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  • Section 120-B IPC r/w. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 427 IPC, Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 3 r/w.24(1-B)(a) and 27 of the Indian Arms Act.
  • Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosives Substance Act, 1908 read with 120-B IPC
  • Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act r/w.120-B IPC.
  • SECTION 3 EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT 1908
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • 1.2.2002 Section 3,
  • Section 3(b),
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  • Section 120-B IPC r/w. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 427 IPC, Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 3 r/w.24(1-B)(a) and 27 of the Indian Arms Act.
  • Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosives Substance Act, 1908 read with 120-B IPC
  • Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act r/w.120-B IPC.
  • SECTION 3 EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT 1908
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • 1.2.2002 Section 3,
  • Section 3(b),
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The present petition is a writ of habeas corpus filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by an advocate who described himself as the State Co‑ordinating Secretary of an unregistered body. He prayed that the respondents be directed to produce the body and person of Pozhilan, who was alleged to be illegally confined in Central Prison, Puzhal‑I, Chennai, and to set him at liberty.

Pozhilan was one of twenty accused in two criminal cases (Cr. No. 250/1988, St. Thomas Mount Police Station and Cr. No. 70/88, Kodaikanal Police Station) charged under multiple provisions including Section 120‑B IPC, Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 427 IPC, Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and provisions of the Indian Arms Act. The allegations included membership of a secessionist movement, conspiring to blow up public installations (a Nehru statue at Kathipara Junction and a TV relay station at Kodaikanal), procurement and use of explosives, and that an accidental explosion caused the death of a co‑accused (Maran).

The cases were investigated together and a charge sheet was filed on 9.6.1991. Pozhilan was tried in Sessions Case No. 63 of 1993; by a judgment dated 17.2.1997 he was awarded life imprisonment for the offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 120‑B IPC. On appeal (Crl.A No. 268 of 1997), a Division Bench of the Madurai Bench partly allowed the appeal on 7.9.2007 and modified the life sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment, with set off of time already undergone. A Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 21.4.2008, the order recording “No merits.”

Subsequently the detenu's wife filed HCP No. 757 of 2008 and the detenu filed a Review Application (SR. No. 32166 of 2008) before the Madurai Bench; both were dismissed on 10.9.2008. After those dismissals, the present habeas corpus petition was filed by the advocate petitioner seeking Pozhilan's release.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench erred in imposing a ten‑year sentence on the detenu when, under the pre‑amendment (old) Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, no minimum sentence was prescribed.
  2. Whether dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court at the threshold (and here recorded as “No merits”) can be treated as an affirmation of the High Court's judgment.
  3. Whether the present writ petition raises fresh or new grounds sufficient to permit a second challenge to the detention where earlier HCP and review proceedings on substantially the same grounds were dismissed and allowed to attain finality.
  4. Whether the detenu's detention is illegal given that he is a convict serving the sentence awarded by the Madurai Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 1997.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The detenu should not have been sentenced to ten years because, under the old (pre‑amendment) Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, there was no prescribed minimum sentence; therefore the appellate Court's imposition of ten years was excessive.
  • The dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court does not amount to an affirmation of the High Court's judgment; reliance was placed on the proposition that an SLP dismissal at the threshold does not constitute a declaration of law or an affirmation.
  • The principle of res judicata has no application in criminal jurisprudence and, when there are new grounds, the detenu can invoke Article 226; implicitly, the petitioner contended there were grounds warranting reconsideration.

