contention has been that the petitioner and her family members are in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation and thus, the petitioner does not require bonafide the premises in question at all and in that way the petition for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement for residence is malafide. He has also contended that since the petitioner's eldest daughter has been married andis living with her husband, the need of the married daughter could not be at all looked into, in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 Rajdhani Law Reproter 19. He has argued that he is aware that in some other cases decided by this Court (all of Single Bench) a view has been expressed that need of the married daughters, who often visit their parents, has to be taken into consideration while assessing the requirement of the landlord for more accommodation. So, he has stressed that as there is conflict of law present, on this point, the matter should be referred to the larger Bench for having an authoritative view on this point.

3. It is true that in the eviction petition the petitioner did plead that one bed room would suffice for her three daugthers but in evidence the attorney and husband of the petitioner made a categorical statement with regard to the ages of the daugthers at the time of making the statement and he deposed that at least two bed rooms are needed for three daughters out of whom two have grown up. It is also well settled law that change in circumstances of the landlord's family during the pendency of the eviction case can be looked into in order to assess the requirement of the landlord for more accommodation. At the time of filing of the eviction petition the plea was taken by the landlady that, one bed room was sufficient for three daughters but that is not conclusive as with the passage of time the need to have more bed rooms for grown up daughters has to be given due importance. So, even if for the sake of arguments, the need of the married daughter is not taken into consideration even then the fact remains that now the landlady does require one bed room for herself and her husband and another bed room for one of the grown up daughters and another bed room for the other two daughters. The grown up daughters do need exclusive accommodation not only for use as bed rooms, but for carrying on their studies as well. So, there is immediate need of the landlady for having three bed rooms when admittedly the landlady is in possession of only two bed rooms. The covered verandah which also serves as a passage to the prawing room obviously cannot be used as a bed room. The tin-shed on the top floor also is not capable of being used as a bed room. So, the Additional Rent Controller was not right in holding that the petitioner landlady and her family members are in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation. The Additional Rent Controller gave this finding ingnoring the subsequent events of the three daughters having grown in ages since the filing of the eviction petition and he also did not care to give importance to the statement of petitioner's husband with regard to the necessity of having atleast two bed rooms for the three daughters out of whom two have already grown up.

4. It has been consistently held by this Court in Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Sehgal, 1976 RCR 249, Ram Nath Tandon v. Ramesh Kumar Bajaj, (1982) 1 RCJ 531 and Uma Rani… v. Vinod Kumar Dubey…., (1982) 2 RCJ (SN) 91, that the landlord's requirement to have separate room for each of his grown up children must be given due importance. So, on the face of it, the finding of the Additional Rent Controller is perverse which needs to be set aside by this Court. It is well settled that if a finding has been given by the Controller ingoring some important piece of evidence or by mis-interpreting the evidence, then such finding can always be set aside by this Court exercising its power of revision conferred by Section 25-B(8) of the Act.

5. A new point has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court should keep in view the comparative positions of the landlady and the tenant and determine the comparative hardship of the two parties. No plea of hardship was raised before the Additional Rent Controller either in the written statement or in evidence. However, an affidavit has been filed by the respondent giving out his plight. The respondent, who has been residing in this premises since many years, is now aged about 83 years and is stated to have almost gone blind and is maintaining himself from, pension of Rs. 405/- per mensem and is stated to be looking after his son's wife and two children aged 4 years and two years of that son. He had two sons, one was Swaran Singh who had separated from the respondent and is stated to have died. I am told at the Bar that widow of Swaran Singh is also dead and there is only one issue of Swaran Singh. No reference is made in the affidavit to that issue and the property which Swaran Singh was occupying. However, it is mentioned in the affidavit that Lal Chand, who was the second son of the respondent, was missing for about an year. He has also mentioned that the amount, which he got as gratuity and provident fund was deposited by him in his son's name, is also not available to the respondent. The facts mentioned by the respondent in his affidavit, are really heart-rending but this Court is go to decide the case on the basis of any emotions. I have all the sympathy and compassion for the respondent but the law, as it stands, does not provide for any scope for this Court to mould the relief keeping in view the comparative hardship of the petitioner and the respondent. This lacuna in the Delhi Rent Control Act was highlighted by this Court in Harbhajan Dass v. Tilak Raj Mehta, (1980) 2 RCJ 780. It was pointed out in this judgment that the Rent Control Acts in Bombay, and Rajasthan do provide for provisions to enable the Court to evaluate the comparative hardship and the comparative need between the landlord and the tenant and work out an equitable arrangement but no such provision exists in the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was also pointed out that Rent Acts of Rajasthan, West Bengal and Bombay also provide for passing of an order of eviction in respect of part of the demised premises and it was reconlmended that the Parliamentmay take up the question of amending the Delhi Rent Control Act in order to incorporate such provisions in the Act as well, but in spite of this the Parliament has not yet amended the Act to incorporate such provisions in the Act. So, this Court is helpless in going into the question of comparative hardship of the landlord and tenant while deciding the present case. Counsel for the respondent also cited Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoen Quamarain, 1987 Rent Cases 260, wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“The rent restricting acts are beneficial legislations for the pro-rection of the weaker party in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these balance harmoniously the rights of the landlords and the obligations of the tenants. The Rent Restriction Acts deal with the problem of rank renting and shortage of accommodation. It is in consonance with the recognition of the right of both the landlord and the tenant that a harmony is sought to be struck whereby the bonafide requirements of the landlords and the tenants in the expanding explosion of need and population and shortage of accommodation are sought to be harmonised and the conditions imposed to evict a tenant are that the landlord must have bona fide need.”

