AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Civil Procedure Code including Order 6, Rule 17, Order 12 Rule 6, Order 1 Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • fit.3. Section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (for short, Bombay Rent Act)
  • Order 6, Rule 17, Order 8 Rule 5, Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code and section 58 of the Evidence Act,
  • section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act and even section 29(4) of the Bombay Rent Act,
  • Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, Maharashtra Rent Act)
  • Order 6, Rule 17 and Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code
  • CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT
  • section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Act
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ORDER 6 RULE 17 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of Bombay Rent Act
  • side.16. Order 6, Rule 17
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Civil Procedure Code including Order 6, Rule 17, Order 12 Rule 6, Order 1 Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • fit.3. Section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (for short, Bombay Rent Act)
  • Order 6, Rule 17, Order 8 Rule 5, Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code and section 58 of the Evidence Act,
  • section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act and even section 29(4) of the Bombay Rent Act,
  • Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, Maharashtra Rent Act)
  • Order 6, Rule 17 and Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code
  • CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT
  • section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Act
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • ORDER 6 RULE 17 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of Bombay Rent Act
  • side.16. Order 6, Rule 17
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (original defendant) challenged an order dated 7 July 2008 of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay. That impugned order allowed a revision and thereby permitted the respondent-plaintiff to amend the plaint. The trial Judge had earlier, by an interim notice order dated 8 February 2008 (interim notice 2014/2007), rejected the plaintiff's amendment application on the ground that it was inconsistent with existing averments, would cause prejudice and injustice to the other side, and that pleadings were complete and issues framed; the opinion notes that no affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief had been filed at the time the amendment application was moved.

The respondent-plaintiff had moved to amend the plaint to give better particulars of subsequent developments in consonance with existing pleadings. The respondent-plaintiff's revision application (challenging the trial court's rejection) was opposed on the ground that a revision against such an interlocutory order is not tenable and that the amendment would substantially affect the rights of the plaintiff.

The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the appellate bench's order allowing the revision and permitting amendment. The High Court reviewed statutory provisions (section 34(4) Maharashtra Rent Act and section 29(3) Bombay Rent Act) and numerous authorities before concluding that the impugned order was within the framework of law. The petition was dismissed; the application for stay of the impugned order was rejected; parties were directed to carry out the amendment within six weeks and consequential amendment was permitted. No order as to costs was made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Revision (under the Maharashtra Rent Act / Bombay Rent Act) is tenable/maintainable against an interlocutory order allowing or disallowing amendment to pleadings where no appeal lies.
  2. Whether the impugned order allowing amendment to the plaint was "in accordance with law" and therefore sustainable under the revisional jurisdiction conferred by section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act (and section 29(3) of the Bombay Rent Act).
  3. What legal principles govern allowance or refusal of amendment of pleadings (including interplay of Order 6 Rule 17, Order 12 Rule 6, and related CPC provisions) and how those principles affect revisional jurisdiction in rent control matters.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The amendment application was to give better particulars of subsequent developments in consonance with pleadings already in the plaint.
  • The amendment was necessary for deciding the suit and was consistent with the original pleadings; it did not raise an alternative or inconsistent plea nor change the grounds of the suit.
  • The amendment would not cause prejudice to the other side and was required to properly adjudicate the controversy.

