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  • Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Section 4 of the Rent Control Act
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  • Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • Section 4 of the Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Adaikala Mary, the landlady, filed R.C.O.P. No. 603 of 1993 seeking fixation of fair rent for premises. She claimed a fair rent of Rs. 2,954 per month. The Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 1,774 per month. The tenant appealed by R.C.A. No. 274 of 1995; the landlords filed R.C.A. No. 311 of 1995. The Appellate Authority allowed the tenant's appeal and dismissed the landlords' appeal, fixing the fair rent at Rs. 1,374 per month. Two revisions (C.R.Ps.) were thereafter filed by the landlords under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The tenant did not file any revision.

Procedural note: The 1st petitioner died during proceedings and the 2nd petitioner (his son) was recognised as legal representative for prosecuting the revisions. The two C.R.Ps. challenge the Appellate Authority's fair rent fixation and related valuation issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a tenant who did not file a revision from the Appellate Authority's order can be heard, in a landlord's revision, to seek remand or reduction of the fair rent fixed by the Appellate Authority.
  2. Whether the Appellate Authority erred in refusing to consider sale deeds and other documents (specifically Ex.P-11 and Ex.P-1) on the ground that they were not marked through parties, in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority permitting certified copies of registered documents to be considered.
  3. Whether guideline values (government-set values for stamp duty) can be treated as conclusive for determining market value, or whether market value must be determined by evidence of transactions between willing buyer and willing seller (comparable sales such as Ex.P-11).
  4. Whether the vacant/appurtenant land should have been taken into account in fixing the fair rent and whether the courts below erred in their factual assessment of area and site value.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Landlords)

  • Ex.P-1 (a document relied on by the petitioners) was not considered by the Appellate Authority; had it been, the rent would have been higher.
  • The appurtenant vacant land was not taken into account though its existence was admitted by the parties.
  • The Appellate Authority incorrectly fixed ground value at Rs. 7.00 lakhs per ground despite guideline values indicating Rs. 7.50 lakhs per ground; Ex.P-11 would show the correct higher value per ground.
  • The Appellate Authority failed to consider Ex.P-11 because of an earlier Supreme Court rule that documents not marked through a party cannot be received; but the change in law (Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah) means certified copies of sale deeds may be considered and therefore Ex.P-11 ought to have been considered.

Respondent's Arguments (Tenant)

