P.K Bahri, J.—This Civil revision has been brought under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against the order May 9, 1985, of Shri J.M Malik, Rent Controller, by which he had dismissed the eviction petition brought by the petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement of residence covered by clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act.

2. It is, indeed, not in dispute that the petitioner is the owner of house No. E-111, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. The family of the petitioner comprises of himself, his wife, one son, two daughters and the petitioner's mother. The petitioner's father, who was alive at the time of filing of the petition, is stated to have died. It is also not in dispute that the respondent was inducted as a tenant on the first floor of the permises for residential purposes in the year 1972. The petitioner alonwith family members is in occupation of the ground floor of the said house which comprises of three bed rooms, drawing-cum-dining room and other amenities. The petitioner's son was studying in Engineering College in Andhra Pradesh at the time the eviction petition was filed but during the pendency of this petition it is asserted that the son has come back from Andhra Pradesh and is now completing his Master's Degree in Eagineering in Delhi College of Engineering at New Delhi, and the petitioner's daughter is a student of B.Sc in Gargi College and the younger daughter is studying in Lady Irwin School. The petitioner himself is employed as a Senior Scientist in the Central Road Research Institute and is drawing salary of Rs. 6,000/- per month while his son is getting a stipend of Rs. 1,000/- per month. It was the case of the petitioner that at the time the premises were let out to the respondent Sh. M.R Kukreja (since deceased), the children of the petitioner were young in ages and with the passage of time his children have grown in ages and his son has become of marriageable age. The accommodation already available with the petitioner and his family members has become unsuitable and thus the petitioner bonafide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for residence for himself and for family members dependent upon him. I may mention that the tenant-M.R Kukreja had died during the pendency of the present petition and his widow alone has been substituted as respondent as she alone is coverd by the amended definition of the tenant. The Controller has negatived the case of the petitioner on two grounds, firstly that the petitioner has not come with clean hands inasmuch as he has not disclosed in the petition or the plan filed alongwith the petition that there was another room available to the petitioner on the ground floor and secondly, that the petitioner's son was studying in Andhra Pradesh and it was not to believe that he would be visiting Delhi quite often so that his need for residence could be looked into. At that time the petitioner's son was to complete his studies in Andhra Pradesh by August 1986. It was also mentioned by the Rent Controller that the petitioner is not financially so well off so as to for the rental income and thus, it is not proved that the petitioner is not in possession of reasonably accommodation and he bonafide requires the demised premises for residence for himself and for family dependent upon him.

