| Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (Assam Chah Karamchari Sangha) v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 (1) LLJ 500 |
Analysis of definition of "industrial dispute" into three elements: (1) factum of dispute, (2) parties, (3) subject matter. |
The Court adopted this tripartite analysis to test whether the present dispute satisfied each element under section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, 1953 S.C.R. 334 |
On non-justiciability of Government satisfaction regarding existence of a dispute where the satisfaction is based on facts. |
The Court held the question of factual existence of a dispute was for the Government and not open to judicial review where there were facts before the Government—applied to conclude material existed for Government satisfaction in this case. |
| Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1857 |
Held that "other authorities" in Article 12 is wide and can include statutory bodies; rejected strict application of ejusdem generis; statutory authorities exercising governmental/quasi-governmental powers may be "State". |
The Full Bench extensively analyzed and distilled criteria from this decision but distinguished IFCI on the ground that IFCI lacked the sovereign/regulatory powers (e.g., power to give directions enforceable as criminal offences) that featured in the Electricity Board's statutory powers. |
| Brooke Bond (India) (Private) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (reported references in text) |
Where promotions are tainted by mala fides or victimisation, an Industrial Tribunal may set aside promotions and direct management to reconsider; Tribunal should not itself decide promotions. |
The Court relied on this authority to reject the argument that the Tribunal could give no directions; it concluded the Tribunal may set aside promotions and prescribe appropriate directions consistent with Brooke Bond. |
| Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 479 |
Observation that the "State" includes departments of the State (e.g., Income-tax Department) for purposes of fundamental rights. |
Referred to as part of the Supreme Court's earlier observations supporting a broad understanding of "State" in Article 12; used in the Court's survey of authority. |
| Basheshar Nath v. Income-tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149 |
Article 12 gives extended meaning to "the State" and includes executive organs and authorities under control of the Government. |
Used in the discussion of the scope of Article 12 and to show that Article 12 has been given an expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court. |
| K. K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 725 |
Support for an expansive construction of "State" in Article 12. |
Cited as part of the jurisprudential background on Article 12's extended meaning. |
| Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621 |
Some judges suggested very wide ambit for "other authorities"; Rajagopala Ayyangar J. observed residuary clause may include every authority set up under a statute for administering laws. |
The Court analyzed the differing observations to show that being a statutory authority alone was not sufficient; the Ujjam Bai observations were read in context and included in formulation of criteria. |
| K. S. Ramamurthy v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1464 |
Interpretation that the phrase "under the control of the Government of India" qualifies "authorities" and related drafting observations. |
Cited to clarify the grammatical and qualifying scope of the residuary clause in Article 12. |
| University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 67 |
High Court view that "other authorities" might be read ejusdem generis with bodies earlier mentioned (i.e., authorities exercising governmental functions). |
Referred to as part of earlier High Court decisions whose approach was distinguished by later Supreme Court rulings; considered in the survey of authorities. |
| Vicaruddin v. Osmania University, A.I.R. 1954 Hyderabad 25 |
Earlier High Court decision on the scope of "other authorities" (similar approach to Shantha Bai). |
Included in the list of earlier High Court authorities examined by the Full Bench to outline differing approaches. |
| Amrita Bazar Patrika Ltd. v. Board of High School & Intermediate Education U.P., A.I.R. 1955 All. 595 |
Earlier High Court decision cited on Article 12 interpretation. |
Used as part of the historical survey of High Court decisions. |
| Madho Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 206 |
Earlier High Court authority on Article 12 scope. |
Referred to among other High Court decisions showing pre-Rajasthan Board approaches. |
| Smt. Ena Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 420 |
High Court approach to Article 12. |
Part of the comparative jurisprudence reviewed by the Court. |
| S. K. Mukherjee v. Chemicals and Allied Products Export Promotion Council, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 10 |
High Court authority on Article 12. |
Included in the list of High Court decisions considered in the opinion's survey. |
| B. W. Devdas v. Selection Committee for Admission (Karnatak Engineering College), A.I.R. 1964 Mys. 6 |
