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citation codes
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Acts
  • Order V, rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXIII, rules 1
  • S. 195, and of Chap. XXV, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.Rules 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter
  • provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the Limitation Act
  • Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions in Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • S. 31.Under Sub-sec. (1) of this section
  • S. 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890,
  • English Workmen's Compensation Act
  • Workman's Compensation Act
  • S. 2(3) of the English Act.
  • S. 2(3) of the new Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order V, rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXIII, rules 1
  • S. 195, and of Chap. XXV, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.Rules 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter
  • provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the Limitation Act
  • Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions in Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • S. 31.Under Sub-sec. (1) of this section
  • S. 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890,
  • English Workmen's Compensation Act
  • Workman's Compensation Act
  • S. 2(3) of the English Act.
  • S. 2(3) of the new Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.D. Koshal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

One Arumugham, employed as a workman by the petitioner, died from a fall from a tractor on 29 October 1969. His mother filed a claim for Rs. 3,500 under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the appropriate Commissioner. The petitioner contested that claim. While that claim was pending, Arumugham's mother died. Her son Periaswami and daughters Thailammal and Anjalai (the respondents) applied to the Commissioner to be substituted as their mother's legal representatives. The petitioner opposed that substitution. The Commissioner accepted the respondents' application, finding that the right to the claim survived to the three respondents and that they were entitled to be substituted as legal representatives for their mother. The petitioner challenged the Commissioner's order dated 30 January 1972 by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act can devolve by operation of law to persons other than the workman or his dependants (i.e., whether heirs or legal representatives of a deceased dependant can be substituted and claim compensation).
  2. How Section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act should be interpreted in conjunction with the definition of "workman" in Clause (n) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 and whether Section 9 bars devolution of compensation to heirs who are not dependants.
  3. Whether previous judicial decisions holding that compensation passes to legal representatives or heirs (or that the right forms part of the deceased's estate) correctly interpreted the Act's provisions, specifically Sections 8 and 9 and the definitions in Section 2.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Compensation under the Act is claimable only by the injured workman or, in the case of death, by the class of persons described as "dependants" in the Act.
  • None of the respondents were dependants within the meaning of the Act, and therefore they could not be substituted as legal representatives to continue their mother's claim.
  • Section 9 bars devolution by operation of law of any lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under the Act to any person other than "the workman."
  • Clause (n) of Section 2 defines "workman" and, by implication according to petitioner's contention, limits passage of rights to dependants only, not to heirs or legal representatives who are not dependants.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented or relied upon in the opinion)

  • They relied on prior decisions (Madras decision in Ikkassintakath Abdurahiman v. Nadakkavu Malikkal Beeran Koya, Calcutta decision in Pasupati Dutt v. Kelvin Jute Mills, and other cases) which were interpreted to permit the compensation right to pass to persons other than a living workman — in some decisions the right was held to vest and be part of the estate.
  • Some authorities were relied upon for the proposition that liability under the Act arises immediately on the accident and amounts to a debt payable to the workman and hence becomes heritable.
  • Other decisions were cited to support the view that applications for compensation do not abate on the death of an applicant and can be continued by heirs or legal representatives in the absence of express application of Order XXII of the Code to Workmen's Compensation proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ikkassintakath Abdurahiman v. Nadakkavu Malikkal Beeran Koya [(1938) I M.L.J 571] Held that Section 9's prohibition on passing compensation to any person other than the workman applies only where a workman exists at the time payment is due, not where the workman died before compensation was awarded. The court (A.D. Koshal, J.) criticized this decision for not considering Clause (n) of Section 2 (definition of "workman"). The opinion finds the Madras Bench's limiting interpretation of "the workman" erroneous and distinguishes it because the definition in Section 2(1)(n) was not brought to that Bench's notice.
Pasupati Dutt v. Kelvin Jute Mills [A.I.R 1937 Cal. 495] Interpreted Sections 2(1)(d), 3(1), 4(1) and 8 of the Act and relied on United Collieries Ltd. v. Simpson (English case) to support that right to compensation can pass to executor of a deceased dependant. The present court observed that the Calcutta Bench did not consider Sections 9 and Clause (n) of Section 2 and therefore their reliance on the English decision was misplaced; the Calcutta judgment was held to be erroneous for not noting material statutory differences.
United Collieries Ltd. v. Simpson [1909 A.C. 383] Under the English Workmen's Compensation Act as then framed, held that the right to compensation passed to the executor of a sole dependant who had died without making a claim. The court explained that the English statute's definition included "legal personal representative" and thus made the English decision inapplicable to the Indian Act, which omitted such words. The opinion notes that the English law was later altered (re-enacted in 1925 with S.2(3)) to limit such devolution.
Radhakrishna Rice Mill v. G. Appalacharyulu [(1958) 1 An. W.R. 316] Held (as summarized in the opinion) that refund duty arises only when there is no dependant "in existence" at the time of the workman's death; treated compensation as becoming property of allocated dependants and thus heritable. The court found this decision followed the Madras and Calcutta decisions and United Collieries, but remarked that the Andhra decision did not notice Sections 9 and 2(1)(n) and therefore did not state correct law.
Santoline Fernandes v. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. [(1967) 34 F.J.R. 124] Held that liability under the Act is created on the accident and amounts to a debt payable to the workman, forming part of his estate and thus heritable. The court observed that this decision, like others, did not bring Sections 2(1)(n) and 9 to notice and followed United Collieries; the present opinion treats that reliance as unsound for not considering the relevant Indian statutory provisions.
Manubhai and Company v. Babajee [(1969) 38 F.J.R. 528] Held that since Order XXII and the Limitation Act were not made applicable to Workmen's Compensation applications, heirs could continue applications and rights to recover money were rights to debts which survive to heirs. The court noted these observations were made without reference to the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act that, according to the opinion, negatived rights of heirs or dependants' legal representatives to continue such applications.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds stepwise and is grounded in a textual and purposive interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act's provisions, particularly Sections 2, 8 and 9, and the relationship between them.