6. It was also observed in this very judgment as follows:

“Rent restriction law would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat— that right the landlord must seek elsewhere.”

7. These observations of the Supreme Court are of no help to the respondent in the present case, in the case before the Supreme Court, it has been proved that the landlady had let out some accommodation instead of using that acommodation for her own needs and that letting was sought to be justified on the ground that landlady has a right to earn income by letting out her property in view of Article 300-A of the Constitution. In this context, the Supreme Court negativing the claim of landlady made those observations. If the landlady bonafide requires some accommodation for her own residence, it is really axiomatic to say that she could let out whatever accommodation becomes available to her for occupation as residence and then seek eviction of the tenant, from another accommodation on the ground of bonafide requirement. In this context, the Supreme Court held that such comforts which the landlady seeks by letting out other accommodations the rent restriction law would not countenance. Such is not the case here.

8. I may mention that in Ram Prakash Saroj v. Mohinder (1981) 1 RCJ 770, Uttam Chand Suri v. Smt. Ram Murti Gupta, (1980) 2 RCJ 410, and Khurshid Haider v. Mst. Zubeda Begum, ((1979) 1 RCJ 621, it was held that the need of married daughter visiting the parents has to be also hept in view while assessing the bonafide need of the landlord for more accommodation. In the case of Sat Pal (supra) reference is made to Ajit Singh v. Inder Saran, (1977) 1 RCR 602, wherein it was held that to allow the owners to evict a tenant to provide for the occasional guests of the owners would be virtually restoring to them the unrestricted rights to move in their own property which is not what is intended by Section 14(l)(e) and only the reasonable need of the landlord is to be kept in view and it was held that need of the married daughter or pther guests of the landlord are not be taken into consideration while assessing the need of the landlord for more accommodation. In Dr. Dr. B.R Malhotra… v. M.R Kukreja (Deceased) Through L.R…., (1988) 1 RCR 220, a case decided by me, I had observed that need of the visiting close relations of the landlord including all the married daughters has to be given due importance. The Case of Sat Pal (supra) was not brought to my notice at that time. The word “himself” appearing in Section 14(1)(e) would not mean that only the physical need of residence of the landlord is to be taken note of. After all a human being is not only a physical being but is also an emotional and social being. It is the need of the landlord himself that comtemplates taking into consideration the need of the family members living with him, may be those family members are not financially dependent on the landlord. Similarly, it is the emotional needs of the landlord that necessitate the visits of married daughters to his house often and keeping in view the way of living of our society, it is also clear that such married daughters stay with their parents quite for some time every year. So, as a broad proposition of law it cannot be stated that need of married daughter cannot be at all taken into consideration while assessing the need of the landlord for more accommodation. I would have made reference to a larger Bench in order to resolve this conflict of law appearing in judgments of his Court, all decided by Single Benches, but in the present case, I have assessed the need of the landlady without taking into consideration the need of the married daughter. Hence, it is not a fit case for making reference to the larger Bench for resolving the said conflict of law.

9. In view of the discussion above, I allow the civil revision and set aside the impugned judgment and pass an eviction order against the respondent, but in view of the pitiable condition of the respondent-tenant, I grant him two years time for vacating the premises. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs throughout.

Civil Revision allowed.