Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereafter called the 1963 Act).The 1963 Act has repealed Indian Limitation Act, 1908 hereafter referred to as the 1908 Act.
  • provisions of Order 22, rules 3 and 4 and the material Articles of the Limitation Act,
  • Order 22 rules 2 and 3 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code of Civil Procedure by reason of section 41 of the Arbitration Act
  • Order 22 of the Code, nor the Limitation Act (i.e 1908 Act)
  • provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 122 of 1963 Act and this provision
  • section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141, the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • section 66 (1) of Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • section 117 section 114 of the Code
  • provisions in Order 22 of the Code
  • provision of rule 11 in Order 22
  • Order XXXII, rule 7, of the Code
  • Arbitration Act, Section 141
  • Article 176 of 1908 Act
  • Article 120 of 1963 Act
  • Art. 176, Limitation Act,
  • provisions of Order 22
  • rule 11 of Order 22
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereafter called the 1963 Act).The 1963 Act has repealed Indian Limitation Act, 1908 hereafter referred to as the 1908 Act.
  • provisions of Order 22, rules 3 and 4 and the material Articles of the Limitation Act,
  • Order 22 rules 2 and 3 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code of Civil Procedure by reason of section 41 of the Arbitration Act
  • Order 22 of the Code, nor the Limitation Act (i.e 1908 Act)
  • provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 122 of 1963 Act and this provision
  • section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141, the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • section 66 (1) of Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • section 117 section 114 of the Code
  • provisions in Order 22 of the Code
  • provision of rule 11 in Order 22
  • Order XXXII, rule 7, of the Code
  • Arbitration Act, Section 141
  • Article 176 of 1908 Act
  • Article 120 of 1963 Act
  • Art. 176, Limitation Act,
  • provisions of Order 22
  • rule 11 of Order 22
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises during the pendency of Civil Revision 126 of 1967, where the respondent Hazari Lal died on August 1, 1967. Subsequently, an application (C.M 1514-J/67) was filed under Order 22 rules 2 and 3 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on record. It was contended that since the proceeding was a revision and not an appeal, Order 22 did not apply and there was no prescribed limitation period for such an application. The matter was referred by Safeer, J. to a larger bench to decide whether the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is analogous to appellate jurisdiction and whether provisions of Order 22 and the Limitation Act apply to civil revision petitions for impleading legal representatives of deceased parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in its true nature part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to revision petitions in view of rules 11 and 12 of the Code.
  3. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Article 120, apply to civil revision petitions where applications are made to implead legal representatives of a deceased party.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • Order 22 rules 2 and 3 read with section 151 were invoked to bring legal representatives of the deceased on record.
  • It was urged that since the proceeding was a revision and not an appeal, Order 22 did not apply and no prescribed limitation period governed such application.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The expression "appeal" is not defined in the Code, and invoking the High Court's appellate jurisdiction through revision makes the petitioner an appellant within the meaning of Article 122 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Provisions of Order 22 should apply to revisions because the revisional jurisdiction is akin to appellate jurisdiction.
  • Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to revisions, contrary to earlier views, relying on Supreme Court decisions including Ram Chandra Aggarwal v. State of U.P.
  • Section 117 of the Code makes the Code applicable to High Courts, and since Order 22 is part of the Code, it applies to revisions as well.
  • It would be inequitable and confusing to hold otherwise, especially since revisions can be converted to appeals and vice versa.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jowala Singh Prem Singh and others v. Malkan Nasirpur and others (A.I.R 1958 Punjab 171) Order 22 does not apply to revisions; limited to suits and appeals. Supported the exclusion of revisions from Order 22 applicability.
Babulal and another v. Mannilal (A.I.R 1953 Rajasthan 169) Section 141 applies only to original proceedings; Order 22 not applicable to revisions. Reinforced that revisions are not governed by Order 22 or Article 176 of 1908 Act.
Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (A.I.R 1949 Lahore 186) Consistent view with Babulal case on non-applicability of Order 22 to revisions. Supported the principle that Order 22 does not govern revisions.
