AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short the Act)
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT
  • Section 7(3)(c) of the Madras Act
  • Rent) Control Act, 1949,
  • Amendment Act of 1969,
  • Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
  • Section 7(3)(c)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short the Act)
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT
  • Section 7(3)(c) of the Madras Act
  • Rent) Control Act, 1949,
  • Amendment Act of 1969,
  • Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
  • Section 7(3)(c)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 by a tenant who had lost in both lower courts. The tenant had been occupying residential premises at Guntakal since 8-9-1978 at a monthly rent of Rs. 125/-. The landlord (respondent) had filed an eviction petition under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, alleging wilful default and bona fide requirement for own occupation. Both lower courts rejected the wilful-default plea but upheld the landlord's plea of bona fide requirement on the basis that the landlord's son intended to start a carpet business at Guntakal. The tenant challenged the appellate order by filing this revision petition. While the revision was pending, the landlord died and his legal representatives were impleaded on 2-2-1996 in C.M.P. 18075/95.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a landlord of residential premises can seek eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act for a non-residential purpose (specifically, to enable his son to carry on a carpet business).
  2. Whether the phrase "own occupation" in Section 10(3)(a)(i) is confined to residential occupation or includes other types of occupation that the structure of the premises admits of (including business occupation).
  3. Whether a residential building, which is not converted under Section 18, may be used for non-residential purposes and whether eviction may be claimed on that basis.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • Because the premises is a residential building, eviction founded on Section 10(3)(a)(i) can only be sought for residential occupation; eviction for business is governed by Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and therefore the landlord cannot claim eviction for a non-residential purpose from a residential premises.
  • The tenant also contended that the premises is residential and not suitable for business; it is not on the main road and therefore not useful for business (this contention was raised in the tenant's pleading/counter).

Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The words "own occupation" in Section 10(3)(a)(i) are not restricted to residential occupation alone but include such occupation as the premises is capable of admitting.
  • The landlord's son planned to shift from Adoni to Guntakal to do the carpet business and to reside at Guntakal; the landlord's evidence described the premises (2 halls, 2 rooms, kitchen, bathroom, latrine, verandah) and stated it was fit both for residence and for storage/ business-related uses.
  • Even if the eviction were treated as sought for business, the landlord contended he was entitled to eviction because the premises could accommodate such business use without structural alteration and had not been converted under Section 18.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shajehan Saheb v. Yukub Khan Saheb, 1962(1) An.W.R. 205 Under the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act, a concession was recorded that eviction from residential premises can be asked only for residential purpose and eviction from non-residential premises only for non-residential purpose (as to sections analogous to Sections 10(3)(a)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii)). The Court distinguished this decision: the Madras Act case did not consider the meaning of "own occupation" in the sense relevant here and therefore "does not help the petitioner" for interpreting Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act in issue.
Dr. Madhusudhan Mahuli v. Lambu Indira Bai, 1987(2) ALT 504 Where there was a composite lease for both residential and non-residential purposes, the Court held eviction for bona fide personal requirement in respect of mixed-purpose premises was not maintainable under Section 10(3)(a) (i.e., the dichotomy between residential and non-residential requirements). The Court treated this case as distinguishable because it involved a composite lease and did not require interpretation of "own occupation" as raised in the present case.
Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze Ahmed & Co. v. Jay Krishna Arora (Supreme Court) — under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (pre-1969 amendment) Held that a landlord may require business premises for his personal residential occupation (or vice versa) if the premises are capable of being put to different uses; the purpose to which the premises were being used by the tenant was not decisive if the premises could be adapted to other uses. The Court observed that the textual layout of the West Bengal provision differs from Section 10(3)(a)(i) and thus the decision "may not be of much help" but acknowledged its holding that capacity of premises to admit different uses is legally relevant.
Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao v. Dr. B. Seetharam, 1989(3) ALT 284 = 1989 (2) APLJ 261 (D.B.) Held that a residential premises remains residential even if let out for a non-residential purpose (e.g., nursing home) provided it has not been converted under Section 18; a residential building can be used for non-residential purposes that the structure admits of (and the character of accommodation is not decided solely by the purpose of lease). The Court relied on and adopted this reasoning: it accepted that "own occupation" in Section 10(3)(a)(i) includes occupations that the building admits of (including certain business uses) so long as conversion under Section 18 has not occurred.
Dakshina Moorthy v. Thulja Bai (Full Bench — Madras High Court) and Busching Schmitz v. Menghani (Supreme Court) — as discussed in Pendyala Referenced for competing tests on determining the nature of a building and for the proposition (in Busching Schmitz) that the purpose of lease is not decisive and that suitability/adaptability for residential uses matters. The Court noted that Pendyala (citing Busching Schmitz) impliedly overruled the Full Bench view in Dakshina Moorthy and used that line of authority to support a broader interpretation of "residential" and the permissible uses of a residential building.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the essential facts and the material statutory provisions. It noted that the premises in question is a residential building and summarized the landlord's evidence that the premises comprised two halls, two rooms, a kitchen, bathroom and latrine, verandah and that 15–20 people could reside there. The landlord's stated intention was to shift a carpet business from Adoni to Guntakal, put his bachelor son in charge and have him reside in the premises; the tenant's counter-plea asserted the premises was residential and not suitable for business, and that it was not on the main road.

