1. In all these revision petitions, the common question involved is whether in a petition filed under S. 14(1)(b) of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, if the landlady dies pending its; disposal, is it open to her legal representatives to bring themselves on record for continuing the proceedings, when the undertaking to be given under S. 14 (2) is claimed to be personal in nature?
2. Both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority having held that the legal representatives could continue the proceedings, these Revision Petitions have been preferred by the respective tenants under late Syed Beevi. It is not in dispute that she was the landlady as defined under S. 2(6) of the Act in respect of the respecs tive premises. She filed eviction petition-under S. 14(1)(b) and when they were pending disposal, she died on 2-7-1986. Equally, it is not in dispute that the second respondent is her husband and respondents 3 to 5 are their children. A claim is put forth by tenants that second respjndent is in Sri Lanka and, therefore, he could not have any rights but this aspect cannot be decided in these petitions. It is admitted that except these four persons, there are no other legal heirs to late Syed Beevi. Yet, their, impleadment is opposed mainly on the sole plea, that, when an undertaking in S. 14(2) will have to be given and when the said undertaking could be confined only to Syed Beevi, the dictum ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’ will apply, and, therefore, on her death, the petitions filed by her would come to an end and that if her legal heirs want to avail themselves of the benefits under S. 14(1)(b), they will have to file fresh petitions in their own right, as landlord, as defined in S. 2(6).
3. Mr. R.S Venkatachari, learned counsel for petitioners, in his lengthy submissions, would go to the extent of claiming that the Rent Controller is a court, and therefore, the provisions of S. 4, C.P.C, would apply, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary found in the Act or the Rules. Making a beginning from this point, he has proceeded further to rely upon Legal Representatives Act, Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act, Civil Procedure Code, etc. In more than one decision it has been held that the Rent Controller is not a civil court, and this was pointed out in Lakshmiammal v. Elumalai Chettiar 93 L.W 492=1980-II-M.L.J 480. When Rules have been framed under the Act, as to what procedure, the learned Rent Controller will hare to follow, it cannot be held that the provision of the Civil Procedure Code will apply. Equally it cannot be held that without filing an application for appointment of a guardian and without an order being passed to bring on record the legal representatives following the prescribed procedure in Civil Procedure Code, the Rent Controller cannot hear a petition of this nature by relying upon S. 27(1) of the Act. Hence, this contention is without any substance. As to what could be done in a proceeding initiated under the Act when the petitioner dies, is specifically provided under S. 27(1) of the Act as follows:
‘Any application made, appeal preferred, or proceeding taken, under this Act, by or against any person, may, in the event of his death, be continued by or against his legal representatives.”
In the earlier enactment, there was no provision made to this effect. It shows the legislative intention that in respect of each and every proceeding that could be initiated under the Act, a legal representative could be brought on record to continue the petitions. There is nothing to’ infer in the said section that it could be confined only to all sorts of petitions, except a petition filed under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. In the absence of any such distinction existing, it has to beheld that S. 27(1) will also apply to the petition filed under S. 14(1)(b).
4. The next contention is that since an undertaking has to be given by the landlady under S. 14(2), which is to the following effect:
“No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed—
(a) on the ground specified in Cl. (a) of sub-S.(1), unless the landlord gives an undertak ing that the building shall, on completion of the repairs, be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-S.(1) for his re-occupation before the expiry of three months from the date of recovery of possession by the landlord, or before the expiry of such fur ther period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow; or
(b) on the ground specified in Cl.(b) of sub S (1), unless the landlord gives an undertak ing that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month an shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for rea sons to be recorded in writing allow.”
and when it partakes the nature of a personal undertaking by her, on her death, it comes to an end under the dictum, ‘actio personalis moritur cum personal There is a misconception in this plea because the undertaking by the landlady is with reference to the property, which she undertakes to demolish and construct. Giving an undertaking is a statutory compulsion which will have to be done with reference to the petition property by the landlady or or the landlord, as the case may be. Under S. 2(6), the wider concept of ‘landlord’ having been conceived, and on the death of Syed Beevi, her legal representatives having become landlords; they have the right to continue the proceeding initiated by her and will be bound by all acts of statutory undertakings given by her. Once such statutory undertaking is recorded or incorporated in the petition, it will be bind ing upon her legal representatives. It is not a personal undertaking given out of her volition, but one which statutorily compels her to give in relation to the property, if relief is sought for under S. 14(1)(b). In its absence, the petition is not maintainable. Therefore, the claim that it is a personal covenant by her is not acceptable.