Ram Saran Dass Tara Chand v. Ram Richpal L. Mannu Lal and another (A.I.R 1963 Punjab 206) Order 22 and Limitation Act provisions do not apply to civil revision petitions. Confirmed the exclusion of revisions from Order 22 and limitation provisions for impleading legal representatives.
Naoomal Tourmal v. Tarachand Sobhraj and another (A.I.R 1933 Sind 200) Distinguished appeal and revision; Order 22 does not apply to revisions. Reinforced the distinct nature of revision and non-applicability of Order 22.
Baksho and another v. Piaro and others (A.I.R 1920 Sind 120) Order 22 provisions on abatement do not apply to revisions. Supported non-applicability of Order 22 to revision proceedings.
Basantibai v. Vishnukumar (A.I.R 1956 Madhya Bharat 125) Revision is different from appeal; Order 22 does not apply to revisions. Confirmed the distinct nature of revision and Order 22's inapplicability.
Manickan and others v. Mr. R. M. Ramanathan Chettiar and others (A.I.R 1949 Madras 435) Order 22 and Limitation Act do not apply to civil revision petitions. Confirmed that abatement rules do not apply to revisions.
Venkat Narsimhan Reddy v. Konda Reddy (A.I.R 1951 Hyderabad 55) Same view on non-applicability of Order 22 to revisions. Supported the general principle of distinction between appeal and revision.
Mt. Tarif Begam and another v. S. Raziuddin (A.I.R 1945 Oudh 219) Non-applicability of Order 22 to revision proceedings. Reinforced the principle of exclusion of revisions from Order 22.
Fatta and others v. Dillu (A.I.R 1954 Himachal Pradesh 44) Same principle as above cases. Supported exclusion of revisions from Order 22.
Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P and C.P and Berar, Lucknow v. I. D. Varshani (A.I.R 1953 Allahabad 414) Order 22 does not apply to references or revisions; no abatement on failure to implead legal representatives within prescribed period. Held that Order 22 did not apply, thus no abatement occurred.
Abdul Khalid v. Abdul Hamid (C.M 1286-J of 1968 in C.R 80-D of 1962) Order 22 does not apply to revisions for impleading legal representatives. Supported the court’s view in the present case.
Nagendra Nath Dey and another v. Suresh Chandra Dey and others (A.I.R 1932 P.C 165) Discussed appellate jurisdiction; not considered in present context. Respondent relied on it but court found it inapplicable to current question.
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatrya Bapat (A.I.R 1932 S.C 1) Discussed appellate jurisdiction; not in present context. Respondent relied on it, but court distinguished it from revision proceedings.
Ram Chandra Aggarwal and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another (A.I.R 1966 Supreme Court 1888) Discussed applicability of Section 141 of the Code to non-original proceedings. Court interpreted that Section 141 applies only to original proceedings, not revisions.
Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal (A.I.R 1962 S.C 903) Clarified Section 141 applies to proceedings in pari materia with suits, not revisions. Distinguished the scope of Section 141, limiting its applicability.
Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragaddar Ramakrishnayyar and others (A.I.R 1962 S.C 1886) Section 141 applies only to original proceedings; execution proceedings excluded. Supported the interpretation that Section 141 does not apply to revisions.
Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd. (A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 381) Section 114 held applicable to High Court appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 117. Distinguished from Order 22 applicability; does not support Order 22 applying to revisions.
Smt. Asho Devi v. Dukhi Sao and others (A.I.R 1965 Patna 472) Sections 100 and 101 of the Code held applicable to Letters Patent Appeals under Section 117. Did not extend to Order 22 applicability in revisions.
Basawanjanayulu v. Ramalingayya (A.I.R 1938 Madras 115) Earlier decision on abatement under Code provisions. Distinguished by Manickan case; not controlling on revisions.
Thakur Prasad v. Sheikh Fakir-Ullah (ILR 17 All. 106 (PC)) Privy Council decision on applicability of Section 141. Supported view that Section 141 applies to original proceedings only.
