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  • provisions of S. 76, sub-cl. (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.6.
  • S. 76, sub-cls. (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT 1949
  • (e) of S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of S. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act
  • S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of the Bombay Rent Act
  • S. 5(3) of the Rent Act
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  • provisions of S. 76, sub-cl. (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.6.
  • S. 76, sub-cls. (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • EAST PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION ACT 1949
  • (e) of S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of S. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act
  • S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • provisions of the Bombay Rent Act
  • S. 5(3) of the Rent Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application under paragraph 35 of the Kutch Province (Courts) Order, 1948, arises out of a suit connected to the redemption of two possessory mortgages over a shop (the "Vakhar") and the plaintiffs' claim for actual possession. The chronological and procedural facts, stated in the opinion, are:

  • Initially, two shops (including the Vakhar) were mortgaged with possession by the plaintiffs' uncle, Laxmichand Jutha, to the first defendant Shamji Jivraj on Jeth Vad 30, Samvat 1989 for 5,000 Koris. On taking accounts, 7,700 Koris were found due to the mortgagee.
  • The plaintiffs paid 7,000 Koris and, to cover the remaining 700 Koris and an additional cash consideration of 300 Koris (total 1,000 Koris), executed a deed of mortgage with possession in favour of defendant 1 dated Vaishak Sud 4, Samvat 2001 (referred to as the first mortgage).
  • Subsequently, by a second possessory mortgage the plaintiffs purported to mortgage the same shop to defendants 2, 3 and 4 for Rs. 1,000 by a deed dated Chaitra Sud 13, St. year 2008 (Ex. 20); that deed itself recites that defendants 2–4 were already in possession as tenants and records terms about redemption rights.
  • Plaintiffs served notice for redemption and filed suit to redeem both mortgages and to recover possession of the Vakhar.
  • The trial Judge decreed redemption of both mortgages, awarded Rs. 296-15-0 to defendant 1 for repairs, and, finding defendants 2–4 to be in possession as tenants, granted plaintiffs only symbolic possession.
  • On appeal the Additional District Judge affirmed the trial court's decision, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the Bombay Rent Act did not apply to Bhachau, and dismissed the appeal with costs.
  • The plaintiffs (applicants) sought revision of those concurrent findings and orders to obtain actual possession of the Vakhar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant-plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual possession of the Vakhar (shop) upon redemption of the mortgages.
  2. Whether defendants 2, 3 and 4, who were in possession prior to the mortgages, are entitled to remain in possession after redemption by claiming protection under the Bombay Rent Act.
  3. Whether the Bombay Rent Act was properly applicable to Bhachau (i.e., whether the Act's application to Bhachau was effective despite alleged misdescription in the Notification).
  4. How the legal principles in the Transfer of Property Act (notably S. 76(a), S. 76(e) and S. 111(c)) interact with statutory tenant protections (e.g., the Bombay Rent Act) in determining whether a tenancy granted by a mortgagee survives redemption.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • They sought redemption and actual possession of the Vakhar.
  • It was contended (by Mr. Shah for applicants) that under S. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act a mortgagee in possession must manage the property as a prudent owner would, and therefore the first mortgagee (defendant 1) could and should have used the shop himself rather than letting it out — implying the lease was not a proper exercise of prudent management and should not bind the plaintiffs.
  • A new contention raised in earlier proceedings (referred to and pursued here) was that the Bombay Rent Act was not duly applied to Bhachau (on the basis of a misdescription in Notification No. 215-J dated 19-9-51), and therefore defendants 2–4 could not claim benefit of the Act.