  • The court below (Appellate Authority) erred in accepting a market value that did not pertain to the relevant year.
  • The respondent's sale deed should have been looked into and the rejection of such documents for not being marked through concerned parties was incorrect in view of the latest Supreme Court decision, so the matter ought to be remanded.
  • Relied upon multiple precedents to support the proposition that market value must be proved by appropriate evidence and that guideline/stamp duty values are not conclusive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah (2001) 2 C.T.C. 424 The Supreme Court held that certified copies of sale deeds could be considered as evidence and parties supporting or opposing such documents are not prevented from adducing evidence; mere receipt of the document does not compel acceptance of its contents. The Court relied on this change in law to evaluate whether Ex.P-11 (a sale deed) could be considered; it concluded that Ex.P-11 could be accepted as market evidence because the transaction was not contested in oral evidence and the vendor included a public limited company.
Inder Singh v. Union of India and P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad The opinion records that two-Judge Bench decisions in these cases were reversed by the Narasaiah decision regarding reception of certified copies; the specific principles from those earlier decisions are not set out in the provided opinion. The opinion notes these earlier decisions were reversed by the Supreme Court in Narasaiah; no separate application beyond that observation is described in the text.
Shaw Wallance and Co. Limited v. Govindas Purushothamdas and Anr (2001) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 80 This decision is cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners; the excerpted opinion does not state the precise rule drawn from this case. The Court recorded that learned Counsel relied on this authority; the opinion does not expressly identify a specific application beyond being listed among authorities relied upon.
Khasim Khaleali v. State of Tamil Nadu The provided opinion lists this case as relied upon by counsel; no specific rule from it is explained in the text. The opinion records reliance but does not articulate a distinct application from this case.
Md. Abdulla and Sons v. Dorai Arasu The provided opinion lists this case among those relied on; no explicit principle from it is set out in the text. The Court notes it as part of authorities cited by counsel; no particular application is described in the opinion excerpt.
Dovo Tax Co. v. T.R. Ramanath (1999 L.W. 269) Held that fair rent is fixed for the building itself; the Rent Controller (and likewise the Appellate Authority) is free to fix the fair rent according to law and is not bound by the contentions or interests of the parties. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the tenant, who did not file a revision and was satisfied with the Appellate Authority's fixation, could not be heard as an aggrieved person under Section 25 to seek reduction of fair rent in the landlord's revision.
Maya Appliances and Centred Equipments v. A. Sulochana Reddy (1996) 1 L.W. 497 Held that fair rent should be determined by the Court; R.W.D. (guideline) rates can be considered, and when statute provides guidelines the Court is bound to take note — remand may be appropriate in some circumstances. The Court cited this authority when discussing the proper approach to market value and when considering whether transactions occurring in the relevant period can be used to fix market value. It also used it to support that comparable transactions in nearby localities after institution of a petition may be material.
Srirangaraja v. Ponniah Thevar (2000) 2 M.L.J. 204 Held that if a material piece of evidence is not considered, it would affect the decision of the case. The respondent relied on this to argue that failure to refer to the sale deed marked by him materially affected the decision; the Court considered this submission in the context of whether Ex.P-11 was improperly rejected.
Sakthi & Co. v. Desigachary This Court held that an application under Section 11 cannot be filed while proceedings under Section 4 are pending; the provided opinion notes this rule but states it does not apply to the present case. The Court observed the principle and expressly stated it was not applicable to the facts before it.
South India Corporation Agencies Ltd. v. C. Chandrakanth Bandani Stated that fixing fair rent must be done considering pleadings and evidence and cannot be made on mere concession; interference by revisional Court is unwarranted unless there is perversity. The Court used this to frame the standard for revisional interference and to explain restraint in interfering with the Appellate Authority absent perversity.
N. Sulaiman v. R. Ravichandran (1995 T.L.N.J. 226) Held that guideline value adopted by registering authorities may be taken as guidance. The Court cited it in considering the role of guideline/stamp duty values as guidance rather than conclusive proof of market value.
K.M. Abdul Razzak v. Damodharan The opinion records that the Supreme Court held the High Court cannot re-appraise evidence and should remand where there is a change in position of law; the precise factual rule in the provided text is limited to that observation. The Court referenced it in connection with the proposition that remand may be necessary where there is a change in the law affecting evaluation of evidence.
D.V. Ramana alias Venkataramana Bhat v. P.S. Rathina Bai (2000) 1 L.W. 826 Held that the Appellate Authority has the powers of the Rent Controller and may reappreciate and recalculate fair rent according to norms; fair rent is for the premises and not to favor either party. The Court relied on this to support the proposition that fair rent is fixed for the building and that fixation need not be favorable to either landlord or tenant; thus the tenant who accepted the Appellate Authority's figure cannot claim to be aggrieved.
Savani Transports (P) Ltd. v. N. Jamal Mohammed (1989) 1 M.L.J. 211 : (1989) 1 L.W. 172 Concerned the question whether the Court is entitled to fix fair rent higher than claimed by the landlord when the statutory procedure produces a higher figure. The opinion cites it while discussing that the fair rent must be fixed as per statutory procedure and may exceed the landlord's claim when justified by evidence and the statutory formula.
Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, A.P. and Ors. (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court held there is no statutory foundation for accepting registering authority's basic evaluation register for stamp duty as conclusive and that comparable sale transactions are generally the best method to determine market value. The respondent relied on this authority to argue against judicial notice of guideline/stamp duty values and in favour of relying on comparable sale transactions such as Ex.P-11 to determine market value.
Rahmath Fathima T.H.S. v. T.K. Kader Mohideen (1996) 2 L.W. 637 Held that government-fixed value is for stamp duty purposes and market value for a survey number results from a bargain between parties and must be proved by evidence. The respondent relied on this decision when arguing that a sale deed (Ex.P-5 in that case) represents market value and must be proved; the Court considered this principle when assessing Ex.P-11.
Srinivasa Gounder v. K. Venkatesan (1997) 3 L.W. 193 Held that reliance on hearsay evidence from the Sub-Registrar's office as proof of transactions is wrong. The Court cited it to underscore that proper evidence is required to prove market transactions and that hearsay procedures are inadequate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner.