Respondents' Contentions and Factual Position

  • The respondents' case, as placed on record, is that Pozhilan was one of the accused in serious offences involving explosives, that he participated in a conspiracy and the making/planting of time bombs causing damage and a death, and that he was duly tried, convicted and sentenced by competent courts.
  • The conviction was confirmed (subject to modification of sentence) by the Madurai Bench, and the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on merits (“No merits”).
  • Earlier remedies (HCP No. 757 of 2008 and Review Application SR. No. 32166 of 2008) raising substantially similar grounds were dismissed by the Madurai Bench on 10.9.2008 and not challenged further; therefore the matter has attained finality in those proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
EGAIARASAN @ THIAGARAJA @ KUZHANDAI v. STATE BY ITS DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBCID, MADURAI [(2008) 2 MLJ (Crl.) 53] Contains Para 26(d) which recorded that conviction under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act read with 120‑B IPC was confirmed and life sentence modified to ten years RI with set off. The Court quoted Para 26(d) to show the Division Bench's order confirming conviction and modifying sentence to ten years; used as factual basis for the sentencing history of the detenu.
Narcotics Control Bureau v. Dilip Pralhad Namade [2004 SCC (Cri) 916] The principle that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition at the threshold does not mean the High Court judgment is affirmed; an SLP dismissal without detailed reasons does not constitute a declaration of law or a binding precedent. The petitioner relied on this authority to argue that the Supreme Court's dismissal of the SLP does not preclude re‑examination; the Court distinguished it because, in the present case, the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on the ground “No merits,” indicating it had considered the merits and found none.
Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121 Referenced as authority supporting the proposition that an SLP dismissal at the threshold does not reverse or affirm the order under challenge. Cited within the discussion of the Narcotics Control Bureau principle; used to support the legal proposition but the Court noted the factual difference in the present case where the Supreme Court recorded “No merits.”
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359] Referenced as authority clarifying that an SLP dismissal does not amount to affirmation of the impugned order. Referred to in the extract relied on by the petitioner; the Court considered these authorities but distinguished them on the basis of the Supreme Court's “No merits” dismissal in the present matter.
Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani [(2004) 1 SCC 497] Another authority on the limited effect of an SLP dismissal at the threshold. Similarly cited in the Narcotics excerpt; the Court treated these authorities as background but distinguished their applicability facts‑wise to the present SLP dismissal which was on merits.
SRIKANT v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BIJAPUR [(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 385] Principle that whether fresh/new grounds have been taken must be decided by the court dealing with the application; substance not form is relevant; minor/surgical changes that leave substance same are not new grounds. The Court relied on this authority to formulate and apply the test for determining whether the present petition raised new or fresh grounds compared to earlier writ/review proceedings; it concluded the grounds were not new.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first setting out the factual and procedural history of conviction, appeal, modification of sentence and the dismissal of the SLP by the Supreme Court. It then examined the core legal contention that the Division Bench erred by imposing a ten‑year sentence when the pre‑amendment Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act prescribed no minimum sentence.

The Court extracted and compared the pre‑amendment text of Section 3 and the post‑amendment text (effective 1.2.2002). It noted correctly that prior to amendment Section 3 prescribed a maximum of ten years (or transportation for life or shorter term) without prescribing any minimum sentence; by contrast the amended Section 3(a) prescribes a minimum of ten years for specified offences.

The Court then analysed the Division Bench's action in modifying the life sentence to ten years. It observed that the Division Bench did not state that ten years was being imposed because it was the statutory minimum under any then‑applicable provision. The Court emphasised the established proposition that when only a maximum and no minimum is prescribed, the sentencing court has unfettered power to impose any sentence within the permissible range, taking into account the gravity and circumstances of the offence. Therefore, the contention that the Division Bench committed a legal error by treating ten years as a statutory minimum was rejected as unsustainable on the face of the Division Bench's order.

Addressing the petitioner's reliance on the principle that dismissal of an SLP does not amount to affirmation of a High Court judgment (as stated in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Dilip Pralhad Namade and related authorities), the Court accepted the principle in general but distinguished the present case factually: the Supreme Court's order dated 21.4.2008 dismissed the SLP on the ground of “No merits,” indicating the Supreme Court had considered the matter on merits and found no substance to interfere. For that reason the Court held the authorities relied upon by the petitioner did not assist him in this factual scenario.

The Court then turned to the procedural posture that earlier HCP and review proceedings (filed by the detenu's wife and the detenu respectively) had been dismissed by a contemporaneous Bench of the Madurai Bench on 10.9.2008 and those orders had attained finality. The petitioner argued that res judicata has no application in criminal matters and that fresh grounds can always be urged. The Court referred to SRIKANT v. District Magistrate, Bijapur and distilled the legal proposition applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions: while res judicata strictly speaking may not apply, if a earlier habeas corpus petition by the detenu (or on his behalf) has been decided on merits and allowed to attain finality, then a subsequent petition seeking the same relief must demonstrate new or fresh grounds not previously available or considered, or changed circumstances making continued detention no longer required. The determination of whether a ground is new depends on substance rather than form; mere surgical or cosmetic changes do not suffice.

Applying that test to the material before it (the earlier HCP and Review Application and the present petition), the Court found that the arguments now advanced were essentially the same as those previously urged and rejected; no fresh or material grounds were shown. Moreover, as Pozhilan is a convict serving a sentence awarded by the appellate Court and not in illegal detention, the contention of illegal detention could not be sustained.

On these bases—(i) absence of any legal error in imposing ten years under the facts and reasoning of the Division Bench, (ii) the Supreme Court's dismissal on merits, and (iii) absence of fresh grounds after earlier final orders—the Court concluded that the habeas corpus petition was without merit and not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The Court's final order states that, for all the reasons explained, "this HCP is dismissed as of no merits and not maintainable."