Defendants' Arguments

  • By written statements, defendants accepted that the property could be redeemed on payment of sums found due; defendant 1 claimed Rs. 296-15-0 for repairs and related expenses.
  • Defendants 2, 3 and 4 asserted that they had been in possession of the shop since Samvat 1994 (prior to the first mortgage) and that they were tenants; accordingly they claimed entitlement to continue in possession even after redemption by invoking the protections of the Bombay Rent Act — therefore plaintiffs should be given symbolic possession only.
  • The deed Ex. 20 itself recorded their possession as tenants and contemplated their ability to redeem the first mortgage; their pleaded position was consistent with the deed and with continued possession as tenants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain, AIR 1952 SC 205 - A mortgagee cannot confer a better title on another than he has; leases granted by a mortgagee in possession cannot enure beyond the term of the mortgage.
- S. 76 sub-clauses (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act require prudent management and prohibit acts detrimental to the mortgagor (e.g., creating enduring interests that survive redemption).
- Exception: statutory rights which a tenant acquires (by operation of statute) may enable the tenant to remain after redemption.
The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to state the general rule that leases by a mortgagee terminate on redemption and that S. 76(a) and (e) do not empower a mortgagee to create a lease that survives redemption, while recognizing the exception where statute creates tenant rights. The decision was applied to frame the legal standard for whether defendants' tenancy could survive redemption.
Dinkar Bhagwant v. Rau Babji, 59 Bom LR 101 Supports the proposition that a lease created by a mortgagee determines on redemption, subject to statutory rights of tenants. Invoked as consistent authority for the statement that S. 111(c) terminates the mortgagee's interest and thereby the lease created by him, unless statute confers tenant rights.
Som Nath v. L.D. Desai, AIR 1951 Punj 404 Holds that the owner (mortgagor) is not a "landlord" for the purpose of rent-restriction legislation unless there is a contract of lease between owner and tenant; the definition of "landlord" requires being entitled to receive rent. Used to support the court's conclusion that plaintiffs were not landlords of defendants 2–4 (no contract to receive rent from them), and therefore defendants could not claim protection under the Rent Act against the plaintiffs.
Hardei v. Wahid Khan, AIR 1954 All 16 Where a mortgagee in possession has let a shop on a (monthly) tenancy in the exercise of rights under S. 76(a), on redemption the tenant may continue to be a tenant and not a trespasser; S. 111(c) does not ipso facto terminate such tenancy without the mortgagor acting to terminate it. The court distinguished this case on the facts: that decision did not involve a tenant claiming rights under a statute like the Rent Act. Thus Hardei was acknowledged but treated as factually different and not controlling in this matter where statutory tenant rights were asserted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in these principal steps, as stated in the opinion:

  1. Fact-finding and estoppel by record: it is not disputed that defendants 2–4 were in possession of the shop from Samvat 1994 (prior even to the first mortgage) and Ex. 20 itself records their possession as tenants. The plaintiffs had acknowledged that position in Ex. 20 and had not demurred to the evidence (including deposition of defendant 3). Given that acknowledgement, the court held it was too late for plaintiffs to contend that the mortgagee should have remained in possession himself rather than leasing the shop.
  2. Legal effect of mortgagee's lease: applying S. 76(a) and S. 76(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, and S. 111(c), the court restated the general principle from Mahabir Gope that a mortgagee cannot create an interest that survives beyond his mortgage interest; leases granted by a mortgagee ordinarily terminate on redemption. However, the court recognized the exception: statutory rights acquired by a tenant may enable that tenant to continue in possession after redemption.
  3. Applicability of the Bombay Rent Act to Bhachau: the court examined the plaintiffs' contention that Notification No. 215-J (19-9-51) misdescribed the municipal area and therefore did not apply the Rent Act to Bhachau. The court accepted the factual and legal conclusion of the Additional District Judge that the Act was intended to apply to Bhachau and that the reference to a "Municipal Borough" was a misdescription; moreover, the Act had been applied to Bhachau and remained in force without earlier objection. The court rejected plaintiffs' technical challenge to non-application.
  4. Requirement of landlord–tenant relationship under the Rent Act: the court turned to whether the plaintiffs could be considered "landlord" vis-à-vis defendants 2–4 under S. 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. Quoting the statutory definition, the court emphasized that a landlord must be "receiving, or entitled to receive, rent" in respect of the premises. The court found there was no contract or basis entitling the plaintiffs to receive rent from defendants 2–4; the defendants paid (and were liable to pay) rent to the first defendant (the mortgagee). Consequently, no landlord–tenant relationship existed between plaintiffs and defendants 2–4.
  5. Application of precedent and distinction: relying on Som Nath v. L.D. Desai, the court observed that an owner does not become a landlord for protective rent legislation until a contract of lease between owner and occupant exists. The court also considered Hardei v. Wahid Khan but distinguished it because in Hardei tenants were not asserting statutory rights; here the defendants were asserting rights under the Rent Act and, crucially, lacked the necessary landlord–tenant relationship with the plaintiffs.
  6. Conclusion of entitlement to possession: because plaintiffs were not landlords vis-à-vis defendants 2–4, the protections of the Bombay Rent Act could not be invoked by those defendants against the plaintiffs. Thus the statutory exception (tenant rights surviving redemption) did not operate in their favour; as a result, on redemption the plaintiffs were entitled to actual possession of the Vakhar.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision application is allowed; the decree of the lower courts is varied to direct delivery of actual possession of the Vakhar to the plaintiffs.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The court varied the lower courts' decrees so that, instead of symbolic possession, the defendants must deliver actual possession of the shop (the Vakhar) to the plaintiffs.
  • The remainder of the lower courts' decree was confirmed (i.e., redemption decrees and award of Rs. 296-15-0 to defendant 1 for repairs remain intact subject to the variation regarding possession).
  • Costs: the defendants were directed to pay the applicants' costs of this Court and to bear their own costs in the lower Courts.

