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  • Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947.Jagannadha Das, C.J: I agree.B/R.G.D16. Order accordingly.
  • Section 24, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act,
  • Rule 61(2) of the Rules under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • Section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. Thereupon, the Sales
  • provisions of Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • SECTION 12 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Section 2(g) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • Rule 61 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Indian Companies Act, 1913,
  • provisions of sub-rule (3)
  • Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • Section 2(g).
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947.Jagannadha Das, C.J: I agree.B/R.G.D16. Order accordingly.
  • Section 24, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act,
  • Rule 61(2) of the Rules under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • Section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. Thereupon, the Sales
  • provisions of Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • SECTION 12 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Section 2(g) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • Rule 61 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
  • Indian Companies Act, 1913,
  • provisions of sub-rule (3)
  • Orissa Sales Tax Act,
  • Section 2(g).
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mohapatra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a limited company with head office at Calcutta which supplied bamboo and related articles to paper mills in Bengal. The firm carried on business for a long time but did not register under Section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. The Sales Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 12(5) of the Act. The firm denied liability to pay tax on the ground that the sales had taken place outside the State of Orissa.

The Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur, by order dated 16-12-1949, assessed the petitioners to pay a tax of Rs. 3215/10/-. That assessment relied solely on a letter of the Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, dated 22-9-1948, which stated that export of bamboos from Orissa to Bengal constituted a "sale" in Orissa and attracted liability to sales tax.

The petitioners appealed to the Assistant Collector and sought revision to the Collector and the Commissioner. The Commissioner, by order dated 19-3-1951, upheld the assessment on a different basis: he found that the goods were collected and despatched in Orissa and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed the sales were completed in Orissa.

The petitioners applied to the Commissioner for a statement of case to the High Court; that application was refused (order dated 30-7-1951). The petitioners filed the present petition to the High Court under Section 24(2)(b) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act challenging the Commissioner's refusal to state a case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period of limitation for applying to the High Court under Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act runs from the date the Commissioner signed the refusal order or from the date on which that refusal was communicated to the petitioner.
  2. Whether, for the purpose of taxation under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, a mere contract for sale (an agreement to sell) within the State of Orissa and export of goods from Orissa is sufficient to constitute a "sale" taxable in Orissa.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The limitation period under Section 24(2) should commence from the date the refusal was communicated to them (their office received communication on 13-8-1951), not from the date on which the Commissioner signed the refusal order (30-7-1951).
  • The assessment is illegal because it treats a mere contract for sale (an executory agreement) as a "sale" within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act; a contract to sell does not transfer property and therefore should not be taxed as a sale under the provincial Act.
  • The petitioners relied on the time taken to obtain copies of the order (application for copy dated 3-8-1951 and related correspondence) for computation of limitation and claimed entitlement to the time provided by the Limitation Act provisions for obtaining copies.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • A preliminary objection was raised that the petition was barred by time because the refusal order bears the date 30-7-1951 and the petition was filed on 28-9-1951 (beyond 30 days).
  • The Commissioner had found as a fact that the goods were collected and despatched in Orissa and therefore it was reasonable to presume the sales were completed in Orissa; this factual finding supported the assessment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Madras), (1951) 19 ITR 402 (Mad) Limitation should be computed from the date the aggrieved party actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing it (i.e., communication), not from the date the officer signed the order. The court relied on this decision to hold that "refusal" implies a communicated refusal and that the limitation period starts from the date of communication (13-8-1951) rather than the date the order was signed (30-7-1951).
Secretary of State v. Gopi-Setty Narayansami, 34 Mad 151 (referenced) Authority cited in Muthiah Chettiar for the proposition that the date of an order means the date of communication or publication, not merely the date of signing. Referred to through the Muthiah Chettiar judgment as supporting authority for the court's view on computation of limitation from communication.
Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan Chettiar, 53 Mad 491 (referenced) Authority cited in Muthiah Chettiar on the point that the date of the order is when it was communicated or pronounced so the party is deemed to have had notice. Referred to through Muthiah Chettiar to bolster the court's conclusion about commencement of limitation on communication.
Budh Prakash Jai Prakash v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur, 1952 All LJ 332 Distinction between an agreement to sell (executory contract) and a sale (executed transaction where property passes); taxation is of a sale of goods, not merely an agreement to sell. The court relied on this Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court to support the view that a mere contract for sale cannot be made taxable as a "sale" and that Explanation III (or equivalent provision) seeking to widen "sale" to include forward contracts is invalid.
Dixon v. Yates (1833) 5 B & Ad. 313 Illustration of when property passes: if vendor appropriates a specific chattel to the contract and vendee assents, the situation is equivalent to delivery and property vests. Quoted to explain the legal distinction between an agreement to sell and a sale; used to illustrate when property passes and why a mere executory contract ordinarily does not transfer property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed two connected aspects: (A) limitation and procedural entitlement to time for obtaining copies; and (B) the legal character of a "sale" for taxation under the Orissa Sales Tax Act.