The Court examined Section 10(3)(a) of the Act (reproduced in the opinion) and observed that the Act draws separate provisions for residential and non-residential buildings but does not define "residential" or "non-residential" buildings. The Court relied on Section 2(iii) (definition of "building") and Section 18 (which prohibits conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building except with Controller's permission) to conclude that structural capacity and formal conversion status are relevant to characterisation.

Turning to authorities, the Court distinguished earlier decisions relied upon by the tenant: (a) Shajehan Saheb was not helpful because it did not consider the meaning of "own occupation"; and (b) Dr. Madhusudhan Mahuli concerned composite leases for mixed purposes and likewise did not demand interpretation of "own occupation." The Court considered the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act decision (Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze Ahmed) and noted the Supreme Court's statement that a landlord may require premises for an occupation different from that used by the tenant so long as the premises can be put to that use; however, the textual differences between the West Bengal provision and Section 10(3)(a)(i) meant that case had limited direct application.

The Court found Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao v. Dr. B. Seetharam persuasive. That Division Bench held that a residential premises remains residential (absent conversion under Section 18) even when used for non-residential purposes and that what matters is whether the structure admits of the alternative use. The Court adopted the reasoning that the purpose of lease is not decisive and that suitability/adaptability of the structure is material.

Applying these principles, the Court interpreted the words "own occupation" in Section 10(3)(a)(i) broadly to include types of occupation which the structure of a residential premises admits of, and not restrict it to residential occupation only. The Court rejected the tenant's factual contention (that the premises' location made it unsuitable for business) as a matter not determinative for the landlord's right: the evidence on record showed the premises could be used for storage or residence and that it was capable of admitting the proposed carpet business without structural alteration and without conversion under Section 18.

From this legal and factual analysis the Court concluded that the landlord was entitled to claim eviction both on the basis of bona fide requirement for business use and on the basis that his son would reside in the premises while carrying on the business.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P.).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petition for revision was dismissed; the tenant must vacate the premises within three months as ordered by the Court.
  • The Court ordered no costs.

Broader legal implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The opinion holds that a "residential building" need not be used only for residential purposes; it may be used for non-residential purposes where the structure admits of such use and provided the building has not been converted under Section 18 of the Act.
  • The phrase "own occupation" in Section 10(3)(a)(i) is to be interpreted to include those types of occupation that the structure of the residential premises admits of (including certain business uses), and is not confined to purely residential occupation.
  • Non-residential premises, conversely, remain non-residential unless structurally altered or converted; eviction from non-residential premises remains governed by the non-residential provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii).

No other orders or costs were directed apart from those explicitly stated in the final paragraph of the opinion.

    Amtual Hafeez And Ors. v. D. Mohammed Ibrahim (Died) And Ors.