  1. Standing and scope of attack: The Court first decided whether the tenant, who did not file a revision against the Appellate Authority's order fixing fair rent at Rs. 1,374, could now be heard in the landlord's revision to seek a reduction. Relying on authorities such as Dovo Tax Co. v. T.R. Ramanath and D.V. Ramana v. P.S. Rathina Bai, the Court emphasized that fair rent is fixed for the building (premises) and not for the landlord or tenant individually. Because the tenant had been satisfied with the Appellate Authority's fixation and had not filed a revision, he could not claim to be a person aggrieved under Section 25 and seek reduction in the landlord's revision. The Court therefore rejected the respondent's contention that the tenant could attack the fair rent in the landlord's revision.
  2. Factual findings on area and vacant land: Both courts below had concurrently found the built-up area to be 320 square feet. The landlords' contention that appurtenant vacant land was overlooked was examined; the Engineer's report and the evidence did not support existence of a separately measured vacant area beyond the 320 square feet. Given the concurrent findings and absence of error, the Court declined to interfere with the area determination.
  3. Site value — evidentiary assessment: The trial court fixed ground value at Rs. 10.00 lakhs per ground; the Appellate Court fixed it at Rs. 7.00 lakhs per ground, referring also to guideline values (Exs. P-8 and P-9) that suggested Rs. 7.46 lakhs. The key contested evidence was Ex.P-11 (a sale deed), which the Appellate Authority had rejected on two grounds: (a) it had not been marked through either of the parties, and (b) the witness who produced it (R.W.2) had not testified to the correctness of the consideration or the circumstances of sale.
  4. Relevance of guideline values and comparable transactions: The Court summarized authorities showing that guideline/stamp duty values are merely for stamp duty purposes and are not conclusive for market value determination; transactions between willing buyer and willing seller (comparable sales) are the preferred basis for market value. The Court observed that guideline values may be taken as guidance only.
  5. Acceptance of Ex.P-11: On the change in law introduced by Narasaiah, certified copies of registered documents may be accepted in evidence (though not compulsorily). Examining Ex.P-11 and the oral evidence, the Court found that R.W.2 (through whom Ex.P-11 was marked) had admitted the sale and that Ex.P-11 related to premises very close to the subject property (two doors away). No evidence was elicited to show the transaction was not genuine; one party to the sale was a public limited company (Coromandel Engineering Company), and there was no reason to believe the consideration was inflated or a distress sale. On that basis, the Court concluded the Appellate Authority was wrong to reject Ex.P-11 and to fix the market value at Rs. 7.00 lakhs without direct supporting transactions.
  6. Mathematical application: The Court adopted the value reflected in Ex.P-11 — Rs. 1,86,253 for 558 square feet — and extrapolated to calculate per ground value (about Rs. 8,01,088 per ground). Using proportional calculation for the 320 square feet in question, the site value became Rs. 1,06,811. Adding the cost of construction (fixed by the appellate court at Rs. 44,083 after depreciation) produced a total value of Rs. 1,50,894. Applying the statutory percentage for non-residential tenancy (12%) resulted in Rs. 1,508.94, rounded to Rs. 1,509 as the monthly fair rent.
  7. Concurrence regarding timing objection: A concurring note by Prabha Sridevan, J. addressed the respondent's objection that Ex.P-11 was dated 1994 and thus post-dated the 1993 petition. The concurring judge examined Ex.P-11 and found the instrument and related records indicated the transaction and Income Tax clearance dated from 1991; therefore the objection that the sale deed was subsequent and irrelevant was rejected. The concurring judge saw no reason to alter the fair rent fixed on 31.7.2001.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The C.R.Ps. are allowed and the fair rent for the petition premises is fixed at Rs. 1,509 per month.