Petitioner (original defendant)'s Arguments / Opposition

  • The trial court correctly rejected the amendment application as inconsistent with existing averments and causing prejudice, particularly because pleadings were complete and issues were framed and no affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief had been filed when the amendment was moved.
  • The Revision against such an interlocutory order is not tenable (i.e., not maintainable) and that the amendment substantially affects the rights of the plaintiff — an argument used to oppose the respondent's revision application in the court below and pressed in the writ petition context.
  • The petitioner sought stay of the appellate bench's order permitting amendment (this stay application was rejected by the High Court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sukhdev Prasad Raghubir… v. Rambhujarat Kshampati… (1983 Mh. L.J 9 : 1982 (1) BCR 832, D.B.) Authority addressing amendment of pleadings and whether revision against an amendment order is maintainable; held that revision against interlocutory/procedural amendment order is not maintainable but orders substantially affecting rights can be challenged in revision. The Court noted this authority but distinguished and reconciled it with other authorities holding revision maintainable where substantial rights are affected; it formed part of the survey of conflicting authorities on maintainability.
Sayarabi Sayyad Abdul Ajij (Deceased) through L.Rs v. Shri Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid, 2004 (5) Mh. L.J 570 : 2004 (4) All M.R 581 (S.B.) Held that if an order allowing amendment affects substantial rights of parties and is not merely procedural, a revision against such order is maintainable. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that revision is maintainable where substantial rights are affected, and used it to justify entertaining the revision under the Rent Act provisions.
Dondapati Narayan Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy, (2001) 8 SCC 115 Principle: amendments should generally be allowed unless permitting amendment would be unjust or prejudicial in a manner that cannot be compensated by costs; courts must consider whether amendment is barred by time, prejudice, or affects accrued rights. The Court cited this authority for the general rule that amendment should be permitted unless clear prejudice exists, using it in its analysis of amendment jurisprudence.
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi, (2006) 4 SCC 385 Explains object of the rule: Courts should try merits and allow amendments necessary for determining the real question in controversy (Order 6 Rule 17); distinction between discretionary and imperative parts of the rule. The Court used these observations to reinforce the liberal approach to amendments and to discuss the legal framework governing amendments (Order 6 Rule 17).
Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 198 Courts should be extremely liberal in granting amendments unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. Referenced to support the proposition that amendment applications are to be liberally allowed absent serious prejudice.
Usha Balasaheb Swami v. Kiran Appaso Swami, (2007) 5 SCC 602 Distinguishes amendment of plaint and written statement: amendments to plaint that alter cause of action are objectionable; amendments to written statement are viewed more liberally. The Court relied on this to explain differing standards for amendment of plaints versus written statements and to guide assessment of the present plaint-amendment application.
Andhra Bank v. ABN Amro Bank N.V., (2007) 6 SCC 167 Holds that additional grounds of defence in an amended written statement are permissible. Cited to illustrate that amendments adding grounds of defence to written statements can be granted; part of broader amendment jurisprudence surveyed by the Court.
Gautam Samp v. Leela Jetly, (2008) 7 SCC 85 Discusses Order 6 Rule 17, Order 8 Rule 5, Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and Section 58 Evidence Act; factors for amendment include whether claimant intends to resile from express admission, and whether explanation/clarification of admissions is possible. Used by the Court to emphasize factors a court must consider in allowing an amendment and that categorical admissions cannot be resiled from without scope for explanation.
Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 7 Authority cited on the caution against allowing amendments that resile from admissions and on relevant factors such as delay and laches. Referred to support the principle that delay/laches and admissions are relevant in amendment applications.
Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 All amendments ought to be allowed which (a) do not work injustice to the other side and (b) are necessary for determining real questions in controversy. Quoted (through later authorities) as a foundational statement of the two conditions for allowing amendments; the Court relied on it in summarizing settled principles.
Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166 Referenced among authorities elucidating the principles governing amendment of pleadings. Used to reinforce settled principles regarding amendment jurisprudence.
North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (Dead) by LRs., (2008) 8 SCC 511 Reiterates principles governing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17: amendments permitted unless (a) injustice to the other side, or (b) not necessary for determining real questions in controversy. Cited to summarize well-settled tests and to support the Court's approach to amendment applications in the present case.
Shanti v. Homes Insurance Co., (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719 Even discretionary orders (such as amendment orders) may be interfered with by appellate courts where the order is insupportable in law or is unjust. Invoked to show appellate/revisional courts can intervene against unsupportable discretionary orders.
Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 Explains proviso to Rule 17: after commencement of trial, amendment applications are generally barred unless due diligence is shown for failure to raise matter earlier; delay and laches are relevant. Cited to underline constraints on post-trial commencement amendments and the requirement of due diligence in such situations.
G. Nagamma v. Siromanamma (1996) 2 SCC 25 Authority referred to for the proposition that even by amending a plaint, a party can seek relief alternatively; cited for legal position on amendment scope. Quoted in the appellate bench's reasoning (reproduced in the opinion) to support that amendments can allow alternative reliefs consistent with pleadings.
Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546 Mandate that judges administer law according to provisions of law and discern legislative intention; judicial decisions must conform to law, not personal notions. Cited to emphasize that orders must be in accordance with law and that revisional courts must enforce legal norms.
G.L. Vijain v. K. Shankar, (2006) 13 SCC 136 Observations that revisional jurisdiction is in substance appellate and High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction; limitations in section 115 CPC not strictly applicable where statute provides wider revisional power. Relied upon to hold that section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act confers wider revisional powers than section 115 CPC and to justify revisional interference where statute permits.
Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2006) 4 SCC 713 Reiterates that revisional jurisdiction involves exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Cited to support the proposition that revisional courts effectively exercise appellate functions when reconsidering interlocutory orders under the Rent Act provisions.
Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, (2002) 6 SCC 1 Referenced in the context of revisional jurisdiction jurisprudence. Used as part of the chain of authorities showing revisional jurisdiction's appellate character.
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 Referenced for the proposition that revisional jurisdiction involves appellate jurisdiction. Part of the authorities relied upon to explain the nature of revisional jurisdiction.
Pacific Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. East India Hotels Ltd., 2004 (5) Mh. L.J 450 : 2005 (1) Bom. C.R 427 High Court authority concerning revision/appeal and amendment issues under Rent Act context. Referred to support the Court's conclusion that revision is maintainable under the Rent Act where conditions are met; used to reject a request for reference to a larger bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining (a) the statutory scheme under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act and the comparable provision in the Bombay Rent Act (section 29(3)), and (b) the line of authority on amendment of pleadings and the scope of revisional jurisdiction.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning were:

