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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act (22 of 1962) as amended by Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision (Amendment) Act (23 of 1962).
  • 584 (14), Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules
  • BANKING REGULATION ACT 1949
  • section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947.
  • RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ACT 1934
  • Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, The Banking Regulation Act
  • sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Regulation Act,
  • Land Tax Act, 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1957
  • provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution.
  • Article 14 of the Constitution. This Rule
  • sub-section (2), the Central Government
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • section 12 A of the Regulation Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION ACT
  • section 18 of the Regulation Act,
  • section 21 of the Regulation Act,
  • section 35 of the Regulation Act,
  • provisions of sub clause (b) (ii)
  • II) Service Recruitment Rules
  • Typist.Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the said Rules,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • stage.(iii) section 7
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • section 23 (e),
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act (22 of 1962) as amended by Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision (Amendment) Act (23 of 1962).
  • 584 (14), Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules
  • BANKING REGULATION ACT 1949
  • section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947.
  • RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ACT 1934
  • Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, The Banking Regulation Act
  • sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Regulation Act,
  • Land Tax Act, 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1957
  • provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution.
  • Article 14 of the Constitution. This Rule
  • sub-section (2), the Central Government
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • section 12 A of the Regulation Act,
  • INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION ACT
  • section 18 of the Regulation Act,
  • section 21 of the Regulation Act,
  • section 35 of the Regulation Act,
  • provisions of sub clause (b) (ii)
  • II) Service Recruitment Rules
  • Typist.Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Rule 5 of the said Rules,
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • stage.(iii) section 7
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • section 23 (e),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M.R.A. Ansari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion disposes of two writ petitions (C.W. No. 690/72 and C.W. No. 1341/70) filed by employees of the Reserve Bank of India (the Bank), Delhi Centre. The petitioners challenged the validity of various Bank schemes and office circulars that regulated fixation of seniority and promotion: principally the "Optee Scheme, 1965", an Optee Scheme of 1969, an office circular dated 22-4-1970, and a combined seniority scheme announced by an office circular dated 12-5-1972 (referred to as the combined seniority scheme of 1972).

The factual background includes: (a) prior institutional history — the Bank's departmental grouping into General and Specialized Departments and the maintenance of separate seniority lists; (b) expansion of Specialized Departments prompting grievances by General Department employees; (c) constitution of a National Industrial Tribunal under Mr. Justice K.T. Desai, which recommended common seniority lists where possible; (d) Supreme Court endorsement of the Tribunal's views; and (e) the Bank's formulation of successive schemes (1965 Optee Scheme, 1969 Optee Scheme, 1970 circular for Industrial Development Bank posts) and finally the 1972 combined seniority scheme that merged various categories and introduced switchover provisions for certain non-clerical staff.

Procedurally, the Bank raised preliminary objections that it was not "State" within Article 12 and that employees' rights arose from contract and thus were not enforceable under Article 226. Other respondents raised objections concerning non-impleading of necessary parties and delay. The Court first addressed the Article 12 issue, then the contractual employment point, then other preliminary objections, and finally the substantive challenge to the combined seniority scheme.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Reserve Bank of India is "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby enabling challenges under Articles 14 and 16.
  2. Whether the employment relations between the petitioners and the Bank are contractual in a manner that precludes remedy under Article 226 (i.e., whether the remedy is limited to ordinary civil suit rather than writ jurisdiction).
  3. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable in view of objections of non-impleading of necessary parties and delay.
  4. Substantive: Whether the Bank's schemes (notably the Optee Scheme, 1965 and the combined seniority scheme of 1972) are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and/or otherwise legally vitiated.

Arguments of the Parties

Bank's Arguments

  • The Bank is not "State" within Article 12 and therefore Articles 14 and 16 cannot be invoked against it.
  • The employment of petitioners was governed by staff regulations and declarations at appointment and was contractual in nature; therefore any dispute regarding contractual terms should be litigated in ordinary civil courts rather than by writ under Article 226.
  • Other procedural objections (as later raised by respondents) — non-impleading of necessary parties and inordinate delay in challenging earlier schemes.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The schemes (1965 Optee Scheme, 1969 circular, 1970 circular and especially the combined seniority scheme of 1972) infringe petitioners' rights and are violative of Articles 14 and 16.
  • The Bank is "State" within Article 12 and petitioners can therefore invoke fundamental rights against it.
  • The declaration and staff regulations do not amount to a contract that curtails the constitutional remedies; petitioners did not waive fundamental rights.
  • Procedural — they challenged specific schemes; where necessary, they argued that impleading concerns were impractical at filing date (for example the combined seniority list was not yet prepared when petition filed).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 S.C. 1857) Authorities set up by statute may be "State" under Article 12 if they are agents/instruments of government, exercise powers to implement laws, have governmental/quasi‑governmental powers or can make enforceable regulations. The Court relied on this decision as guiding principles to determine that RBI's statutory powers, governmental functions and control by Central Government bring it within Article 12.
All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association & another v. Reserve Bank of India & another (AIR 1966 S.C. 305) Endorsement of Desai Tribunal's observation that, where possible without detriment to efficiency, employees in the same category serving in different departments should be grouped for promotion and common seniority maintained. The Court recorded that the Supreme Court endorsed the Tribunal's views, which formed the background for the Bank's later schemes including the Optee Scheme of 1965.
L.P.A. No. 155 of 1972: Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Delhi Administration (Full Bench, Delhi High Court) Reviewed case law on "State" under Article 12 and laid down principles on when a statutory body is "State". The Court relied on the Full Bench's synthesis (cited at length) to frame tests applied to RBI — whether it is agent of Government, vested with duties to administer laws, power to give enforceable directions, etc.
Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (AIR 1953 S.C. 250) Employment under a specified temporary contract can be purely contractual; such persons may have remedies in ordinary courts rather than under Article 32/226 for alleged violation of Articles 14/16. The Court distinguished this authority on facts, noting the petitioner there was a temporary contract employee; the Court held the RBI employees' situation was different and the case did not bar writ remedy here.
Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa (AIR 1972 S.C. 843) Contractual employment (e.g., headmaster under private school's contract) does not permit enforcement of contractual rights via writ petition after takeover; contractual rights are enforced in civil suit. The Court distinguished the case: here petitioners were employees of a statutory body that is "State" and no deliberate waiver of fundamental rights was shown; therefore Article 226 was open.
Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1959) 1 S.C.R. 528 Fundamental rights (Article 14) cannot be waived by voluntary private settlement; Article 14 imposes a constitutional obligation on the State. The Court used the principle to support the view that employees could not be taken to have waived constitutional protections by contract or agreement with the Bank.
D.F.O., South Kheri & others v. Ram Sanehi Singh (1970 S.C.W.R. 194) Even where rights arise from contract, a writ may be maintainable if a public authority has exercised statutory power in a manner depriving a person of valuable rights. The Court applied this authority to hold that private contractual origin of a right does not preclude writ jurisdiction where action involves public/statutory authority (RBI).
Union of India & others v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies (AIR 1968 S.C. 718) Schemes and executive measures may impose obligations; courts can compel performance of obligations imposed by departmental schemes where appropriate — substance, not form, matters. The Court invoked this principle to hold that the Optee Scheme of 1965, being a substantive scheme formulated by the Bank, obliged the Bank to implement obligations arising from it vis‑à‑vis those who acted under it.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (AIR 1958 S.C. 538) Tests for permissible classification under Article 14: intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus to object; and further enumerated principles (presumption of constitutionality, burden on challenger, etc.). The Court used these tests and accompanying principles as the framework to evaluate whether the combined seniority scheme complied with Articles 14 and 16.
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (AIR 1955 S.C. 191) Articulated the two‑limbed test for permissible classification under Article 14 (intelligible differentia; rational relation to object). Referred to within the Dalmia analysis; used as foundational authority for Article 14 analysis of the schemes.
B. Gopalaiah and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1969 A.P. 204) Where a whole class is discriminated against, courts should not refuse relief simply because members of the favored class are not before the court; impleading all beneficiaries is impractical. The Court relied on this decision to reject the objection that necessary parties were not impleaded in the challenge to the combined seniority scheme (C.W. No. 690/72) when the seniority list had not yet been prepared.
All India Station Masters' & Assistant Station Masters' Assn. v. General Manager, Central Railway (AIR 1960 S.C. 384) Equality of opportunity in promotion applies within the same class — distinct recruitment/training or separate classes permit different channels of promotion. The Court cited and distinguished this doctrine when analysing whether different groups (clerical vs non‑clerical) could be treated as same or different classes for promotion/seniority purposes.
Mervyn Cotinho & others v. Collector of Customs & others (AIR 1967 S.C. 52) Permissibility of a rotational system where two recruitment sources exist; but rotational system cannot apply where only one source exists (and may violate Article 16). The Court used these principles to explain why the combined seniority scheme's merging of unlike classes (clerical and non‑clerical) could not be justified by analogy to permissible rotational systems.
S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 S.C. 1427) Recruitment/promotion combining direct recruits and promotees can be valid if classification has reasonable relation to office requirements; equality in promotion predicated only where promotees drawn from same source. The Court invoked this line of authority to stress that reasonable classification is permissible, but the combined seniority scheme failed the applicable tests when it merged distinct classes without adequate basis.
Other authorities cited (summary list in opinion): K.N. Guruswamy; K.T.M. Nair (Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair); State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy; Md. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh; Govind Dattaray Kelkar; State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao; C.A. Rajendran; Anand Prakash Saksena; H.S. Shivalingaiah Various principles on Article 14/16: permissible classification, when merger/absorption is permissible, when discretionary schemes require guiding principle, and when administrative schemes are open to writ challenge. The Court relied on the cumulative guidance of these authorities to analyse whether the Optee Scheme of 1965 and the combined seniority scheme of 1972 accorded with Article 14/16 tests; overall the precedents supported upholding the 1965 Optee Scheme but condemning the 1972 combined seniority scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing preliminary objections first and then the substantive challenge:

1. Whether the Bank is "State" under Article 12

  • The Court adopted the Full Bench synthesis and the principle from Rajasthan State Electricity Board: a statutory body is "State" if it is an agent/instrument of the Government, set up to administer laws, vested with powers to carry out governmental/quasi‑governmental functions, or empowered to make enforceable rules/regulations.
  • The Court examined the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and other statutes (Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Banking Regulation Act) and identified multiple indicia: exclusive functions relating to currency issuance, governmental entrustment of public money handling, nomination/removal of Governor/Directors by Central Government, power to make regulations with Central Government's previous sanction, enforcement and penal provisions, and extensive control over scheduled and other banks.
  • On these statutory features and the Bank's carrying of sovereign functions (currency, foreign exchange regulation, control over banking policy), the Court concluded that the Bank is "State" under Article 12; accordingly, Articles 14 and 16 can be invoked against it. The Bank's preliminary objection on Article 12 was rejected.

2. Whether employment relations are contractual, barring writ remedy

  • The Bank relied on staff regulations and a declaration signed by employees and invoked decisions where purely contractual or temporary employment displaced writ remedies.
  • The Court held the staff regulations and the declaration could not be construed as a contract that displaces fundamental rights or the availability of writ jurisdiction. The Court distinguished precedents where employment was of a clearly contractual and temporary character (Satish Chandra Anand; Banchhanidhi Rath) and relied on authorities (e.g., D.F.O. South Kheri) to hold that even where rights originate in contract, public/statutory action affecting those rights can be tested by writ jurisdiction.
  • Two factual conclusions followed: there was no deliberate, intentional waiver of fundamental rights by the petitioners; and even if source of their rights had contractual elements, Article 226 remained available. The Bank's objection was rejected.

3. Other preliminary objections (impleading, delay)

  • C.W. No. 690/72: Objections that necessary parties were not impleaded and bilateral settlement could not be quashed were rejected. The Court accepted that the combined seniority list itself had not yet been prepared when the petition was filed and that the petition attacked the scheme (not a particular seniority list). The Court relied on B. Gopalaiah to hold impleading all beneficiaries impractical.
  • C.W. No. 1341/70: The Court found two defects: (a) writ filed after inordinate delay (in respect of the 1965 Optee Scheme and 1969 circular) without satisfactory explanation; (b) necessary parties who would benefit from those schemes were known at filing and were not impleaded. For the 1970 circular similarly, necessary parties were not impleaded. These objections were upheld and C.W. No. 1341/70 was dismissed on preliminary grounds.