Hemanta Kumari Debi's case (A.I.R 1919 P.C 79) Power to record compromise as part of decree under Arbitration Act and Section 141. Clarified scope of Section 141 in relation to arbitration proceedings, not revisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of revision jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and distinguished it from appellate jurisdiction. It noted that revision is a discretionary remedy exercised by the High Court primarily to correct jurisdictional errors or irregularities by subordinate courts, and is not equivalent to an appeal where parties contest substantive points. The Court examined the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Articles 120, 122, and 131, which prescribe limitation periods for various applications including appeals, revisions, and applications to implead legal representatives.

The Court observed that Article 120, which prescribes a 90-day limitation period for applications to implead legal representatives, applies only to applications "under the Code of Civil Procedure," specifically those governed by Order 22. However, Order 22 applies to suits and appeals but not to revisions, as supported by Rule 11 of Order 22 and consistent judicial precedents. The Court reviewed numerous High Court and Supreme Court decisions which uniformly held that Order 22 does not apply to revision proceedings and that Section 141 of the Code applies only to original proceedings, not to appeals or revisions.

The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that revision jurisdiction is akin to appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of applying Order 22 and the Limitation Act provisions related to appeals. It emphasized the distinct nature of revision as a supervisory jurisdiction differing fundamentally from appeal. The Court also clarified that Section 117 of the Code, which applies the Code to High Courts except as otherwise provided, does not enlarge the scope of Order 22 to revisions, given the specific provisions and judicial interpretations.

Finally, the Court concluded that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to applications to implead legal representatives in revision proceedings, as these are not original proceedings or proceedings in pari materia with suits. Consequently, the provisions of Order 22 do not apply to revisions, and the limitation prescribed by Article 120 is not attracted.

Holding and Implications

The provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings in revision, and Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to applications for impleading legal representatives in such revision proceedings.

The direct effect of this decision is that applications to bring legal representatives on record in revision petitions are not governed by the limitation period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act or the procedural requirements of Order 22. This clarifies that revisions are distinct from appeals and suits in procedural context. The Court noted that while this may result in delays or dilatory tactics by litigants, the remedy lies with the legislature and not the courts. No new precedent beyond the clarification of existing law was established.

    Smt. Kalwant Kaur Petitioner v. Hazari Lal And Another S

    S.N Shankar, J.:— During the pendency of civil revision 126 of 1967 Hazari Lal, respondent, died on August 1, 1967. On December 4, 1967, C.M 1514-J/67 was filed under Order 22 rules 2 and 3 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased. It was urged that proceedings being not an appeal but in revision, Order 22 did not apply and there was no prescribed period of limitation for such an application.

    Safeer, J., before whom the matter came up, has referred the following question for decision by a larger bench:—
    “Is the revisional jurisdiction given by section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code a part and parcel in its true nature of the appellate jurisdiction provided by the Code and are the provisions in Order 22 of the Code applicable to revision petitions in view of rules 11 and 12 in the Code and whether the provisions in the limitation act are also attracted to civil revision petitions where applications are preferred for impleading the legal representatives of a deceased party ?”
    We have heard Shri H. S. Dhir for the applicant and Shri Gaja Nand for the respondent.
    Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for revision by the High Court, reads as under:—
    “The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears —
    (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
    (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
    (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.”
    These revisional powers can be exercised by the High Court suo-motu and can also be invoked by an aggrieved party by means of an application. The case in hand falls in the latter category and the question referred to us has been examined in this backgound wih reference to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereafter called “the 1963 Act”).
    The 1963 Act has repealed Indian Limitation Act, 1908 hereafter referred to as “the 1908 Act”. The repealed Act divided the Schedule annexed to it prescribing periods of limitation, into three divisions. The first division prescribed periods of limitation for institution of suits. The second division dealt with appeals and the third division prescribed limitation for filing of applications. No period for filing an application for revision was prescribed in the Schedule to 1908 Act. The result was that it was open in law to an aggrieved party to file revision without being confronted with the bar of limitation. The courts, however, in exercise of their discretion, conferred by section 115, refused to entertain an application for revision if it was belated or where the party was found to be guilty of latches or delay. The position under the 1963 Act is now different. Like the repealed Act, this Act also contains a Schedule prescribing the periods of limitation. The first division of the Schedule to this Act also prescribes period of limitation for filing of suits, the second division prescribes periods for appeals and the third division for applications. Articles 122 and 131 appear in the third division and they specifically refer to revisions and prescribe periods of limitation in the following terms:—
    Art. 122.