  1. Interpretation of Section 9: The court examined Section 9's prohibition that "no lump sum or half-monthly payment ... shall ... pass to any person other than the workman by operation of law" and rejected the view that "the workman" must be limited to a workman who is alive when payment falls due. The court holds that the phrase should be given its ordinary meaning and read so as to "shut out completely the passage of the right of compensation to persons other than the workman."
  2. Role of Clause (n), Section 2(1): The court emphasized the concluding portion of Clause (n), which states that any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. The court reads this provision as effectively enlarging the notion of "workman" in Sections such as Section 9 to include dependants where the workman is dead. Thus, "workman" in Section 9 should be read to mean the workman if alive, and his dependants if he is not.
  3. Interaction with Section 8: The court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 8 (which prescribes deposit with the Commissioner of lump sums payable in certain situations, apportionment among dependants, reimbursement to employers if no dependants exist, and rules on payment/mode of payment) and concluded that the Act consistently contemplates payment to the workman himself or to his dependants only. Section 8(4)-(6) specifically provide for apportionment among dependants and repayment to the employer when no dependants exist, which, in the court's view, confirms that the Act was not intended to benefit heirs outside the class of dependants.
  4. Purpose of the Act: The court referred to the Act's preamble and legislative purpose — to provide compensation to certain classes of employers' workmen for injury by accident — and explained that the scheme reasonably extends benefits to dependants (who relied on the deceased workman) but not to all heirs. The definition of "dependant" in Clause (d) of Section 2(1) is selective and dependency-based, indicating that the Act's benefits are not for all heirs.
  5. Procedural rules and Order XXII: The court examined Section 23 (conferring certain powers of a civil court on the Commissioner) together with Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, and observed that only certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were made applicable to proceedings under the Act. Notably, Order XXII (dealing with legal representation where parties die) is not made applicable by Rule 41, which supports the conclusion that legal representation by heirs was not contemplated by the Act.
  6. Critical review of authorities: The court scrutinized the reported decisions relied upon by respondents (Madras, Calcutta, Andhra and other decisions, and the English United Collieries case). It found these authorities to have not brought Section 9 and Clause (n) of Section 2(1) to judicial attention, or to have relied on the English statute's different wording which expressly included legal personal representatives. For that reason, the court concluded those decisions were erroneous or inapplicable on the stated statutory grounds.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: From the combined textual, contextual and purposive analysis, the court concluded that the Act limits entitlement to compensation to the workman (if alive) or to the dependants (where the workman is dead), and excludes devolution by succession to heirs or legal representatives who are not dependants. Therefore the Commissioner's order allowing substitution of the respondents (who were not shown to be dependants within the statutory definition) as legal representatives was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition succeeds and the impugned order of the Commissioner dated 30 January 1972 is quashed.