4. Substantive analysis — validity of the Optee Scheme (1965)

  • Background: Optee Scheme was implemented in the context of Desai Tribunal recommendations and Supreme Court endorsement to equalize promotion opportunities between General and Specialized Departments.
  • The Court accepted that the Optee Scheme was formed to provide speedier promotion chances to selected optees and found that the Bank itself acknowledged the scheme was intended to equalize promotional opportunities.
  • Applying the principle from Union of India v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies (that courts can enforce obligations imposed by schemes) and the Article 14/16 classification tests (Dalmia and related cases), the Court held the Optee Scheme did not violate Articles 14 and 16. It was a valid, targeted scheme founded on available intelligible differentia and a rational relation to its object.

5. Substantive analysis — validity of the Combined Seniority Scheme (1972)

  • The scheme had two articulated components: (1) integration of clerical staff across Specialised and General Departments; and (2) integration of eligible non‑clerical staff with clerical staff, including counting one‑third of non‑clerical service for clerical seniority and automatic switchover (subject to qualifications).
  • Effects on petitioners: The Court found (and recorded Bank's admissions) that the combined seniority scheme adversely affected petitioners — loss of monetary benefits (some optees had been reduced substantively to lower grade on transfer), loss of promotion chances, and overall reduction in prospects of optees compared to position under 1965 scheme. The scheme did not restore advantages given up under the 1965 Optee Scheme and indeed reduced promotion opportunities for those who had acted under the 1965 scheme.
  • Article 14/16 analysis: Applying the Dalmia framework and a suite of precedents, the Court concluded the combined scheme failed permissible classification tests in two principal respects:
    • It treated optees who had been selected and transferred under a valid 1965 scheme as if they were in the same class as those who had remained in the General Departments, thereby negating the specific class formation resulting from selection and transfer; this introduced unfair discrimination against optees.
    • More importantly, the merger of non‑clerical and clerical cadres — with automatic counting of one‑third of non‑clerical service for clerical seniority and automatic switchover for eligible non‑clerical employees — lumped together distinct classes recruited and qualified on different bases. The Court found no intelligible differentia or reasonable nexus justifying this forced merger; the combined scheme effectively made unequals equals, contrary to Article 14, and impeded equality of opportunity under Article 16.
  • Analogy to other precedents: The Court distinguished situations where rotational systems or dual sources of recruitment are permissible (Mervyn Cotinho; S.G. Jaisinghani; All India Station Masters), explaining that those authorities either involved distinct recruitment sources lawfully treated via rotation or appropriate classification — facts not present here.
  • Conclusion on substance: The combined seniority scheme was declared bad in its entirety; the Court found no severable portion that could be upheld and therefore struck down the whole scheme.

Holding and Implications

Holding — DISPOSITION OF PETITIONS

The Court made the following dispositive orders:

  • C.W. No. 1341/70: Dismissed (the petition challenging the Optee Scheme of 1965 and office circulars of 1969 and 1970) — dismissed without costs on preliminary grounds (delay and non‑impleading of necessary parties).
  • C.W. No. 690/72: Allowed — the combined seniority scheme of 1972 (office circular dated 12‑5‑1972) was struck down in its entirety as violative of Articles 14 and 16. The petition was allowed with costs; counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 500/‑.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The combined seniority scheme of 1972 is invalidated; the Bank cannot implement it as framed. The Optee Scheme of 1965 was upheld as valid (subject to the procedural dismissal of C.W. No. 1341/70 on other grounds), and the petitioners who acted under the 1965 scheme retain the status of being prejudiced by the 1972 scheme as found by the Court.
  • Remedial note: The Court observed that it was not the judicial function to design the alternative method for achieving the laudable objective of equal promotion opportunities; it suggested possible administrative alternatives (selection, rotational system, or keeping combined scheme in abeyance until optees obtain benefits) but did not mandate a specific administrative solution.
  • Precedential effect: The judgment applies established Article 12, 14 and 16 principles to the facts; it affirms that statutory bodies vested with sovereign or governmental functions can be "State" and be subject to fundamental rights, and it reinforces the principle that administrative schemes which merge distinct classes without intelligible differentia or rational nexus may be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16. The Court expressly struck down the combined scheme in toto and found no severable portion sustainable on the present record.

Concluding Observations

This summary strictly follows the reasoning and facts recited in the provided opinion. No material outside the opinion has been introduced. Where the opinion distinguishes authorities or explains legal tests, those statements have been summarized and attributed to the opinion's text.

    J. S. Sachdev & Others Petitioners v. Reserve Bank Of India, New Delhi & Another S

    M.R.A Ansari, J.:— The petitioners in both the writ petitions are the employees of the Reserve Bank of India, Delhi Centre, (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) and in their respective writ petitions, they seek to challenge the validity of certain schemes formulated by the Bank regulating the fixation of seniority and the method of promotion of the said employees. It would be convenient to dispose of both the writ petitions by a common judgment.