3. It is now well settled that the landlord is not the sole judge of his requirements and the bonafide need and the requirement of the landlord has to be assessed by the court objectively. In order to see whether a particular landlord is in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation or not has to be assessed from the social status of the landlord and the financial position and the way of living to which the landlord is accustomed and the number of the family members living with the landlord. It is also to be seen by the court as to whether this ground has been set up with some ulterior motive or is a genuine ground. These principles have been enunciated by the highest Court in the well-known cases Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra 1969 R.C.R 1917 and Sarvate T. B. v. Nemi Chand, 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) Counsel for the respondent has made reference to Amarjit Singh v. Smt Khatoon Quamarain., (1986) 4 SCC 736, wherein it has been observed that rent restriction laws would provide only a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat that right the landlord must seek elsewhere. It was held that the distinction between ‘desire’ and ‘need’ must be kept in view. He has also cited Shri Shyam Bihari Singh v. Smt. Sushila Devi, (1982) 1 RCJ 355, wherein keeping in view the peculiar facts of the said case it was observed by Kirpal, J. that the requirement of guest room by the landlady for occasional visitors from outside who do not fall in the category of the family members of the landlady cannot be considered. In the cited case the landlady had converted one room into a shop and the landlady was found to be in possession of sufficient accommodation and the court came to the conclusion that the landlady did not require any additional accommodation. In cannot be stated as a broad proposition of law that the requirement of the family guests cannot be at all taken notice of while assessing the need of the landlord. The need of the landlord is to be assessed in the whole perspective viz. his way of living, his social status and the number of family members living with him and the accommodation available to him. In that perspective the need of the visiting close relations brothers, sisters, married daughters has to be given due importance. It is also true that whlie acting as a court of revision this Court is not to re-appraise the evidence considered by the Controller. It is only where it is shown that the Controller has either misread the evidence or has drawn wrong inference from the admitted facts or has committed any other illegality that this Court can interfere with the finding of the lower Court. It is also well settled that if the findings arrived at by the Controller are perverse, even then this Court is duty bound to interfere with such findings. Keeping in view all these propositions of law, which cannot be stated to have changed colour with the passage of time, we have to see whether in the present case the petitioner has been able to prove or not that he bonafide requires the premises in question for residence for himself and for the members of his family. It is now proved that the petitioner's family comprises of petitioner himself, who has become Class. I Officer while at the time of the letting he was Class II officer and he was now one grown up son, who has come back to Delhi and is living with the petitioner and that son is also now of marriageable age and moreover one daughter of the petitioner is studying in the college, who is now aged about 17 years and another daughter now aged about 8 years is studying in a school. Besides that, the petitioner has aged mother living with him. The accommodation available to the petitioner and his family members comprises of one drawing-cum-dining room size 14′ × 18′ and three bed rooms of the sizes 10′ × 12′, 10′ × 12′ 12′ × 14′. The Rent Controller has thrown out the case of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not disclosed in the pleadings that there existed another room in the courtyard. The Rent Controller has forgotton that the said room is not a regular room but is only a tin shed measuring 9′×4½ This is evident from Ex. RW1/1, copy of the entry from the record of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi on which the respondent himself has placed reliance in the proceedings. That tin shed by no stretch of reasoning can be called a room. Even the respondent admitted in his cross-examination that the said particular tin shed has roof of asbestos sheets. The respondent has stated that the said shed measures 10′ × 8′ but this is belied by the document produced by him Ex. RW1/1 wherein tin shed has been shown as measuring 9′ × 4½′. The accommodation having a width of 4½ cannot by any stretch of reasoning be called a room. Ex. RW1/1 makes it clear that one Vidya Sagar was living in one room measuring 11′ × 12′ and also a tin shed. So it is not correct to say that Vidya Sagar was living in the said tin shed only. This entry from the record of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi pertained to the period 1969-1970. Although the petitioner has stated on oath that he had not let out the said tin shed or any room to any other tenant yet no specific question was put in the cross-examination suggesting that Vidya Sagar was living there as a tenant. At the Bar counsel for the petitioner stated that Vidya Sagar was a relation of the petitioner. However, it is not necessary to probe this matter further because at the moment we are concerned only with the fact whether the said tin shed can be considered a living room or not. I am of the firm view that the said tin shed cannot be treated as a living room. Hence, the petitioner cannot be held guilty of suppressing any material fact from consideration of the Controller by not disclosing the existence of such a tin shed which admittedly stands unathorisedly constructed. The Controller was also wrong in ignoring the need of the son, who was earlier studying in Andhra Pradesh, when there was a testimony of the petitioner that the son was visiting Delhi in his vacation three times a year. At any rate, the need of the son could not have been ignord on were fact that the son was to complete his course in Andhra Pradesh in 1986.

4. The material fact now which has changed the complexion of the case of the petitioner is that the son after completing bis education has come back to Delhi and is now living with the petitioner and is doing higher studies in Delhi. Were fact that he is getting a stipend of Rs. 1,000.per month would not make the said son financially independent so that he could afford to set up a separate residence from his parents. The petitioner and his wife obviously need one bed room for their own use and one bed room is required for their grown up son and another bed room is needed by the grown up college going daughter and another bed room obviously is needed for the younger daughter and the aged mother. So the minimum need of the petitioner is of four bed rooms while the petitioner is in possession of only three bed rooms. The tenant cannot dictate to the landlord that the landlord should not have separate bed room for his grown up son and the grown up daughter and should confine his family members to an improvised tin shed. In the year 1972 when the petitioner had let out the premises to the respondent the children of the petitioner were young in ages and thus he, in order to have more income, thought of letting out the first floor but with the passage of time his children have grown up and the petitioner has also become Class-I officer. So there is nothing wrong in petitioner now seeking more accommodation for the need of his family members. The Controller was not right in giving a finding that the petitioner cannot afford to forgo the rental income coming from the demised permises. It is for the landlord to decide whether the landlord would like to live in proper accommodation or to live in small accommodation and have rental income. Neither the tenant nor the court can dictate to him that he should forgo his bonafide need for more accommodation for the sake of earning rental income of Rs. 600/- per month from the respondent. I may mention that the petitioner has three brothers and one sister. One of his brothers is living in Delhi, There is no reason to disbelieve the petitioner that occasionally his brothers and sister come and stay with him in order to meet their mother; who is living with the petitioner. So examined from any angle, it is evident that the Controller has gone wrong in drawing wrong inferences from the proved facts and has misread the evidence and has negatived the claim of the petitioner for more accommodation on flimsy grounds. The judgment of the Controller, to say the least, is perverse.

5. I allow the civil revision and set aside the impugned order and pass the eviction order against the respondent on the ground covered by clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and grant six months time to the respondent for vacating the premises in question. The petitioner shall have costs from the respondent throughout.

Revision allowed.