5. Learned counsel for petitioners relies upon the following decisions :—A learned single Judge of this Court in Mohamed tb-rahim v. Rahiman Khan in dealing with the provisions of Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, took the view that an order directing eviction is one for the personal benefit of the landlord and it is not capable of execution after his death, and, therefore, if the legal representatives desire to ask for eviction against the tenant, they can do so on a proper application being made to the Rent Controller because S. 7A(5) of the Rent Control Order is not a bar to such an application. It was also held that an executing Court can question executabtlity of the decree by enquiring whether the decree is a personal one or not.
6. He would then refer to another decision in Thimvengadasami Naidu v. Nachiappa 1968-I-M.LJ 145 wherein the learned Judge dealing with the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, held that a purchaser of property during the pendency of an eviction petition for wilful default in payment of rent could continue the proceedings, as a successor-in-interest It was also pointed out therein that whenever there is a personal requirement of the landlord, such as owners' occupation, his legal representatives can continue the proceedings. This view was arrived at by relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shah Dhanaraj Kantilal v. Additional Judge Small Came Court, Madras 1949-2-M.L.J 38 N.R.C which took the view that a landlord's son would become the landlord on the death of the landlord, and hence, he could claim the benefit of default which occurred during the lifetime of his father. Another decision relied upon therein is repotted in Shanmugham v. Satyanarayana Prasad 77 L.W 353 = 1964-2-M.L.J 96. in which it was held that when a landlord obtains an order of eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, but sells the property, the order of eviction is enforceable at the instance of the purchaser.
7. In D.N Sanghavi and Sorts v. Ambalal 1974-3-S.C.R 55=1975-1-S.C.C 708. in construing the words ‘his business’ in S. 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, it was held that if the partnership deed excludes a sleeping partner expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm's business, it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupatiou by way of business. This decision is confined to the interpretation of the said words in that Act, and does not lay down any general proposition of law, as to whether successors-in-interest could derive benefits of petition alreadv filed for eviction under stated grounds. None of these decisions relied upon advances the claim of petitioners that the covenant is a personal covenant.
8. As pointed out by the appellate authority the decision in Shantilal Takordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Teeval A.I.R 1976 S.C 2358=1977-1-S.C.R 341 has made it quite clear that in matters of this nature, the right of the landlord on his death does not cease and that it could be availed of by members of his family. It was a case in which the landlord has asked for possession of the premises for occupation by himself and members of his family. Therefore, even when the claim was for personal occupation, it having been held that his lawful heirs could continue the petition, the decision in Mohamed Ibrahim v. Rahiman Khan is no longer good law. As pointed out above S. 27(I) specifically provides for continuance of proceedings by the legal representatives. Further, this aspect has been cleared by this Court in Govindaraj v. Venfcateswara Rao 85 L.W 280=1972-II-M.L.J 231 and Thiruvengadasami Naidu v. Nachiapan by holding that legal representatives can continue the proceedings under the Act, which will necessarily include the proceedings filed under S. 14(1)(b). It is then claimed by learned counsel for petitioners that minors without a guardian being appointed cannot give an undertaking in that, as provided in the Civil Procedure Code, a guardianship petition ought to have been filed. By referring to Mulla's Mohamedan Law at page 374, it is claimed by respondent's counsel that the father is a de facto guardian and hence he could act and give undertaking on behalf of his minor children. On impleadment, they are represented only by their father as guardian. Hypertechnicalities are not to be inducted in proceedings initiated under the Act. The Act itself was passed for a summary manner of resolving disputes between landlords and tenants. It is quite unfortunate that by entrusting these matters with the Judiciary it had led to these matters being agitated, even beyond what is done in civil courts (sic) Under the Act any person could be appointed as Rent Control proceedings pending for ten years and 15 years could been avoided. This is one instance to show that there is a keen desire to made the procedure to be adopted in these matters as complicated as it could be, so that the successful party would not get relief in his lifetime.
9. Therefore when none of the points raised by learned counsel for petitioners could be accepted, particularly in view of the decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Teiwala these petitions are dismissed with costs in each petition.
KA/VCS.