    1. This is a revision petition filed Under section 22 of the a.p. buildings (lease, rent & eviction) control act, 1960 (for short the act) by the tenant who lost in both the Courts below. The petitioner is a tenant of residential premises at Guntakal from 8-9-1978 on a monthly rent of Rs. 125/-. The respondent filed eviction petition Under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground of wilful default and bona fide requirement for own occupation respectively. Both the Courts rejected the plea of wilful default but upheld the plea of bona fide requirement viz., that the premises is required by the landlord's son for starting carpet business at Guntakal. Against the order of the appellate Court, the tenant filed this revision. Pending revision, the landlord died and his legal representatives were impleaded on 2-2-1996 in C.M.P. 18075/95.

    2. The only contention urged by Smt. K. Sesharajyam, learned Cousel for the petitioners is that as the premises is residential building, the landlord cannot seek eviction on the ground that he requires it for non-residential purpose. She contends that eviction from residential premises can be sought for only for the purpose of residential occupation Under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, while eviction from non-residential premises can be sought only for the purpose of business Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii). On the other hand, Mr. K. Somakonda Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the word 'own occupation' occurring in section 10(3)(a)(i) is not restricted to residential occupation only but includes such occupation as the premises is capable of admitting. He further submits that this question is academic since ground for eviction is that the respondent's son wants to shift from Adoni to Guntakal to do business there which includes residing at Guntakal.

    3. To appreciate the rival contentions, the essential facts and the relevant provisions of the law may be noticed. In the petition, the landlord stated that he got carpet business in Adoni which he wants to shift to Guntakal entrusting it to his bachelor son and make him reside permanently at Guntakal. He stated that the premises is fit for storage of carpet and also for residence. In the counter, it is stated that the premises is residential one and not suitable for business. The landlord while giving evidence as P.W.I stated that the house consists of 2 halls, 2 rooms, one kitchen and bathroom and one latrine besides verandah and that 15 to 20 people can reside in the house. As rightly contended by Mr. Somakonda Reddy, the landlord's intention to shift the business to Guntakal and put his son in charge of it, implies that the son wants to reside in the premises besides carrying on business. In the counter, the stand of the tenant was that as the premises is not situated on the main road, it is not useful for business. As this was not in issue, the evidence is evidently silent on this aspect. Thus there is no difficulty in holding that the landlord is entitled to claim eviction for personal residential occupation Under section 10(3)(a)(i).

    4. Even assuming that the eviction is sought for only for the purpose of business, the question is whether the landlord is entitled to claim eviction. sections 10(3)(a)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii) read as follows:

    "10(3)(a):

    A landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building-

    (i) in case it is a residential building-

    (a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation;

    (b) xxxxxxxxxx

    (ii) xxxxxxxxxx

    (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise-

    (a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or

    (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence"

    5. It may be noticed that though the Act makes separate provisions for residential and non-residential premises for fixation of fair rent, grounds of eviction etc., it does not define residential or non-residential building. Section 2(iii) defines building as any house or hut or part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purpose and enumerates gardens, grounds, garages and out-houses appurtenant to such house and furniture or any fittings as included in the definition. Section 18 of the Act says that no residential building shall be converted into non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. It may be noticed that there is no converse provision in respect of conversion of non-residential building into residential building. In this background the contentions of rival parties may now be examined. There is no doubt that the premises in question is residential premises.

    6. Smt. K. Sesharajyam, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on two decisions of this Court in Shajehan Saheb v. Yukub Khan Saheb, 1962(1) An.W.R. 205 and Dr. Madhusudhan Mahuli v. Lambu Indira Bai, 1987(2) ALT 504. In the first case arising under Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949, the landlord who was in occupation of a portion of the building sought eviction of the other portion used by the tenant for business purpose Under Section 7(3)(c) of the Madras Act which is analogous to Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The learned Counsel for the landlord conceded that Under section 7(3)(a)(i) analogous to section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, eviction from residential premises can be asked only for residential purpose and eviction from non-residential premises can be asked only for non-residential purpose Under Section 7(3)(a)(iii) (analogous to Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act). The learned Judge extended the principle so conceded to Section 7(3)(c) also and dismissed the eviction petition. The meaning of the words 'own occupation' occurring in section 7(3)(a)(i) was not considered in that case. Hence this case does not help the petitioner.