Consequences and implications:

  • Direct effect: The Appellate Authority's fixation of Rs. 1,374 is revised to Rs. 1,509 per month as the fair rent for the premises in question. There will be no order as to costs.
  • Evidentiary implication: The Court accepted that certified copies of sale deeds (Ex.P-11) may be relied upon where the transaction is not impeached in evidence, applying the principle from Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah. The Court thereby treated a comparable local sale deed as sufficient basis for recalculating site value where oral evidence did not contradict the transaction.
  • Limit on third-party challenges: The Court reaffirmed that a party (here the tenant) who was satisfied with the Appellate Authority's order and did not file a revision cannot in the landlord's revision claim to be a person aggrieved and obtain reduction of fair rent; fair rent is fixed for the building and not in favour of a particular party.
  • No new legal precedent was proclaimed by this Court beyond application of existing authorities; the Court applied settled principles about reception of sale deeds, the limited role of guideline values, and the purpose of fair rent fixation.

No costs were awarded. The opinion contains a separate observation by Prabha Sridevan, J. rejecting the timing objection to Ex.P-11.

    Susainathan And Anr. v. T. Vijayan

    1. These revisions arise out of an order passed under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The landlords are the petitioners in both the revisions. One Adaikala Mary was the landlady who filed the application and the petitioners were brought on record as her legal representatives pending C.R.P. Since the 1st petitioner died, the 2nd petitioner his son was recognised as the 1st petitioner's legal representative for the purpose of prosecuting the revisions.

    2. Adaikala Mary, the landlady filed R.C.O.P. No. 603 of 1993 for fixing the fair rent. According to her, the fair rent per month was Rs. 2,954. The Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 1,774. Against this, the tenant filed R.C.A. No. 274 of 1995 and the landlords filed R.C.A. No. 311 of 1995. The appellate Authority allowed the tenant's appeal and dismissed the landlords appeal by fixing the fair rent at Rs. 1,374 per month. Against this, the two revisions have been filed by the landlord. The tenant has not filed any revision.

    3. Mr. Rathnadurai, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that his document Ex.P-1 was not at all considered by the Appellate Authority and if that had been taken into account, the rent would not have been fixed at such a low level. Ex.P-1 would show that the property would fetch a higher rent. He also submitted that the vacant land had not been taken into account though it was admitted by the parties that there was vacant land. He pointed out to the appellate Judge's order where after referring to the guideline value, which gives the value per ground at Rs. 7.50 lakhs, the Appellate Authority had for no reason fixed the ground value at Rs. 7.00 lakhs per ground. He submitted that the Appellate Authority had erred in not looking at Ex.P-11 which was a document which would show the correct value per ground. The reason for the Appellate Authority not adverting to this document was because of the Supreme Court ruling that if a document is not marked through a party to the document, it cannot be received in evidence. In Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah (2001) 2 C.T.C. 424, the Supreme Court had reversed the two Judge Bench decisions in Inder Singh v. Union of India and P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad and held that certified copies of sale deeds could be considered and parties who support or oppose the said document are not prevented to adduce their evidence to substantiate their stand and the mere acceptance of evidence does not mean that the Court is compelled to accept such transaction, it might treat it as evidence. In view of the change of law, the learned Counsel submitted that the Appellate Authority ought to have considered Ex.P-11.

    4. Learned Counsel are relied on the following decisions: Shaw Wallance and Co. Limited v. Govindas Purushothamdas and Anr. (2001) 2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 80, Khasim Khaleali v. State of Tamil Nadu and Md. Abdulla and Sons v. Dorai Arasu .

