Chandra Reddi, J.:— I agree with the conclusions reached by my learned brother that these Revision Cases should be dismissed. But, having regard to the nature of the questions raised, I would like to give my reasons in support of it. The necessary facts are stated in his judgment and therefore unnecessary to repeat them.
2. In these cases, the constitutionality of the explanation added to Section 2(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (hereinafter called the Act) by Act XXV of 1947 is put in issue. The amendment came into force on 1-1-1948. Section 2(b) of the Act defines a sale with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions as “every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and includes also a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge.” The additions to this section which are impugned before us are in the following words:
“Explanation(2):— Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in this state, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made (a) if the goods were actually in this state at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or
(b) in case the contract was for the sale or pucrhase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in this state at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.”
3. The validity of this explanation is attacked on two grounds (1) that this is ultra vires the Madras Legislature as it is incompetent to a Provincial legislature to enact a statute having an extra-territorial operation;
4. (2) that this explanation is repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Sale of Goods Act and therefore void to the extent of repugancy for want of sanction of the Governor-General as required by Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
5. On the first point, the ground of attack is that this explanation seeks to confer a power upon the State to impose tax on sales taking place outside the State, which is not within the sphere of Provincial Legislature. In my opinion this contention cannot prevail. It is an unexceptionable proposition that a Legislature cannot pass a Legislation that would be binding on a territory outside its limits. But, there is no question of extra-territorial jurisdiction being conferred upon the state by this new explanation. Prior to the inauguration of the Constitution, the power of the Provincial Legislature to make laws for the Province of Madras was derived from Section 100(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which recites thus:
“Subject to the two preceding sub-Sections the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the “Provincial Legislative List”).”
6. The entry in the provincial list which enabled the provincial Legislature to enact a legislation for levying sales tax is No. 48 which speaks of taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements. This item does not restrict the power of the legislature to make legislation for imposing tax on sales taking place within the boundaries of the province. The point for consideration is whether by reason of entry No. 48, the Legislature of the Madras Province (as it was called before) was competent to undertake this legislation.
7. The correct approach to a problem of this kind is indicated in Wallace Brothers anp Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay 1948 2 M.L.J 62.. One of the questions debated there was whether Sections 3, 4, 4-A and 63 of the Indian Income-Tax Act which enabled the Income Tax authorities to include the income arising without British India to make an assessment of Income Tax on incomes including those arising without British India were valid. This was answered by the Privy Council in favour of the Income-tax Department in agreement with the High Court of Bombay and the Department. In dealing With the contention that the relevant sections of the Indian Income-tax Act having an extra territorial operation was ultra vires the Central Legislature, their Lordships remarked thus:
“There is no rule of law that the territorial limits of a subordinate Legislature define the possible scope of its legislative enactments or mark the field open to its vision. The ambit of the powers possessed by a subordinate Legislature depends upon the proper construction of the statute conferring those powers. No doubt, the enabling statute has to be read against the background that only a defined territory has been committed to the charge of the Legislature. Concern by a subordinate Legislature with affairs or persons outside its own territory may therefore suggest a query whether the Legislature is in truth minding its own busines. It does not compel the conclusion that it is not. The enabling statute has to be fairly construed.”
8. In another part of the judgment, it is stated:
“The resulting general conception as to the scope of income-tax is that, given a sufficient territorial connection between the person sought to be charged and the country seeking to tax him, Income-tax may peoperly extend to that person in respect of his foreign income.”
9. These passages summarise succinctly the law on the subject which bears a close analogy to the present one.
10. The view enunciated in this case was accepted by the Supreme Court in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras. There the right of the Madras Government to tax a sale which was completed within another province where the property in the goods passed although the contract of sale was entered into within the former province was questioned on behalf of the assessee. It was urged that the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act was not competent to pass an Act which was capable of operating upon sales concluded outside the province and that, secondly Section 2(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act did not authorise the levy of tax in respect of a transaction of sale where property in the goods sold passed outside the province. The first one was rejected but the second one found acceptance with Their Lordships. In dealing with the first one, it was stated inter alia by Mukherjea, Justice (as he then was) that it would be quite competent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the province provided that there was sufficient and real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing province. Lower down in the judgment it is remarked:
“As a matter of fact the legislative practice in regard to sales-tax laws adopted by the Provincial Legislature prior to the coining into force of the Constitution has been to authorise imposition of taxes on sales and purchases which were related in some manner with the taxing province by reason of some of the ingredients of the transaction having taken place within the province or by reason of the production or location of goods withinit at the time when the transaction took place. If in the Madras Sales Tax Act the basis adopted for taxation is the location of the place of business or of the goods sold, within the province of Madras, undoubtedly it would be a valid piece of legislation to which no objection on constitutional grounds could be taken. The controversy, therefore, narrows down to the short point as to what exactly has been adopted as the basis of the levy of Sales Tax by the Madras Legislature.”