    7. The 2nd case relied by the learned counsel is Dr. Madhusudhan Mahuli's case (2nd supra). In that case arising under the Act, there was a composite lease for both residential and non-residential purposes and eviction petition was filed by the landlord on the ground that he requires for residential purpose. The learned Single Judge held that in view of dichotomy maintained Under Section 10(3)(a) of the Act between respective requirements and causes of action for filing eviction petition for residential and non-residential premises and in view of absence of provision for eviction from a premises let out for mixed purposes, the eviction petition for bona fide personal requirement in respect of the building let out for mixed purpose is not maintainable under the Act and accordingly dismissed the eviction petition. This is also distinguishable since the question for consideration in that case was whether the eviction petition is maintainable in the case of composite lease. In that case also there was no occasion for the Court to interpret 'own occupation'.

    8. Now let me examine the eases cited by Mr. K. Soma Konda Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. The first case relied on by him is Maulavi Abdur Rub Firoze Ahmed & Co. v. Jay Krishna Arora, , arising under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Section 13(1)(f) of that Act as it stood before it was amended by the Amendment Act of 1969, reads as follows:

    "Where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held"

    9. The landlord filed suit for eviction of the tenant from the premises which was used for his business, on the ground that he requires it for his personal residential occupation. Upholding the contention of the landlord, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

    "The law does not require that landlord must need the premises for his own occupation only for the purpose to which they were being put by the tenant. It may well be that a tenant cannot put the demised premises to any other use. But there is no bar in law in the way of the landlord requiring the business premises for his residential occupation and vice versa provided the premises are capable of being put to different uses, as they seem to be in this case"

    10. As can be seen from the extract of the above section though the words 'for his own occupation' are there the layout of the West Bengal section is different from that of section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Actand hence this decision may not be of much help.

    11. In Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao v. Dr. B. Seetharam, 1989(3) ALT 284 = 1989 (2) APLJ 261 (D.B.), a Division Bench comprising Justice Amareswari and Justice S.S.M. Quadri held that residential premises continues to be residential building even though it was let out for a non-residential purpose, namely nursing home, provided it is not converted into non-residential building Under Section 18 of the Act and hence the landlord is entitled to seek possession of a house used by the tenant as Nursing Home for residential purpose. The Division Bench held that the decision of the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Dakshina Moorthy v. Thulja Bai, (F.B.) regarding tests to be applied for determination of nature of the building is impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani, where it was held that the purpose of lease is not decisive of character of accommodation and whatever is suitable or adaptable for residential uses even by making changes can be designated as residential premises. Thus residential building can be used either by landlord or tenant not only for residential purpose but also for such non-residential purpose as the structure of the building admits of, for example, office, nursing home, while non-residential building can be let out or used by the landlord only for non-residential purposes. I agree with the contention of Mr. Somakonda Reddy. The word 'own occupation' occurring in section 10(3)(a)(i) includes the types of occupation which the building admits of. Thus interpreted, in the present case, own occupation includes occupation for the purpose of carrying on business in carpets in view of the evidence about the nature of the building. Merely because the premises is not on the main bazaar it cannot be said that it is not useful for business. In the present days it is too much to expect all business shops to be on the main road only in towns and cities in view of lot of pressure on the land. Moreover it is not for the tenant to say whether it is suitable or not for the landlord to do business at a particular place.

    12. To sum up, residential building need not be let out for residential purpose only but can be let out for non-residential purpose if the structure of building permits of such use and continues to be residential building as long as it is not converted into non-residential building Under Section 18 of the Act. The words 'own occupation' occurring in section 10(3)(a)(i) have to be interpreted as including the type of occupation as the structure of residential premises admits of and cannot be restricted to residential occupation only. On the other hand, non-residential premises can be let out only for non-residential purposes and will always remain as non-residential premises and can never be treated as residential premises unless its structure is altered. Eviction from such premises can be sought only on the ground of requirement for business.

    13. Applying the above principle to the instant case since the premises though residential can be used for business of sale of carpets without necessity of structural alteration and is not converted Under Section 18 of the Act as non-residential building, the landlord is entitled to claim eviction on the ground that he requires it for his own business. He is also entitled to eviction for the reason that his son wants to reside in the premises besides doing business.

    14. Accordingly, the C.R.P. is dismissed. No costs. Three months time is granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Amtual Hafeez And Ors. v. D. Mohammed Ibrahim (Died) And Ors.
    (Jun 6, 1996)