    5. Learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the Court below grievously erred in accepting the market value when it did not pertain to the relevant year. He also submitted that his sale deed ought to have been looked into and the rejection of those documents on the ground that they were not marked through the concerned parties was not correct in view of the latest Supreme Court decision and he also submitted in these circumstances, the C.R.Ps. ought to be remanded. For this purpose, he relied on the following decisions:

    (i) Dovo Tax Co. v. T.R. Ramanath 1999 L.W. 269; (ii) Maya Appliances and Centred Equipments, etc. v. A. Sulochana Reddy (1996) 1 L W. 497; (iii) Srirangaraja v. Ponniah Thevar (2000) 2 M.L.J. 204; (iv) Sakthi & Co. v. Desigachary ; (v) South India Corporation Agencies Ltd. v. Chandrakanth C. Bandani ;(vi) N. Sulaiman v. R. Ravichandran 1995 T.L.N.J. 226; (vii) Land Acquisition Officer v. V. Narasaiah 2001 T.L.N.J. (S.C.) 33; (viii) K.M Abdul Razzak v. Damodharan. ; (ix) D.V. Ramana alias Venkataramana Bhat v. P.S. Rathina Bai (2000) 1 L.W. 826.

    6. One of the questions that has first got to be decided before considering the submissions with regard to the quantum of fair rent made by both counsel is, whether the tenant not having filed a revision can be heard to say that the matter must be remanded. The Rent Controller fixed the ground value at Rs. 10.00 lakhs per ground. The tenant dissatisfied, filed one appeal and the landlords filed another. The Appellate Authority allowed the tenant's appeal and dismissed the landlords' appeal. The tenant was not aggrieved by the fair rent that was fixed by the Appellate Authority and he did not choose to file any revision. The question is, whether he can now urge in the revision filed by the landlord that the fair rent has to be reduced though he did not challenge the fair rent fixed by the Appellate Authority. Learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously argued that he should be allowed to attack the fair rent fixed by the Appellate Authority on the ground the fair rent is fixed only for the building and not vis-a-vis, the tenant or the landlord.

    7. In the decision reported in Dovo Tax Co. v. T.R. Ramanath 1999 L. W. 269, the landlords claimed that the building would fetch a rent of Rs. 1,250. The Rent controller fixed the fair rent at a higher rate. The tenant contended that he could not. This High Court held thus:

    The fair rent is fixed for the building in question in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not fair rent for the landlord or for the tenant, but for the building and as such the Rent Controller is free to fix the fair rent as per law untrammelled by the contentions of the parties.

    8. In Maya Appliances and Centred Equipments, etc. v. A. Sulochana Reddy (1996) 1 L.W. 497, this Court held that fair rent should be determined by the Court. The RW.D. rates can be looked into and when the statute provides certain guidelines, the Court is bound to take note of that and therefore set aside the orders of the Rent Control Authorities and remanded the matter.

    9. The decision reported in Srirangaraja v. Ponniah Thevar (2000) 2 M.L.J. 204, arises out of an order of eviction and where the learned Judge held that if a material piece of evidence is not considered, it would affect the decision of the case. This was relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent to show, how the failure to refer to the sale deed marked by him had materially affected the decision of the case.

    10. In Sakthi & Co. v. Desigachary , this Court was called upon to consider whether an application can be filed under Section 11 of the Act while proceedings under Section 4 are pending. It was held that it cannot be done. This does not apply to the present case.

    11. In K.M Abdul Razzak v. Damodharan. , the Rent Controller had found that the building was in a dilapidated condition and the landlord had not established bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot reappraise or reassess evidence and arrived at a finding contrary to the finding recorded by the Court below and held that the High Court ought to have remanded the case to the appellate Court if there was a change in position of law. The change in position in that case was the modification of the effect of the P. Orr. & Son's case by the subsequent decision in Vijay Singh's case.