The opinion does not announce a broad new rule of law; it applies established principles (from the Transfer of Property Act and decided cases) to the facts and holds that because plaintiffs were not landlords vis-à-vis the occupying defendants, the defendants could not avail themselves of the Bombay Rent Act to retain possession after redemption.

Order: Revision allowed in part; decree varied to award actual possession to plaintiffs; otherwise decree confirmed. Costs awarded as stated.

    Bhanshali Kushalchand Ramji v. Sha Shamji Jivraj

    This revision application under paragraph 35 of the Kutch Province (Courts) Order, 1948, arises out of a suit for partition. The only question falling for consideration is whether the applicant-plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual possession of the Vakhar (shop) in suit. This property and another shop had been originally mortgaged with possession by the plaintiffs' uncle Laxmichand Jutha with the first defendant Shamji Jivraj on Jeth Vad 30 of Samvat year 1989 for 5000 Koris and, on taking accounts of the mortgage, 7700 Koris were found due to the mortgagee towards which the plaintiffs paid 7000 Koris and for the balance of 700 Koris and for a cash consideration of 300 Koris, in all 1000 Koris, the plaintiffs mortgaged with possession the suit shop with the said defendant 1 by a deed of mortgage dated Vaishak Sud 4 of Samvat year 2001 and this is referred to in this suit as the first mortgage. By a second possessory mortgage the plaintiffs mortgaged the shop to defendants 2, 3 and 4 for Rs. 1000/- by a deed of mortgage dated Chaitra Sud 13 of St. year 2008 corresponding to 8-4-52 (Ex. 20). However the said defendants 2, 3 and 4 were in possession of the suit shop from Samvat year 1994, that is to say, from prior to the date of the first mortgage and the deed of mortgage, Ex. 20, recites the fact of their possession as tenants. The document also says that the defendants were at liberty to redeem the first mortgage on payment of the sum due to the first mortgagee Shamji Jivraj (defendant 1) and that the mortgagors will redeem the second mortgage on payment of the sum due to defendants 2, 3 and 4 together with whatever sum the said defendants might have paid for redemption of the first mortgage. The plaintiffs served the defendants with a notice for redemption and thereafter brought the present suit for redeeming both the mortgages.

    2. By their written statements the defendants agreed that the property may be redeemed on payment of whatever sum was found due on the two mortgages, and in addition defendant 1 claimed Rs. 296-15-0 for the cost of repairs etc., incurred by him on the property. Defendants 2, 3 and 4 contended that since they were tenants of the property from before the date of the two mortgages they were entitled to the benefit of the bombay rent act and were not liable to deliver actual possession to the plaintiffs even after the redemption and that the plaintiffs may be awarded symbolical possession of the property only.

    3. The learned trial Judge decreed redemption of both the mortgages and also awarded Rs. 296-15-0 to defendant 1 for the cost of repairs. He held that as defendants 2, 3 and 4 were in possession as tenants of the shop in question they were entitled to continue in possession thereof and the learned Judge therefore awarded symbolical possession to the plaintiffs. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge concurred with this finding of the Subordinate Judge, and held that Cls. (d) and (e) of S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, on which reliance was placed by the plaintiffs, had no application to the proved facts of the case. A new contention was urged in the appeal, viz., that the bombay rent act was not duly applied to Bhachau where the property is situate and therefore defendants 2, 3 and 4 could not claim the benefit of the said Act. The learned Judge rejected this contention holding that the bombay rent act did apply to the present case, and in the above view he dismissed the appeal with costs.