11. According to this extract, the crux of the problem is whether there is any real and sufficient territorial nexus between the dealings subjected to tax and the taxing province. Their Lordships also pronounced on the validity of the provision now in these terms:
“The presence of the goods within the province at the time of the contract would undoubtedly make the sale, if subsequently completed, a sale within the province by reason of the explanation added by Act XXV of 1947; but as this explanation was not in operation during the relevant period with which we are concerned, the assessment of sale tax in our opinion, on the transactions during this period is illegal and not warranted by the provisions of the Act.”
12. It may be mentioned that the tax which formed the subject matter of enquiry in that case related to a period between 1st April 1947 and 31st December 1947, and as already pointed out the explanation now assailed came into force only on 1-1-1948.
13. After this authoritative pronouncement, it is futile to question the vires of explanation 2 to Section 2(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
14. I may also refer usefully to a passage in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India), Ltd.:
“In the case of sales tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods etc., should have a territorial connection with the State. Broadly speaking local activities of buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course, such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale or purchase to be taxed.
In exercise of the legislative power conferred upon them in substantially similar terms by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislatures encated sales tax laws for, their respective provinces, acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the basis of their sales tax legislation.”
15. The law as stated here puts the matter beyond all controversy and it is too late now to challenge the validity of this explanation.
16. Budh Prakash v. The Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur A.I.R 1952 All 764.; Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash 1954 S.C.J 573. an appeal to the Supreme Court from the above and Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, Cuttack A.I.R 1953 Orissa 23. cited for the petitioners are not really in point. They deal with cases of executory contracts and forward contracts and cannot therefore have any bearing upon the present enquiry. Surely, the new explanation does not seek to clothe the State with power to tax executory contracts of sale but only with levy of tax on completed sales. The explanation has to be read with the main provision defining the sale. For these reasons, the first contention of the petitioners fails.
17. This leads me to the controversy regarding the alleged repugnancy between the impugned provisions and the relevant sections of the Sale of Goods Act. It is stated that this explanation makes a change in the notions as obtained from the Indian Sale of Goods Act and is opposed to the completion of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act. Under this explanation, transfer of property is deemed to have taken place in the taxing province where the goods are produced despite the property in the goods passing in another state which is the situs of sale as provided under the Sale of Goods Act.
18. To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to refer to entry No. 48 of the provincial List which confers authority on the Provincial Legislature to make laws for levy of taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements. Thus, the object of this entry is not to confer power on Provincial Legislatures to enact the Legislation to deal with contracts of sales or sales as such. The pith and substance of this is to provide power to levy taxes on sale of goods and it does not entrench upon the province of the concurrent list and therefore there is no repugnancy to Sale of Goods Act. It is certainly within the legitimate sphere of the Provincial Legislature to make the laws so long as it does not travel beyond the scope of entry 48. That the Sale of Goods Act does not prescribe a situs of sale and consequently there can be no conflict in regard to this matter between Section 2 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and the material provisions of the Indian Sale of Goods Act is apparent from a statement in the Judgment of Chief Justice Patanjali Sastry in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India), Ltd..
“Neither the Sale of Goods Act nor the common law relating to the sale of goods has anything to say as to what the situs of a sale is, though certain rules have been laid down for ascertaining the intention of the contracting parties as to when or under what conditions the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. That question often raises ticklish problems for lawyers and Courts, and to make the passing of title the determining factor in the location of a sale or purchase would be to replace the old uncertainties and difficulties connected with the nexus basis with new ones.”
19. This question directly arose in the High Court of Madras in Luis Dreyfus and Co. v. The State of Madras. Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ. constituting the Bench ruled that there was no conflict between the 2nd explanation to Section 2(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and the provisions of the Indian Sale of Goods Act as the latter Act does not fix the situs of sale. In support of their conclusion the learned Judges relied on the passage in the Judgment of the Supreme Court extracted above.