  1. Statutory scope: The Court interpreted section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act (and the corresponding provision in the Bombay Rent Act) as conferring a wider revisional power than the general revisional power under section 115 CPC. The provision permits the Bench or District Court to call for the case and pass such order as it thinks fit to satisfy itself that the decree or order was according to law.
  2. Review of authorities on amendment: The Court surveyed Supreme Court and High Court authorities which state the settled principles governing amendments (Order 6 Rule 17, Order 12 Rule 6 CPC etc.), including the liberal approach to amendments, the necessity to avoid injustice to the other side, and the distinct considerations applicable to amendments to plaints versus written statements.
  3. Reconciling conflicting authorities on maintainability of revision: The Court acknowledged earlier High Court decisions (e.g., Sukhdev Prasad) which indicated that revision against interlocutory/procedural orders is not maintainable but noted those same decisions also recognized that orders substantially affecting rights are challengeable in revision. The Court relied upon other authorities (e.g., Sayarabi, and multiple Supreme Court decisions) to hold that when an interlocutory order affects substantial rights and appeal is not available, revision is maintainable.
  4. Principle of "in accordance with law": The Court explained that the phrase "in accordance with law" includes multiple facets such as binding precedent, principles of natural justice, and procedural practice and procedure, particularly when substantial rights are affected. If an order is not in accordance with law or is perverse and no appeal lies, revision under section 34(4) is available.
  5. Application to present matter: The Court considered the impugned appellate bench order which had allowed the revision and permitted amendment after reviewing authorities (including G. Nagamma) and the trial court's findings. The High Court found the impugned order to be within the framework of law and record and therefore sustainable. The Court expressly kept all defence pleas/points open for adjudication in the main suit.
  6. Disposition and ancillary directions: The Court rejected the petitioner's submission for reference to a larger bench in light of the consistent Supreme Court and High Court precedents surveyed; dismissed the writ petition; refused to grant stay of the impugned order; and directed the parties to carry out the amendment within six weeks, permitting consequential amendment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed and the impugned order of 7 July 2008 (allowing the revision and permitting amendment to the plaint) is upheld. The application for stay of that order is rejected. Parties are directed to carry out the amendment within six weeks and consequential amendment is permitted. No order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The Court held that section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act provides wider revisional power than section 115 CPC; where appeal is not available and an order is not in accordance with law or affects substantial rights, revision is maintainable under the Rent Act.
  • The phrase "in accordance with law" was interpreted broadly to include adherence to binding precedent, principles of natural justice and proper procedure; an interlocutory or procedural order that is contrary to law or perverse may be revisited in revision jurisdiction.
  • The decision affirms the proposition that amendment applications should be judged in light of settled principles (including Order 6 Rule 17 and related provisions), and that revisional courts must exercise jurisdiction to correct orders not made in accordance with law even where those orders are interlocutory, provided statutory conditions are met.
  • Direct practical effect on the parties: the plaint amendment as allowed by the appellate bench stands and must be carried out within six weeks; all defence points remain open for adjudication in the main proceedings; no costs were awarded.
  • The Court refused to refer the issue to a larger bench, relying on the surveyed Supreme Court and High Court authorities as sufficient to decide maintainability and scope of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Act.

Order of the Court: Petition dismissed. No order as to costs. Prayer for stay rejected. Directions to carry out the amendment within six weeks and consequential amendment permitted.

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    Abeda Iqbal Patel v. Cormorant Investment Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai .

    Anoop V. Mohta, J.:— The petitioner-original defendant has challenged the impugned order dated 7th July, 2008 passed by the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court at Bombay, whereby, against an order in interim notice 2014/2007 dated 8-2-2008, passed by the learned trial Judge, has allowed an amendment application to the plaint by holding that the Revision is tenable.

    2. The application for amendment to give better particulars of subsequent developments in consonance with the pleadings already made in the plaint was moved by the respondent-plaintiff. The same was rejected by holding that it is inconsistent and contrary to the averments already made in the plaint and it would cause prejudice and injustice to the other side. The pleadings are completed and the issues are framed. But, no affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief filed, when the present application for amendment was moved. The respondent's-plaintiffs Revision Application against the said order was opposed by contending that the Revision under such interlocutory order is not tenable and also on the ground that it substantially affects the rights of the plaintiff.

    2. The relevant section/portion of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, “Maharashtra Rent Act”) is as under :—

    Section 34(4):— Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding in Brihan Mumbai, the Bench of two Judges specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) and elsewhere, the District Court, may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and the Bench or Court aforesaid or the District Judge or any Judge to whom the case may be referred by the District Judge, shall pass such order with respect thereto as it or he thinks fit.”

    3. Section 29(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (for short, “Bombay Rent Act”) read thus :—

    Section 29(3):— Where no appeal lies under this section from a decree or order in any suit or proceeding in Greater Bombay the Bench of two Judge specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) and elsewhere the District Court, may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law, call for the case in which such decree or order was made and (the Bench or Court aforesaid or the District Judge or any Judge to whom the case may be referred by the District Judge, shall) pass such order with respect thereto as (it or he thinks fit.)

    4. By the impugned order it is held that the Revision is tenable and thereby allowed the amendment application filed by the respondent-plaintiff. Therefore, the present Writ Petition by placing strong reliance mainly on the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 258 of 2007, dated 5th August, 2008, Sukhdev Prasad Raghubir… v. Rambhujarat Kshampati…., reported in 1983 Mh. L.J 9 : 1982 (1) BCR 832, (D.B). In these two judgments (supra) the orders of amendment to the pleadings were involved. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case in both these judgments, it is held that the Revision against the order of amendment being interlocutory and procedural in nature, not maintainable, but at the same stroke it is clearly observed in both these judgments that order which are substantially affecting the rights of the parties can be challenged in Revision.

    5. There are other judgments of this Court whereby, it has been held that a revision against an interlocutory order when the substantial rights are involved, and when appeal is not maintainable or barred, is maintainable. Even prior to this in Sayarabi Sayyad Abdul Ajij (Deceased) through L.Rs v. Shri Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid, 2004 (5) Mh. L.J 570 : 2004 (4) All M.R 581 (S.B), considering same provisions of Bombay Rent Act and the order allowing amendment, held that if such order affects substantial rights of parties, is not merely procedural order, the Revision against such order is maintainable.

    6. The Supreme Court in Dondapati Narayan Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayana Reddy, (2001) 8 SCC 115 has observed:—

    “The amendment should, generally, be allowed unless it is shown that permitting the amendment would be unjust and result in prejudice against the opposite side which cannot be compensated by costs or would deprive him of a right which has accrued to him with the lapse of time. Amendment may also be refused, if such a prayer made separately, is shown to be barred by time. Neither the trial Court nor the High Court has found the existence of any of the circumstances justifying the rejection of the prayer for amendment of the written statement. Whether or not the amendment is allowed, the trial Court is otherwise obliged to decide the validity of the disputed Will which is the basis of the suit filed by the plaintiff. We are of the opinion that the Courts below.”

    7. In Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K Modi, 2006 (4) Mh. L.J (SC) 719 : (2006) 4 SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under:—

    “15. The object of the rule is that the Courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side.

    16. Order 6, Rule 17 consists of two parts. Whereas the first part is discretionary (may) and leaves it to the Court to order amendment of pleading. The second part is imperative (shall) and enjoins the Court to allow all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.

    17. In our view, since the cause of action arose during the pendency of the suit, proposed amendment ought to have been granted because the basic structure of the suit has not changed and that there was merely change in the nature of relief claimed. We fail to understand if it is permissible for the appellants to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in the new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit.

    20. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleadings of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide. There is a plethora of precedents pertaining to the grant of refusal of permission for amendment of pleadings. The various decisions rendered by this Court and the proposition laid down therein are widely known. This Court has consistently held that the amendment to pleading should be liberally allowed since procedural obstacles ought not to impede the dispensation of justice.”