    4. It is not disputed for the plaintiffs and indeed it could not be disputed that defendants 2, 3 and 4 were in possession of the suit shop from before the date of their mortgage, and this fact is even recited in the document Ex. 20. Their case, as set out in the written statement is that they were in possession of the shop since Samvat year 1994 and defendant 3 Lakhamshi Devshi has deposed to that effect and this has not been demurred to by the plaintiffs. But whether the said defendants were tenants of the property from Samvat year 1994, that is to say, from before the date of the first mortgage in suit, or whether the shop was leased to them by defendant 1 subsequent to the date of his mortgage, the fact does remain that they were in possession of the property as tenants from before the date of the second mortgage (Ex. 20). But Mr. Shah for the applicants has urged that under S. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act a mortgagee in possession must manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own, and that the property in question being a shop it was not necessary for the mortgagee, first defendant, to let it out to a tenant and the said mortgagee could well have used it for himself. The short answer to this contention is that the plaintiffs were aware of the lease of the shop by the mortgagee first defendant to defendants 2, 3 and 4 and they had accepted that position and had never demurred to it. In point of fact, in the second document (Ex. 20) they have themselves acknowledged the fact that the shop was already in the possession of defendants 2, 3 and 4 as tenants of the first defendant Shamji Jivraj. Therefore it is too late in the day now to contend that defendant 1 should have remained in possession of the property himself and should not have given it on lease to others, and must be taken that defendants 2, 3 and 4 were validly in possession as tenants.

    5. Now under S. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the interest of the first defendant in the suit shop as a mortgagee terminates on the redemption of his mortgage and equally his power to dispose of the property extends only upto that event and not beyond. The term of his mortgage was one year ending on Samvat year 2009 and the term having expired the plaintiffs are undoubtedly entitled to redeem his mortgage, a position to which the defendants do not demur, but the question is whether on such redemption defendants 2, 3 and 4 are not liable to deliver actual possession of the property to the plaintiffs. A similar question had arisen in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain, AIR 1952 SC 205 (A), where the defendants first party claimed to continue in possession even after the redemption on the ground that they were the tenants of the property under the mortgage. Dealing with the question their Lordships observed:

    “The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create an interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee. Further, the mortgagee, who takes possession of the mortgaged property, must manage it as a person of ordinary prudence would manage if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property; see S. 76, sub-cls. (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. It follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage; any leases granted by him must come to an end at redemption. A mortgagee cannot during the subsistance of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor's interests such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land thereby defeating the mortgagor's right to ‘khas’ possession; it would be an act which would fall within the provisions of S. 76, sub-cl. (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.”

    6. At the same time their Lordships held:

    “A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It is an exception to the general rule. The tenant cannot be ejected by the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage.”

    7. On the facts of that case their Lordships held that the defendant first party was not a ‘raiyat’ and was therefore not entitled to claim the benefit of the bihar tenancy act and to remain in actual possession even after redemption. Therefore S. 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act do not empower the mortgagee to create a lease of the mortgaged property which is to enure beyond the redemption of the mortgage itself, and it is quite clear that under S. 111(c) of the Act when the interest of the mortgagee comes to an end the lease created by him also determines, though as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope's case (A) this is subject to any rights that might be conferred or created on the tenant by any statute (See also Dinkar Bhagwant v. Rau Babji, 59 Bom LR 101 pp. 114-115) (B).

    8. The question therefore is whether any rights are conferred on or created in defendants 2 to 4 under the bombay rent act. As to this it was urged on the plaintiffs' behalf that the said Act has not been made applicable to Bhachau and therefore the defendants cannot claim the benefit of the Act. The point of the contention is that the Notification No. 215-J dated 19-9-51, by which the Rent Act was made applicable to Kutch, contains a Schedule which says inter alia that the Act was applied to the area of the Bhachau Municipal Borough and because Bhachau had no Municipal Borough at all the area to which the Act was intended to be applied could not be determined so far as the Bhachau Taluka was concerned and therefore it could not be said that the Act was made applicable to Bhachau town. It is true that Bnachau had no municipal borough but it is not alleged that Bhachau had no District Municipality. In any event, the position appears to be as has been pointed out by the learned Additional District Judge that the towns which had no Municipal Boroughs were included it the Schedule and the Act was applied to those towns, and it was intended therefore that the Act was also to apply to Bhachau town, and that the mention in the Notification of the Bhachau Municipal Borough was a case of misdescription. No attempt has been made on behalf of the plaintiffs to controvert this statement of the learned Additional District Judge. Considering that the Rent Act has been applied to Bhachau and has been in force since some years without objection, this contention of the plaintiffs appears to rest on a mere technicality and it should not be allowed to prevail.

