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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Writ Nos. 46-D to 51-D of 1964)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by H.R. Khanna, C.J., disposes of six writ petitions (Nos. 46-D to 51-D of 1964). The court treated Civil Writ No. 46-D of 1964 as representative because counsel agreed the material facts were the same in each petition.

The petitioner in Civil Writ No. 46-D, Dhanna Singh, claimed ownership of a 320-square-yard plot in village Himayunpur purchased on August 26, 1957, upon which he built a house and three shops. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on September 12, 1957 (dated September 3, 1957) covering about 3,000 acres including the petitioner's land, specifying the public purpose as "the execution of the interim general plan for the greater Delhi."

On February 20, 1963, a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued for acquisition of lands including the petitioner's land; an award by the Collector was made on January 15, 1964. The petitioner challenged the Section 6 notification and the award, arguing among other points that the interim general plan referred to in the Section 6 declaration was non-existent on the date that declaration was made.

Respondents named were: Chief Commissioner, Delhi Administration (No. 1); Land Acquisition Collector (No. 2); and Delhi Development Authority (No. 3). Affidavits in opposition were filed by officials of the Delhi Development Authority and the Delhi Administration. The court heard counsel for both parties (Mr. Dalip Kapur for petitioner; Mr. Dipak Choudhari and Mr. Keshav Dayal for respondents).

The court ultimately concluded that the Section 6 notification and the Collector's award dated January 15, 1964 were liable to be quashed. No arguments were advanced by the petitioner against the Section 4 notification.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (dated February 20, 1963) is valid where the public purpose stated in the declaration—"the execution of the interim general plan for the greater Delhi"—had ceased to exist by the date of that declaration.
  2. Whether the Collector's consequent award dated January 15, 1964 can be sustained if the Section 6 declaration is invalid.
  3. Whether a declaration under Section 6 which specifies a non-existent public purpose constitutes a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner challenged the Section 6 notification and the award inter alia on the ground that by the date the Section 6 notification was issued (February 20, 1963) the interim general plan—identified in the notification as the public purpose—had ceased to exist and therefore the declaration was invalid.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents relied upon prior decisions (including Uttar Pradesh Samaj Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. Union of India) to assert that planned development of Delhi is a public purpose.
  • They argued that the object of the interim general plan and the later master plan was the planned development of Delhi, implying a continuity of public purpose despite different nomenclature.
  • Respondents cited Shyam Swarup Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh to suggest that differences in description of public purpose between notifications do not necessarily vitiate proceedings if the purposes are analogous.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Somawanti and others v. The State of Punjab and others Government declaration of public purpose is final except where there is a colourable exercise of power; if the declared purpose is not a public purpose (or is private/non-existent), the declaration is a nullity. The court invoked this principle to hold that because the purpose stated in the Section 6 declaration (execution of the interim general plan) was non-existent on the date of the declaration, the declaration amounted to a colourable exercise of power and was invalid.
Uttar Pradesh Samaj Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. Union of India and others Planned development of Delhi constitutes a public purpose. The court accepted the general proposition that planned development is a public purpose but distinguished the case on its facts: the controlling question here was whether the public purpose specified in the Section 6 notification had ceased to exist by the date of that notification; the precedent did not address that precise question.
Shyam Swarup Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A modification in the description of the public purpose between Section 4 and Section 6 notifications may not vitiate proceedings where the purposes are analogous and the later purpose is not non-existent. The court held this precedent offered no assistance because, in the cited case, the public purpose in the later notification remained existent and analogous; by contrast, in the present case the purpose specified in the Section 6 declaration was found to be non-existent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the established chronology and the statutory requirements of the Land Acquisition Act:

  1. Chronology and factual findings:
    • The interim general plan for greater Delhi was prepared by town planners in 1956.
    • A Section 4 notification referencing that interim general plan was issued in September 1957 and published in the Delhi Gazette on September 12, 1957.
    • The Delhi Development Act came into force on December 31, 1957.
    • A draft master plan was published on July 8, 1960, and, according to the affidavit of the Engineer Member of the DDA, the interim general plan remained in force only up to September 1, 1962, when the master plan came into force and superseded it.
    • Nevertheless, the Section 6 declaration was issued on February 20, 1963, describing the public purpose as "the execution of the interim general plan for the greater Delhi."
  2. Legal requirement under the Act:
    • Sub-section (2) of Section 6 requires that every declaration state the purpose for which the land is needed, and that purpose must be real and in existence.
  3. Application of principles:
    • Because the interim general plan had ceased to be operative by September 1, 1962, it did not exist on February 20, 1963 when the Section 6 declaration was made; therefore the purpose specified in the declaration was non-existent.
    • Relying on the principle in Smt. Somawanti (that a declaration is final save where it is colourable), the court found that specifying a non-existent purpose amounts to a colourable exercise of power and renders the declaration invalid.
  4. Consideration of respondents' authorities and arguments:
    • The court acknowledged the correctness of the proposition that planned development of Delhi is a public purpose (Uttar Pradesh Samaj case) but held that the central question here was whether a Section 6 notification is valid when the public purpose it specifies has ceased to exist.
    • The court distinguished Shyam Swarup Saksena on the basis that in that case the later public purpose was not non-existent and so the observed analogy between purposes did not apply to the present situation.
    • The court also noted that the authorities had allowed about five and a half years to elapse between the Section 4 notification and the Section 6 declaration; had the Section 6 declaration been made within the shorter period envisioned by the interim plan, the difficulty would not have arisen.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Because the declared public purpose in the Section 6 notification was non-existent when the declaration was made, the declaration was not in conformity with law and was a colourable exercise of power; consequently, the Section 6 notification and the award founded on it were liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petitions are accepted; the notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (dated February 20, 1963) and the consequent award made by the Collector on January 15, 1964 are quashed.