Immediate consequences and costs:

  • The petitioner's challenge to the Commissioner's order was allowed and the order substituting the respondents as legal representatives was quashed.
  • Because the question of law was complicated, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The opinion focuses on the direct effect on the parties (quashing of the impugned order and the apportionment of costs) and does not expressly state that it is laying down any broader new precedent beyond its analysis and rejection of earlier authorities.

    Habeebullah Maricar (B.M) v. Periaswami And Others

    A.D Koshal, J.:— One Arumugham was employed with the petitioner as a workman and, while on duty, died as a result of a fall from a tractor on 29 October, 1969. His mother filed a claim for Rs. 3,500 under the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), before the Commissioner having jurisdiction, but the same was contested by the petitioner. During the pendency of that claim with the Commissioner, Arumugham's mother also died, whereafter her son Periaswami (respondent 1) and her two daughters. Thailammal and Anjalai (respondents 2 and 3 respectively) made a joint application to the Commissioner praying that they be substituted for their mother as her legal representatives. That application was also contested by the petitioner but was accepted by the Commissioner with a finding that the right to the claim survived to the three respondents and that they were entitled to be substituted as legal representatives for their mother.

    2. The order of the Commissioner is dated 30 January, 1972, and it is that order by which the petitioner feels aggrieved and which he has attacked under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that it be quashed by a writ of certiorari.

    3. This petition originally came up for hearing before me sitting singly and it was then contended in support of it that compensation payable under the Act could be claimed only by the injured workman or in case of this death, by a body of persons described by the Act as “dependants,” and not by any other person, that admittedly none of the respondents was a dependant within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act and that the application made by the respondents before the Commissioner for substitution of their names as their mother's legal representatives, was liable to be rejected. Reference in this connexion was made to various provisions of the Act and specially to S. 9 which, inter alia, bars the devolution by operation of law of any lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under the Act to any person other than “the workman” and to Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 which defines “a workman” and states that any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. This contention was sought to be met by the dicta in various judgments more particularly the one in Ikkassintakath Abdurahiman v. Nadakkavu Malikkal Beeran Koya [(1938) I M.L.J 571], to the effect that the latter part of S. 9 according to which no lump sum or half-monthly payment shall pass to any person other than the workman, applies only to a workman who is in existence when the time for payment comes and not to one who died before compensation was awarded. As no reference to the definition of workman as appearing in the Act was made by the learned Judges who decided that case which, in my opinion, made all the difference to the determination of the point in dispute, I referred to case for decision to a Full Bench and that is how we are now seized of it.

    4. Section 9 of the Act reads thus:

    “Save as provided by this Act, no lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under this Act shall in any way be capable of being assigned or charged or be liable to attachment or pass to any person other than the workman by operation of law, nor shall any claim be set off against the same.”

    In holding this section to be limited in application to the case of an existing workman, Venkataramana Rao and Abdur Rahman, JJ., who constituted the Bench in the Madras case, reasoned thus:

    “Section 9 also has no bearing on the facts of the particular case. The first part of that section provides that no lump sum or half-monthly payment payable under the Act is capable of being alienated or subjected to attachment. This is for the purpose of securing the benefit which the Workman's Compensation Act is intended to provide for the workman or the dependants of the workman. This part of the section has, therefore, no application to the present case. The other part of the section in S. 9 is that no lump sum or half-monthly payment shall pass to any person other than the workman. This contemplates that the compensation is payable to a workman and cannot be claimed by any person by operation of law. Therefore, before that clause can come into operation, there must be an existing workman to whom it is payable and it his no application to a case where the workman died before the award of compensation. In the case of a workman who is alive and to whom the compensation is payable, the Act says that it must be paid to him and it should not go to any other person; for example, if he becomes an insolvent, his trustee in bankruptcy cannot claim the sum for the benefit of his creditors. This section, therefore, has no application to this case where the property has been allotted to Pethumma, the mother of the workman who is a dependant under the Act. It has become her property; it has been recognized to be her property by the said compensation money being invested in the post office savings bank by the order, dated 26 September, 1936.”

