| Chamu Nemappa Gotadki v. N.H. Nesarikar and others (1971 R.C.R. 426) |
Case addressing competence of State Legislature re Entry 3, Seventh Schedule; observations that Cantonment Act is a special Act in that specific context. |
The Court held the authority was of no assistance to petitioners here because that case dealt with State Legislature competence and not with the present issues; the observation that the Cantonment Act was a special Act could not be used to block acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. |
| Patna Improvement Trust v. Laxmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077 |
Demonstrates that a special local Act did not exclude application of the Land Acquisition Act where the special Act modified but contemplated use of the Land Acquisition Act machinery. |
Cited to support the proposition that the Development Act did not exclude or impliedly repeal the Land Acquisition Act and that the two Acts could coexist. |
| Babli Lal v. Chief Commissioner of Delhi and others (Civil Writ No. 584-D of 1963; decided 27 Feb 1969) |
Rejected the contention that the Development Act impliedly repealed the Land Acquisition Act; held the two enactments were not repugnant. |
Relied upon to reject petitioners' implied repeal arguments and to support coexistence of the two Acts. |
| Attorney General v. Great Eastern Railway Company (1871–72 Ch.App. 475) |
General principle that when there is an express difference the special Act may prevail over the general Act. |
Quoted as a general interpretive principle that a special Act will overrule a general Act only where express conflict appears; used to frame the implied repeal analysis. |
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Harnarain (Full Bench, Cr. A. 163 of 1967; decided 30 May 1969) |
Explains that repeal by implication is not favored; intention to repeal must appear with cogent force; if two statutes can be reconciled both should be given effect. |
Applied to hold that Development Act did not impliedly repeal the Land Acquisition Act in Delhi. |
| Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561 |
Affirms presumption against implied repeal; absence of express repeal indicates Legislature did not intend repeal. |
Used to support the conclusion that Parliament intended the Development Act to coexist with the Land Acquisition Act. |
| Shri Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi and another, (1975) II SCC 386 |
Reiterates that if two Acts can stand together repeal is not to be implied. |
Supported the court's view against implied repeal of the Land Acquisition Act by the Development Act. |
| Krishan Kumar Chopra v. Union of India & others (Civil Writ No. 333-D of 1961; decided 9 May 1969) and M/s Delhi Chemicals & Pharmaceutical Works v. Union of India (Civil Writ No. 828-D of 1963; decided 28 May 1969) |
Held that "planned development of Delhi" is not different from "development according to plan" and is a public purpose; acquisition under Land Acquisition Act was permissible. |
Cited to reinforce that acquisition for planned development qualifies as a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act and that such acquisition can validly be effected under that Act. |
| Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2077 |
Observed that acquisition for planned development of Delhi under the Land Acquisition Act was permissible before the Master Plan was ready. |
Found decisive here because the impugned section 4 notification was issued in October 1961 (before Master Plan 1962); Court relied on Aflatoon to reject petitioners' contention that acquisition was inhibited until Master Plan was complete. |
| Munshi Singh and others v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150 |
Stated that the public purpose in a notification should be particularised and that vague descriptions could be insufficient in some contexts. |
The Court distinguished Munshi Singh: where large areas are involved a general description ("planned development of Delhi") may suffice; relied on later authority (Pt. Lila Ram) to uphold the sufficiency of the notification here. |
| Pt. Lila Ram v. Union of India and others, (1975) 2 SCC 547 |
Held that execution of the Interim General Plan for Greater Delhi is a public purpose and that for notifications covering large areas the purpose need not be specified with extreme particularity. |
Used to validate the description of purpose ("planned development of Delhi") in the impugned notification and to distinguish Munshi Singh. |
| Smt. Gunwant Kaur and others v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, AIR 1970 SC 802 |
Case concerning sufficiency of a section 4 notification in a different factual context (large plot described in the schedule and issues about opportunity to object). |
Court held it was distinguishable on facts and of no assistance to petitioners here. |
| Narendrajit Singh and others v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 306 |
Held that section 4(i) does not require that the identity of lands to be ultimately acquired must be specified; the duty is to specify the locality where land is needed. |
Applied to reject the complaint that lack of Khasra numbers in the notification prevented effective objections under section 5A. |
| Raj Kumar and another v. Union of India and others (Civil Writ No. 473-D of 1963; decided 1 Mar 1974) |
Rejected argument that "planned development of Delhi" as a notification purpose is vague and insufficient. |
Relied upon to uphold the validity of the section 4 notification's stated purpose in the present cases. |
| Jagdish Ram and others v. The State of Punjab and another, AIR 1971 Punjab & Haryana 139 |
Held a particular section 4 notification invalid on facts where description did not enable identification of lands within municipal limits. |
Court distinguished the case on its facts and held it did not assist petitioners because the impugned notification here delineated blocks and annexures. |
| Lt. Governor v. Mandir Sita Ram, AIR 1973 Delhi 218 |
Discussed the nature of the Collector's inquiry under section 5A (quasi-judicial) and the administrative requirement for reasons in certain instances. |
Quoted for the proposition that a speaking order is not always required and that the Lt. Governor may adopt the Collector's report after applying his mind; used to reject argument that declaration under section 6 required a detailed speaking order. |
| Ganga Bishnu Swaika and another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society and others, AIR 1968 SC 615 |
Held that the satisfaction of the Government under section 6 does not have to be expressed in a particular formula; the declaration published under subsection (2) is conclusive evidence the land was needed for public purpose. |
Applied to reject the contention that the wording "whereas it appears to the Lt. Governor" made the section 6 declaration invalid. |
| Valji Mulji Soneji v. State of Gujarat and others, (1970) II GLR 95; and Dosabhai Ratansha Keravala v. State of Gujarat and others, (1970) II GLR 361 |
Held, in Gujarat High Court decisions, that long delay between section 4 notification and section 6 declaration could be fatal to acquisition proceedings. |
The Court rejected reliance on these authorities because of statutory interpolation (Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Act, 1967, section 4(2)) and because the declarations in the present matter were made in 1966 (prior to the Ordinance), rendering petitioners' delay argument inapplicable here. |
| Ratni Devi v. Chief Commissioner (Petition No. 332 of 1971; decided 13 Apr 1975 — unreported) |
Reiterated that acquisition for planned development of Delhi is a public purpose. |
Cited to support the court's conclusion that planned development is a valid public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. |