A. Limitation and Computation of Time

- The court interpreted the term "refusal" in Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act to mean a "communicated refusal." If a Commissioner merely signs an order but does not communicate it, that signing alone cannot be treated as the operative refusal for limitation purposes. The court held that limitation starts from the date of communication of the refusal to the aggrieved party (here, 13-8-1951), not from the date the order was signed (30-7-1951).

- The court relied on the Madras decision in Muthiah Chettiar which states that computation of limitation should not begin earlier than the date on which the party actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing it.

- The court then applied Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act which makes the provisions for obtaining copies (Section 12 of the Limitation Act) applicable except where excluded by special/local law. The Orissa Sales Tax Act contained no express exclusion. On the facts (application for copy made 3-8-1951; correspondence from Board of Revenue calling for stamps and folios on 14-8-1951 received 17-8-1951; folios sent 20-8-1951; copies ready letter dated 30-8-1951 received 4-9-1951), the petitioners were entitled to 22 days as the time requisite for obtaining copies (from 14-8-1951 to 4-9-1951). Consequently the petition filed on 28-9-1951 was within time.

- The court examined Rule 61(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules which requires that, on receipt of an application for copy, the dealer be informed of the court-fee stamps required. The court treated the postal communication used by the Board as the ordinary mode of informing parties of requisite fees and thereby accepted the petitioners' reliance on the time for postal transmission as part of the computation.

B. Merits — Character of "Sale" and Validity of Assessment

- The petitioners contended that the assessment was illegal because it treated a mere contract for sale (an agreement to sell) as a completed sale taxable under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The court explained the legal distinction: an agreement to sell is executory and does not transfer property; a sale is an executed contract where property passes.

- The court observed that the Collector's letter suggested that mere export of bamboos from Orissa would constitute a "sale" in Orissa. The Sales Tax Officer's assessment was based on that letter. The Commissioner, however, upheld the assessment on a different footing — a presumption that, because the goods were collected and despatched from Orissa, the sales were completed there. The court found that this was "too long a presumption" in the absence of material showing the sales were actually completed in Orissa.

- On the constitutional/legislative competence point, the court reasoned that the provincial legislature (Orissa) is competent to tax "sales" under Entry 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule (Government of India Act 1935), but it cannot make the meaning of "sale" wider than that used under the Government of India Act (i.e., as understood in India — a completed transaction involving transfer of interest). If the Orissa Act's second proviso to Section 2(g) sought to treat an executory contract as a "sale" (widening the meaning beyond that recognized by the Government of India Act), that provision would be ultra vires. The court relied on the Allahabad decision (Budh Prakash Jai Prakash) and on the Sale of Goods Act distinctions to support this view.

- While the court expressed the view that a mere contract for sale should not be taxable as a sale and that the second proviso to Section 2(g) "seems to be ultra vires," it did not finally decide the substantive constitutional validity. Instead, the court determined that the Commissioner had to state a case and refer the specified point to the High Court for authoritative decision, because the Commissioner's factual presumption lacked supporting material and the legal question of whether a contract to sell and export suffices for taxation required resolution.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ordered that the Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur, be required to state a case and refer the following question to the High Court:

“Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment is legal being based on the position that mere contract for sale within the State of Orissa and the export of goods from Orissa is sufficient for taxation under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947.”