    With all respect to the learned Judges who constituted the Bench these observations do not appear to me to lay down the law correctly. In the first place, no reason is assigned by them for limiting the expression “the workman” to a workman who is alive and for refusing to extend it to the case of one who is dead, even though transfer by inheritance is a recognized mode of devolution by operation of law. In my opinion, there is no valid reason for restricting the meaning of the expression “pass to any person other than the workman by operation of law” which should be given its ordinary meaning, viz., that in no case the sums mentioned shall stand transferred to a person other than the workman by reason of any legal provision. In other words, the expression is intended to shut out completely the passage of the right of compensation to persons other than the workman. In the second place, the assumption of the Bench that the section could in terms apply only to a case of an existing workman appears to have been made by reason of the provisions of Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 not having been brought to its notice. That clause is extracted below:

    “‘workman’ means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is—

    (i) a railway servant as defined in S. 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Sch. II; or

    (ii) employed on monthly wages not exceeding Rs. 1,000 in any such capacity as is specified in Sch. II;

    whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them.”

    The concluding part of the clause which states that any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them, is very significant. For all practical purposes it enlarges the definition of “workman” so as to bring within is compass the dependants of the workman and when this part of the clause is brought to bear on the interpretation of S. 9, the relevant part of that section would surely be readable thus:

    “… or pass by operation of law to any person except the workman (who has been injured) and (where the workman is dead) his dependants.”

    5. This means that if S. 9 is interpreted in the light of the definition in the said Cl. (n), that section should apply not only to a workman who is alive and to whom compensation is payable but also to one who is dead and whose dependants are not in a position to receive the compensation. The word “workman” as occurring in S. 9 would thus mean the workman himself if he is alive and his dependants if he is not. The opinion to the contrary expressed in the Bench decision having been arrived at without a reference to that definition must be held to have been based on an erroneous reading of S. 9 which rules out the passing of compensation by succession to heirs of a deceased workman who are not his dependants.

    6. The interpretation of S. 9 just above arrived at by me finds support from the object and various other sections of the Act. Prior to the passing of the Act, a workman who suffered injury had no remedy except when his case entitled him to damages under the law of torts. It was the Act which entitled him to compensation for injury and to his dependants for his death in case such injury or death had resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The preamble to the Act reads:

    “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident; it is hereby enacted as follows”.

    The object of the Act was thus to make provision for the payment of compensation to a workman only, i.e, to the concerned employee himself in case of his surviving the injury in question and to his dependants in the case of his death [this being so in view of the definition contained in Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2] and to nobody else (as would appear from the discussion which follows). Section 3 of the Act provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation “in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” This section is completely silent about the person to whom compensation is payable. Section 4 deals with quantum of compensation which is to be assessed with reference to the provisions of Schs. I and IV to the Act. This section is also silent as aforesaid and when coupled with the provisions of Sch. IV makes compensation payable in a lump sum when the injury in question results in death or permanent total disablement of the worker involved in the accident and through half-monthly payments when such injury causes only temporary disablement. Section 4A lays down, inter alia, that compensation under S. 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. This section also does not mention the person or persons entitled to the compensation and the same is true of Ss. 5 to 7 which deal with the method of calculating wages, review and commutation of half-monthly payments. Then comes S. 8 which may be quoted here in extenso.

    “8. (1) No payment of compensation in respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death, and no payment of a lump-sum as compensation to a woman or a person under a legal disability, shall be made otherwise than by deposit with the Commissioner, and no such payment made directly by an employer shall be deemed to be a payment of compensation:

    Provided that, in the case of a deceased workman, an employer may make to any dependant advances on account of compensation not exceeding an aggregate of Rs. 100, and so much of such aggregate as does not exceed the compensation payable to that dependant shall be deducted by the Commissioner from such compensation and repaid to the employer.

    (2) Any other sum amounting to not less than Rs. 10 which is payable as compensation may be deposited with the Commissioner on behalf of the person entitled thereto.

    (3) The receipt of the Commissioner shall be a sufficient discharge in respect of any compensation deposited with him.

    (4) On the deposit of any money under Sub-sec. (1), as compensation in respect of a deceased workman the Commissioner shall deduct therefrom the actual cost of the workman's funeral expenses, to an amount not exceeding Rs. 50, and pay the same to the person by whom such expenses were incurred, and shall, if he thinks necessary, cause notice to be published or to be served on each dependant in such manner as he thinks fit, calling upon the dependants to appear before him on such date as he may fix for determining the distribution of the compensation. If the Commissioner is satisfied, after any inquiry which he may deem necessary, that no dependant exists, he shall repay the balance of the money to the employer by whom it was paid. The Commissioner shall, on application by the employer, furnish a statement showing in detail all disbursements made.