20. In support of the theory of repugnancy the counsel for the petitioners called in aid a passage in the judgment of Hidayathullah, J. in Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue Madhya Pradesh.
“What we have stated here does not apply, however, to the amended explanation for which no sanction of the Governor-General was obtained. A reading of the amended Explanation would show that it trenches substantially upon the existing rules embodied in the Sale of Goods Act. To change effectively those rules was not within the unconditional competence of the Provincial Legislature. They could only do so if the Bill had been assented to by the Governor General, as required by Sections 100 and 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Admittedly, the amending Act was not so assented to and consequently it fails to work any change. Further the rules have been amended to make the transaction complete when the goods are produced in the province and not appropriated towards the contract already existing. That would be levying an excise duty from the manufacturer, because till the goods are appropriated towards the contract—the transaction of sale is not complete and a tax purporting to be “on the sale of goods” cannot be levied because no sale has taken place. This, however, does not arise in this case but is applicable to the other case which, for other reasons, we have decided to reject.”
21. Apart from how far these observations can have relevancy in the present context and whether they could be reconciled to what was stated by the learned Judge earlier, they could not have much force in the light of the rule stated by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. and also Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras. Further there is the direct decision of the Madras High Court referred to above which is binding on us so long as it is not overruled. It follows that there is really no repugnancy between the present enactment and the Sale of Goods Act of the Central Legislature and the former can operate without any question of voidness.
22. This contention can be rejected on another ground. The sanction of the Governor-General is essential only in cases falling under Section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
23. Sub-Section 2 of Section 107 states:
“Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent legislative list contains any provisions repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Federal Law or an existing Indian Law with respect to that matter then, if the Provincial Law, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General or for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, has received the assent of the Governor-General or of His Majesty, the Provincial Law shall in that province prevail, but nevertheless the Federal legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter.”
24. In these cases, admittedly the assent of the Governor-General was not obtained but this is not decisive of the matter. It remains further to consider whether the Provincial law which is said to have violated Section 107 was enacted by virtue of its powers received from the concurrent list. I have already pointed out that it is by reason of entry No. 48 that the Madras General Sales-Tax Act could be passed, whereas contracts which are dealt with in the Indian Sale of Goods Act come under entry 10 of the concurrent list. It is therefore seen that the two enactments deal with different subjects and in order to come within the purview of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 the Provincial law must be traceable to the concurrent legislative list.
25. Similar questions have been the subject matter of judicial review. It was held by the Privy Council in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia that where the provincial law falls within the powers given to the province under the provincial list and does not depend upon any of the powers provided by the concurrent list the question of repugnancy under Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 does not arise. The ruling of the Federal Court in Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar contains a decision which governs the present case. It was laid down there that to attract the applicability of Section 107 it has to be established that the impugned Act and the existing law must be in respect of the same subject matter and both of them must be covered by one of the entries in the concurrent list and secondly there must be repugnancy between the two provisions. What follows from this is that if the subjects dealt with by the two enactments are different and the sources of the power of the Legislatures are traceable to two different lists Section 107 cannot have any operation. These two authorities were followed by the Bench in Luis Dreyfus and Co. v. The State of Madras 1954 2 M.L.J 326..
26. It is not necessary to refer to the other decisions which state the law to the same effect. On these rulings, the argument as to repugnancy cannot have any force and has to be repelled.
27. In the circumstances, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Government Pleader's fee is fixed at Rs. 125 in each case.
Umamaheswaram, J.:— These Revision Petitions are filed under Section 12(B) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act against the orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras and they raise difficult and interesting questions of law. The main point that arises for consideration is, whether the amendment introduced by Act XXV of 1947 to the definition of “Sale” in Section 2(b) of Madras General Sales Act is ultra vires of the Madras Legislature. Explanation 2 to Section 2(b) is in the following terms:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken place in this province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made:
(a) if the goods were actually in this province at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or
(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then if the goods are actually produced in this Province at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.”
28. The validity of the explanation was attacked on the ground that no sanction of the Governor-General was obtained under Section 107(2) of the Government of India Act 1935, but this objection was negatived by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The grounds on which the learned advocates for the petitioners challenged its validity are as follows:
(i) that the effect of the explanation is to levy sales tax not on sale of goods but only on contracts of sale by reason of the existence of goods within the state.
(ii) that this provision is repugnant to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act and therefore should not prevail, as the previous sanction of the Governor-General was not obtained for enacting the amendment that was introduced in 1947.