    Description of application. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. To restore a suit or appeal or application for review or revision dismissed for default of appearance or for want of prosecution or for failure to pay costs of service of process or to furnish security for costs. Thirty days. The date of dismissal. Art. 131. To any court for the exercise of its powers of revision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Ninety days. The date of the decree or order or sentence sought to be revised.
    Unlike the 1908 Act, the 1963 Act thus in terms regulates the rights of an aggrieved party in revision. The two Articles referred to above, however, relate only to an application to restore a revision dismissed on any one of the grounds mentioned in Article 122 and to the filing of the revision. They do not provide limitation for the filing of an application to implead legal representatives of a deceased party. Article 120 of the Act, however, provides for applications for impleading of legal representatives. It reads as under:—
    Art. 120
    Description of application. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of a deceased defendant or respondent, made a party. Ninety days. The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant or respondent as the case may be.
    The question, therefore, that arises is whether this Article applies to the application of impleading legal representatives in case of revision.
    The provisions analogous to this Article, in the 1908 Act were articles 176 and 177. They read as under:—
    Art. 176.
    Description of application. Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run. Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or of a deceased appellant made a party. Ninety days. The date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant. Art. 177. Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased defendant or of a deceased respondent made a Party. Ninety days. The date of the death of the deceased defendant or respondent.
    Article 120 in the present Act has simply combined these two Articles of the 1908 Act, without anything more, to indicate that the Legislature in the present Act intended to add to their field of operation as indicated by the plain meanings of the words as used. On the contrary the words “Under the Code of Civil Procedure” in the opening part of this Article incorporating the expression “under the same” previously used in Articles 176 and 177, specifically limits the field of its operation to applications under the Code alone. The only provision in the Code for such applications is Order 22. It has repeatedly been held that this Order does not apply to revisions principally on two grounds. Firstly, because while the Order talks of suits, rule 11 in the Order specifically makes it applicable to appeals but not to revisions and secondly, because Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not have the effect to make this Order applicable to appeals. In Jowala Singh Prem Singh and others v. Malkan Nasirpur and others (A.I.R 1958 Punjab 171) (1) it was observed :—
    “.. . Ordinarily the provisions of O. 22, Civil Procedure Code, govern the case of abatement during the pendency of the suit. This principle has been extended expressly by R. 11 of O. 22 to the case of appeals but there is no mention of its applicability to revisions.”
    “This is a case in which the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius should apply, and I think that by restricting the application of the rule of abatement expressly to suits and appeals, the intention of the legislature was to exclude from its purview cases arising from proceedings in revision. Art. 176, Limitation Act, which provides a period of limitation for making the legal representatives a party, refers to legal representatives “of a deceased plaintiff or of a deceased appellant”.