    (5) Compensation deposited in respect of a deceased workman shall, subject to any deduction made under Sub-sec. (4), be apportioned among the dependants of the deceased workman or any of them in such proportion as the Commissioner thinks fit, or may, in the discretion of the Commissioner, be allotted to any one dependant.

    (6) Where any compensation deposited with the Commissioner is payable to any person, the Commissioner shall, if the person to whom the compensation is payable is not a woman or a person under a legal disability, and may, in other cases, pay the money to the person entitled thereto.

    (7) Where any lumpsum deposited with the Commissioner is payable to a woman or a person under a legal disability, such sum may be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with for the benefit of the woman, or of such person during his disability, in such manner as the Commissioner may direct; and where a half-monthly payment is payable to any person under a legal disability, the Commissioner may, of his own motion or on an application made to him in this behalf, order that the payment be made during the disability to any dependant of the workman or to any other person, whom the Commissioner thinks best fitted to provide for the welfare of the workman.

    (8) Where, on application made to him in this behalf or otherwise, the Commissioner is satisfied that, on account of neglect of children on the part of a parent or on account of the variation of the circumstances of any dependant or for any other sufficient cause, an order of the Commissioner as to the distribution of any sum paid as compensation or as to the manner in which any sum payable to any such dependant is to be invested, applied or otherwise dealt with, ought to be varied, the Commissioner may make such orders for the variation of the former order as he thinks just in the circumstances of the case:

    Provided that no such order prejudicial to any person shall be made unless such person has been given an opportunity of showing cause why the order should not be made, or shall be made in any case in which it would involve the repayment by a dependant of any sum already paid to him.

    (9) Where the Commissioner varies any order under Sub-sec. (8) by reason of the fact that payment of compensation to any person has been obtained by fraud, impersonation or other improper means, any amount so paid to or on behalf of such person may be recovered in the manner hereinafter provided in S. 31.”

    Under Sub-sec. (1) of this section lumpsums payable as compensation—

    (a) In respect of a workman whose injury has resulted in death; or

    (b) to a woman or a person under a legal disability;

    must be deposited with the Commissioner and cannot be paid directly by the employer. The sub-section would embrace lumpsums payable to the dependants in case of the workman's death as a result of the injury as also in the case of his death not resulting from the injury. In other words, the sub-section would come into play in the case of a workman whose injury has resulted in death, in the case of a workman who has not died as a result of the injury, but is a woman or a person under a legal disability and also in the case of a workman who dies otherwise than as the remit of an injury but whose dependant entitled to the compensation is a woman or a person under a legal disability. Sub-section (2) then enables employers to deposit with the Commissioner any sum payable as compensation which is not less than Rs. 10 even though it is not compulsorily depositable with him under Sub-sec. (1) Sub-sections (4) and (5) enumerate persons to whom compensation is payable and these sub-sections comprize the only provisions dealing with that subject. According to Sub-secs. (4) and (5) the compensation deposited under Sub-sec. (1) in respect of the workman whose injury has resulted in death or who is otherwise dead the expression used is “the deceased workman” in contradistinction to the expression “a workman whose injury has resulted in death” which appears in Sub-sec. (1) is payable as follows:

    (a) Cost of the workman's funeral expenses not exceeding Rs. 50 is payable to the person by whom such expenses were incurred.

    (b) If there are any dependants of the deceased workman the compensation is to be apportioned among them in such proportion as the Commissioner thinks fits.

    (c) If no dependants exist, the balance of compensation (after the payment of funeral expenses as aforesaid) is to be returned by the Commissioner to the employer.

    Sub-sections (6) and (7) deal with the manner of payment when the person entitled thereto is a woman or a person under a legal disability and also when such is not the case. Sub-sections (8) and (9) give the Commissioner the power to vary an order of apportionment or mode of payment.