    The Bank was constituted under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The primary purpose for the constitution of the Bank, according to the preamble to the Act was “to regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage”. To this primary function of the Bank, other functions were added from time to time as and when the parliament passed other legislation to meet the economic needs of the country. For carrying out all these functions, the Bank classified its administrative machinery into the following five groups:—
    1. General side, i.e, Banking Department, Issue Department, Public Debt Office and Exchange Control Department;
    2. Department of Banking Operations and Development and the Industrial Finance Department;
    3. Agricultural Credit Department as provided in section 54 of the Act;
    4. Economic Department and the Department of Statistics; and
    5. Industrial Development Bank of India.
    The departments falling under the first group were known as the General Departments and those falling under the other four groups were known as the Specialized Departments. Although in the first instance, recruitment to the various posts in the Bank was made on a common basis, i.e, by a competitive examination and selection, the successful candidates were allotted either to the General Departments or to the Specialized Departments according to the vacancies available in the respective Departments. But when once such allotment was made, the seniority and promotion of the employees in the various departments were determined on the basis that each department was a separate department. In other words, separate seniority lists were prepared for the employees in the General Departments and in the Specialized Departments and the employees in the Central Departments could not claim confirmation and promotion in the vacancies arising in- the Specialized Departments and vice versa.
    It so happened that with the expansion of the activities of the Bank in various fields as a result of the policies of the Government and the legislation that was passed by Parliament from time to time, there was greater expansion in the Specialized Departments of the Bank as compared to the General Departments of the Bank. This again resulted in greater scope for confirmation and promotion for the employees working in the Specialized Departments as compared to the employees working in the General Departments. The latter naturally felt dissatisfied and wanted the Bank to equalise them with the employees in the Specialized Departments for the purpose of seniority and promotion. The Government constituted a National Industrial Tribunal consisting of Mr. Justice Kantilal T. Desai in 1960 to consider the grievances of the employees of the Bank in this regard. Before the Tribunal, the All India Reserve Bank Employees Association pleaded that
    “all promotions should be made strictly according to the combined seniority irrespective of the cadre or department and that such wide discretionary powers in the matter of promotions should not be vested in the administration”. The Bank, on the other hand, claimed that under the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948, the Bank had the absolute discretion in the matter of making appointments and promotions notwithstanding the seniority of an employee in any grade and it justified the maintenance of separate seniority lists for the various Departments on the ground that the work in each of these groups was becoming more and more of a special nature and inter-transferability was not only undesirable in the best interest of the Bank but was also hard to achieve. The Tribunal in its award made the following observations:—
    “Having carefully considered all aspects of the matter and all the evidence placed before me in view of the limited scope of the item under reference, I am unable to give any specific directions to the Bank in connection therewith. I can only generally observe that it is desirable that wherever it is possible, without detriment to the interests of the Bank and without affecting efficiency, to group employees in a particular category serving in different departments at one centre together for the purpose of being considered for promotion, a common seniority list of such employees should be maintained. The same would result in opening up equal avenues of promotion for a large number of employees and there would be lesser sense of frustration and greater peace of mind among the employees”.
    The above views of the Tribunal were endorsed by the Supreme Court in All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association and another v. Reserve Bank of India and another (AIR 1966 S.C 305) (1).
    In pursuance of the above recommendations made in Desai's award and which were endorsed by the Supreme Court, the Bank formulated schemes from time to time with a view to give greater opportunities to the employees in the General Departments for confirmation and promotion. The first scheme which the Bank formulated with this object was what is called the First Optee Scheme, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Optee Scheme). Some of the broad features of this scheme were that an option was given to the confirmed Grade II Clerks and officiating Grade I Clerks of the General Departments to be allotted to the Specialised Departments. Out of the employees who exercised such option, a panel was drawn by selection on the basis of seniority and merit and those who were selected were transferred to the Specialised Departments from time to time as and when vacancies in the Specialised Departments arose. On such transfers, these transferees were posted only as Grade-II Clerks in the Specialized Departments even if some of them had been officiating as Grade I Clerks. While maintaining their seniority inter se, their seniority vis-a-vis the employees who were already working in the Specialized Departments was determined on the basis “that their transfer was in the interest of the Bank, that is to say, the substantive position of the transferee in the seniority list of the Department concerned will be fixed above the employee who joined service after the date of his recruitment or date of graduation as the case may be and below the employee who joined service before the date of his recruitment/graduation”. The petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 were among those who were transferred from the General Departments to the Specialized Departments under the Optee Scheme. Some of them were officiating as Grade I Clerks in the General Departments, but on their transfer to the Specialized Departments, under the Optee Scheme, they were posted to substantive posts of Grade II Clerks. Some of these petitioners not only had to forego the higher pay which they were drawing as officiating Clerks Grade I but also lost their seniority in the General Departments. The other petitioners did not suffer any monetary loss by such transfer but lost their seniority in the General Departments. These optees, however, expected that the loss of seniority and the monetary loss which some of them had suffered by such transfer would be compensated by the speedier chances of promotion in the Specialized Departments.
    The confirmed Clerks Grade I in the General Departments, however, felt dissatisfied with the Optee Scheme as they were left out of the scope of the said scheme and were denied the chance of being transferred from the General Departments to the Specialized Departments. With a view to redress their grievances, the Bank formulated another scheme which will hereinafter be referred to as the Optee Scheme, 1969. Under this scheme, confirmed Clerks Grade I in the General Departments were eligible to be transferred to the Specialized Departments to the extent of 33-1/3% of the long term normal vacancies of Clerks Grade I (that is to say, excluding expansion vacancies) arising in the Specialized Departments during the period 1-2-1969 to 30-6-1970. Transfers from the General Departments to the Specialized Departments were to be made by selection and a panel was prepared of the persons selected. Transfers of the persons in this panel to the Specialized Departments were to be made as and when long term vacancies of Clerks Grade I arose in each of the Specialized Departments, the 1st, 4th, 7th and 10th and so on vacancies being filled up by drawing on the panel in the order in which the names were listed. It would not be necessary to refer to the other provisions in the scheme, as the main ground on which this scheme is challenged is that the benefit under the scheme was available only to a limited extent, namely, to the extent of 33-1/3% of the vacancies in the Specialized Departments and not to the extent of 100%. In 1970, the Bank constituted another Specialised Department known as the Industrial Development Bank and a scheme was formulated for the recruitment to the several posts in the Industrial Development Bank. This scheme was put in the form of an office circular dated 22-4-1970. We are concerned only with the scheme of recruitment to the posts of Clerks Grade I under this circular. The posts of Clerks Grade I in the Industrial Development Bank were to be filled up on selection basis by inviting applications from the employees attached to the General Departments as well as the Specialized Departments in Groups 2 and 3 of the Bank who possessed certain qualifications which were prescribed in the circular. Confirmed Clerks Grade I either in the General Departments, or in the other specialized Departments were, however, not eligible to apply for the posts of Clerks Grade I in the Industrial Development Bank.
    It would thus be seen that the various schemes formulated by the Bank benefited only certain categories of employees in the General Departments and the demand made by the All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association before the National Industrial Tribunal consisting of Mr. Justice Desai, namely, that there should be a common seniority list for all the employees in all the departments of the Bank and that promotions to all the posts in the Bank should be made on the basis of the common seniority list, had not been fully satisfied by the Bank by any of the schemes formulated by it. Therefore, the Association continued to agitate for the acceptance of its original demand and after prolonged negotiations, the Bank and the Association concluded an agreement on 7-5-1972. Under this agreement, the Bank substantially conceded the demand of the Association that there should be a common seniority list for all the employees of the Bank and that the Bank should not maintain separate seniority lists in each of its groups and that confirmations and promotions should be made only on the basis of the common seniority list. Under this agreement, the non-clerical employees of the Bank were also given the option to be transferred to the clerical side subject to their being a graduate or possessing the certificate of having passed I.I.B Examination. These non-clerical optees were also given the benefit of seniority by treating one third of their total service on the non-clerical side as service on the clerical side. As some of the employees of the Bank including the petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 did not accept the terms of this agreement and as the agreement would be binding only upon the parties thereto, the Bank issued an office circular dated 12th May, 1972 which contained the terms of this agreement with a view to make it binding upon the petitioners and the other employees of the Bank who were not parties to the agreement.
    The petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 have challenged the validity of the office circular dated 12th May, 1972 and petitioners in C.W No. 1341/70 have challenged the validity of the Optee Scheme of 1965 and the office circulars of 1969 and 1970. The details of these schemes and the circulars and the grounds on which they are challenged will be referred to at a later stage. But it may be stated at this stage itself that the main controversy is in respect of the combined seniority list which was contemplated under the office circular dated 12th May, 1972. If this circular is upheld, then the petitioners in C.W No. 1341/70 will no longer be concerned with challenging the validity of 1965 Optee Scheme and the office circulars of 1969 and 1970. It is only if the office circular of 1972 is held to be bad that we may be called upon to consider the objections to the other schemes which have been put forward by the petitioners in C.W No. 1341/70.
    The petitioners in both the writ petitions challenged the several schemes mainly on the ground that these schemes are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The question of the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution arises only if the Bank is considered to be a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Bank has raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of both the writ petitions on the ground that the Bank is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. We have, therefore, first to consider this preliminary objection raised by the Bank against the maintainability of the two writ petitions.
    A lot of case law has been cited before us on this point by the learned counsel for the Bank as well as for the petitioners in the two writ petitions. It would be unnecessary to consider all the cases cited by the learned counsel in view of the fact that most of these cases have been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in L.P.A No. 155 of 1972 (The Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Delhi Administration and others) decided on 29th January, 1973. It will be sufficient if we refer only to one of the cases, viz., Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and others (AIR 1967 S.C 1857) (2) in which it was held as follows:—
    “These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression ‘other authorities’ in Art. 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Art 19 (1) (g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Art. 12 and one of Directive Principles laid down in Art. 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State, as defined in Art. 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Art. 298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word ‘State’ as used in Art. 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government. The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable”.
    The Full Bench of this Court was largely guided by the decision in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board's case and after reviewing the case law on the subject, laid down the following principles:—
    “On a consideration of the various observations referred to above, we are of the opinion that a body or authority cannot, by the mere fact that it has been constituted or set up by a statute, be regarded as an ‘authority’ and hence ‘state’ within the meaning of Article 12. To be such an ‘authority’, it should have functions and powers such as are mentioned or indicated in the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court. Broadly stated, the said observations indicate that a body or authority constituted or set up by or under the Constitution or a statute within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India would be an ‘authority’ and hence ‘state’ within the meaning of Article 12 if —
    (i) it is an agent or instrument of the Government; or
    (ii) it has been set up for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State, or has been vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws; or
    (iii) it has been vested with power to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions, or powers to give directions which are to be obeyed and command obedience of the same; or
    (iv) it is invested with power to make rules or regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others”.
    It is in the light of the above principles that we have to consider whether the Bank is a “state” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and for this purpose, we have to examine the scheme of the Act. We have already referred to a portion of the preamble to the Act which reads as under:—
    “Whereas it is expedient to constitute a Reserve Bank for India to regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage”.
    Section 3 of the Act states that —
    “A bank to be called the Reserve Bank of India shall be constituted for the purposes of taking over the management of the currency from the Central Government and of carrying on the business of banking in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
    Section 4 of the Act fixed the capital of the Bank at five crores of rupees. Although at the time of the constitution of the Bank a part of this capital was derived from non-governmental sources also, but subsequently the entire capital was contributed by the Central Government. Though under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act the Bank was designated as a body corporate whose affairs are managed by the Governor of the Bank, the Deputy Governor and the Central Board of Directors, still the Governor, Deputy Governor and the Central Board are all nominated by the Central Government and they have to function in accordance with the directions given to the Bank by the Central Government. Section 11 of the Act gives the power to the Central Government to remove from office the Governor, the Deputy Governor or any other Director. Section 17 of the Act authorises the Bank, inter alia, to accept money on deposit without interest from, and the collection of money for the Central Government, the State Governments, local authorities, banks and any other persons and to purchase, sell and rediscount of bills of exchange and promissory notes. Under section 20 of the Act, the Bank shall undertake to accept monies for account of the Central Government and to make payments up to the amount standing to the credit of its account and to carry out its exchange, remittance and other banking operations, including the management of the public debt of the Union. Under section 21 of the Act, the Central Government shall entrust the Bank, on such conditions as may be agreed upon, with all its money, remittance, exchange and banking transactions in India, and, in particular, shall deposit free of interest all its cash balances with the Bank. Under section 22 of the Act, the Bank shall have the sole right to issue bank notes in India and may xx. xx. xx. xx. issue currency notes of the Government of India supplied to it by the Central Government and under sub-section (2), the Central Government divested itself of the power to issue any currency notes. Under section 30 of the Act, the Central Government has the power to supersede the Central Board of the Bank and thereafter the general superintendence and direction of the affairs of the Bank shall be entrusted to such agency as the Central Government may determine and such agency may exercise the powers and so all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Central Board under the Act. Section 32 of the Act gives the authority to the Bank to punish any person contravening the provisions of section 31 of the Act. Under section 38 of the Act, the Central Government undertook not to put into circulation any rupees, except through the Bank and the Bank undertook not to dispose of rupee coin otherwise than for the purposes of circulation. Section 40 of the Act gives the power to the Bank to sell or buy from any authorised person foreign exchange at such rates of exchange and on such conditions as the Central Government may from time to time determine. Section 42 of the Act makes it obligatory on every scheduled bank to maintain a percentage of its cash reserves in the Bank and the Bank also is authorised to increase the cash reserves. All the scheduled banks are under an obligation to send regular statements to the Bank furnishing information about their financial position and in cases of default by any of the scheduled banks, the Bank has the power to punish the Director, Manager or Secretary of the scheduled bank with a fine. Under section 53 of the Act, the Bank shall prepare and transmit to the Central Government a weekly account of the Issue Department and of the Banking Department in such form as the Central Government may by notification in the Gazette of India prescribe. The Bank has also to transmit a copy of the annual accounts of the Bank within two months from the date on which the annual accounts of the Bank are closed. Under section 58 of the Act, the Central Board has the power to make regulations with the previous sanction of the Central Government to provide for all matters for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.