    In case Babulal and another v. Mannilal (A.I.R 1953 Rajasthan 169 (2) the argument that Order 22 applied to revisions because of section 141 of the code was repelled. The Bench held that Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied only to proceedings of original nature and consequently Article 176 of 1908 Act did not apply to revision applications. In agreement with a similar view expressed by a full bench of the Lahore High Court in Mohd. Sadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (A.I.R 1949 Lahore 186) (3) and approving the decision of the full bench in Babulal's case (supra), the Punjab High Court in Ram Saran Dass Tara Chand v. Ram Richpal L. Mannu Lal and another (A.I.R 1963 Punjab 206 (4) came to the same conclusion. The question also come up before the Sind High Court in Naoomal Tourmal v. Tarachand Sobhraj and another (A.I.R 1933 Sind 200) (5). The division bench of this Court following an earlier decision of the Court in Baksho and another v. Piaro and others (A.I.R 1920 Sind 120) (6), on the same principle held that provisions of Order 22 about abatement of suits and appeals did not apply to applications for revisions. The Madhya Bharat High Court in Basantibai v. Vishnukumar (A.I.R 1956 Madhya Bharat 125) (7) took the same view. A division Bench of the Madras High Court in Manickan and others v. Mr. R. M. Ramanathan Chettiar and others (A.I.R 1949 Madras 435) (8), distinguishing an earlier decision of the Court in Basawanjanayulu v. Ramalingayya (A.I.R 1938 Madras 115) (9) held that question of abatement under the Code did not arise but for the combined application of the provisions of Order 22, rules 3 and 4 and the material Articles of the Limitation Act, and as neither Order 22 of the Code, nor the Limitation Act (i.e 1908 Act) applied to civil revision petitions there could be no question of abatement of such petitions. Reference may also be made to Venkat Narsimhan Reddy v. Konda Reddy (A.I.R 1951 Hyderabad 55) (10), Mt. Tarif Begam and another v. S. Raziuddin (A.I.R 1945 Oudh 219) (11) and Fatta and others v. Dillu (A.I.R 1954 Himachal Pradesh 44) (12) where the same view was taken by the courts. This question also arose before the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P and C.P and Berar, Lucknow v. I. D. Varshani (A.I.R 1953 Allahabad 414) (13). This was a case of a reference under the Income Tax Act to the Court. On an application under section 66 (1) of Income-tax Act, 1922, made by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Appellate Income-tax Tribunal, Allahabad referred the question of law for the decision of the Court. During the pendency of the reference the respondent assessee died on December 10, 1948. The reference came up for hearing on September 13, 1949 when counsel of the deceased assessee informed the Court about the death of the assessee. The Court adjourned the matter and directed the Commissioner of Income-tax to make an application within one month giving the names of the legal representatives. This was not done. The matter came up before the Court again on July 26, 1950. The Court granted further three weeks time to make the application for bringing the heirs of the deceased on the record. The rules of the Court did not provide that the party which applied for a reference should take steps to have notices issued to the opposite party after the reference was made. On August 11, 1950, the Commissioner of Income-tax made an application giving the names of the legal representatives of the deceased assessee and prayed that the notices be issued to them and they be brought on the record. It was urged by the opposite side that the legal representatives having not been brought on record within the prescribed period for application under Order 22 the reference had abated. The argument was repelled by the Court and it was held that the reference could not abate as Order 22 did not apply. It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in a revision will not be an application “under the Code of Civil Procedure” and, therefore, Article 120 will not apply. This Court in Abdul Khalid v. Abdul Hamid (C.M 1286-J of 1968 in C.R 80-D of 1962) decided by Rangarajan, J., has taken the same view and we are in respectful agreement with it.
    Shri Gaja Nand, appearing on behalf of the respondent urged that the expression appeal is nowhere defined in the Code of Civil Procedure and whenever, therefore, a party invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to set-aside a decision of the subordinate court, as in case of a revision, the proceedings were in the nature of appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term so that the petitioner in revision would be an appellant within the meaning of Article 122 of 1963 Act and this provision would in terms apply. In support of this submission he placed reliance on the observations of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey and another v. Suresh Chandra Dey and others (A.I.R 1932 P.C 165) (14) and of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatrya Bapat (A.I.R 1932 S.C 1) 15. In these two cases the question was not considered in the context of the present controversy. It may be true that in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court the aggrieved party may be asking the court to exercise its appellate powers but the concept of appeal and revision in the Code of Civil Procedure are wholly different. The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court does not place the two proceedings at par to justify the assumption that an appeal is same as a revision. The two remedies are separate and distinct in the scheme of the Code. In Naoomal Tourmal v. Tara Chand Sobhraj (A.I.R 1933 Sind 200) (5) the Division Bench, adverting to the nature of appeal and revision said:—
    “There is an analogy between a revision application and an appeal but the two are not identical. In a suit or an appeal the points to be decided ordinarily are those on which the parties are at variance. A revision application stands on a different footing. It is a matter between a higher court and a lower Court; in fact revisional powers may in certain cases, be exercised without an appeal or an application by any of the parties concerned.”
    In Basantibai v. Vishnukumar (A.I.R 1956 Madhya Bharat 125) (7) the Court said:—
    “A revision is necessarily different from an appeal. There is a mistake in thinking that the two are identical. The order in revision is of its nature an essential act of the Court. In suit appeal the points to be decided ordinarily are those on which the parties are at variance. The revision stands on different footing.”