    8. In Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh, 2006 (5) Mh. L.J (SC) 634 : (2006) 6 SCC 198, the Apex Court has observed:—

    “Court should be extremely liberal for granting the prayers for amendment of pleadings unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side”.

    10. In Usha Balasaheb Swami v. Kiran Appaso Swami, 2007 (5) Mh. L.J (SC) 593 : (2007) 5 SCC 602, the Apex Court has further elaborated the General principle revolving around Order 6, Rule 17 and Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code with regard to the plaint and written statement and the difference in principle applicable to them. The relevant observations are as under:—

    “19. It is equally well-settled principle that a prayer for amendment of the plaint and a prayer for amendment of the written statement stand on different footings. The general principle that amendment of pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or substitute cause of action or the nature of claim applies to amendments to plaint. It has no counterpart in the principles relating to amendment of the written statement. Therefore, addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement would not be objectionable while adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action in the plaint may be objectionable.

    22. Keeping these principles in mind, namely, that in a case of amendment of a written statement the Courts would be more liberal in allowing than that of a plaint as the question of prejudice would be far less in the former than in the latter and addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement can also be allowed, we may now proceed to consider whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application for amendment of the written statement.”

    9. In Andhra Bank v. ABN Amro Bank N.V, (2007) 6 SCC 167, the Apex Court has observed that the additional ground of defence in amendment of written statement is permissible and it is accordingly granted.

    10. Recently, in Gautam Samp v. Leela Jetly, 2008 (5) Mh. L.J (SC) 545 : (2008) 7 SCC 85 while considering Order 6, Rule 17, Order 8 Rule 5, Order 12, Rule 6 of Civil Procedure Code and section 58 of the Evidence Act, dealing v/ith the aspect of written statement, the Supreme Court has observed that —

    “The Court is required to apply its mind on several factors including viz. whether by reason of such amendment the claimant intends to resile from an express admission made by him. In such an events the application for amendment may not be allowed.” Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 7. It is concluded by observing as under:—

    “28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.”

    29. An explanation can be offered provided there is any scope therefor. A clarification may be made where the same is needed.

    30. We will assume that despite the amendments made by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, amendment of pleadings being procedural in nature, the same should be liberally granted but as in all other cases while exercising discretion by a Court of law, the same shall be done judiciously.”

    11. In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (Dead) by LRs., (2008) 8 SCC 511, the Apex Court has reiterated in para 16 as under:

    “16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363, which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar ., (1990) 1 SCC 166”

    12. The Court need to consider various facets of Civil Procedure Code including Order 6, Rule 17, Order 12 Rule 6, Order 1 Rule 10 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the stage of the trial, due diligence/reason and the Judicial exercise of discretion and facts and circumstances of the case. Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N., (2006) 12 SCC 1.

    13. In Shanti v. Homes Ins. Co., (1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR 1974 SC 1719, the Apex Court has observed that “the amendment order is not purely of discretion. Even with regard to discretionary orders the Appellate Court can interfere where the order is insupportable in law or is unjust.

    14. In Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, 2008 (6) Mh. L.J (SC) 161 : (2008) 5 SCC 117, the Supreme Court has observed that:—

    “15. As discussed above, though first part of Rule 17 makes it clear that amendment of pleadings is permitted at any stage of the proceeding, the proviso imposes certain restrictions. It makes it clear that after the commencement of trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if it is established that in spirt of “due diligence” the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial depending on the circumstances, the Court is free to order such application.

    18. As rightly referred to by the High Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC I, this Court cautioned that delay and laches on the part of the parties to the proceedings would also be a relevant factor for allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of the pleadings.”

    15. What is boiled out from all this is that to grant or reject an amendment of plaint and or written statement is important facet of proper adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the Court needs to consider various aspects as referred above while granting and/or refusing the amendment application. Therefore, in a given case if Court in spite of all this reject such application, the Appellate Court and or the Revisional Court, needs to consider right or wrong exercise of discretion by the Court below. Any party, therefore, if aggrieved by such order is entitled to challenge the same, being an order against which appeal is not available, under the Act and therefore, only remedy is the Revision. Therefore, even if it is procedural order, still if the Court satisfied that it “was not made according to law” as contemplated under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act and even section 29(4) of the Bombay Rent Act, the interference is a must. It can be done only when the Revisional Court reconsiders the same and pass order accordingly.