    In addition to the functions entrusted to the Bank under the Act, other functions were entrusted to the Bank under other laws like the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, The Banking Regulation Act etc. The preamble to the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 is in the following terms:—
    “Whereas it is expedient in the economic and financial interests of India to provide for the regulation of certain payments, dealings in foreign exchange and securities and the import and export of currency and bullion.”
    Section 3 of the said Act gives the power to the Bank to authorise any person to deal in foreign exchange and under section 4, no person other than an authorised dealer shall, except with the previous general or special permission of the Bank, buy or otherwise acquire or borrow from, or sell or otherwise transfer or lend to, or exchange with, any person not being an authorised dealer, any foreign exchange. Under section 17, no person residents in India, shall, except with the general or special permission of the Bank, settle or make a gift of, any property so that a person who at the time of the settlement or the making of the gift is resident outside India, elsewhere than in territories notified in this behalf by the said Bank will have an interest in the property, or exercise any power for payment in favour of a person who at the time of the exercise of the power is resident outside India elsewhere than, in such notified territories. Under section 18 B, no airline, shipping company or travel agent shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified therein, book for any person a passage for a journey the whole or any part of which is outside India. Under section 19 (2), the Reserve Bank has the power to examine any information, book or other document in the possession of any person and also to require any such person to furnish, or to obtain and furnish to the Bank such information, book or other document. Under section 23, a contravention of any of the provisions of the said Act is considered an offence and upon conviction by a Court, the offender is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
    Under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation Act) the Bank is vested with considerable powers of superintendence and control over other banks. Under section 12 A of the Regulation Act, the Reserve Bank has the power to require any banking company to call a general meeting of the shareholders within a specified time to elect in accordance with the voting rights permissible under the Regulation Act fresh directors and the banking company shall be bound to comply with the order of the Bank. Under section 18 of the Regulation Act, every banking company, not being a scheduled bank, shall maintain in India by way of cash reserve with itself or in the current account opened with the Reserve Bank a sum equivalent to 3 per cent of the total of its time and demand liabilities and shall submit to the Reserve Bank before the fifteenth day of every month a return showing the amount so held. Under section 21 of the Regulation Act, the Reserve Bank is authorised to determine the policy in relation to advances to be followed by banking companies generally or by any banking company in particular and when the policy has been so determined, all banking companies or the banking company concerned, as the case may be, shall be bound to follow the policy as so determined. Under sub-section (2) of the same section, the Reserve Bank has the power to give directions to the banking companies as to the purposes for which advances may or may not be made, the margins to be maintained in respect of secured advances etc., and every banking company shall be bound to comply with any directions given to it under this section. Under section 22, no banking company shall carry on banking business in India unless it holds a licence issued by the Reserve Bank and any such licence may be issued subject to such conditions as the Reserve Bank may think fit to impose it. The Reserve Bank may cancel a licence granted to a banking company under this section if the company ceases to carry on banking business in India; or if the company at any time fails, to comply with any of the conditions imposed upon it under sub-section (1); or if at any time, any of the conditions referred to in sub-section (3) is not fulfilled. Under sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Regulation Act, every banking company shall submit to the Reserve Bank a return in the prescribed form and manner of the assets and liabilities referred to in sub-section (1) of that section and under section 26, every banking company shall within thirty days after the close of each calendar year, submit a return in the prescribed form and manner to the Reserve Bank as at the end of such calendar year of all accounts in India which have not been operated upon for ten years. Under section 29, every banking company shall prepare a balance-sheet and profit and loss account in respect of all business transacted by it and under section 31, such account and balance-sheet shall be furnished as returns to the Reserve Bank within three months, from the end of the period to which they refer. Under section 35 of the Regulation Act, the Bank is empowered to inspect any banking company's books and accounts and if upon such inspection the Reserve Bank is satisfied that in the public interest or in the interest of banking policy etc., it is necessary to issue directions to the banking companies generally or to any banking company in particular, the Bank may under section 35A issue such directions as it deems fit and the banking companies shall be bound to comply with such directions. Under section 36AA, the Reserve Bank has the authority in certain circumstances to remove from office any chairman, director, chief executive officer or other officer or employee of the banking company. Under section 36AE, the Reserve Bank may report to the Central Government that a banking company may be taken over by the Central Government and upon such report, the Central Government may acquire the undertaking of such banking company. Under section 45, the Bank may apply to the Central Government for an order of moratorium in respect of a banking company and on such application, the Central Government may make an order of moratorium staying the commencement or continuance of all actions and proceedings against the company for a fixed period of time on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and proper. Section 46 provides for the levy of penalties on the banking companies and the officers of such companies for contravention of the provisions of the regulation act or of the orders or directions issued by the Bank to the said companies and under certain circumstances, the Bank itself has the power under section 47A to impose penalties on erring banking companies.
    The several provisions of the Act, the Foreign Exchange Act and the Regulation Act, which have been referred to above, are, in our view, sufficient to bring the Bank within the scope of the principles enunciated by the Full Bench of this Court. The Bank is a statutory body constituted under an Act of Parliament. Its entire capital is contributed by the Government. In other words, the Government is the only shareholder of the Bank. The Government exercises complete control over the administration of the Bank. The Governor, the Deputy Governors of the Bank and the Central Board of Directors are all nominated by the Government and they are liable to be removed by the Government. The Bank is constituted to regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage. These functions constitute the sovereign functions of the Government and the several provisions of the Act which have already been referred to, and which vest the Bank with the exclusive power to operate the currency of the country have the effect of vesting the Bank with some of the sovereign functions of the Government. In the words of the Full Bench of this Court, the Bank has been vested with powers to carry out governmental functions and is also an instrument of the Government. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was passed to regulate dealings in foreign exchange and securities and the import and export of currency and bullion. This again is a sovereign function of the Government and the Bank has been made the instrument of the Government to carry out this sovereign function. By virtue of the Regulation Act, the Bank has been given control of other private banks. The several provisions of these two Acts which have been referred to above make it abundantly clear that the Bank has been set up for the purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament and has been vested with the power to make decisions in order to implement those laws. It has been also vested with powers to give directions which are to be obeyed and command obedience of the same. It has been vested with power to make rules and regulations and to administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and others. It is also an agent of the Government inasmuch as under the provisions of the Act referred to above it can accept payments and make payments on behalf of the Government.
    It would also be useful at this stage to refer to the reasons given by the Full Bench of this Court for holding that the Industrial Finance Corporation of India was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Reference was made to the preamble of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act which stated that it was established as it was expedient to do so for the purpose of making medium and long-term credits more readily available to industrial concerns in India, particularly in circumstances where normal banking accommodation is inappropriate or recourse to capital issue methods is impracticable. Reference was also made to the fact that the Central Government was only a minor shareholder of Corporation and such, it could not be said that the Government was having such control over the Corporation as was contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution. Referring to the provisions of the said Act which conferred the power on the Central Government to have general superintendence over the affairs and business of the Corporation, it was held that it was only in the nature of a kind of check over the working of the Corporation and could not be regarded as control over the entire Corporation within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Referring to section 23 of the said Act which enumerated the kind of business which the Corporation may transact, the Full Bench expressed the view that that business consisted, generally speaking, of guaranteeing, underwriting and granting loans and advances and the various clauses in the section read like the clauses of the Memorandum of a company. Referring to section 23 (e), the Full Bench observed that no doubt the said provisions permitted the Corporation to act as an agent for the Central Government or, with its approval, for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the transaction of any business with an industrial concern, but that it was obvious that such agency was only one kind of business which the Corporation might transact and the said provisions could not be said to make the entire corporation an agent or instrument of the Central Government. Referring to certain penal provisions of the said Act, the Full Bench observed that these provisions merely made certain acts offences punishable under the Act and that these provisions did not make any disobedience of any direction given by the Corporation punishable as an offence, but it only made certain actions of persons dealing with the Corporation punishable as offences. The full Bench further observed that the said actions were punishable not because of any disobedience of any order or direction of the Corporation but were punishable by reason of the statute itself. After reviewing the provisions of the Act, the Full Bench observed as follows:—
    “The above review of the provision in the Act shows that some of them treat the Corporation as any other financial institution, while some provisions give certain special rights or powers in the matter of recovery of its dues or reliefs in case of default on the part of its debtors or loanees, which provision do not militate against the Corporation being a trading Corporation or a banking Corporation. No doubt, some of the provisions show that under the Act the Corporation needs the sanction or permission of the Central Government in certain matters and the Central Government has the power to issue directions to the Corporation regarding certain matters. But, they are not, in our opinion, sufficient to make the Corporation an agent or instrument of the Central Government. The provisions do not show that the Corporation has been set up for administering any laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State or that it has been vested with any duty to make decisions in order to implement such laws. They do not also show that the Corporation has been vested with powers to carry out Governmental or quasi-governmental functions, or powers to give directions which are to be obeyed and command obedience of the same.”
    It will be obvious that the reasons given by the Full Bench for holding that the Industrial Finance Corporation of India was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution do not, in our view, apply to the Bank. On the other hand, in our view, these reasons clearly exemplify the distinctions between the functions of the Bank and those of the Industrial Finance Corporation of India.
    Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel for the Bank, however, contends that the primary function of the Bank is to carry on banking business and the other functions referred to above are incidental functions of the Bank and that, therefore, the Bank cannot be regarded as a State. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the following rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board:—
    “It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Art. 19 (1) (g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Art. 12 and one of Directive Principles laid down in Art. 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word ‘State’ as used in Art. 12.”
    The last contention of Mr. Shroff on this question is that the Bank is not state qua its employees and in support of this contention, he has pointed out that the disputes between the Bank and its employees have been referred from time to time to arbitrators constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. He has, however, not cited any authority to the effect that the mere reference of certain disputes by the Bank under the Industrial Disputes Act will stamp the Bank with the character of a private institution or that it will take away its character as State. Further, we cannot make any distinction between the employees of the Bank with reference to their functions in respect of the banking activities of the Bank and its functions as an agent of the Government or the instrument of the Government. The same employees carry out all the functions of the Bank.
    In view of the above discussion, it must be held that the Bank is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the petitioners in both the writ petitions can invoke Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution against the Bank. This preliminary objection of the Bank against the maintainability of the writ petitions has, therefore, to be rejected.
    The next preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shroff against the maintainability of the two writ petitions is that the employment of the petitioners in the Bank was on the basis of a contract and that any rights which the petitioners have against the Bank under the said contract cannot be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution and the only remedy open to the petitioners is by way of ordinary suit in the civil court. In this connection, he refers to the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 passed by the Bank and to the declaration made by the petitioners at the time of their appointment. Reference, in particular, is made to Regulations 28, 29 and 31 which are reproduced below:—
    “28. Seniority. — An employee confirmed in the Bank's service shall ordinarily rank for seniority in his grade according to his date of confirmation in the grade and an employee on probation according to the length of his probationary service.
    29. Promotion. — All appointments and promotions shall be made at the discretion of the Bank and notwithstanding his seniority in a grade no employee shall have a right to be appointed or promoted to any particular post or grade.
    31. Scope of an employee's service. — Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided, the whole time of an employee shall be at the disposal of the Bank, and he shall serve the Bank in its business in such capacity and at such place as he may from time to time be directed.”
    The declaration which the petitioners signed at the time of their appointment is in the following terms:—
    “Declaration to be bound by the staff Regulations.
    Place:
    Date:
    I hereby declare that I have read and understood the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948, and I hereby subscribe and agree to be bound by the said Regulations.
    Name in full:
    Nature of appointment:
    Date of appointment:
    Signature:
    Witness:
    Date:
    The learned counsel has also referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely,
    (1) Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (A.I.R 1953 S.C 250
    and
    (2) Banchhanidhi Rath v. The State of Orissa (A.I.R 1972 S.C 843).