    Further, it will also be seen that while ordinarily an appeal is continuation of a suit this is not true in case of a revision. (See Ram Saran Das Tara Chand v. Ram Richpal A.I.R 1963 Punjab 206) (4). Appeal can be filed as of right but revision is a discretionary remedy depending on the facts of the case. The scope of interference by the High Court in the two proceedings is also not the same. Besides, rule 11 of Order 22 making the Order applicable to appeals does not provide for its application to revision as already discussed. For all these reasons, it is not possible to equate revision with appeal to attract Article 120 of 1963 Act to revisions.
    Shri Gaja Nand then urged that the conclusion in the above cited cases that Order 22 did not apply to revisions was based on the view that Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not attracted to proceedings which were not original: This view, the learned counsel said, was erroneous in face of the later pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Aggarwal and other v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another (A.I.R 1966 Supreme Court 1888) (16). In this case the Supreme Court, after referring to an earlier decision of the Court in Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal (A.I.R 1962 S.C 903) (17) “ observed that in Munshiram's case the Court had acted upon the view that:
    “.. . the expression “civil proceeding” in S. 141 is not necessarily confined to an original proceeding like a suit or an application for appointment of a guardian etc., but that it applies also to a proceeding which is not an original proceeding.”
    The learned counsel placed reliance on the extracted observation and maintained that Section 141 in view of these observations applied to proceedings which were not original proceedings and as such applied to revisions so that Order 22 was fully attracted to such proceedings. The submission cannot be accepted. No case has been brought to our notice in which the Supreme Court has held that section 141 applied to proceeding in appeal or revision and the observations relied upon did not lay down any law to the contrary as would be clear presently. Before dealing with this observation, let us see what the Supreme Court has laid down in relation to section 141 and the scope of its applicability. In Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragaddar Ramakrishnayyar and others (A.I.R 1962 S.C 1886) (18) Subarao, J., speaking for the majority, after noticing the view taken by the privy Council in Thakur Prasad v. Sheikh Fakir-Ullah ILR 17 All. 106 (PC) (19) said:—
    “This view has ever since been followed. We have already held that the application by the judgment — debtor to set aside the sale is a proceeding in execution and, therefore, S. 141 of the Code will not apply for two reasons, namely, (1) as execution proceedings were continuation of suit within the meaning of Order XXXII, rule 7, of the Code and as the. Code provided specifically for suits, S. 141 could not be invoked; and (2) as we have held, an application by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale is a proceeding in execution and therefore S. 141, which applies only to original proceedings, does not apply to such proceedings.”
    The Supreme Court thus has unambiguously approved the view that section 141 applied only to original proceedings.
    The observations extracted above and relied upon by the learned counsel in Ram Chandra Aggarwal's case did not lay down a law to the contrary. As stated in the judgment itself, the observations were in relation to the earlier decision in Munshi Ram's case. In Munshi Ram's case all that the Court had held was that in a case when an award was filed in court the powers of the court were indicated by the Arbitration Act itself and were limited to the acceptance of the award if there was no objection to it and to pass a decree in accordance therewith or to supersede, revoke or modify it or remit it for further consideration as provided in the Arbitration Act, but this did not disable the parties from terminating their dispute in a different way so that if the parties were dissatisfied with the award and wanted to substitute it by a compromise and where the award was not thrown overboard but modified in its operation, the award, in so far as it was not altered, still remained operative and continued to bind the parties and the court had the power and jurisdiction to record such an agreement of the parties to make it a part of the decree by including it either in the operative portion or in the Schedule of the decree as indicated by the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi's case (A.I.R 1919 P.C 79 on page 81) (20). Referring to this power to record such an agreement and to make it a part of the decree, it was held that this power flowed from the application of the Code of Civil Procedure by reason of section 41 of the Arbitration Act and also by Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words all that the Supreme Court had held in Munshi Ram's case was that even though proceedings initiated by reference to arbitration, which had already culminated in the award, and in that sense were not original proceedings, still, if the award was filed in Court under the Arbitration Act, Section 141 would be applicable to proceedings in that court so that the court where the award was filed would have the jurisdiction to record a compromise arrived at between the parties in terms indicated in the judgment. Section 141 was thus held to be attracted (even though the proceedings before the court were not original) because the court where the award was filed was not a court of appeal or revision. The proceedings before the Court in such a case were in pari materia with the suit. It is in this context that after referring to Munshi Ram's case in the extracted observation it was observed that section 141 applied “also to proceedings which were not original proceedings”. These observations in this context cannot be availed of in support of the proposition that the Supreme Court ruled that section 141 of the code applied to proceedings which were not original proceedings and was, therefore, attracted to appeals and revisions also. They do not, therefore, help the respondent.