    7. This analysis of the provisions of S. 8, especially that of Sub-sec. (4) which enjoins refund of the compensation to the employer in case no dependants are forthcoming, leaves no room for doubt that the Act was not intended to benefit any person except the workman and his dependants. And there are good reasons for the object of the Act being so restricted. As already stated, prior to the enforcement of the Act a workman had no remedy in respect of an injury arising from an accident attributable to his employment unless he was entitled to damages in tort. It was the Act which for the first time provided a remedy, for accidental injuries to a workman even though his employer could not be held responsible, therefore, and even though it had resulted from an accident for which perhaps the workman himself was to blame. It was in these circumstances reasonable to extend the benefit which the Act provided for the workman himself in respect of the injury to his dependants only and to no others. The expression “dependant” is thus defined in Cl. (d) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act:

    “‘dependant’ means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely:

    (i) a widow, a miner legitimate son, an unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother;

    (ii) if wholly dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death a son or a daughter who has attained the age of eighteen years and who is infirm; and

    (iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death—

    (a) a widower;

    (b) a parent other than a widowed mother;

    (c) a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter legitimate or illegitimate if married and a minor or if widowed and a minor;

    (d) a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor;

    (e) a widowed daughter-in-law;

    (f) a minor child of a pre-deceased son;

    (g) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive; or

    (h) a paternal grand-parent if no parent of the workman is alive”

    A look at this definition of the term “dependant” would show that it is not intended to benefit all the heirs of a deceased workman, but to embrace only those relations who, to some extent, depend upon him for their daily necessities, so much so that even some of the nearest and dearest ones, viz., sons who have attained majority, married daughters, and an illegitimate daughter, whether married or unmarried are excluded if they were not dependant on the worker's earnings, wholly or in part, kinship coupled with dependency, is thus made the sole criterion for a person to fall within the ambit of the definition. And if that be so, there is no reason why the benefit of the Act should go to heirs other than “dependants” and S. 9 coupled with the definition in Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 be given a restricted meaning in derogation of the language used by the Legislature. To hold otherwise and to extend the benefit of the Act to the legal representatives of the deceased workman or of the dependants would be to burden the employer with liability not flowing from the object which the Act sought to achieve and to pass the benefit provided by the Act to persons altogether outside the class contemplated by it.

    8. Further assistance in this regard is available from the provisions of S. 23 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. That section is reproduced below:

    “The Commissioner shall have all the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purpose of taking evidence on oath (which such Commissioner is hereby empowered to impose) and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of S. 195, and of Chap. XXV, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.”

    Rules 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 (hereinafter called the rules), lays down:

    “Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or these rules the following provisions of Sch. I to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, namely, those contained in Order V, rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX; Order XIII, rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XXIII, rules 1 and 2, shall apply to proceedings before Commissioners, in so far as they may be applicable thereto:

    Provided that—

    (a) for the purpose of facilitating the application of the said provisions the Commissioner may construe them with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adapt them to the matter before him; and

    (b) the Commissioner may, for sufficient reasons, proceed otherwise than in accordance with the said provision, if he is satisfied that the interests of the parties will not thereby be prejudiced.”

    A combined effect of S. 23 of the Act and rule 41 of the rules is that only certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and not others have been made applicable to proceedings under the Act. Order XXII which deals with legal representation in cases where parties to proceedings die is conspicuous by its absence from rule 41 and lends further strength to the conclusion above arrived at that such representation was not contemplated in a case falling under the Act.

    9. I shall now take up for consideration the other cases cited at the Bar in support of the stand of the respondents. The first of them is Pasupati Dutt v. Kelvin Jute Mills [A.I.R 1937 Cal. 495], decided by Derbysire, C.J, and B.K Mukherjea, J. Reference by the learned Judges was made to the previsions of Ss. 2(1)(d), 3(1), 4(1) and 8 of the Act which they proceeded to interpret in conformity with the decision reported as United Collieries, Ltd. v. Simpson [1909 A.C 383], a case under the English Workmen's Compensation Act wherein the House of Lords held that the right to compensation for injuries suffered by a workman who is dead passes to the executor of a sole dependant who had died without having made a claim. The provisions of S. 9 and of Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act, however, were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges and provisions analogous thereto were not to be found in the English statute which, on the other hand, as it then stood, contained in S. 13 a definition of “workman,” the concluding portion which is as follows:

    “any reference to a workman who has been injured shall where the workman is dead, include a reference to his legal personal representative or to his dependants or other person to whom or for whose benefit compensation is payable.” (Italicizing mine);

    The effect of this part of the definition clearly is to include a legal personal representative of a deceased workman in the body of persons to whom the English Act made compensation payable. The words “legal personal representative” were perhaps advisedly omitted by our Legislature when the Act was promulgated and this difference between the two statutes would make the dictum of United Collieries case (vide supra), inapplicable to the interpretation of the Act. It is noteworthy that the English Act was replaced and re-enacted in 1925 and the law laid down in United Collieries case (vide supra), was deliberately altered by the English Legislature through a provision contained in S. 2(3) of the new Act. That section reads:

    “Where a dependant dies before a claim under this Act is made, or if a claim has been made before an agreement or award has been arrived at or made, the legal personal representative of the dependant shall have no right to payment of compensation and the amount of compensation shall be calculated and apportioned as if that dependant had died before the workman.”