    We do not construe the Regulations and the declaration made by the employees as a contract entered into between the Bank and its employees regarding the terms of their service. It is not the case of the Bank that the appointment of a particular employee was made on the basis of a contract. According to the Bank, the appointments of all the employees of the Bank are made under a contract. We have not come across a case where a statutory body like the Bank, which is state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, makes appointments of all its employees under a contract. If the Regulations referred to above are to be construed strictly as a contract, then no rights at all are secured under the contract in favour of an employee and he would be completely at the mercy of the Bank. This could not have been the intendment of the Regulations. The two decisions of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the Bank do not advance his contention at all. It the case of Satish Chandra Anand, the petitioner before the Supreme Court was employed by the Government on a five year contract in the Directorate-General of Resettlement and Employment of the Ministry of Labour. The contract of service was due to expire in 1950 and shortly before its expiration, the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated 30th June, 1950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that letter. He was asked in that letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms and he accepted the offer and continued in service. He was not a permanent Government servant, for he was on a five year contract and the work for which he was employed, namely, Resettlement and Employment, was itself only of a temporary character. On these facts, it was held by the Supreme Court that the employment of the petitioner was on a contractual basis and that having accepted the offer, he could enforce any rights which he had under his contract in the ordinary courts and that he could not seek relief under Article 32 (1) of the Constitution for the alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Similarly, in the case of Banchhanidhi Rath, the appellant was appointed as Head Master of a private school under a contract. That school along with many other schools was subsequently taken over by the Government and the Government Wrote to the Director of Public Instruction that the Government had decided to retire Head Masters of all such schools on attaining the age of 58 years. This order of the Government was challenged by the appellant and the Supreme Court held that the appellant could not have enforced the contract of employment in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and that if a right was claimed in terms of the contract, such a right could not be enforced in a writ petition. In both the cases cited above, the employment of the particular person was under a contract. In the first case, the petitioner was appointed under a special contract which was to be in force for five years in the first instance and the post to which he was appointed itself was of a temporary nature. In the second case, the appellant claimed a higher age of superannuation on the basis of a contract which he had entered into with the management of the school before it was taken over by the Government. These two cases are clearly distinguishable from the case of the employees of the Bank.
    Shri P. P. Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners in C. W. No. 690/72, on the other hand, contended that the petitioners were employees of the State and any contract entered into by them with the Bank would not over-ride the fundamental rights which they had under the constitution and he cited the following decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention. In Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-tax (1959) 1 S. C. R. 528, (5) the assessee under the Income-tax Act had entered into a settlement with the Commissioner under section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947. But subsequently, the assessee challenged the validity of the settlement on the ground that section 5 (1) of the said Act had been declared void by the Supreme Court and claimed that his properties might be released from attachment and the amount already paid under the settlement might be refunded to him. On the refusal by the Commissioner to comply with the demand of the assessee, the latter moved the Supreme Court by special leave and contended that his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution had been infringed. It was contended on behalf of the Revenue that the assessee by voluntarily entering into a settlement had waived his fundamental right founded under Article 14 of the Constitution. This plea was negatived by the Supreme Court and it was held that there could be no waiver of the fundamental right founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed as follows:—
    “Article 14 was founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued all over the civilised world, its language was the language of command and it imposed an obligation on the State of which no person could, by his act or conduct, relieve it.”
    In the words of Das, C. J., —
    “It seems to us absolutely clear, on the language of Art. 14 that it is a command issued by the Constitution to the State as a matter of public policy with a view to implement its object of ensuring the equality of status and opportunity which every welfare State, such as India, is by her Constitution expected to do and no person can, by any act or conduct, relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposed on it by the Constitution. Whatever breach of other fundamental right a person or a citizen may or may not waive, he cannot certainly give up or waive a breach of the fundamental right that is indirectly conferred on him by this constitutional mandate directed to the State.”
    S. K. Das J. explained what amounts to waiver. He observed as under:—
    “The generally accepted connotation is that to constitute ‘waiver’, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, or conduct such as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”
    In The D.F.O South Kheri & others v. Ram Sanehi Singh (1970) S.C.W.R 194, (6) one Ram Sanehi Singh had at an auction held by the Forest Officer purchased the right to cut timber for the period November 1, 1965 to October 31, 1966 under certain forest laws. On January 10, 1967 the Divisional Forest Officer passed an order that the sleepers “against the tally” dated October 29, 1966 in the allotment of 1965-66 season being “wrong” since they were cut in the month of November 1966, do stand cancelled and that the sleepers be “passed against” the tally after getting the hammer-marks cancelled and be “reinspected against the allotment for 1966-67 season”. Ram Sanehi Singh filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the above order of the Divisional Forest Officer. The petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court holding that the Divisional Forest Officer had acted in exercise of authority conferred upon him by the terms of the contract, and that the remedy of the respondent was to claim relief in a regular suit for the enforcement of the agreement or for damages and not in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of the same High Court, however, reversed the order of the learned Single Judge following the judgment of the Supreme Court in K. N. Guruswamy v. The State of Mysore and others (1955) 1 S.C.R 305 (7) and held that where a party interested in a contract claimed that he had not received the same treatment and he had not been given the same chance as anybody else, he was entitled to move a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that the order made by the Divisional Forest Officer in exercise of the statutory authority was liable to be quashed, because it was made on irrelevant considerations. The Forest authorities filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the said judgment of the High Court and on their behalf it was contended that since the dispute arose out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had authority to modify any action taken by a subordinate forest, authority, the remedy of the respondent was to institute an action in the civil court and that the writ petition was not maintainable. This contention was not accepted by the Supreme Court and it held as follows :—
    “But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this court in K. N. Guruswamy's case (1955) I SCR 305 there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power.”
    Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the two cases cited above, we have to hold that firstly there was no deliberate or intentional waiver by the petitioners of any fundamental rights which the Constitution gave them and secondly that even if the source of the petitioners' right was a contract entered into between them and the Bank, they could still invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the Bank has, therefore, also to be rejected.
    We may now proceed to consider certain other preliminary objections raised by the respondents in the two writ petitions other than the Bank against the maintainability of the respective writ petitions. We shall first consider the objections raised by the respondents against the maintainability of writ petition No. 690/72. The objections urged by the respondents in C.W No. 690/72 are two-fold, namely, —
    (i) that necessary parties have not been impleaded, and
    (ii) that an bilateral settlement, namely, the agreement entered into between the Bank and the All India Reserve Bank Employees Association, cannot be quashed by means of a writ.
    We are of the view that there is no merit in either of these two objections. With regard to the first objection, it must be noted that on the date on which the writ petition was filed, only the combined seniority scheme was published but the combined seniority list itself was not prepared. On the date of filing the petition, the persons who were benefited by such scheme were not known and could not, therefore, be, made parties to the writ petition. Further, the writ petition challenges the validity of the scheme and not the validity of the seniority list prepared under the scheme. In B. Gopalaiah and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R 1969 A.P 204) (8)., it was held as follows:—
    “Where it is not a case of discrimination of individual against individual but a case where, a whole class of citizens have been discriminated against, the court cannot refuse to give relief to them on the ground that the class of persons who will be benefited as a result of the discrimination are not before the Court. The person who complains of discrimination cannot be expected to search the country for all persons who are likely to be benefited by its discriminatory policy. Of course, if the discrimination is in favour of an individual against an individual different considerations might arise. But this is not such a case. Where a scheme formulated by the Government is attacked on the ground of its being discriminatory the position is precisely the same as if a statute is attacked as being discriminatory and it can never be an answer to such an attack that persons likely to be benefited by a discriminatory statute should be brought before the Court before the statute is struck down.”
    We are in respectful agreement with the above observations of the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. So far as the second objection is concerned, the petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 are not parties to the agreement which was entered into between the Bank and the Association and further they are not seeking the quashing of the settlement arrived at between the Bank and the Association. They are seeking the quashing of the scheme formulated by the Bank. Therefore, none of the preliminary objections raised either by the Bank or by the other respondents in C.W No. 690/72 is tenable and it has to be held that the said writ petition is maintainable.
    So far as writ petition No. 1341/70 is concerned, the petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 had filed an application on February 19, 1971 for being impleaded as respondents. While rejecting this application on the ground that:
    “It was for the petitioners to implead the necessary parties as respondents. If they have omitted to do so then it is at their own risk. Moreover at this stage it cannot be said whether the applicants are in fact necessary parties.”
    The Court, however, by its order dated 3-3-1971 permitted them to be present at the hearing of the writ petition and held that —
    “As the applicants appear to be interested in supporting the optee schemes they are allowed to be present at the hearing of the writ petition and would be entitled to make their submissions at the time of the hearing.”
    This order, in our view, entitles the petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 to raise objections to the maintainability of C.W No. 1341/70. These objections are again two-fold, namely, —
    (i) that the necessary parties have not been impleaded, and
    (ii) that the said writ petition has been filed after an inordinate delay.
    As already stated, the petitioners in C.W No. 1341/70 challenge the validity of —
    (1) The optee scheme of 1965,
    (2) The Office Circular of 1969, and
    (3) The Office Circular dated 22-4-1970.
    So far as the optee scheme of 1965 and the office circular of 1969 are concerned, the writ petition has been filed after inordinate delay which has not been explained satisfactorily. Further, in respect of these two schemes, the necessary parties have not been impleaded. By the time the writ petition was filed, the persons who would be benefited by the optee scheme of 1965 as well as by the office circular of 1969 were known to the petitioners and if they wanted these schemes to be quashed, they should have impleaded the parties who would be benefited by these schemes and who would be adversely affected if these schemes were quashed. With regard to the office circular of 1970, even if the writ petition does not suffer from the vice of inordinate delay, it certainly suffers from the vice of omission to implead the necessary parties. The persons who were benefited under the scheme of 1970 were also known to the petitioners even before the date of filing the petition and they should have been, therefore, impleaded as parties to the petition. The preliminary objections raised against the maintainability of writ petition No. 1341/70 have, therefore, to be upheld and this petition is liable to be dismissed on these grounds alone.
    Although we have held that C.W No. 1341/70 is not maintainable so far as it sought to challenge the optee scheme of 1965, we have still to consider whether there was anything basically wrong in the Optee scheme of 1965, because the petitioners in C.W No. 690/72 challenge the combined seniority scheme of 1972 mainly on the ground that certain rights had accrued to them under the Optee scheme of 1965 and that these rights were infringed by the combined seniority scheme of 1972. It would appear from Desai's award that the clerical staff employed in the General Departments of the Bank were not getting equal opportunities of promotion as their counter-parts in the Specialised Departments in view of the fact that there was comparatively greater expansion in the Specialised Departments thereby giving the clerical staff of the Specialised Departments speedier chances of promotion to the posts of staff officers Grade II. It is no doubt true that before the Desai Tribunal the Bank justified the maintenance of separate seniority lists in the General Departments and each of the Specialised Departments on the ground that the work in the Specialised Departments was of a special nature and the clerical staff who were allotted to the Specialised Departments were selected on the basis of the special qualifications and were also given a special training. Although the Desai Tribunal did not completely reject this stand taken by the Bank before it, however, made a recommendation that —
    “It is desirable that wherever it is possible, without detriment to the interests of the Bank and without affecting efficiency, to group employees in a particular category serving in different departments at one centre together for the purpose of being considered for promotion, a common seniority list of such employees should be maintained. The same would result in opening up equal avenues of promotion for a large number of employees and there would be lesser sense of frustration and greater peace of mind among the employees.”
    These recommendations were endorsed by the Supreme Court and it is in this background that the Bank formulated the Optee scheme of 1965.
    The main features of the Optee scheme of 1965 may be reproduced:—
    “1. Vacancies in groups II, III and V against which employees are to be considered for transfer —
    All vacancies of Clerks Gr. II occurring in Departments in Groups II, III and V (including the existing vacancies) at each centre upto 30th June, 1970 will be treated as expansion vacancies to be filled up by transfer of confirmed clerks Grade II (including officiating clerks Grade I) on the General Side in the manner set out below.
    2. Procedure for inviting applications and eligibility conditions for transfer to Departments in Groups II, III and V.
    A circular will be issued inviting applications in form ‘A’ from confirmed graduate Clerks Gr. II (including officiating Clerks Gr. I) of the General side (Group I) for the preparation of a panel of suitable employees who are willing to opt for transfer to any of the Departments in Groups II, III and V at each centre under the optee scheme. The old panel will be treated to have lapsed and confirmed clerks Gr. II (including officiating clerks Gr. I) who had opted earlier, but have not so far been transferred will be required to apply afresh for inclusion of their names in the panel under this scheme. As regards the graduate non-clerical staff transferred to the clerical cadre, only those who have been absorbed against permanent vacancies of clerks Gr. II on the General Side will be eligible to opt for transfer.
    3 (iv) As and when vacancies arise in the Departments in Groups II, III and V at each centre, they will be filled up by drawing on the panel, the first vacancy going to the first person on the panel, the second to the second and so on. An employee will have no “choice” of the Department to which he may be posted. The postings will be made in the order in which the vacancies arise.
    (v) Officiating Clerks Gr. I, will be transferred only in their substantive capacity as clerks Gr. II.
    (vi) (a) The seniority of the optees on transfer to the Departments in Groups II, III and V will be determined on the basis that their transfers to the concerned Departments have been made in the interest of the Bank, that is to say, the substantive position of the transferee in the seniority list of the Department concerned will be fixed above the employee who joined service after the date of his recruitment or date of graduation as the case may be and below the employee who joined service before the date of his recruitment/graduation.
    (vii) Names of employees in the panel who decline the offer of transfer to any of the Departments in Groups II, III and V will be deleted and such employees will not be eligible to opt for transfer again.”