DISMISSED

Implications

  • Direct effect: The petition seeking production and release of Pozhilan was dismissed; the detenu remains in custody serving the sentence as modified by the Division Bench (ten years' rigorous imprisonment, subject to set off of time already undergone).
  • Finality and procedural consequence: The Court treated the prior proceedings (appeal, SLP dismissal on merits, HCP and review dismissals) as having attained finality for purposes of the present petition and held that no fresh grounds were shown to reopen the matter under Article 226.
  • Broader precedential effect: The opinion applies established principles about sentencing discretion under a pre‑amendment statute and about the standards for permitting successive habeas corpus petitions after earlier decisions have become final. The opinion does not purport to lay down novel legal doctrine beyond those applications.

    G. Pavendhan v. State Of T.N.

    Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to direct the respondents 1 to 3 to produce the body and person of Pozhilan, who is now illegally confined in Central Prison, Puzhal-I, Chennai before this Court and set him at liberty forthwith.

    ORDER

    ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J.

    The petitioner, an advocate and stated to be the State Co-ordinating Secretary of ‘Thamizhaga Makkal Urimai Kazhagam’, an unregistered body, stated to be espousing the cause of human rights, has filed this habeas corpus petition praying to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus to produce the body and person of Pozhilan, who is alleged to be illegally confined in the Central Prison, Puzhal-I, Chennai before this Court.

    2. From the materials placed on record, it is seen that the detenu Pozhilan is one among the 20 accused in Cr. No. 250/1988 of St. Thomas Mount Police Station and Cr. No. 70/88 of Kodaikanal Police Station for the offences under Section 120-B IPC r/w. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 427 IPC, Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 3 r/w.24(1-B)(a) and 27 of the Indian Arms Act. It is alleged on the part of the respondents that the father of the detenu by name Perunchithiranar was the President of ‘Ulaga Tamil Ina Munnetra Kazhagam’, a Tamil chauvinist movement, advocating the secession of Tamil Nadu from India and the detenu Pozhilan is an active member of the said movement. It is further alleged that the detenu Pozhilan along with other accused assembled at the office of ‘Ulaga Tamil Ina Munnetra Kazhagam’ in Chennai on 20.3.1988 and conspired to blow up the Nehru statue at Kathipara Junction, Chennai and T.V Relay station at Kodaikanal and the detenu purchased gelatin sticks and prepared time bombs; that the time bombs were planted at Nehru statue, Kathipara Junction. chennai on 10.4.1988, which exploded causing damage to the statue and on 11.4.2008, the detenu directed the other co-accused to go to Kodaikanal and cause devastation to the television tower in Kodaikanal; that while the co-accused were planting time bombs in T.V tower in Kodaikanal on 11.4.1988, a time bomb exploded accidentally causing the death of an accused by name Maran on the spot besides wreaking extensive damage to the compound wall of the T.V tower station in Kodaikanal. Both the cases were clubbed together and investigated and charge sheet was laid in the above two cases on 9.6.1991 Along with other accused, the detenu was tried in Sessions Case No. 63 of 1993 by the Principal Sessions Judge, Dindigul and by the judgment dated 17.2.1997, the detenu was awarded life imprisonment for the offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act r/w.120-B IPC. Aggrieved, the detenu preferred Crl.A No. 268 of 1997 before this Court and the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court, by a common judgment dated 7.9.2007 has partly allowed the said appeal, modifying the sentence in the following terms:

    “Para No. 26(d):

    The conviction of A.1 and A.2 under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosives Substance Act, 1908 read with 120-B IPC is confirmed, but the sentence of life imprisonment, which is the maximum sentence provided under the section is modified to a period of ten years rigorous imprisonment. The period already undergone shall be given set off.”

    3. Against the said judgment, the detenu preferred SLP. Crl.M.P No. 6605 of 2008 along with Crl.M.P No. 6611 of 2008 before the Honourable Supreme Court and the Honourable Supreme Court by the order dated 21.4.2008 has dismissed the said SLP in the following terms:

    “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Delay condoned. No merits. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.”

    4. In these circumstances, the wife of the detenu has filed HCP. No. 757 of 2008 before the Madurai Bench of this Court seeking to reconcile the discrepancy in the award of punishment to the detenu on the ground that he could have been awarded imprisonment for the term below ten years, instead of ten years by the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court in the Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 1997. The detenu has also filed Review Application (MD) SR. No. 32166 of 2008 to review the judgment passed in the criminal appeal No. 268 of 1997. A contemporary Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court, by the order 10.9.2008 has dismissed both the HCP and the unnumbered Review Application as not maintainable. After the dismissal of the said HCP and the Review Application (SR), this HCP has been filed by the petitioner, seeking the release of the detenu.