    16. The sections in question are wider than the General Revisional Procedure of Civil Procedure Code. The requirement is; if any appeal is not available and, if order is not in accordance with law and, it affects the substantial rights of the parties, I see there is no reason that, against such order, the remedy is available to the aggrieved parties is to file Revision. There is no bar created, under the Maharashtra Rent Act.

    17. It is pertinent to reproduce the observations of the Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, 2007 (2) Mh. L.J (SC) 863 : (2007) 1 SCC 546:

    “2. Judges must administer law according to the provisions of law. It is the bounden duty of judges to discern legislative intention in the process of adjudication. Justice administered according to individual's whim, desire, inclination and notion of justice would lead to confusion, disorder and chaos.”

    18. In a given case, any such order which is contrary to the well settled principle of law and or not in accordance with law, would definitely affect the substantial rights of the parties. Therefore, if any party preferred a Revision application and placed on record the Apex Court decisions and High Court decisions with this regard, granting or not granting amendment, the Revisional Court needs to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law. That can be done only after hearing both the parties in Revision. Even though, it is against the so called interlocutory or procedural order. In my view, the Revisional Court has no choice but to entertain such Revision and passed appropriate order, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and prevailing law on the subject.

    19. Another important facet observed by the Apex Court G.L Vijain v. K. Shankar, (2006) 13 SCC 136 in following paragraphs is also substantially affects the reasoning given in Sukhadev and J.M Constructions (supra):—

    “15. There is furthermore no dispute that the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases. The revisional jurisdiction, however, in effect and substance is an appellate jurisdiction.

    16. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2006) 4 SCC 713, this Court observed : (SCC P. 730, para 47)

    “47. A revisional jurisdiction as is well known involves exercise of appellate jurisdiction. [See Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 and Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman., (2002) 6 SCC 1].”

    20. Therefore, the revisional Court, need to exercise its jurisdiction if the conditions precedent laid down in section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Act are fulfilled. The limitation of power as contained in section 115 of Civil Procedure Code is, therefore, not applicable. G.L Vijain v. K. Shankar, (2006) 13 SCC 136.

    21. The present Petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the impugned order whereby the plaintiffs amendment application has been granted by considering the various aspect on merit, as well as, on law and permitted to amend the said plaint by observing in para 17 as under :—

    “17. The learned Advocate for the applicant further referred to the judgment of Supreme Court 1996 (2) SCC page 25 in the matter of G. Nagamma v. Siromanamma, wherein their Lordship observed that, even by amending plaint, party can seek relief alternatively also. We find ratio of those authorities are clearly speaking about the legal position. It is a fact that, in the trial Court applicant has sought amendment just to provide better particulars that too with pleadings and it is required for deciding the suit which is necessary to be added. It is not causing any prejudice to the other side, but the learned Trial Judge alleged misread the legal position and misdirected in appreciating the factual aspect. In fact applicant is not raising any alternative or inconsistent plea. There is no any change of ground. A simple contentions is being added that too consistent with the original pleadings about the bona fide requirement, showing the appointment of staff members and suit premises required for that purpose. We find the findings arrived by the trial Court is not according to law. Hence, order of trial Court is require to be set aside by allowing Revision Application. Hence, order.”

    22. The impugned order is within the framework of law and the record. However, all defence pleas/points are kept open.

    23. Resultantly, I am of the view that:—

    (a) The section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Act gives/provides wider power to the Revisional Court than section 115 of Civil Procedure Code.

    (b) Any order, if it is not in accordance with law, and contrary to law or settled principle of law or perverse, but not appealable, a Revision is maintainable.

    (c) The phrase “in accordance with law” has various facets. It is in use in every field of law. It covers various doctrines including the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, the Doctrine of Natural Justice and the practice and procedure of law specially when it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Therefore, any judgment or order need to be in accordance with law, whether interlocutory or final, if not then there is no bar, the Revision is maintainable, even against such order.

    24. In my view, considering the various Supreme Court Judgments and even the Judgments of this Court as referred above, Sayarabi (supra) and Pacific Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd.… v. East India Hotels Ltd.…., 2004 (5) Mh. L.J 450 : 2005 (1) Bom. C.R 427, such Revision is maintainable. The submission that matter be referred to larger bench is also rejected in view of the Supreme Court Judgments and High Court Judgments referred above.

    25. The petition is therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.

    26. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks stay of the order. In view of the above reasons, the prayer for stay is rejected.

    27. The petitioner/parties to take steps to carry out the amendment within six weeks. The consequential amendment is also permitted.

    Petition dismissed.
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