Additional direct outcomes and consequences:

  • The court held that the petition was filed within time because the limitation period commenced on the date of communication of the refusal (13-8-1951) and the petitioners were entitled to time for obtaining copies under the Limitation Act; therefore the time bar objection failed.
  • The court found the Commissioner's factual presumption (that sales were completed in Orissa because goods were collected and despatched there) unsupported by material before the Sales Tax Officer, and therefore inadequate as a basis to sustain the assessment without referring the legal point to the High Court.
  • The court did not finally decide the broader substantive constitutional question (i.e., the validity of treating an executory contract as a "sale" for taxation). Instead, it directed a reference so that the High Court may determine that question.

Implication regarding precedent: The opinion indicates a view on the legal distinction between an agreement to sell and a sale and expresses concern about the possible ultra vires character of statutory language that expands "sale" to include executory contracts, but it stops short of deciding that constitutional issue; accordingly, no final new precedent on the substantive point was established by this order — the point has been referred for authoritative decision.

Order accordingly.

    Messrs Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. The Collector Of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, Cuttack Opposite Party.

    Mohapatra, J.:— This is an application sunder Section 24, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, asking us to direct the Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur, to state a case.

    2. The petitioners are a Limited Company, incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having their Head Office at Calcutta. Sabaigrass and supplies the above articles to Orient Paper Mills, Brajaragnagar, Titagar Paper Mills and other Bengal Paper Mills. The Firm, inspite of carrying on business for a long time, did not take steps to get itself registered under Section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. Thereupon, the Sales Tax Officer issued notice under Section 12, clause (5) of the Act in response to which the Firm denied liability to pay the tax on the ground that the sales had taken place outside the State of Orissa and, as such, no tax was payable in Orissa. The Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur, by his order dated 16-12-49, assessed the petitioners to pay a tax of Rs. 3215/10/-. The Sales Tax Officer's order of assessment solely relied upon the letter of the Cot lector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, No. 3264 C.T/328 C.T of 48, dated the 22nd September, 1948. There being a reference to the letter of the Collector of Commercial Taxes in the body of the order itself, we allowed the production of the said letter and, in order to understand the contents of the said letter, we allowed also the production of the letter written to the Collector by the Asst. Manager of the petitioners, the letter being dated 20th September, 1948. The letter of the Collector runs thus:

    “Please refer to your letter No. A/364 dated 20-9-48. The export of bamboos by you from Sambalpur and other districts of Orissa to the Titaghur Paper Mills Co., and the Bengal Paper Mills Co., in Bengal constitutes a “sale” in Orissa and as such attracts liability to Sales Tax. The Orissa Sales Tax Act does not exempt such exports from payment of sales tax. The fact that you have been registered in West Bengal does not affect the question in any way.”

    3. Against the order of the assessment, the petitioners went up in appeal to the Asst. Collector, and in revision to the Collector and the Commissioner. The Commissioner, by his order dated March 19th, 1951, upheld the assessment on reasons different from that of the Sales Tax Officer. He found:

    “The goods were collected in Orissa and were despatched from Orissa. Normally, therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the sales were completed in Orissa. No doubt, there may be different contracts belying this presumption; but as no evidence have been produced by the party, this presumption of station of despatch will prevail. It is, therefore, not at all unreasonable that the Sales Tax Officer has treated the gross turnover as assessable.”

    4. The petitioners' petition to the Commissioner for stating a case and referring the matter to the High Court having been refused the present petition has been filed. A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, that the present petition is barred by time. The order, refusing to make a reference, bears the date “30th July, 1951”, and the present petition has been filed on 28th September 1951. Under the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, the petition to the High Court has got to be filed within 30 days of such refusal by the Commissioner. Sub-section (2) runs thus:

    “If, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Revenue Commissioner refused to make such reference, the applicant may, within thirty days of such refusal, either—

    (a) withdraw his application (and if he does so, the fee paid shall be refunded), of:

    (b) apply to the High Court against such refusal.”

    5. It is contended by the petitioners that the period of limitation should commence not from the signing of the order but from the communication of such order to the petitioners, which remains uncontroverted, to the effect that the refusal was communicated by the office of the Commissioner, Sambalpur, in his Office letter No. 5750.Grl, dated 9th August, 1951 which was received in the Office of the petitioners on 13th August 1951. To us, it appears that the term “refusal” implies within itself “communicated refusal”. If the Commissioner signs the order and keeps it for himself without communicating it to the person against whom refusal is meant, it cannot be taken to be a refusal as contemplated under Section 24. We, therefore, think that the limitation will start from the date of communication of the order of refusal and not from the date of signing of it. We are supported in our view by a decision of the Madras High Court, reported in ‘Muthiah Chettiar v. Commr of Income Tax, Madras’, (1951) 19 ITR 402 (Mad). The Head Note runs as follows:

    “If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order.”