    The petitioners claim that the optee scheme was formulated with the special purpose of affording equal opportunities for promotion to the confirmed clerks Gr. II and officiating clerks Gr. I in the General Departments along with their counter-parts in the Specialised Departments and that there was an implied assurance given by the Bank that the optees would be given such chances of promotion. It is no doubt true that the scheme itself does not contain any provisions giving any such assurances as is claimed by the petitioners and the Bank in its counter-affidavit has also denied that any such assurance was given by the Bank under the optee scheme, but the background in which the optee scheme came to be formulated, namely, the recommendation of the Desai's award and the decision of the Supreme Court endorsing the said recommendations, there can be no doubt that the optee scheme was formed with the specific purpose of affording speedier chances of promotion to the optees. In the reply affidavit filed by the Bank in this writ petition also the Bank has referred to the background in which the optee scheme came to be formulated and has admitted in sub-para (7) of para IV of its affidavit that —
    “having regard to the observations of the National Tribunal as confirmed by the Supreme Court, the Reserve Bank had been reviewing the position regarding the grouping of the departments from time to time.”
    in sub-para (11), the Bank has also admitted that —
    “The Bank had taken various steps from time to time to equalise the promotional opportunities.”
    and in the same sub-para the Bank has stated that one of the steps so taken was the optee scheme of 1965. Whether it was open to the Bank to take further steps in the same direction and whether the combined seniority scheme of 1972 which has been challenged by the-petitioners is also a step in the same direction, will be considered at a later stage. But for the present, we cannot accept the denial by the Bank that the optee scheme of 1965 was not formed with the specific purpose of giving speedier chances of promotion to the optees under the said scheme. The opportunities or speedier promotion must be deemed to be part and parcel of the scheme.
    Although it was the Bank itself which had sponsored the optee scheme of 1965, it now seeks to characterise this scheme as being discriminatory in nature so far as it did not confer the benefit of the optee scheme to the other employees of the Bank, such as the confirmed clerks Gr. I and the non-clerical employees in the General Departments. The Association also challenges this scheme on the same ground and contends that the scheme is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that, therefore, the petitioners cannot base their claims on such a scheme. The optee scheme has to be considered from the point-view of —
    (i) Confirmed Clerks Grade II and. Officiating Clerks Grade I in the Specialised Departments,
    (ii) Confirmed Clerks Grade I in the General Departments,
    (iii) Confirmed Clerks Grade II and officiating Clerks Grade I in the General Departments who were not selected under the optee scheme, and
    (iv) The non-clerical staff in the General Departments.
    So far as we are aware, the clerks coming under category (i) stated above have not objected to the optee scheme and it has not been shown to us how they were prejudicially affected by the optee scheme. So far as category (ii) is concerned, a separate scheme was formed in 1969 for their benefit. As regards the (iii) category, the optee scheme was open to all the confirmed Clerks Gr. II and officiating Clerks Grade I in the General Departments and every one of them could exercise his option under the scheme. From out of those who had exercised such option, selection was made on the basis of seniority and merit. Those who are not selected could have no legitimate grievance against the optee scheme. So far as the last category is concerned, the Bank itself treated them as a separate class of employees and their seniority, confirmation and promotion were confined to the non-clerical side of the General Departments and they were not eligible for confirmation, seniority or promotion to the vacancies in the clerical side of the General Departments. If this category felt aggrieved by the optee scheme, then it ought to have challenged the scheme by filing a petition promptly in this Court.
    Therefore, the optee scheme of 1965 does not suffer from any vice and cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As already stated, the optee scheme was formed for the purpose of giving speedier chances of promotion to the optees in the Specialised Departments and this amounted to be an implied assurance on the part of the Bank and formed part and parcel of the scheme.
    In our view, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in The Union of India and others v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. (AIR 1968 S. C. 718) applies to the optee scheme of 1965. In that case, a scheme called the Export Promotion Scheme was published by the Textile Commissioner. Under the said scheme, the exporters were invited to get themselves registered with the Textile Commissioner for exporting woollen goods and it was represented that the exporters would be entitled to import raw materials of the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the f.o.b value of the exports. The firm of M/s. Indo-Afghan Agencies had exported woollen goods to Afghanistan of the value of Rs. 5,03,471.73 nP. and claimed a certificate from the Textile Commissioner for the import of raw materials equal to 100 per cent of the value of the exports. The Textile Commissioner, however, issued an import certificate for Rs. 1,99,459/- only. In a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the firm asked for a writ or an order directing the Union of India and the Textile Commissioner to issue a licence permitting import of the raw materials of the value of Rs. 5,03,471.73 nP. The Punjab High Court accepted the writ petition and held that under the scheme the firm was entitled to obtain import licences for an amount equal to 100 per cent of the f.o.b value of the exports. The judgment of the High Court was confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. While doing so, the Supreme Court made the following observations:—
    “It is not the form of the order, the method of its publication or the source of its authority, but its substance, which determines its true character. Granting that it was executive in character, the Courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the Schemes upon the departmental authorities.”
    In our view, the optee scheme of 1965, in substance, was a scheme formulated by the Bank for the purpose of providing equal opportunities to the clerical staff of the General Departments of the Bank for promotion and the Bank was bound to implement the scheme and could not deprive those who had acted under the said scheme of the said opportunities.
    It is now to be considered whether the combined seniority scheme of 1972, which has superseded the optee scheme of 1965, has prejudicially affected the interests of the petitioners. For this purpose, it is necessary to state the main features of the combined seniority scheme. The scheme can be devided into two parts, namely,
    (1) the integration of the clerical staff of the Specialised Departments with those of the General Departments; and
    (2) the integration of the non-clerical staff with the clerical staff in all the departments of the Bank.
    We shall first refer to the second part of the scheme which is contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the scheme. These paragraphs are reproduced below:—
    “8. Combined seniority between clerical staff in different departments.
    The seniority lists of the staff mentioned below working in the general side and Specialised Departments (i.e in all the Groups I to V of the Departmentwise grouping) will be merged into one with effect from 7th May, 1972 in accordance with the provisions of clause 10 in the manner set out below:—
    (a) All Clerks Grade II, Field Investigators and Clerks Grade I (with less than one year total officiating service) will be placed in the combined seniority list, relative seniority of an employee being fixed according to the date of his first appointment as Clerk/Field Investigator.
    (b) All confirmed Clerks Grade I, Clerks Grade I officiating as such on 7th May, 1972 with one year or more total officiating service, Assistants (temporary, officiating as well as confirmed) and Field Inspectors will be placed in the combined seniority list ranking as a group above the employees listed under sub clause (a) above. The relative seniority of an employee will be fixed on the basis of the total length of service put in by him from the date he first started officiating as Clerk Grade I/Field inspector after deducting therefrom the periods during which he reverted as Clerk Grade II/Field Inspector otherwise than on account of proceeding on leave.
    Note. The relative seniority of an Assistant (including that of an assistant recruited directly) who has not served as a Clerk Grade I, will be fixed in relation to his position in the groupwise/departmentwise seniority list vis-a-vis those Assistants who have served as Clerk Grade I as illustrated in Enclosure II.
    (c) Fixation of seniority as referred to in sub clauses (a) and (b) above will be subject to the proviso that the inter se position as between two employees in the existing group wise/departmentwise seniority lists is not disturbed to the detriment of any senior employee within the same group/department except as provided for in clause 6 and sub clause (e) below.
    (d) If the seniority of two employees happens to be identical the employee who is better qualified will rank as the senior of the two in the combined seniority list.
    (illustration for fixation of seniority is given in enclosure 1)
    (e) The seniority of class III personnel having been fixed as provided for in such clauses (a) and (b) above the seniority of an optee/selectee clerk in the existing specialised departments whose seniority compared to his juniors in the existing General side is adversely affected will be protected to the extent of his entitlement had he not opted/been selected under the optee/selectee scheme: provided that he shall apply in this regard in writing within one month from the date of notification of the combined seniority list. Applications for such adjustments will not be entertained after expiry of the period stipulated above.
    (f) Employees who are on leave as on 7th May 1972 but had been officiating as Clerk Grade I before proceeding on leave and would have so continued had then not proceeded on leave will be deemed to be officiating in that grade on 7th May 1972.
    9. (1) (a) Employees officiating as Clerks Grade I on 7th May, 1972.
    An employee officiating as a Clerk Grade I as on 7th May, 1972 will continue to officiate without prejudice to the claims of employees whose position may be above him in the combined seniority list. If he reverts, his next promotion will be according to his substantive seniority in the combined list. Reversion only on account of proceeding on leave will not be deemed as reversion for the purpose of this clause.
    (b) Promotion as Clerks Grade I between 7th May 1972 and the notification of the combined seniority list.
    Promotions during this period will be made with reference to the existing departmenta1.groupwise seniority list but without prejudice to the claims of seniors in the combined seniority list. When the combined seniority list becomes available, a review of all such promotions made in the interregnum will be made and senior employees not officiating in the higher grades will be promoted by replacing the junior employees. The review will be completed within a period of two weeks.
    (c) Promotions as Clerk Grade I thereafter. Promotions will be made from the combined seniority list.
    (II) Promotion to Assistants' Grade.
    The provisions in sub clause (I) as detailed for officiating Clerks Grade I and promotion to Clerks Grade I will be applied in a similar manner to officiating Assistants and promotions to the grade of Assistants subject to those of clause II.
    (III) (a) Seniority of employees promoted as Staff Officers Grade II after 7th May, 1972.
    Employees promoted as Staff Officers Grade II after 7th May 1972 will rank for purposes of promotion to and confirmation in that grade below those officiating as Staff Officers Grade II on 7th May 1972.
    (b) Officiating appointments as Staff Officers Grade II from 7th May 1972 upto and including 31st August, 1972.
    (i) In the case of the Agricultural Credit Department the zonal panels as obtaining on 7th May 1972 will be split up officewise (vide clause 10) and promotions will be made from the officewise panels provided that an employee already on orders of transfer under the existing zonal scheme will, if and when he reports for duty at the office to which he is transferred, be absorbed in that office to subject to maintenance of inter se seniority as it stood in the zonal list before it was split up. In the case of other departments, appointments will continue to be made under the existing procedure, namely, from the seniormost employees available from the respective departmental panels.
    (ii) Employees appointed to officiate as Staff Officers Grade II after 7th May 1972 and before 1st September 1972 will be entitled to continue to officiate as Staff Officers Grade II, notwithstanding the preparation and introduction of the combined seniority list. If and such employee reverts on proceeding on leave, he will be entitled to be appointed to officiate in the next vacancy that occurs but subject to sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) below.
    (c) Officiating appointments as Staff Officers Grade II after 31st August 1972 and until the 1972/73 panel becomes available.
    The names of the employees in the departmental panels who are appointed to officiate after 7th May 1972 and upto and including 31st August 1972 and those who are not officiating as Staff Officer Grade II as on 1st September 1972 will be combined with reference to their position in the combined seniority list of each office and a panel for officiating promotion will be prepared treating each office as a unit.
    Subject to the provisions of sub clause (b) (ii) above, officiating appointment will thereafter be made from the combined panel but without prejudice to the ultimate seniority of candidates who will in due course be placed in the 1972/73 panel.
    (d) Officiating appointments as Staff Officers Grade II from the date the 1972/73 becomes available.
    When the 1972/73 panel becomes available the panel referred to in sub-clause (c) above will be merged in it. Officiating appointments will thereafter be made on the basis of the relative seniorities in the combined panel subject again to sub clause (b) (ii) above.
    (e) The structure of the Staff Officers Grade II cadre and the principles which may govern their seniority for purposes of promotion to staff officers grade I are amongst the issues that are under the consideration of the Reserve Bank of India Officer-Cadres Review Committee. The Bank would be in a position to take a view on the question of the principles that should regulate the confirmation of the employees promoted to officiate as staff officer Grade II after 7th May 1972 only after considering the recommendations of the said committee and also all other aspects of the matter.
    (iii) As regards confirmation of the employees who were promoted to officiate as Staff Officers Grade II on or after 1st September 1971 and upto 7th May 1972, the Bank will consider adopting, on the question whether confirmation will be made departmentwise/groupwise or treating the office as a unit the basis compatible with the decision taken by the Bank in respect of employees promoted after 7th May 1972.”
    The effect of the supersession of the optee scheme of 1965 by paragraphs 8 and 9 of the combined seniority scheme will be immediately obvious. Firstly the loss of the monetary benefits which the optees suffered under the optee scheme, such as the officiating Clerks Grade I in the General Departments being appointed only as substantive Clerks Grade II in the Specialised Departments was not restored to them under the combined seniority scheme. This is admitted by the Bank in its reply affidavit. Secondly, although the seniority of the optees as on the date they opted under the optee scheme of 1965 was maintained vis-a-vis those who did not opt under the said scheme, yet there was no interference with the appointment of their juniors to substantive vacancies of Grade I Clerks which had taken place during the interval and they continued to be confirmed Grade I Clerks while their seniors, the petitioners, were appointed only as confirmed Grade II Clerks or officiating Grade I Clerks. This also is admitted by the Bank. Thirdly, the chances of promotion of the optees under the combined seniority scheme were considerably reduced. This also is admitted by the Bank.
    The first part of the scheme which provides for integration of non-clerical staff with the clerical staff is contained in paragraph 1 to 7 of the scheme. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:—
    “1. Combined seniority between clerical staff and eligible non-clerical staff opting for switchover.
    (a) All employees in Class III non-clerical cadre substantively in the categories that have been listed as groups I, III, IV, V in the annexure (Reference is not to the departmentwise groups) who are graduates or have passed both parts of Institute of Bankers Examination will be eligible to exercise an option in accordance with sub clause (a) or (b) of clause 2 to be transferred, automatically and without any screening, to posts in the clerical cadre which are vacant and are other than of a purely stop-gap or short term nature, subject to sub-clause (b) below. Actual transfer to positions involving clerical duties will be effected in a phased manner as laid down in clause 7.
    (b) On such option being exercised within the period of two months as per clause 2 (a), or one month as per clause 2 (b) as the case may be, the position of such optee will be fixed in the combined seniority list by counting for the purpose of seniority in the clerical cadre one third of his total non-clerical service in Class III in the Bank until 7th May 1972 or the date of acquiring the qualification i.e the date of publication of the results of the examination, as the case may be (vide clauses 3 (a) and 3 (b).
    2 (b) Any employee who acquires the qualification for eligibility after the 7th May 1972 will have within one month of acquiring the said qualification, to exercise his option whether he desires to switchover to the clerical cadre with his seniority being determined as per clauses 1 (b). The option once exercised shall be final subject to the right of revocation and with the same consequences, as at sub clause (a) above. Those eligible but not exercising the option within the aforesaid period of one month shall lose the right of option thereafter.
    3 (a) The notional seniority in the clerical cadre of those employees who are eligible for switchover on the 7th May 1972 and exercise their option under clause 2 (a) will be fixed with effect from 7th May, 1972.
    (b) In respect of employees who acquire the eligiblity qualification in future and exercise their option under clause 2 (b), their notional seniority in the clerical cadre will be fixed with effect from the date of acquiring such qualification viz. date of publication of the results of the examination.
    4 (a) An employee opting for switchover will, for the purpose of compilation of the combined seniority list, be deemed to be a member of the clerical cadre with effect from the date as at clauses 3 (a) and 3 (b), as the case may be.