    Shri Gaja Nand then urged that it would be inequitable and confusing to hold that Order 22 did not apply to revisions when indisputably it was open to the court to convert a revision into an appeal and vice versa. The learned counsel also referred to section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure which confers a right to the proceedings being continued by or against the representatives on the death of a deceased party. He also pointed out that the result of a conclusion that Article 120 did not apply to revisions will be to delay the disposal of revisions and encourage dilatory tactics on the part of those petitioners who after filing the revision had obtained stay of proceedings in courts below. These considerations of expediency, we are afraid, do not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court to justify an interpretation of the law in a manner other than as laid down by the Legislature. The submission that a dishonest litigant may resort to dilatory tactics and may not file an application for impleading the legal representatives of a deceased party to the revision is not groundless but the remedy for this lacuna does not lie with the court.
    Lastly, the learned counsel referred to section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure and contended that provisions of the Code, save as provided in Part IX and Part X of the Code, applied to the High Courts and because Order 22 was not one of the provisions saved by the section, the Order applied to the High Courts both in appeals as well as in revisions irrespective of section 141. This interpretation of S. 117 by the learned counsel is patently not tenable. If section 117 was intended to make the Code applicable enbloc to the High Court there would have been no separate provisions in the Code for appeals. The specific provision of rule 11 in Order 22 in particular providing that in the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an “appellant” and the “defendant” a “respondent” and the word “suit” and “appeal”, would also have been wholly redundant. The obvious purpose and meaning of section 117 is to apply the Code to the High Courts, save as provided in Part IX and Part X of the Code, to the extent the provisions are applicable to the High Court. For reasons we have set out above, the courts have consistently held that the provisions of Order 22 though applicable to High Courts in cases of appeals is not attracted to revision. Section 117 in such a situation will not have the effect to enlarge the field of operation of S. 141 to attract Order 22 to revisions also. Our attention was drawn to Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd. (A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 381) (21) and Smt. Asho Devi v. Dukhi Sao and others (A.I.R 1965 Patna 472) (22). In the Allahabad case by virtue of section 117 section 114 of the Code was held to be applicable to proceedings taken by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction so that the High Court subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed in Order 47 was competent to review its judgment. Similarly, in the Patna case sections 100 and 101 of the code were held to be attracted in the case of Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court. There is nothing either in section 114 or the provisions permitting review which were held to apply to the High Court by the Allahabad High Court nor in sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which were found to be attracted to Letters Patent Appeals by Patna High Court, which excluded their application to the High Court. These provisions, therefore, could be held to apply to High Courts by reason of section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The cited cases, therefore, do not support the contention of the learned counsel that section 117 made the code as a whole including section 141 applicable to High Courts.
    An argument was also raised that by virtue of section 141, the Code of Civil Procedure and its provisions, applied to writ proceedings. Writ proceedings may well be said to be original but in no case can they be equated with revision proceedings. We do not consider it necessary for this reason in this case to go into the controversy-whether the provisions of Civil Procedure Code do or do not apply to writ proceedings.
    For reasons aforesaid the answer to the question referred to us is that provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings in revision and Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, also does not apply to such proceedings because proceedings in revision are not original proceedings or proceedings in pari materia with a suit.
    Reference answered.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Smt. Kalwant Kaur Petitioner v. Hazari Lal And Another S
    (Dec 20, 1972)