High Court decision concerning statutory authorities and Article 12. |
Referred to as part of the High Court decisions considered. |
| V.N. Parameswaran v. Principal, Medical College, I.L.R. (1966) 2 Kerala 339 |
High Court authority on Article 12. |
Included among decisions canvassed by the Full Bench. |
| Krishna Gopal Ram v. Punjab University, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 34 |
High Court authority on Article 12. |
Part of High Court decisions reviewed. |
| G. V. Sundaresh v. Bangalore University, 1967 (2) Mys. L.J. 592 |
Held Bangalore University (statutory) to be an "authority" under Article 12; applied criteria of power to make laws/orders within limited field. |
The Full Bench cited this as an example of a High Court applying the criteria the Court summarized (power to make regulations, exercise governmental power in limited field). |
| Gandhi Faiz-e-am Degree College v. University of Agra, A.I.R. 1968 Allahabad 188 |
University of Agra held to be an "authority" under Article 12 because of power to frame statutes/ordinances and perform governmental functions. |
Used as another High Court example where the Court applied the criteria summarized by the Full Bench. |
| Maharashtra State Electricity Board Engineers' Association v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board, A.I.R. 1968 Bombay 65 |
Held the Electricity Board to be "State" under Article 12 because it discharged public functions amenable to State control and had powers such as eminent domain. |
Referred to as a decision applying the criteria (statutory public functions, amenability to control) summarized by the Court. |
| Umesh Chandra v. V. N. Singh, A.I.R. 1968 Patna 3 |
University of Patna held to be "State" under Article 12 due to statutory powers to make statutes/ordinances. |
Noted as another High Court decision applying the Court's criteria. |
| Ranjit Kumar Chatterjee v. Union of India & others, A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 95 |
Held employees of Hindustan Steel Limited (non-statutory company) not to be Government servants under Article 311; referenced Rajasthan Board decision for distinction. |
Cited in the discussion to show limits of the Rajasthan Board decision and to distinguish Article 311 issues from Article 12 issues. |
| Pramodrai Shamaldas Bhavsar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 337 |
Bombay High Court held LIC (statutory corporate body) to be not "State" under Article 12 because its activities were businesslike and did not affect citizens' liberties as governmental exercise does. |
Referred to as an example where the criteria led to exclusion from Article 12; Court noted similar reasoning in applying criteria to IFCI. |
| Shyam Lal Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1970 (2) LLJ 393 (Allahabad) |
Allahabad High Court held LIC to be "State" under Article 12 on the facts of that Act and corporation. |
Cited to show divergent High Court views applying the Court's criteria; Full Bench did not adopt either High Court's result for LIC but noted reliance on the same criteria. |
| Sher Singh v. Vice-Chancellor, Punjab University, A.I.R. 1969 Punjab & Haryana 391 |
Held Punjab University to be covered by Article 12 for Part III purposes but clarified different senses of "State" in other parts of the Constitution. |
Cited as a High Court decision; the Full Bench treated its reference to Article 12 as obiter and noted the decision's limited reasoning on Article 12. |
| Mohinder Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 170 |
Division Bench held a Society/Board administering a school was not under Government control and thus Article 311 did not apply; Court used Rajasthan Board observations to treat the Society as a statutory authority for Article 12 analysis. |
Used to demonstrate application of the Rajasthan Board criteria at High Court level and to highlight possible over-reading of Bhargava J.'s observations. |
| Amir-Jamia & others v. Desharath Rai, I.L.R. 1969 (2) Delhi 202 |
Held Jamia Millia Islamia amenable to Article 226 jurisdiction; discussed when a body becomes a public authority for Article 226 and the relation to Article 12. |
The Full Bench agreed with conclusions as to Article 226 amenability but noted that Article 12 issue required separate consideration under the criteria the Bench summarized. |
| Aftab Ram v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1970 J & K 132 (F.B.) |
Held that for Article 12 categorisation, the authority must be statutory and have powers including power to give directions the disobedience of which is punishable — otherwise not Article 12 "authority". |
Referred to as a High Court decision that applied Rajasthan Board observations and supported the Court's view about necessary statutory/sovereign features for Article 12 inclusion. |
| Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. Ltd., 1932 A.C. 328 (House of Lords) |
Principles of construction concerning the limiting effect of a specific example before general words (argument invoked by appellant about demonstrative effect of "local"). |
Cited by counsel in support of a purposive/limiting construction argument; the Full Bench mentioned the case but declined to resolve that line of argument in view of its analysis of domestic precedent. |