    9. But in order that defendants 2 to 4 may become entitled to the benefit of the bombay rent act it has first to be shown that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and them. “Landlord” is defined in S. 5(3) of the Rent Act as meaning any person who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. Now it cannot seriously be contended for the defendants that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive rent from them. They are paying and are liable to pay rent to the first defendant, and if it were urged that they are liable to pay rent to the plaintiffs as well then they would be subjected to a double liability for paying rent which is clearly not contemplated. The relationship of lessor and lessee is between the first defendant and defendants 2 to 4. The owner of the property which is the subject of a mortgage with possession cannot by any stretch of reasoning, be considered a landlord of the mortgagee's tenants within the meaning of S. 5(3) of the Rent Act. He cannot certainly claim rent from the tenants of the mortgagee nor is the tenant liable to pay it to him. “Tenant” as defined in S. 2(11) is a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes sub-tenants. Therefore the essential requirement for the creation of a relationship of a landlord and tenant is that the former should be receiving or be entitled to receive rent from the latter and the latter should be liable to pay the same to the former, and in the present case that requirement is lacking because quite evidently the plaintiffs are not receiving, nor is there any contract between them and defendants 2, 3 and 4 entitling them to receive rent from them; and the said defendants are not liable to pay any rent to the plaintiffs. Therefore no relationship of landlord and tenant exists between them. This view finds support from Som Nath v. L.D Desai, AIR 1951 Punj 404 (C). The relevant Act in that case was the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and the tenant was the tenant of the mortgagee. The definition of “landlord” under the said Act was almost similar to the one contained in the bombay rent act. The definition of “tenant”, though restricted, was for the purpose of the present case similar to that of “tenant” in the bombay rent act. It was held that an owner of property does not become a person entitled to receive rent of the property until there is brought into existence a contract of lease between himself and another person and as the plaintiff had not entered into any such contract with the defendant nor was there any such contract which would be binding on them he could not be held as landlord within the meaning of the definition. Eventually it was held that the protection of Restriction Act was available only against a landlord and the plaintiff not being a landlord the defendant could not claim any rights against him under the said Act.

    10. Mr. Jadeja has relied on Hardei v. Wahid Khan, AIR 1954 All 16 (D), where the principle laid down in AIR 1952 SC 205 (A), was followed, but it was held that where a mortgagee in possession of a shop has, in exercise of his right under S. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, let out the shop on a monthly tenancy, on the redemption of the mortgage the tenant continues to be a tenant and does not become a trespasser; and further that S. 111(c) of the Act does not mean that if in the exercise of his powers of due management as a person of ordinary prudence the mortgagee has entered into an agreement of tenancy the tenancy automatically and ‘ipso facto’ lapses on the date of the redemption without the mortgagor exercising his option putting an end to it. But it does not appear from the facts of that case that any rights were claimed by the tenants under a statute like the Rent Act, and therefore that decision is distinguishable from the present case.

    11. The question of eviction in the present case must necessarily depend upon the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 4, and if that relationship is not established, as indeed it cannot be established, then no question of claiming the benefit of the bombay rent act can at all arise. In order to attract the provisions of S. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act the requisite condition is that the plaintiff should be a landlord and the defendant should be a tenant and there should exist between them a relationship of landlord and tenant. Evidently, as the plaintiffs here are not the landlord of the defendants, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be available to the defendants. It follows that the plaintiffs are entitled to actual possession of the suit shop.

    12. Accordingly I allow this revision application and vary the decree of the lower Courts by directing that instead of delivering symbolical possession of the suit property, viz., the Vakhar, the defendants shall deliver to the plaintiffs actual possession of the said property. Subject to this variation the decree passed by the lower Courts is confirmed. The defendants to pay the applicant's costs of this Court and to bear their own.

    D.H.Z
    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Bhanshali Kushalchand Ramji v. Sha Shamji Jivraj
    (Mar 25, 1957)