    (b) Until such time as he is actually transferred to the clerical cadre an optee from the non-clerical cadre will, however, continue to be in the non-clerical grade in which he is placed at the time of option and will accordingly remain eligible for promotion in the non-clerical cadre;
    Provided that an employee officiating in a category that is listed as group II, VI, VII or VTII of Annexure as the case may be will be confirmed in that category only if he revokes his earlier option before confirmation, for which he will have an opportunity.
    5 (a) At the time of a actual transfer from a post in the non-clerical to the clerical cadre an optee will be fitted into the appropriate clerical grade i.e Grade I or Grade II as the case may be to which his seniority in the clerical grade determined in the manner provided for in clause 1 (b), will entitled him, irrespective of his grade in the non-clerical cadre.
    (b) On such transfer to the clerical grade the pay of the non-clerical employee will be fixed as if he had commenced his service in the clerical grade on the date on which he actually commenced his service in the non-clerical grade. If the pay so fixed falls short of the substantive pay drawn in the non-clerical grade such substantive pay will be protected and the difference will be made good by the grant of a special personal pay which will be absorbed in future increments, if any due. Any personal pay drawn on fitment in the revision of pay scales effective from 1st January 1970 shall be continued and not so absorbed. However, such a special personal pay/personal pay shall not be taken into account for fixation of pay in a higher grade (Assistants and above) on promotion.
    6. Such of those non-clerical employees as have been transferred to/appointed in the clerical cadre under the Bank's various schemes and who possess or acquire the eligibility requirement referred to in clause 1 (a) after 7th May 1972 will, on individual application to be made within two months from that date or one month from the date of acquiring such eligibility afterwards, be allowed to opt for switchover and if, by the exercise of such option, they become entitled to a higher place in the seniority list than they would enjoy but for such option, they will be given this advantage of the higher seniority. Such option shall not be available after the expiry of the periods stipulated above.
    The above provision will also apply to those non-clerical employees who have/been interviewed and found suitable for switchover under the existing scheme but whose actual transfer has not taken place.
    Apart from those provisions in the scheme, which, according to the petitioners, afford a double benefit upon the non-clerical staff with which we are not directly concerned for the purpose of this petition, it is apparent that some of the provisions work to the detriment of the clerical staff, especially some of the petitioners herein. As a result of counting one-third of their total service for the purpose of seniority, some of the non-clerical employees will become senior to some of the petitioners. This also is admitted by the Bank, although the Bank has attempted to minimise the effect of these provisions, what is more important is that under these provisions non-clerical staff, who may acquire the requisite qualification in the future, will also get the benefit of the scheme and may become senior to some of the petitioners.
    Therefore, there can be no doubt that the combined seniority scheme is detrimental to the interests of the petitioners not only by adversely affecting their emoluments and seniority but also their chances of promotion. The question to be considered is whether under these circumstances the combined seniority scheme is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
    The principles to be borne in mind by Courts in determining the validity of a statute on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia V. Justice Tendolkar (AIR 1958 S. C. 538) (9). The Supreme Court referred to the following passage from an earlier judgment of the same Court in Budhan Choudhry V. The State of Bihar (AIR 1955 S. C. 191) (10):—
    “It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”
    After referring to the above observations in Budhan Choudhry's case, the Supreme Court proceeded to enunciate the following principles:—
    ”(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;
    (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;
    (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
    (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest;
    (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and
    (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.”
    The Supreme Court then observed that a close perusal of its decisions in which the above principles had been enunciated and applied by it would also show that a statute which might come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Art. 14 of the Constitution might be placed in one or other of the following five classes:—
    ”(i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the Court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the Court will uphold the validity of the law.
    (ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination. xx. xx. xx.
    (iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle of policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in, the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the Court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law. * * *
    (iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification; the Court will uphold the law as constitutional. * * *
    (v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court xx. xx. xx. xx. xx. xx. xx. that in such a case the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.”
    The broad principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Rant Krishan Dalmia have been interpreted by the Supreme Court itself decisions. In Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. The State of Kerala (1961) 3 S.C.R 77, (11) the principles were made applicable to cases where no attempt was made for making a valid classification and the persons who were differently situate were treated alike. In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the validity of the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955 as amended by Act 10 of 1957 by the State of Kerala. By section 4 of the said Act, all lands in the State of whatever description and held under whatever tenure were to be charged and levied a uniform rate of tax to be called the basic tax. Section 7 gave power to the Government to exempt from the operation of the Act such lands or class of lands which the Government may, by notification, decide. Section 5A enabled the Government to make a provisional assessment of the basic tax in respect of the lands which had not been surveyed by the Government and provided that the Government after conducting the survey shall make a regular assessment and make the necessary adjustments in respect of the amounts paid already. The petitioners in that case owned forest in the State of Kerala. They challenged the validity of the Act on the grounds that the provisions of the Act contravened Articles 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 (1) of the Constitution inasmuch as:—
    (i) the Act did not have any regard to the quality of the land or its productive capacity and the levy of a tax at a flat rate of Rs. 2 per acre imposed very unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold property;
    (ii) the Act did not lay down any provision calling for a return from the assessee for an enquiry or investigation of facts before the provisional assessment was made or any right of appeal to any higher authority and, in fact, did not make any provision for hearing the assessee at any stage.
    (iii) section 7 gave arbitrary power to the Government to pick and choose in the matter of grant of total or partial exemption from the provisions of the Act, and
    (iv) the tax proposed to be levied had absolutely no relation to the production capacity of the land sought to be taxed or to the income they could derive, and therefore, the Act had been conceived with a view to confiscating private property, there being no question of any compensation being paid to those who may be expropriated as a result of the working of the Act.
    The Supreme Court, by majority, struck down the provisions of the Act and one of the grounds on which the Act was struck down was that :—
    “The Act obliged every person who held land to pay the tax at the flat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable of yielding any income. Consequently, there was no attempt at classification in provisions of the Act and it was one of those cases where the lack of classification created inequality. It was therefore hit by the prohibition to deny equality before the law contained in Art. 14.”
    In the case of All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association v. General Manager Central Railway and others (AIR 1960 S.C 384, (12) ** the petitioners who described themselves as Road-side Station Masters challenged the constitutionality of the channel of promotion for Guards to higher grade Station Masters' posts as notified in the issue of the Central Railway Weekly Gazette No. 3 dated 23-11-1951. Under this notification, Guards had two lines of promotion open to them. One that is by promotion, C grade Guards might become B grade Guards on Rs. 100 — 185 and thereafter by further promotion A grade Guards on Rs. 150 — 225. The second line of promotion open to them is that by an examination to the posts of Station Masters on Rs. 150 — 225 scale and thereafter to all the further promotions that were open to the Station Masters. The Road-side Station Masters on pay scale of Rs. 80 — to Rs. 170 could also reach by promotion the grade of Rs. 150 — 225 but only after going through an intermediate stage of Rs. 100 — 185. Similarly, Station Masters on Rs. 100 — 185 scale might also reach the stage of Rs. 200 — 300 but only after passing through the intermediate stage of Rs. 150 — 325. Obviously the provisions enabling Guards to become Station Masters on the pay scale of Rs. 150 — 225 placed the Station Masters of Rs. 80 — 170 scale at a disadvantage as against Guards on that pay scale and also puts the Road-side Station Masters on the pay of Rs. 100 — 185 pay scale at a disadvantage as against Guards on that scale of pay. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the channel of promotion in so far as it enabled the Guards to be promoted as Station Masters in addition to the other line of promotion open to them as Guards amounted to a denial of equal opportunity as between Road-side Station Masters and Guards in the matter of promotion and thus contravened the provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution. This contention was not accepted by the Supreme Court and it was held that at the Road-side Station Masters and Guards were recruited separately and trained separately and had separate avenues of promotion, the conclusion was irresistible that they formed two distinct and separate classes as between whom there was no scope for predicating equality or inequality of opportunity in matters of promotion. It was further observed — and it is on these observations that the petitioners rely — that —
    “The concept of equality can have no existence except with reference to matters which are common as between individuals, between whom equality is predicated, Equality of opportunity in matters of employment can be predicated only as between persons, who are either seeking the same employment, or have obtained the same employment. It is therefore clear that, assuming without deciding that matters of promotion are matters relating to employment within the meaning of Art. 16 (1), such equality of opportunity in matters of promotion, must mean equality as between members of the same class of employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent classes.”
    The case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy (AIR 1967 S.C 1458) (13) is somewhat similar to the case of K.T.M Nair cited above. In this case also, a law relating to levy of assessment on land was being challenged on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The law under challenge was the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act (22 of 1962) as amended by Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision (Amendment) Act (23 of 1962). Under the provisions of this Act, the scheme of ryotwari settlement was given up so far as the minimum rate was concerned and a flat minimum rate was fixed in the case of dry lands without any reference to the quality or fertility of the soil and in the case of wet lands a minimum wet rate was fixed and it was sought to be justified by co-relating it to the ayacut. The Act was struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and one of the grounds on which it was struck down was expressed in the following terms:—
    “But in the instant case, as we have pointed out earlier, the whole scheme of ryotwari settlement was given up so far as the minimum rate was concerned and a flat minimum rate was fixed in the case of dry lands without any reference to the quality or fertility of the soil and in the case of wet lands a minimum wet rate was fixed and it was sought to be justified by correlating it to the ayacut.”
    The Supreme Court also explained the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution in the following words :—
    “A statutory provision may offend Art. 14 of the Constitution both by finding differences where there are none and by making no difference where there is one. Decided cases laid down two tests to ascertain whether a classification is permissible or not, viz., (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible defferentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.”
    In Md. Usman and others, v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1971) S.L.R 584 (14), Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Subordinate Service Special Rules was challenged as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Rule provided for the promotion to the post of Sub-Registrars as well as for recruitment to these posts. It was contended that this Rule was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, because though among the clerks there were U.D.Cs as well as L.D.Cs, yet all of them had been put in one class for the purpose of recruitment, that as per the Ministerial Service Rules the U.D.Cs had to be selected from the L.D.Cs after the L.D.Cs had put in certain number of years of service and after they had passed the accounts test as well as the registration test, that a U.D.C held superior post to that of an L.D.C and his salary was higher and his condition of service were better than that of an L.D.C and that, therefore, as Rule 5 treated U.D.Cs as well as L.D.Cs as equal for the purpose of recruitment for the post of a Grade II Sub Registrar, the rule violated the doctrine of equality. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in K.T.M Nair's case. The Supreme Court rejected this contention on the following grounds:—
    “On the facts before us we are unable to agree that for the purpose of recruitment with which we are concerned herein the State should have classified the U.D.Cs and L.D.Cs separately. If the State had treated the U.D.Cs as being superior to the L.D.Cs for the purpose of that recruitment it would have resulted in a great deal of injustice to a large section of the clerks. The fortuitous circumstances of an officer in a particular district becoming an U.D.C would have given him an undue advantage over his seniors who might have been as efficient or even more efficient than himself, merely because they chanced to serve in some other district. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not think that in the present case the State can be said to have treated unequals as equals. The rule of equality is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination. In our opinion the High Court by overlooking the reason behind Rule 5 came to the erroneous conclusion that the said rule violated Art. 14 of the Constitution.”
    While upholding the validity of Rule 5 of the said Rules, it has to be noted that the Supreme Court confirmed its earlier view expressed in K.T.M Nair's case, namely, that the equality doctrine was attracted not only when equals are treated as unequals but also where un-equals are treated as equals.
    In Mervyn Continho and others v. Collector of Customs and others (AIR 1967 S.C 52) (15), an order of Central Board of Revenue of 1963 as well as the Government of India circular of 1965 were challenged on the ground that they were violative of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution. The petitioners in that case were Appraisers in the Customs Department. The system that prevailed for recruitment to the post of Appraisers was that 50 per cent was reserved for direct recruits while the remaining 50 per cent was filled up by promotion from subordinates in the Customs Department and that seniority was determined in the cadre by the system of rotation, i.e, the list was arranged in such a way that there was one person from the direct recruits and one from the promotees alternately. It was contended that this system had resulted in discriminatory treatment against them with the consequence that promotees of much longer service in the cadre of Appraisers were put in the seniority list below direct recruits with much shorter service. This, according to the petitioners, offended against equality of opportunity guaranteed under Art. 16 (1) of the Constitution. The other grievance of the petitioners was that in the cadre of Principal Appraisers who were all promoted from Appraisers, there was again discrimination and violation of equality of opportunity inasmuch as the same method was followed in the matter of fixation of seniority of Principal Appraisers. In this case, there was only one source of recruitment, i.e, by promotion from the cadre of Appraisers. The Supreme Court while upholding the validity of the system of recruitment to the post of Appraisers, namely, 50 per cent by direct recruitment and 50 per cent by promotion from subordinates, however, struck down the system of promotion to the post of Principal Appraisers. The reasons given by the Supreme Court for upholding the one and for striking down the other will afford guidance for deciding the case before us. With regard to the rotational system, the Supreme Court gave the following reasons:—
    “Where, therefore, recruitment to a cadre is from two sources, namely, direct recruits and promotees and rotational system is in force, seniority has to be fixed as provided in the explanation by alternately fixing a promotee and a direct recruit in the seniority list. We do not see any violation of the principle of equality of opportunity enshrined in Art. 16 (1) by following the rotational system of fixing seniority in a cadre half of which consists of direct recruits and the other half of promotees, and the rotational system by itself working in this way cannot be said to deny equality of opportunity in Government service.”
    But with regard to the question of promotion to the cost of Principal Appraisers, the Supreme Court observed as follows :—