    5. The main thrust of the petitioner is that the detenu should not have been awarded the punishment of ten years imprisonment by the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court, since nowhere in the old Act it has been contemplated that the minimum period of sentence for an offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act is ten years.

    6. For better appreciation of this aspect and for the sake of convenience, Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, prior to amendment is extracted hereunder:

    “3. Punishment for causing explosion likely to endanger life or property - Any person who unlawfully and maliciously causes by any explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property shall, whether any injury to person or property has been actually caused or not, be punished with transportation for life or any shorter term, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, to which fine may be added.”

    Thus, there is no doubt that prior to amendment, no minimum punishment is prescribed, for the offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

    7. The Explosive Substances Act was amended and substituted by Act 54 of 2001 with effect from 1.2.2002 Section 3, after amendment, reads as follows:

    “3. Punishment for causing explosion likely to endanger life or property - Any person who unlawfully and maliciously causes by -

    (a) any explosive substance an explosion of a nature likely to endager life or to cause serious injury to property shall, whether any injury to person or property has been actually caused or not, be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;

    (b) any special category explosive substance an explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property shall, whether any injury to person or property has been actually caused or not, be punished with death, or rigorous imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

    8. Thus, under the amended provision of Section 3, the minimum punishment prescribed for the offences falling within the ambit of Section 3(a) is imprisonment for a period of ten years and the maximum sentence prescribed is life imprisonment, while for the offences falling within the ambit of Section 3(b), the punishment prescribed is either death or rigorous imprisonment for life.

    9. In this backdrop, it has been argued on the part of the detenu that since no minimum sentence is prescribed under the old provision of law, under which alone the detenu has to be convicted, the appellate Court has committed an error in sentencing the detenu for a period of ten years, under the presumption that it is the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore, prayed that since no minimum sentence is prescribed under the old Act, the sentence of ten years imposed on the detenu by the appellate Court is excessive and therefore, the detenu deserved to be set at liberty.

    10. At the cost of repetition, we shall extract hereunder Para No. 26(d) of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court in Crl.A Nos. 233, 234, 268, 284, 336 and 402 of 1997, dated 7.9.2007, which is also reported in (2008) 2 MLJ (Crl.) 53 [EGAIARASAN @ THIAGARAJA @ KUZHANDAI v. STATE BY ITS DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBCID, MADURAI].

    “Para No. 26(d):

    The conviction of A.1 and A.2 under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Explosives Substance Act, 1908 read with 120-B IPC is confirmed, but the sentence of life imprisonment, which is the maximum sentence provided under the section is modified to a period of ten years rigorous imprisonment. The period already undergone shall be given set off.”

    11. Thus, while imposing the said sentence of ten years, nowhere the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court has indicated that the same is being imposed on the accused, since being the minimum sentence. The powers of the Court are unfettered in imposing the punishment on any accused when minimum and maximum sentences are prescribed for any offence. The Courts can impose any period sentence within the permitted periods of sentence prescribed under the Act or Code for such offence, taking into consideration the gravity of the offence, the manner in which it has been committed and such other aspects. In the case on hand, though no minimum period of sentence is prescribed and only a maximum period of sentence of life is prescribed for the offence under Section 3 under the old Act, the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court has imposed the sentence of ten years on the accused and as has already been asserted supra, nowhere it has been mentioned that it is imposing the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence. Therefore, the argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court has committed a legal error in imposing the sentence of ten years, as if it is the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence, falls to the ground.

    12. As against the said judgment of the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court, an SLP has been preferred before the Supreme Court, which met the fate of dismissal at the hands of the Honourable Supreme Court. At this juncture, an argument has been advanced on the part of the petitioner that since the SLP having been dismissed, it cannot be construed that the judgment under appeal has been either rejected or confirmed and therefore, there is no legal bar for entertaining this petition. In support of their argument, a judgment of the Supreme Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Dilip Pralhad Namade [2004 SCC (Cri) 916] has been pressed into service, wherein it has been held as follows:

    “…. Further more, disposal of SLP against a judgment of the High Court does not mean that the said judgment is affirmed by such dismissal. The order passed in any SLP at the threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any declaration of law or constitute a binding precedent. (See Union of India v. Jaipal Singh(2004) 1 SCC 121]. This Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding the petition for special leave to appeal and that too when the SLP was being dismissed. What is impugned before this Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before this Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage (See Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359] and Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani [(2004) 1 SCC 497].