Immediate implications for the parties:

  • The Section 6 declaration and the Collector's award in respect of the petitioner's land are nullified; the relief prayed for in the representative petition was granted.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court.
  • The petitioner's challenge to the Section 4 notification was not pressed and therefore the Section 4 notification was not adjudicated upon for validity in this opinion.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes that a declaration under Section 6 must specify a public purpose that is real and in existence at the time of the declaration; the court treated a declaration specifying a non-existent purpose as a colourable exercise of statutory power. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel general principle beyond applying these established legal standards to the facts of this case.

Judgment delivered by H.R. Khanna, C.J.; P.S. Safeer, J., concurred. Final order: "Petitions accepted."

    Dhanna Singh Petitioner v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi Administration And Others S

    H.R Khanna, C.J:— This judgment would dispose of six writ petitions Nos. 46-D to 51-D of 1964. Arguments have been addressed before us in Civil Writ No. 46-D of 1964 and it is the common case of the learned counsel for the parties that the material facts in all the writ petitions are the same. We would, consequently, give the facts as stated in Civil Writ No. 46-D of 1964.

    Dhanna Singh petitioner in this petition has prayed for the issuance of a writ to quash notifications dated September 3, 1967 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), dated February 20, 1963 under Section 6 of the Act and the award dated January 15, 1964 of the Land Acquisition Collector respondent No. 2 in the petition. The petitioner claims that he is the owner of a plot of land measuring 320 square yards situated in village Himayunpur. It is stated that after purchasing that plot on August 26, 1957 the petitioner built a residential house and three shops on that plot. A notification dated September 3, 1957 under Section 4 of the Act relating to 3,000 acres of land including the land in dispute was issued and was published in the Delhi Gazette on September 12, 1957. The relevant part of the notification reads as under:—

    “Whereas it appears to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, that the land is likely to be required to be taken at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the greater Delhi, it is hereby notified that the land described in the Schedule below is likely to be required for the above purpose.

    The notification is made under the provision of Section, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to all whom it may concern.

    In exercise of the power conferred by the said Section if Chief Commissioner of Delhi is pleased to authorise for the time being engaged in the undertaking with their servants and workmen to enter upon any survey any land in the locality and do all other acts required or permitted by that Section.

    Any person interested who has any objection to the acquisition of the said land may, within 30 days from the publication of this notification, file his objection in writing before the Assistant Secretary, D.D.P.A, Regal Building, New Delhi, who has been appointed to perform the function of the Collector under the said Act.

    On Feburary 20, 1963 notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued for the acquisition of land including that of the petitioner. The material part of the notification reads as under :—

    “Whereas it appears to the Chief Commissioner Delhi that land is required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the greater Delhi it is hereby declared that the land described in the specification below is required for the above purpose.

    This declaration is made under the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to all whom it may concern and under the provisions of Section 7 of the said Act. The Collector of Delhi is hereby directed to take order for the acquisition of the said land.

    A plan of the land may be inspected at the office of the Collector of Delhi.”

    The petitioner has assailed the validity of the impugned notifications inter alia on the ground that on the date the notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued the interim general plan was non-existent.

    The respondents named in the petition are Chief Commissioner Delhi Administration respondent No. 1, the Land Acquisition Collector respondent No. 2 and the Delhi Development Authority respondent No. 3, and they have all resisted the petition. Affidavits of Shri Balbir Singh Saigal, Engineering Member, Delhi Development Authority, and Shri A.V Venkatasubban, Secretary (Local Self Government), Delhi Administration, have been filed in opposition to the petition.

    We have heard Mr. Dalip Kapur on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Dipak Choudhari and Mr. Keshav Dayal on behalf of the respondents, and are of the view that the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act and the consequent award made by the Collector on January 15, 1964 are liable to be quashed. So far as the notification under Section 4 of the Act is concerned, no arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner to challenge its validity.