    “We are of opinion that the petitioners have a legitimate grievance in this respect. The source of recruitment of Principal Appraisers is one, namely, from the grade of Appraisers. There is, therefore, no question of any quota being reserved from two sources in their cases. The rotational system cannot, therefore, apply when there is only one source of recruitment and not two sources of recruitment. In a case, therefore, where there is only one source of recruitment, the normal rule will apply, namely, that a person promoted to a higher grade gets his seniority in that grade according to the date of promotion subject always to his being found fit and being confirmed in the higher grade after the period of probation is over. In such a case it is continuous appointment in the higher grade which determines seniority for the source of recruitment is one. There is no question in such a case of reflecting in the higher grade the seniority of the grade from which promotion is made to the higher grade. In so far, therefore, as the respondent is doing what it calls restoration of seniority of direct recruits in Appraisers' grade when they are promoted to the Principal Appraisers' grade, it is clearly denying equality of opportunity to Appraisers which is the only source of recruitment to the Principal Appraisers' grade.”
    In the case of Govind Dattaray Kelkar and others v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and others (AIR 1967 S.C 839) (16) the appointment by direct recruitment as Assistant Controller of Imports and Exports was challenged as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. While upholding the direct recruitment to the said post, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—
    “Under Article 16 of the Constitution there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State to promotion from one office to a higher office thereunder. Article 16 of the Constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 thereof. It gives effect to the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion. It follows that there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment or promotion. The concept of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the promotees are drawn from the same source. If the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources, and the said differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification. There can be cases where the differences between the two groups of recruits may not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one against the other in the matter of promotions, and, in that event a court may hold that there is no reasonable nexus between the differences and the recruitment. In short, whether there is a reasonable classification or not depends upon the facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the time the recruitment is made.”
    In the case of S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 S.C 1427), the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Income-tax Officers (Class I, Gr. II) Service Recruitment Rules under which recruitment of the Income-tax Officers (Class I, Gr. II) was partly made by promotion and partly by direct recruitment. These Rules were challenged on the ground that they interfered in the chances of promotion of the persons who were already in service. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court on the ground that although under Article 16 of the Constitution there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in the matters relating to employment or appointment, there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment of promotion and that the concept of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the promotees are drawn from the same source and that if the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources, and the said differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification.
    The decisions of the Supreme Court in the State of Mysore and another v. Narasinga Rao (AIR 1968 S.C 349) (17) and C.A Rajendran v. Union Of India & Others (AIR 1968 S.C 507) (18) were also to the same effect. So also is the decision in the case of Anand Prakash Saksena v. Union of India and others (1968 S.L.R 582) (19). The last case which we would like to refer is of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in H. S. Shivalingaiah v. The State of Mysore and others, 1971 (1) S.L.R 326 (20). In that case, the Mysore Civil Services (Typists and Junior Assistants/Second Division Clerks) Change of Cadre Rules, 1964 were under challenge as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner in that case had joined Service in the State Government as a Second Division Clerk in the Commercial Tax Department and he was later promoted to the cadre of First Division Clerks on 20-3-68. In January, 1962, the State Government took a policy decision to permit interchangeability in the cadres of Typists and Junior Assistants/Second Division Clerks in order to give some relief to the persons in the lowest rank of Class III posts doing the work of a routine nature and desirous of some change in the nature of duties or work. In the order made by them on the 24th January, 1962 in that regard, they provided, among other things, that seniority in the changed cadre will be fixed with reference to the date of entry in the original cadre, which means that the entire length of service would be counted for purposes of seniority. In pursuance of this policy decision, the Governor promulgated a set of rules and rule 2 of the said rules provided as follows:—
    “2. Chance of cadre:
    Notwithstanding anything in the rules of recruitment specially made in respect of any service:
    (i) A Typist possessing the qualifications prescribed for the post of Junior Assistants/Second Division Clerks may change his cadre to that of a Junior Assistant/Second Division Clerk as the case may be, and
    (ii) A junior Assistant/Second Division Clerk possessing the qualifications prescribed for the post of a typist may change his cadre to that of a Typist.”
    Rule 5 of the Rules provided that the previous service rendered by persons permitted to change their cadre shall be counted for purposes of leave, pension and seniority. As a result of these rules, some typists who had exercised the option under the Rules were treated as senior to the petitioner. The petitioner contended that these rules which permitted the change of cadre and also gave the benefit of the entire service in the previous cadre for the purpose of seniority was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, reliance was sought to be placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Station Master's and Assistant Station Master's Association, already referred to above. The Mysore High Court distinguished this case on the ground that the Supreme Court was dealing with two different categories and the proposition made was that as between the said two categories, it was impossible to raise any argument of equality of inequality and the Supreme Court was not dealing with the case of amalgamation of two categories or absorption of a person from one category into another. The High Court upheld the rules and gave the following reasons for doing so:—
    “Now in the case before us, as we have already pointed out, the basic educational qualification for recruitment as Second Division Clerks as well as typists is the same, viz., the passing of Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examination. Typist has, in addition, to acquire the qualification of having passed some examinations in typing and shorthand. Rule 2 of the Change of Cadre Rules permits a person from one cadre to go into another cadre, only if he has the qualifications necessary for being recruited to that other cadre. When such a condition is stipulated for the change of cadre, the result is that in the matter of qualifications there is complete equation. At the time the change of cadre rules were promulgated, rules prevalent for recruitment to cadres of typists as well as Second Division Clerks provided for similar tests at the time of recruitment, viz., a viva voce examination to test the mental alertness of candidates. Even the Special Rules later promulgated in the year 1966 provide the same syllabus so far as the general educational qualification is concerned. They prescribe a written examination on General English and General Knowledge and a viva voce examination to test the mental alertness of candidates and to assess their suitability for appointment. There is thus similarity so far as the qualifications and procedure for recruitment are concerned.
    The pay scales are also the same.
    It is said that the nature of work performed by a Second Division Clerk and the nature of work performed by a Typist are completely different and that there is something superior about the work done by a Second Division Clerk. It is seen, however, that they are both in the lowest rank in Class III posts and both of them do the work of a routine nature, as is clearly indicated in the order of Government dated 24th January 1962 which is in the nature of a policy decision to which we have already made a reference.”
    Let us now proceed to apply the principles enunciated in the several cases cited to the facts of the case before us. We have already held that so far as the optee scheme of 1965 is concerned, it was not in any way violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution nor did it suffer from any other vice. It satisfies the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ramkrishan Dalmia. It was a valid scheme which was sponsored by the Bank itself for the purpose of equalising the chances of promotion of its employees in the General Departments and its employees in the Specialised Departments. The petitioners who opted for the scheme were then working either as officiating Clerks Grade I or substantive Clerks Grade II in the General Departments. It is no doubt true that some of the petitioners had been originally appointed to the non-clerical posts in the General Departments but were subsequently appointed to the clerical side by selection after they acquired the necessary qualifications for appointment as Clerks Grade II. On the date of the optee scheme, therefore, those petitioners who were originally appointed on the non-clerical side were in every respect equal to the clerks who were eligible to be transferred to the Specialised Departments under the optee scheme. It is not as if those petitioners were transferred to the clerical side only for the purpose of the optee scheme of 1965. The petitioners suffered certain disadvantages by opting under the scheme by way of losing certain monetary benefits and also losing their position as officiating Clerks Grade I. The advantages which they had thus given up were not restored to them under the combined seniority Scheme. Some of the persons who had opted under the 1965 optee scheme were able to obtain promotions whereas the petitioners were deprived of their due chances of promotion. Therefore, as between the same class of persons, namely, those who had opted under the 1965 optee scheme, there was discrimination against the petitioners as a result of the optee scheme being superseded by the combined seniority scheme. Not only did these petitioners lose the advantages which were available to them under the optee scheme of 1965 but also lost the advantages which they already possessed before they opted under the said scheme. Their juniors were promoted as officiating and confirmed clerks Grade I and while national seniority of the petitioners was maintained, still the advantages which their juniors had obtained in the meantime were retained by them. Therefore, as between the petitioners and the other clerical staff in the General Departments, the combined seniority scheme has brought about a discrimination against the petitioners.
    We cannot accept the contention that the optee scheme of 1965 was itself discriminatory in nature inasmuch as only some of the clerks in the General Departments were given the benefit of the optee scheme and others were deprived of the said benefit and that what the combined seniority scheme did was to remove the vice of discrimination from which the optee scheme of 1965 suffered. This contention is based upon a mis-conception that those who were selected under the optee scheme formed the same class with those who were not selected. It is no doubt true that the clerks who were selected under the optee scheme and those who either were not selected or did not exercise their option under the optee scheme originally belonged to the same class. They possessed the same qualifications and were appointed to the same post in the General Departments, namely, to the post of Clerk Grade II. But when once some of them were selected under the optee scheme and were transferred to the Specialised Departments, they ceased to form the same class along with their former colleagues in the General Departments. It has to be noted that the petitioners and other who were transferred to the Specialised Departments under the optee scheme were not so transferred by any fortuitous chance, but were transferred as a result of selection. Two persons may possess the same qualifications, but one of them may be appointed to a lower post and the other to a higher post. After such appointment, the two cease to belong to the same class. The optees who were, thus, transferred to the Specialised Departments under the optee scheme by selection formed a different class from those who were not selected or those who did not exercise the option under the optee scheme, and chose to remain as clerks in the General Departments. In our view, they belonged to two different classes. The combined seniority scheme is discriminatory inasmuch as it puts the optee on par with the others and relegates them to the position which they occupied prior to their selection under the optee scheme while at the same time taking away all the advantages which the optees had under the optee scheme. This discrimination cannot be justified on any reasonable criterion.
    The more glaring defect in the combined seniority scheme is the merger of the non-clerical staff with the clerical staff and the benefit of seniority given to the non-clerical staff. Under no principle can the non-clerical staff be treated as forming the same class as the clerical staff. Unlike the clerical staff in the General Departments, and the clerical staff in the Specialised Departments, the recruitment of the non-clerical staff was made on an entirely separate basis. While the recruitment to the clerical staff in the General Departments as Well as in the Specialised Departments was made on a common basis and the posting in one or the other departments depended purely on a chance, the recruitment to the non-clerical side was made on an entirely different basis. The qualifications prescribed for appointment to the non-clerical staff were different from the qualifications prescribed for appointment to the clerical side. The fact that after the appointment to the non-clerical side some of them acquired the same qualifications as were prescribed for appointment to the clerical side is not a relevant factor for the purpose of classification. There was no inter-se transfer between the clerical and non-clerical sides. The clerical staff could never be transferred to the non-clerical side. It is no doubt true that some posts of the non-clerical side, such as typists, may be akin to the post of a clerk and the duties of a typist and a clerk may both be of a routine character, but there are other posts in the non-clerical side which bear no similarity with the post of clerk. The Annexure to the combined seniority scheme shows that there are as many as 22 posts on the non-clerical side, such as, Typewriter Mechanics, Telex Operators, Punch Operators, Mechanic-cum-Operators, Comptometer Operators, Adreme Machine Operators, Burrough Machine Operators, Tabulator Operators, Assistant Air Conditioning Plant Operators, Computers, Hostel Supervisor, Electricians Grade II, Electrician-cum-Caretaker, Assistant Caretakers and Translators. No attempt has been made to show how the work in such posts is similar in nature to the work of clerks. We cannot, therefore, hold that the non-clerical staff forms part of the same class as the clerks. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the two form entirely different classes. They are in a sense unequals. To combine the two under one class and make them equals is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and to the extent that a combination results in obstructing the chances of promotion, confirmation etc. of the clerks, such combination was violative of Article 16 of the Constitution.
    The combined seniority scheme cannot be justified on the analogy of recruitment to the same post from two different sources. The combined seniority scheme creates one source for confirmation and promotion and in doing so, it has brought into this one source persons belonging to different classes. The scheme comes within the mischief of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in K.T.M Nair's case and also in the case of Nalla Raja Reddy. The reasons given by the Supreme Court in Mervyn Cotinho's case for striking down the order regarding the method of promotion to the post of Principal Appraisers also apply. The case of non-clerical staff does not satisfy the tests laid down by the Mysore High Court in H. S. Shivalingaiah's case. The scheme does not come within the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the All India Station Masters' case or S. G. Jaisinghani's case, as the non-clerical staff and the clerical staff were not treated as two different sources for recruitment. The scheme does not also come within the rule laid down in Md. Usman's case, as the non-clerical staff and the clerical staff do not form the same class as the L.D.Cs and the U.D.Cs in that case. The object with which the combined seniority scheme was formulated is no doubt a laudable object inasmuch as it seeks to give equal opportunities of promotion to all the employees of the Bank, but the method adopted is not the correct method. It is, of course, not the function of this Court to suggest the proper method for achieving this laudable object. We can suggest that either the transfer of non-clerical staff to the clerical staff may be made by selection instead of being made automatically as under the impugned scheme or by adopting the rotational system. The least that can be done is that the combined seniority scheme should be kept in abeyance till all the petitioners have obtained the benefit of the optee scheme of 1965. These are only suggestions. For the present, we are only concerned with the question whether the combined seniority scheme is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and for the reasons already stated above, we have to hold that the combined seniority scheme is bad. We are also unable to hold that any portion of the scheme is separable from the other portion and that only a portion of the scheme is bad. As the scheme stands, we have to strike down the entire scheme.
    In the result, writ petition No. 1341/70 is dismissed without costs and writ petition No. 690/72 is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 500/-.
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    J. S. Sachdev & Others Petitioners v. Reserve Bank Of India, New Delhi & Another S
    (May 11, 1973)