    The Calcutta Division Bench did note this change, but acted on United Collieries case (vide supra), with an observation that there was no provisions in the Act corresponding to S. 2(3) of the English Act. Really this erroneous observation stemmed from the fact that provisions of S. 9 and of Cl. (n) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act were not brought to their notice. It is on that account that their judgment must be held to be erroneous.

    10. My comment on the Calcutta case applies equally to Radhakrishna Rice Mill v. G. Appalacharyulu [(1958) 1 An. W.R 316], decided by Manohar Pershad, J., who noted the definition of the term “dependant” in S. 2(1)(d) as also the provisions of Ss. 3, 4 and 8 of the Act. In regard to S. 9, however, he merely said:

    “Section 9 refers to non-assignment and non-attachment of compensation amount.”

    The relevant part of S. 9 under which the passing of compensation by operation of law to any person other than the workman is barred does not appear to have been brought to his notice, nor again the definition of workman in S. 2(1)(n). He did note that under S. 8 none except the dependants had a right to compensation but then went on to say:

    “A duty to refund the amount of compensation arises only when there is no dependant ‘in existence’ and this must mean, ‘in existence’ at the time of the workman's death, i.e, at the time of the death of Bullemma. To put any other interpretation would be to frustrate the object of the Act, and place the right to compensation on an uncertain contingency. The contention of Sri Neti Subrahmanyam is that the dependant does not get any vested right and till the amount is actually distributed it cannot be said that the dependant acquired any right. This argument is equally devoid of force. As stated earlier, after the deposit is made by the employer, the Commissioner has to find out who the dependants are so that he might effect the distribution of compensation money among them. It is, therefore, clear that once an allotment of compensation to a dependant or distribution of compensation money amount to several other dependants is made, the compensation allotted becomes the property of the dependants and if the dependants dies, the said amount being his property would devolve on his or her heirs.”

    For this conclusion the learned Judge found support from the Madras and Calcutta decisions above discussed and also from United Collieries case [1909 A.C 383] (vide supra). I have already shown that out of three cases last mentioned, the first two do not lay down good law, and the same is true of the Andhra case in which also the provisions really relevant to the determination of the point in dispute were not noticed.

    11. The next case cited on behalf of the respondents is Santoline Fernandes v. Mackinnon Mackenzie and company [(1967) 34 F.J.R 124]. the discussion in which suffers from the same draw back as attended the Calcutta decision above cited and which makes no reference to Ss. 2(1)(n) and 9 of the Act, but, on the other hand, follows United Collieries case [1909 A.C 383] (vide supra), in holding that the liability under the Act

    “is created immediately on the accident occurring to the workman suffering injury and must amount to a debt payable to the workman”

    and, therefore, forms a part of his estate which is heritable.

    12. The last case from which support was sought by learned counsel for the respondents is Manubhai and Company v. Babajee [(1969) 38 F.J.R 528], in which K.K Desai, J., held that the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the Limitation Act not having been made applicable to applications for compensation made under the Act, there is nothing in law to suggest that applications for compensations under the Act cannot be continued by heirs of deceased applicants. In this connexion, he observed:

    “There is no time fixed within which heirs of deceased applicants must come on record to enable them to continue the applications originally filed by deceased applicants. Applications filed under the above Act being for recovery of money must be held to be in respect of rights to debts which survive to heirs of deceased applicants. As the right to the debt was not personal right of the deceased applicant, the opponent as his widow was entitled to continue the original application in her own right. The debt survived to the opponent and was claimable by her. As the debt survived, the application cannot be held to have abated at any date. This is so because the provisions in Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure are not made applicable to applications made under the Act.”

    These observations were made without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act which, as already shown by me negative the rights of the heirs of a deceased workman or dependant to legal representation.

    13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is accepted and the impugned order is quashed. In view of the complicated question of law involved, the parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.

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