    Perusal of the notification under Section 4 of the Act goes to show that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired, was mentioned in the notification to be “the execution of the interim general plan for the greater Delhi.” This interim general plan was prepared by a team of town planners in 1956. On December 31, 1957 the Delhi Development Act came into force. A draft master plan for the planned development of Delhi was published in July 8, 1960. The affidavit of Shri Balbir Singh Saigal, Engineer Member of the Delhi Development Authority, shows that the interim general plan was in force up to September 1, 1962 when the master plan came into force. It would, therefore, follow that the interim general plan was not in force after September 1, 1962 and was from that date superseded by the master Plan. In the notification under Section 6 of the Act the public purpose for the acquisition of the land is mentioned to be “the execution of the interim general plan for the greater Delhi.” As the interim general plan had ceased to exist and was no longer in force on February 20, 1963, there could be obviously no question of the execution of that plan on that date. It is, in the circumstances, not clear as to how a notification under Section 6 could be issued on that date for acquiring land for the purpose of the execution of the interim general plan. According to sub-section (2) of Section of the Act every declaration made under the above Section shall state inter alia the purpose for which the land is needed. Since the purpose specified in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was non-existent, the above declaration cannot be held to be valid and in conformity with law. The requirement about the mention of the public purpose in the notification under Section 6 necessarily contemplates that the purpose should be real, true and in existence and not fictitious, imaginary or non-existent. In the case of Smt. Somawanti and others v. The State of Punjab and others, (1) their lordships observed:—

    “Now whether in particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is public purpose, leaving aside for a “moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will be final”.

    As the purpose mentioned in the declaration under Section 6 for the acquisition of the land has been found to be non-existent, there is no escape from the conclusion that there has been a colourable exercise of the power in the issuing of declaration under Section 6 of the Act in the present case.

    On behalf of the respondents reference has been made to a decision of this Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Samaj Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., v. Union of India and others, (2) wherein it was held that the planned development of Delhi was a public purpose. In our opinion, there can be no dispute so far as the above proposition is concerned, but the point with which we are concerned is materially different. All that we have to see is whether a notification under Section 6 of the Act can be valid if the public purpose specified in the notification has ceased to exist. So far as that question is concerned, we have no doubt that the non-existence of the public purpose mentioned in the notification would introduce a fatal infirmity in the notification.

    It may be mentioned that the language of the notification under Section 4 of the Act issued in the present case is different from that of the notification issued on November 13, 1959 which was the subject matter in the case of Uttar Pradesh Samaj Cooperative Building Society Ltd. (2). In that case the public purpose mentioned was “the planned development of Delhi,” while in the present case it is “the execution of the interim general plan.” Reference to “ Interim General Plan for Greater Delhi,” published by the Ministry of Health in 1956, shows that some 3,000 acres of land were needed of residential development for two or three years before the preparation of the master plan. Had the authorities concerned taken steps to acquire the land in dispute by issuing a notification under Section 6 of the Act within two or three years of the preparation of the interim general plan and not deferred the matter till February, 1963, they would not have encountered the difficulty with which they are confronted in the present case. As things, however, are, they allowed a period of five and a half years to elapse after the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act and the result there of was that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired ceased to exist by the date notification under Section 6 was issued. The authorities concerned seem then to have been influenced by the consideration that there could be no variance between the public purpose mentioned in the two notifications under Sections 4 and 6 and that they had to adhere to the purpose mentioned in the earlier notification.

    Reference on behalf of the respondents has also been made to the case of Shyam Swarup Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. In that case the public purpose was mentioned in the notification under Section 6 of the Act to be “Construction of Government buildings by the Public Works Department.” The public purpose stated in the notification under Section 6 of the Act was “The extension of Mahanagar Housing Scheme by Municipal Board, Lucknow.” It was held that though the public purposes within the two notifications were not identical, they were analogous to each other and the modification introduced in the notification under Section 6 had not the effect of vitiating the entire proceedings. No assistance, in our opinion, can be derived from the above authority by the respondents because the purpose for which the land was being acquired in the cited case was not held to be non-existent. Argument has also been advanced on behalf of the respondents that the object of the interim general plan as well as of the master plan was the planned development of Delhi. This may be so, but this fact would not materially affect the case because, as stated earlier, the public purpose mentioned in the impugned notification is not the planned development of Delhi but the execution of the interim general plan. As the interim general plan has ceased to be operative, the acquisition of land for the execution of that plan cannot be upheld.

    We, therefore, accept the petitions and quash the impugned notification under Section 6 of the Act as well as the award made by the Collector on January 15, 1964. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

    P.S Safeer, J—I agree.

    ANK Petitions accepted.
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    Comments

    Dhanna Singh Petitioner v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi Administration And Others S
    (Aug 6, 1969)