29. Before dealing with those objections we might state that there is no dispute as regards the facts in all these Revision Petitions. The assessees who entered into contracts of sale in respect of goods within the Madras State delivered them outside the state of Madras by taking the railway receipts in their own name and by collecting the moneys by drawing hundies on banks outside the State. In T.R.C Nos. 271 and 272 of 1953 the year of assessment was 1947-1948. In T.R.C Nos. 283 and 333 of 1953 the year of assessment was 1948-1949. In T.R.C Nos. 344, 348 and 364 of 1953 the year of assessment was 1949-1950. There is no substance in the first contention as, under the explanation, no sales tax is sought to be levied on contracts of sales simpliciter. What the explanation provides is that the Madras State is entitled to collect sales tax if the goods are actually in the State at the time when the contract of sale or purchase is made in respect thereof. It does not levy tax on a mere executory contract which is not completed and which does not fructify in a sale involving transfer of property in the goods. Even though the contract of sale is entered into outside the state and the actual sale involving the transfer of the property in goods takes place in another state, still the Madras State is entitled, by reason of the explanation, to levy tax if the goods are within the State when the contracts of sale are entered into. This position is conceded by the learned Government Pleader and he states that no sales tax is sought to be levied by peas on of the explanation on the mere contracts of sale which are unaccompanied or followed by the sale of the goods, i.e, passing of ownership or title in those goods. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Budh Prakash v. S.T Officer Kanpur confirmed by the Supreme Court has really no application to the present case. As already pointed out, the learned Government Pleader rightly conceded that the liability to be assessed to sales tax can arise only if there is a completed sale and not when there is only an agreement to sell (which can only result in a claim for damages) and that the State Legislature cannot enlarge the definition of sale so as to include agreements to sell and arrogate to itself, a power which is not conferred upon it by the Government of India Act, 1935. In this view, the decision in Bharat Sabaigrass v. Collector of Commercial Taxes which followed the decision in Budh Prakasa v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur has equally no bearing.
30. The next contention that, prior to the constitution, it was incompetent for the provincial Legislature to levy sales tax in respect of sales taking place outside the State is equally without force. Entry No. 48 in the Provincial List empowered the provincial Legislatures to levy “taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements” and it does not suggest that a legislation imposing tax on sale of goods can be made only in respect of sales taking place within the boundaries of the province. Section 100(3) of the Government of India Act only enacts that a law could be passed by a Provincial Legislature for the purpose of the province itself, as pointed out by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras which is in the following terms:
“It admits of no dispute that a provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of India outside the limits of the province, but it would be quite competent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the province, provided that there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing province. This principle, which is based upon the decision of the judicial committee in Wallace Brothers etc., and Company v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay has been held by this court to be applicable to sales tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Tax Act Case (The State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. 1953 S.C.J 373. and its propriety is beyond question.”
31. The only question that arises, therefore, is whether, under the explanation, there is a sufficient and real territorial nexus between the transaction of sale and the taxing province. A sale consists of a number of ingredients which are essential in the sense that, if any of them is missing, there is no sale. In the Bombay Sales Tax Case, it has been pointed out that the following are some of the ingredients to constitute a sale: (i) the existence of goods which form the subject matter of the sale (ii) the bargain or contract which, when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price (iii) the payment, or promise of payment, of a price (iv) delivery of the goods, and (v) the passing of title. The Madras Legislature had enacted that, if the goods forming the subject matter of the contract of sale, are actually in the State when the contract of sale is made, or in the case of the sale of future goods by description, if the goods are actually produced in the State at any time after the contract of sale is made, the sale shall be deemed to be made within the State. We are inclined to hold that the existence of the goods affords sufficient nexus and that the Legislature was competent to impose a tax in respect of such a transaction wherever the actual sales take place. The learned advocate for the petitioners drew our attention to the passage at page 748 in State of Bombay v. United Motors, Ltd. which is in the following terms:
“Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustained as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been tested in a Court of law”.
32. And contended that the question left open in that decision falls to be determined in these cases. We might, however, point out that subsequently in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of the explanation in dealing with a conviction based on Section 2(b) as it stood prior to the amendment. The observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) are as follows:
“If in the Madras Sales Tax Act the basis adopted for taxation is the location of the place of business or of the goods sold, within the Province of Madras, undoubtedly it would be a valid piece of legislation to which no objection on constitutional grounds could be taken.”