    14. The inevitable conclusion is that the judgment has no legal sanction.”

    13. There cannot be any dispute regarding the above proposition of law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. But, in the case on hand, as could be seen from the order, dated 21.4.2008, passed by the Honourable Apex Court in the SLP, (extracted supra), the Honourable Apex Court has dismissed the SLP on the ground that there are ‘no merits’. In this view of the matter, when the Honourable Apex Court has gone into the merits of the case and found ‘no merits’ to grant leave to file the criminal appeal, which is not the position in the case relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the above judgment of the Honourable Apex Court cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner.

    14. Further more, soon after the dismissal of the SLP, the wife of the detenu has filed HCP. No. 757 of 2008 and the detenu has filed Review Application SR. Nos. 32166 of 2008 before the Madurai Bench of this Court virtually on the same grounds raised herein and the Madurai Bench of this Court has dismissed both the said petitions by its detailed order dated 10.9.2008 Admittedly, the said order of the Madurai Bench of this Court has reached its finality, since being not challenged by the petitioner. While such being the position, the petitioner has again come forward to file this petition, saying that the principle of res judicata has no application to the criminal jurisprudence and whenever there are new grounds to be urged, the detenu can knock the doors of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    15. In SRIKANT v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BIJAPUR [(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 385], wherein, after discussing various case laws on the subject, it has been held:

    “Whether any new ground has been taken, has to be decided by the court dealing with the application and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in that regard. But one thing is clear, it is the substance and not the form which is relevant. If some surgical changes are made with the context, substance and essence remaining the same, it cannot be said that challenge is on new or fresh grounds.”

    16. On an analogous reading of the entire case law on the subject, the following legal proposition could be culled out:

    The principle of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would not apply to a writ of habeas corpus where the petitioner prays for setting him at liberty. But, when once the habeas corpus petition filed either by the detenu or on his behalf by somebody, was dismissed by the High Court on merits and the same has not been assailed in appeal and thus it has reached its finality, for filing the second habeas corpus petition, the petitioner must show that there exist new or fresh grounds to be considered by the High Court, which were not available to him while filing or deciding the earlier habeas corpus petition and that continuance of his detention is no more required in view of the changed circumstances. The fact, as to whether the grounds raised in the second habeas corpus petition are new or fresh ones, has to be decided by the court dealing with the application and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in that regard. But, it must be kept in mind that it is the substance and not the form which is relevant and if some surgical changes are made with the context, substance and essence remaining the same, it cannot be said that challenge is on new or fresh grounds. In the absence of any fresh or new grounds and if the petitioner fails to prove that continuance of his detention is no more required in view of the changed circumstances, it is not open to the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to exercise a power of review or some kind of an appellate jurisdiction over the decision already rendered by it earlier regarding the very same detention order.

    17. In the light of the above legal position, now we have to see whether this petition has been filed on new or fresh grounds and whether the petitioner has brought forth any changed circumstances, so as to set him at liberty, in view of such changed circumstances. Of course, it must be kept in mind, while deciding the petition as to whether the grounds now raised are fresh or new ones and no surgical changes are made with the context and that the substance and essence not remained the same. From a reading of the HCP. No. 757 of 2008 and Review Application (SR) No. 32166 of 2008, which were rejected by a contemporary Bench of this Court, it is crystal clear that the very same argument has been advanced before that Bench also, which met the fate of rejection. No new ground, much less the one, which was not available at the time of hearing either the criminal appeal or the HCP and the Review Application, has been brought forth before us and the so-called grounds urged herein were very well available even before the Division Bench of this Court, at the time of hearing the criminal appeal. Having allowed the order of the Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court in HCP. No. 757 of 2008 and the Review Application (SR) No. 32166 of 2008 to reach its finality, without being challenged before the Honourable Apex Court, the petitioner has come forward to file this petition, as if he is raking up new grounds.

    18. The other aspect to be pointed out is that the detenu is a convict prisoner and there cannot be any doubt that he is serving the sentence awarded against him by the Madurai Bench of this Court in the Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 1997. When such being the position, at no stretch of imagination it could be said that he is in ‘illegal detention’, as has been termed on the part of the petitioner.

    For all the above reasons and discussions, this HCP is dismissed as of no merits and not maintainable.

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    Comments

    G. Pavendhan v. State Of T.N.
    (Mar 20, 2009)