    12. In D.V. Ramana alias Venkataramana Bhat v. P.S. Rathina Bai (2000) 1 L. W. 826, the tenant filed an appeal against the order of Rent Controller fixing the fair rent. The Appellate Authority raised it and the tenant filed a revision. This Court dismissed the revision on the ground that the Appellate Authority has got all the powers of the Rent Controller and it can reappreciate and recalculate and fix the fair rent according to the norms laid down under the act and fixing of fair rent does not mean it should be favourable or beneficial to one party. It only means, fair rent as far as the premises is concerned.

    13. In South India Corporation Agencies Ltd. v. C. Chandrakanth, Bandani , this Court held that fixing of fair rent has to be done considering the pleadings and evidence available on record and cannot be made on concession of parties. Interference with the revisional Court is uncalled for unless there is perversity in the approach of the authorities below.

    14. I am afraid, these decisions do not come to the aid of the respondent. It is true that fair rent is fixed only for the building. The Rent Controller fixed the fair rant at Rs. 1,774 per month in one case and Rs. 887 in the other. The tenant filed one appeal and the landlord filed another. The appellate Court fixed fair rent in both the appeals at Rs. 1,374. The tenant was satisfied and now the learned Counsel wants this Court to interfere in revision at his behest. I am afraid, that cannot be done. It is true that the fair rent under Section 4 of the Rent Control Act is fixed with reference to the premises.

    15. In D.V. Ramana alias Venkataramana Bhat v. P.S. Rathina Bai (2000) 1 L.W. 826, in paragraphs 6 and 7, it was held thus:

    It is clear from the above decision that fair rent is fixed for the building whether it is applied by tenant or landlord. Fixation of fair rent does not mean fixation of low rent favourable or beneficial to the advantage of tenant, as that would result in landlord getting only an unfair rent. A fair rent is fixed as per the specified procedure provided under the Act. Fair rent is essentially just rent having regard to all the circumstances and it is not rent favourable to the tenant as such. Whoever may be the applicant, the fair rent will have to be fixed according to the norms prescribed under the Act.

    In Savani Transports (P) Ltd. v. N. Jamal Mohammed (1989) 1 M.L.J. 211 : (1989) 1 L. W. 172, landlord wanted to fix fair rent at a particular amount. But, when the procedure under the Act was followed, the fair rent will be far in excess of the amount claimed by the landlord. The question was whether the Court is entitled to fix fair rent than what is claimed by the landlord.

    16. And again in Dovo Tax Co. v. T.R. Ramanath 1999 L.W. 269, from which already a passage had been extracted, this Court held that the Rent Controller is free to fix fair rent as per law. This freedom of discretion is also applicable to the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority has fixed the fair rent on an appreciation of the materials before it. This fair rent was fixed not with reference to the tenant or the landlord, but because the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that this was the fair rent with regard to the building. It is evident that the tenant also felt satisfied that this was the fair rent as far as the building was concerned and he did not challenge the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and therefore, he cannot claim to be a person aggrieved under Section 25 of the Act and seek for reduction of the fair rent fixed by the Appellate Authority.

    17. Now, we come to the quantum of rent. As far as the area is concerned, both the courts held that the built-up ares is 320 square feet. The landlord's case that the appurtenant vacant land was not taken into consideration was rejected by both the Courts. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the evidence of R.W.1 the respondent clearly shows that there is open land. He has stated as follows:

    But however, the Engineer's report filed on the side of the petitioners do not show the existence of vacant land. The Engineer's Report reads that he took measurement of the entire portion and compared it with the sale deed under which the vacant land pertaining to the above property was bought. In the measurements of the entire portion, he has given the measurement as 320 square feet. In fact, even the petitioner in his evidence has only referred to one area and that is 320 square feet. In view of the concurrent findings of both the Courts with regard to the area, I do not want to interfere with the same, since there does not appear to be any error in this regard.