    6. Chief Justice Rajamannar, in his judgment, observes:

    “The only question on the merits which falls for decision in whether the one year has; to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Officer, or the date when it was communicated to the petitioner, or the date, if there be any, on which the petitioner had the opportunity of coming to know of the order. The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on a number of decisions of this Court of which it is sufficient to refer to two, namely, — ‘Secretary of State v. Gopi-Setty Narayansami’, 34 Mad 151 and — ‘Swaminathan v. Lakshmanan Chettiar’, 53 Mad 491, which support his contention that the date of the order does not mean the date when the Officer passed the order but the date when such order was either communicated to the party or the date when it was pronounced or published, in such a manner that the party must be deemed to have had a notice of it on the date of such pronouncement or publication.”

    7. As it appears from paragraph 3 of the affidavit, filed by the petitioners, that, in fact, an official letter was written to the advocate of the petitioners, it seems to be the practice of that Board of communicating with the persons aggrieved by official letters.

    8. According to us, therefore, the pertinent date for the purpose of limitation is 13th August, that is, the date of communication of the order, and not 30th of July, the date on which the order was signed.

    9. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, the provisions of S. 12 of the Act, which prescribes computation of period for obtaining copies of order or judgment, shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. There being no provision in the Orissa Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the provisions of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, the petitioners, in the case, are entitled to the advantage of computation that they had taken for the purpose of obtaining the copies. The petitioners have filed an affidavit, as observed above, the contents of which have not been disputed before us. The petitioners had filed the application, for copy on 3-8-51. The Office of the Board of Revenue, Sambalpur, in their letter dated 14-8-51, called for supply of stamps and folios: within 7 days. The letter was received at the Office of the petitioners' advocate on 17-8-51. The requisite folios and court fees were sent on 20-8-51. Then again the Board of Revenue, in their letter dated 30-8-51, intimated that the copies were ready and asked to take delivery of them within 7 days, the letter having been, received by the petitioners' advocate on 4-9-51. These facts transpire from paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 of the affidavit. On the above facts, therefore-they are entitled to 22 days as the time requisite for obtaining copies, i.e, from 14-8-51, when, the limitation commenced, up to 4-9-51, and there being no latches on their part during; these days. The present petition having been, filed on 28-9-51, they are within time.

    10. A point was taken that they were not entitled to the time the letters from Sambalpur took to reach them. But our attention has been drawn to Rule 61(2) of the Rules under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, which runs as follows:

    “On receipt of the application, the dealer will be informed of the court fee stamps that will be required under the provisions of sub-rule (3) for the supply of copy. After the necessary court-fee has been paid by the dealer, a certified copy of the order will be prepared and granted to him.”

    11. This shows the dealer is entitled to be informed of the requisite court-fee and stamp which means, in the absence of any other provisions, he is to be informed by the usual, mode of communication, that is, by postal letters. The learned counsel, appearing on, behalf of the opposite party, has produced before us a true copy of the extract from letter No. 3626 dated 15-7-52, from the Deputy Secretary to Board of Revenue, Sambalpur, to the Collector of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, Cuttack., Paragraph 3 runs as follows:

    “Under Rule 61 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules on receipt of an application for a copy, a notice assessing the requisite folios and court-fee stamps is pasted on the Notice Board. On receipt of stamps from the party., copies are prepared and when these are ready another notice asking the party to take delivery of the copies in person is pasted on the Notice Board. A party may take delivery through an authorised agent.”

    12. In the extract there is nothing to indicate clearly that was the practice prevailing at time when the petitioners of this case had applied for the copies. On the contrary, the fact that the authorities had written a letter to the petitioners to supply the folios &c., as it appears from the affidavit, makes us more inclined to find that the Department used to inform the parties applying for copies by postal communications for depositing folios, and this is in accord with Rule 61(2).

