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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a review petition filed under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) against an order dated 6-6-2002 passed by the Company Court in Company Petition No. 420 of 2002. The petitioner claimed to be a creditor within the meaning of Section 10 of the Companies Act and contended that he ought to have been heard before the order was passed. The review petition argued that mesne profits constituted a debt entitling the petitioner to notice under Section 101 of the Companies Act. The Company Court had dispensed with notice under Section 102 and proceeded to confirm the resolution reducing share capital after no objections were received to a public notice. The petitioner sought review of this order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the power of review under Order 47 of the C.P.C. is maintainable by a party who was not a party to the original proceedings.
  2. Whether the petitioner, claiming to be a creditor by virtue of a claim for mesne profits, qualifies as a "person aggrieved" entitled to seek review under Order 47 Rule 1.
  3. Whether mesne profits constitute a "debt" under the Companies Act for the purpose of requiring notice under Section 101.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent Company's Arguments

  • The review petition under Order 47 is not maintainable as the petitioner was not a party to the original proceedings.
  • The Company Court is a civil court and follows the procedure under the C.P.C.; hence, review power must be expressly conferred.
  • Order 47 Rule 2 restricts review to parties to the lis, and a non-party cannot seek review.
  • The petitioner’s claim for mesne profits does not constitute a debt as per Section 101 of the Companies Act since damages become debt only upon decree.
  • Notice was dispensed with under Section 102, and notice was published publicly with no objections received, justifying confirmation of the resolution.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner was a creditor within the meaning of Section 10 of the Companies Act and thus entitled to be heard before the order was passed.
  • The claim for mesne profits constitutes a debt and therefore entitles the petitioner to notice under Section 101.
  • The petitioner relied on the wider interpretation of "person aggrieved" under Order 47 Rule 1 to maintain the review petition despite not being a party to the original proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Private Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 374 Interpretation of "person aggrieved" under Section 96 of the C.P.C.; allowing appeal by non-parties if prejudicially affected. The Court relied on this precedent to support that a non-party, if aggrieved, may seek review under Order 47 Rule 1.
Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak v. The Charity Commissioner, AIR 1976 Bombay 304 Section 96 of the C.P.C. does not restrict appeals to parties only; non-parties may appeal if aggrieved. Supported the view that review petitions can be filed by aggrieved persons, not strictly limited to parties.
Bharat Singh v. Firm Sheo Pershad Giani Ram, AIR 1978 Delhi 122 Review under Order 47 limited to parties to the lis; non-parties must use other legal remedies. The Court distinguished this view as not fully aligned with Apex Court precedents.
K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 : AIR 1997 SC 3277 Right of review available to aggrieved persons within prescribed limitation period under Order 47. Reinforced that review lies for aggrieved persons, including non-parties, if conditions are met.
Union Of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, (1974) 2 SCC 231 : AIR 1974 SC 1265 Mesne profits constitute damages and become debt only upon decree. Used to determine that mesne profits claim is not a debt at the stage of the order under review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by affirming that the Company Court functions as a civil court and thus has power of review under Order 47 of the C.P.C. The Court then analyzed whether a non-party can seek review. It distinguished between the expressions "person aggrieved" under Order 47 Rule 1 and "party" under Rule 2, noting that the former is broader. The Court relied on Apex Court precedents, particularly Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha and K. Ajit Babu, to hold that a person aggrieved, even if not a party, may maintain a review petition if filed within the limitation period.

However, the Court examined the petitioner’s claim of being a creditor under Section 10 of the Companies Act and found that the claim for mesne profits was a claim for damages, which only becomes a debt upon decree, citing Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry. Since no decree had been passed, the petitioner was not a creditor entitled to notice under Section 101. The Court also noted absence of material showing outstanding municipal taxes as a debt at the time of petition filing.

Given that notice was dispensed with under Section 102 and the company’s case that only one creditor existed, supported by a public notice with no objections, the Court concluded that the case did not fall within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 for review. Therefore, the review petition was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

The Court REJECTED the review application.

The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner, claiming to be a creditor on the basis of mesne profits, was not entitled to notice under Section 101 of the Companies Act and could not maintain a review petition under Order 47. The ruling clarifies that while the power of review extends to persons aggrieved beyond formal parties, such relief depends on the nature of the claim and procedural compliance. No new precedent was established beyond the application of settled principles.

    Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. v. Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd.

    1. At the threshold it was contended on behalf of the Respondent company that petition for review considering Order 47 was not maintainable. In so far as power of review is concerned, it is now a settled proposition of law that the power to review must be conferred for exercising the power of review. The company Court while exercising jurisdiction under the Companies Act does not cease to be civil Court. The rules framed under the Companies Act, will be applicable to company proceedings. In the absence of any specific rule, procedure provided under the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable. In the instant case, Order 47 is power of the Civil Court and in those circumstances, the High Court functioning as a company Court, but none the less a Civil Court has the power of review.