    18. With regard to the value of the site, the trial Court fixed it at Rs. 10.00 lakhs, per ground. The Appellate Court fixes it at Rs. 7.00 lakhs, per ground. The Appellate Court has also referred to Exhibits P8 and P9 which are the guideline values from which the appellate Court calculates the ground value at Rs. 7,46,160. Learned Counsel for the respondent fervently urged that his document which is Ex.R-3 was not considered and therefore, the matter has to be remanded. But for the reasons given in the aforesaid paragraphs, I am of the opinion that as far as the respondent is concerned, he has allowed the decision of the Appellate Authority of fixing the rent at Rs. 1,372 per month to be the fair rent for the premises and therefore, this submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent is rejected. As regards Ex.P-11, it is relied on by the Rent Controller to arrive at the fair rent of Rs. 10.00 lakhs. This is rejected by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority not only refers to the decision of this Court and the Supreme Court that unless the parties concerned with the document are examined, the sale deeds cannot be relied on for fixing the value of the site, but the Appellate Authority also on a consideration of the evidence of R.W.2, through whom Ex.P-11 was marked, finds that the said witness only admits the factum of sale, but not the circumstances under which this value was arrived at. It is seen from the document Ex.P-11 which is marked through R.W.2 the respondent herein that the petition premises is very close to the property, subject matter of Ex.P-11. R.W.2 admits from a perusal of the document, regarding the consideration for which the property has been sold.

    19. Now, we come to the relevance of Exs.P-8 and P-9 which are the guideline values. The suit property is situated at T.S.No. 1/67. For the relevant survey number the value is Rs. 310.90 per square feet. The Appellate Authority order reads thus:

    There does not seem to be any justification for fixing the value of the site at Rs. 7.00 lakhs when the Appellate Authority has the document before the Court which shows the guideline value to be Rs. 7.50 lakhs.

    20. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, A.P. and Ors. , where the Supreme Court held that there is no statutory foundation for accepting the basic evaluation register maintained by registering authority for collection of stamp duty and that evidence of price fetched in comparable sale transaction is generally accepted as the best method to determine the market value.

    21. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on Rahmath Fathima T.H.S. v. T.K. Kader Mohideen (1996) 2 L.W. 637, where this Court held that the Government fixes the value only for the purpose of stamp duty and that the market value for a particular survey number is the result of a bargain between the parties. In that case, Ex.P-5 which was the disputed document was a sale deed. According to him, Ex.P-5 represents the market value and it was contended that Ex.P-5 would not have been registered if the transaction is less than the value fixed by the Government. It is in that context that the learned Judge held that the market value of a particular survey number is the result of a bargain between the parties and it is to be proved by evidence.

    22. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on Srinivasa Gounder v. K. Venkatesan (1997) 3 L.W. 193, in which the Appellate Authority had relied upon the hearsay evidence of P.W.1 on the basis of information ascertained by him from the Sub Registrar's Office. The High Court held that this procedure is wrong.

    23. In the decision reported in N. Sulaiman v. R. Ravichandran 1995 T.L.N.J. 226, this Court has held that the guideline value adopted by the registering authorities may be taken as a guidance.

    24. From the decisions cited by both the counsel, it is seen that the value fixed by the Government for the purposes of stamp duty has no relevance and judicial notice cannot be taken for the same. For determination of the market value, transaction between a willing purchaser and a willing seller will alone form the basis. Viewed at from this angle, we are left only with Ex.P-11. The Appellate Authority has rejected Ex.P-11, one, on the ground that this had not been marked through either of the parties and another on the ground that he has not spoken to the correctness of the consideration recorded in those sale deeds. As regards the acceptability of document without examining anybody connected with the transactions for proving market value, the Supreme Court has recently held in the decision cited above in Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Narasaiah (2001) 2 C.T.C. 424, that certified copy of registered documents may be accepted as evidence of transaction. Ofcourse, there is no compulsion to accept them, but in the same decision, the Supreme Court has held that Court can act on documents regarding transactions recorded in such documents and it was open to the parties to support or oppose the said document of transaction and they are not prevented from adducing their evidence to substantiate their stand. In this case, the document itself was marked only through R.W.2 who has not said anything in his evidence even in the cross-examination regarding the bona fides or the genuineness of the transaction.