    13. Now coming to the merits of the case, the main contention of the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, is that the assessment is illegal inasmuch as the assessment is based upon the legal position that mere contract for sale in the State of Orissa is sufficient to make it taxable under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, as a contract for sale is denied to be a sale under the second proviso to Section 2(g). The whole basis of assessment is the order of the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur, dated 16-12-49, and the Collector's letter dated 22nd September, 1948. From the letter of the Collector, as we have quoted above, we find that, according to him, mere export of Bamboos is sufficient to constitute a sale in Orissa. There seems to be enough force in the contention that a mere contract for sale cannot constitute a sale. It being executory in character, pure and simple, no property or ownership passes under it. The sale, on the other hand, is an executed contract where complete ownership passes. The second proviso in Section 2(g) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act seems to be ultra vires. Entry No. 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act 1935, running as “Taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements” in a Provincial Subject. The Provincial Legislature is competent to legislate on the subject. But the “sale”, under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, cannot be made wider than what it meant under the Government of India Act. We are to take it that the British Parliament used the term “sale” in the sense in which it was used in India, i.e, a completed transaction involving a transfer of interest. A mere contract for sale is not a completed transaction. If it meant anything other than or wider than the meaning of the word “sale”, appearing in the Government of India Act, to that extent it must be said to be ultra vires. Mere contract for sale, therefore, within the State of Orissa cannot be taxable under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. We are supported in our view by a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in — ‘Budh Prakash Jai Prakash v. Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur’, 1952 All LJ 332 at p. 335. Sapru J. observes:

    “The point which I am stressing is that there is, as is evident from sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, a distinction between an agreement to sell and a sale and what is authorised by the Government of India Act is taxation of a sale of goods and not agreement to sell which has not materialized into a sale. An agreement to sell is, as I have said before, an executory contract pure and simple. No property under it passes. A sale, on the other hand, is an executed contract, i.e, it is a contract plus a conveyance. The distinction between an agreement to sell and a sale has been brought out by Mr. Benjamin in his well-known book on Sale (Eighth Edn, p. 1). In Mr. Benjamin's view:

    ‘In order to constitute a sale there must be (1) An agreement to sell, by which alone property does not pass; and (2) an actual sale, by which the property passes’

    14. I would also quote in this connexion the observations of Parke, J. in — ‘Dixon v. Yates’, (1833) 5B & Ad. 313 at p. 340:

    ‘Where there is a sale of goods generally no property in them passes till delivery because’ until then the very goods sold are ‘not ascertained’. But where by the contract itself, the vendor appropriates to the vendee a specific chattel, and the latter thereby agrees to take that specific chattel and to pay the stipulated price, the parties are then in the same situation as they would be after a delivery of goods in pursuance of a general contract. The very ‘application’ of the chattel is equivalent to-delivered by the vendor, and the assent of the ??? to take the specific chattel, and to pay the price is equivalent to his accepting possession. The effect of the contract, therefore, is to vest the property in the bargainee’.

    at p. 336:

    “I am satisfied that Explanation III of sub-s. (b) of Section of the Act which seeks to put a meaning not contemplated by the British Parliament on the word “sale” with reference to forward contracts is invalid.”

    15. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, has drawn our attention to the finding of the Commissioner to contend that the decision of the Commissioner is based upon a finding of fact that the sales had taken place within the State of Orissa. The finding of the Commissioner has been quoted above. It is clear that before the Sales Tax Officer there was absolutely no material from which it could be concluded that the sales were completed within the State of Orissa. As such, the basis of assessment by him was the letter of the Collector on the theory that mere export is sufficient to make a transaction taxable. The finding of the Commissioner “that the goods were collected in Orissa and were despatched from Orissa. Normally therefore it is reasonable-to presume that the sales were completed in. Orissa, “is too long a presumption, there being no material that the sales were actually completed in Orissa. We would, therefore, require the Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur, to state a case and refer it to this Court on the following point:

    “Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment is legal being based on the position that mere contract for sale within the State of Orissa and the export of goods from Orissa is sufficient for taxation under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947.”

    Jagannadha Das, C.J:— I agree.

    B/R.G.D

    16. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Messrs Bharat Sabaigrass Ltd. v. The Collector Of Commercial Taxes, Orissa, Cuttack Opposite Party.
    (Jul 29, 1952)