    2. The only question which remains to be answered is whether the power of review can be exercised at the instance of the party who was not a party to the proceedings. This is the argument which learned counsel for the company has raised considering language of Order 47, that the order sought to be reviewed by this Court cannot be reviewed. Order 47 Rule 1 provides that the application for review is maintainable at the instance of any person aggrieved by decree or order from which appeal is allowed but from which no appeal is preferred, or from a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or reference of the Court of small causes. In so far as Order 47 Rule 2 is concerned, it is the specific power only of a party to the proceeding. In other words, the legislature has chosen to use two different expressions one in so far as “Person aggrieved” in Order 47 Rule 1 and any party under Order 47 Rule 2.

    3. The Court therefore, will have to consider the expression under Order 47 of C.P.C On behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Private Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 374. We are not really concerned with the facts of that case but considering the expression “person aggrieved” under Section 96, the Apex Court has observed as under:

    “It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment.”

    4. A Division Bench of this Court in Fakir Mohamed Abdul Razak v. The Charity Commissioner, Bombay. AIR 1976 Bombay 304 considering Section 96 of the C.P.C held that it is well settled position in law that there is nothing in Section 96 which lays down that it is only party to the suit who can file appeal. Section 96 of the C.P.C does not use the expression other person or party. It is in that context that the court held that even a person who is not party to the proceeding can prefer an appeal. The learned counsel on behalf of the Company relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bharat Singh v. Firm Sheo Pershad Giani Ram, AIR 1978 Delhi 122, which has taken a view that it is only a party to the lis who can prefer review and other person adversely affected can take such steps which may be available to them in law to protect their rights as and when the adverse order or decree is sought to be enforced so as to protect their rights. It seems that the attention of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court was not drawn to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Jatan Golcha (supra) as referred to earlier. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 : AIR 1997 SC 3277.

    5. Having heard learned counsel, I am of the opinion that expression person aggrieved under Order 47 Rule 1 is wider in amplitude and scope than the expression Party under Order 47 Rule 2 which restricts the parties to the lis. This is the view taken by Apex Court in Smt. Jatan Golcha (supra). It is also the view of the Apex Court in the case of K. Ajit (supra). In the case of K. Ajit in proceedings arose from an Order of Central Administration Tribunal. The issues raised were whether power of review was available to the Tribunal and whether a person not a party to the order could prefer a review. After considering the scope and effect thereto in Paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Apex Court finally observed as under:

    “We therefore find that a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure if filed within the period of limitation.”

    6. In other words to maintain an application for review, the party must satisfy two tests. Firstly that the party is aggrieved and secondly that the review is filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The use of expression “prescribed period of limitation” will be subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Considering the two judgments of the Apex Court and Division Bench of this Court in the case of Fakir Mohd. (supra), it is clear that review at the instance of a person aggrieved and filed within the period of limitation would lie and to that extent the judgment of Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Bharat Singh (supra) does not correctly lay down the law. In respect of a company petition before the company Court, therefore, clearly a review petition would lie at the instance of a party aggrieved.

    7. Petitioner before this Court by the present review application seeks review of the order passed by the Company Court dated 6-6-2002 in Company petition No. 420 of 2002. The case of the Petitioner is that he was creditor within the meaning of Section 10 of the Companies Act and as such ought to have been heard before the order was passed. In the review petition, contention is that the petitioner was creditor as per Exh. 5 to the petition. Perusal of Exh. 5 would show that the rent as and up to July, 2002 had been paid. Petition was filed on 15-4-2002 and order was passed on 6-6-2002. The claim of which petitioner contended that he was creditor was in respect of mesne profits. The review petition proceeds on the footing that as mesne profits can be claimed by the Petitioners that would be “debt” and therefore, petitioner would be creditor. In so far as this aspect is concerned, mesne profits would be of compensation for occupation of the premises after termination of the tenancy. In other words, these would be “damages” which the Court would have to ascertain considering the Judgment in Union Of India v. Raman Iron Foundry .. (1974) 2 SCC 231 : AIR 1974 SC 1265, the damages would become debt only on decree being passed by this Court. That event has yet to happen and in these circumstances, at least today the claim for mesne profits cannot be said to be debt which would entitle the petitioner to notice, if any under Section 101 of the Companies Act. It is then contended that the municipal taxes for the period April 2000 to September 2000 at least would be payable. There is nothing on record to show when the demand was made or when the municipal taxes were to be paid. It is no doubt true that apart from rent. Petitioner is entitled to claim taxes. However, what is important to bear in mind is that whether on the date when the petition was filed, the company was indebted to the Petitioners. There is no material before this Court to so hold. Under Section 101 before giving effect to a resolution of the company for reduction of share capital, the Court in those situations which would result in diminution of liability in respect of unpaid share capital or payment to any share holders of any paid up share capital has to issue notice to the parties set out therein. That is not the case here. However, the Court can still direct notice. In the instant case, considering Section 102 notice was dispensed with. The case of the company was that there was only one creditor. Notice otherwise was published in the Times of India inviting objections. No objection was received and it is in those circumstances, the Court proceeded to confirm the resolution of the share holders reducing the share capital. Considering that aspect, to my mind, this would not be a case which would fall within Order 47 Rule 1 for the Court to review its earlier order dated 6-6-2002.

    Review application rejected.

    Application rejected.
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    Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. v. Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd.
    (Nov 30, 2002)