    25. Now, as regards relevance of this document, in May a Appliances and Centred Equipments, etc. v. A. Sulochana Reddy (1996) 1 L.W. 497, the learned Judge had held that for determination of market value according to legal principles, transaction by a willing seller to a willing purchaser in open market must be considered and not the mere opinion or suggestion by the landlord and any transaction that takes place in a nearby locality after the institution of the fair rent application within a reasonable period thereafter has been held to be of material use in fixing the market value. In this case, I am of the opinion that the Appellate Authority went wrong in rejecting Ex.P-11 and fixing the market value at Rs. 7.00 lakhs without any document to support that rate and using the guideline value for reference when all the decisions referred to both by the counsel for the petitioners and the respondent are to the effect that this cannot be taken judicial notice of. R.W.2 himself deposes in his evidence that the decision premises is only two doors away from the premises which is subject matter of Ex.P-11. In these circumstances, I think, the value reflected in Ex.P-11 can be accepted as market value.

    26. The decision reported in D.V. Ramana alias Venkataramana Bhat v. P.S. Rathina Bai (2000) 1 L. W. 826 clearly lays down that the fair rent will have to be fixed having regard to all the circumstances and it is not the rent favourable to either the landlord or the tenant. In the decision reported in Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Narasaiah (2001) T.L.N.J. 33 : (2001) 2 C.T.C. 424 it was held that the transaction recorded in the exhibits marked in the case that was under consideration could be relied on though no one was examined for proving such transaction. This conclusion was arrived at because in that case, the State had not created any doubt regarding the bona fides or genuineness of the transactions mentioned therein. In this case, the appellate Court declined to accept the value of the site recorded in Ex.P-11 though the transaction was not denied by R.W.2, the respondent herein nor was anything elicited in the oral evidence that the transaction was not genuine. One of the parties to this sale deed is a public limited company namely the Coramandel Engineering Company and we have no reason to believe that the sale consideration reflected therein is inflated or that it was a distress sale.

    27. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in adopting this value for the purpose of calculating the market value of the site. The calculation made by the appellate Court is left undisturbed otherwise. The cost of construction for 320 sq.feet at the rate of Rs. 160 less depreciation was fixed at Rs. 44,083. The value of the site in Ex.P-11 is Rs. 1,86,253 for 558 sq.feet. Therefore, for one ground, the value is about Rs. 8,01,088. The value of 320 sq. feet is calculated as 320 x 801088/2400 which will give us Rs. 1,06,811. Therefore the total value will be Rs. 1,50,894. Since tenancy is non-residential, 12% of this is calculated and a sum of Rs. 1508.94 is arrived at which is rounded off to Rs. 1,509. This will be the fair rent.

    28. In the result, the C.R.Ps. are allowed. The fair rent for the petition premises is Rs. 1,509. No costs.

    29. Prabha Sridevan, J.: In these cases judgment was pronounced on 31.7.2001 and the fair rent was fixed on the basis of Ex.P-11. Immediately, the learned Counsel for the respondent brought to my notice that Ex.P-11 is of the year 1994 and therefore, it cannot be relied on for the purpose of fixing the fair rent in a petition filed in the year 1993 itself and therefore, the matter was listed today for further arguments. But, I find from a perusal of Ex.P-11 that the argument between the parties was entered into in 1991 itself and the Income Tax clearance certificate was also obtained in the same year. So, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the sale deed is one year subsequent to the Rent Control Original Petition and the consideration reflected in a subsequent sale deed cannot be relied upon, cannot be accepted. There is no reason for any alteration in the fair rent already fixed and the order passed on 31.7.2001.

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    Susainathan And Anr. v. T. Vijayan
    (Jul 30, 2001)