33. After referring to the various ingredients or elements covered by the expression “Sale of goods” Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) observed at page 743 that,
“The presence of the goods within the province at the time of the contract would undoubtedly make the sale, if subsequently completed, a sale within the province by reason of the explanation added by Act XXV of 1947.”
34. As this explanation was not in operation during the relevant period with which the Supreme Court was concerned, it was held that the assessment of sales tax, in respect of sales concluded outside the State, was illegal and not warranted by the provisions of the unamended Act. We do not agree with the argument of the learned advocates for the petitioners that the observations are only obiter dicta and ought not to be followed. We follow those observations and hold that the explanation to Section 2(b) was validly enacted.
35. A more substantial contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the impugned provision is repugnant to the Sale of Goods Act and that under Section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, the Sale of Goods Act should prevail over the Sales Tax Act as the assent of the Governor-General was not obtained. As already pointed out, the amendment was made, in exercise of the powers conferred by item 48 of the Provincial List and not under item 10 of the Concurrent List dealing with “contracts, including partnership, agency, contract of carriage and other special forms of contract but not including contracts relating to agricultural land.” As the power of the Madras Legislature is dreived from Item 48 of List No. 2 and not Item 10 of List No. 3, we are of opinion that no question of repugnancy between the Madras Sales Tax Act and the Sale of Goods Act arises. This principle, namely, that if the power of legislation is derived from different lists no question of repugnancy arises, is well settled and concluded by the Privy Council Meghraj v. Alla Rakhia and by the Federal Court in Lachminarayan Das v. Province of Bihar. Following those decisions, we hold that as the subject matters of the two enactments are entirely different, no question of repugnancy under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, arises and the amendment is not invalid on the ground that the assent of the Governor-General was not obtained. We are supported in this conclusion by a recent decision of the Madras High Court in Luis Dreyfus and Co. v. State of Madras. We respectfully follow that decision as the identical question was considered therein.
36. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act are, in any way, affected, altered or modified by the amendment. The petitioners contended that there is a difference regarding the situs under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and that consequently the terms of Section 107 of the Government of India Act are contravened. In The State of Bombay v. United Motors, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“Neither the Sale of Goods Act, nor the common law relating to the sale of goods has anything to say as to what the situs of sale is, though certain rales have been laid down for ascertaining the intention of the contracting parties as to when or under what conditions the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.”
37. Those observations were followed by the Bench of the Madhas High Court in Luis Dreyjus and Co. v. State of Madras and their Lordships held that,
“In view of this, the argument, that the provision in Explanation 2 to Section 2(h) of the Sales Tax Act of 1947 is repugnant to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, must be repelled…”.
38. We therefore agree that under the Sale of Goods Act, there is no provision fixing the situs of sale. The decisions in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Mysore Chromite, Ltd. and State of Madras v. Lachia Shetty and Sons. Ltd. were relied on by the learned Advocates for the petitioners in support of their contention that the observations in Luis Dreyjus and Co. v. State of Madras “that there is no provision fixing the situs of sale under the Sale of Goods Act” are opposed to the conclusions of those two decisions. We are of opinion that there is no force in that contention as what was decided in those two cases was that, on the particular facts, by applying the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, the property passed outside the Indian territory.
39. Reliance was placed on the decision in Shriram v. Board of Revenue in support of the contention that the explanation offends Section 107 of the Government of India Act. We have already dealt with the question that there is no repugnancy and that the impugned explanation does not in any way trench upon the provisions of the Slae of Goods Act. We wish to follow the decision of the Madras High Court reported in Luis Dreyjus & Co. v. State of Madras in preference to the decision in Shriram v. Board of Revenue.
40. In view of our conclusions that the explanation is intra vires, T.R.C Nos. 271, 272, 283 and 333 of 1953 fail. In T.R.C Nos. 344, 348 and 364 of 1953, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal exempted the transactions subsequent to 26-1-1950 and the Revisions relate only for the period from 1-4-1949 to 26-1-1950 and they also stand dismissed. As no Revision Petitions have been filed by the State for the period from 26-1-1950 to 31-3-1950 it is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of our decision in T.R.C Nos. 83, 273, 284, 285, 148 and 192 of 1953.
T.A.B
41. Petitions dismissed.
Government of India Act, 1935.Government of India Act, 1935.Sale of Goods Act.