The Doctrine of Ultra Vires: Constitutional Limits on Legislative and Executive Power in India

The Doctrine of Ultra Vires: Constitutional Limits on Legislative and Executive Power in India

I. Introduction: Defining the Doctrine

The doctrine of ultra vires, which translates to "beyond powers," is a cornerstone of administrative and constitutional law in India. It serves as a fundamental mechanism of judicial review, ensuring that state action, whether legislative or executive, remains within the confines of the authority conferred by law. As articulated by the Allahabad High Court, the term signifies a "lack of power" and points to the capacity of the person or entity to perform an act (Anand Prakash And Another v. Assistant Registrar, Co-Operative Societies And Others, 1966). The doctrine proceeds on the premise that all power is limited. While in its broadest sense, any act not warranted by law may be deemed illegal, ultra vires is distinct; it pertains specifically to actions taken in excess of conferred powers, irrespective of whether the act itself is otherwise illegal (Anand Prakash, 1966).

When an action is challenged as being ultra vires the Constitution of India, it implies that the legislative or executive body has transgressed the ultimate source of all legal authority in the nation. Such a challenge can be mounted on two primary grounds: first, a lack of legislative competence, where a legislature enacts a law on a subject matter over which it has no jurisdiction; and second, the violation of express or implied constitutional limitations, most notably the infringement of Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III or the contravention of the 'basic structure' of the Constitution. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of how the doctrine of ultra vires operates as a constitutional check on state power in India, drawing upon seminal judicial precedents.

II. Legislative Competence and the Doctrine of Pith and Substance

The Constitution of India establishes a federal structure with a clear demarcation of legislative powers between the Union and the States, as delineated in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule. A primary application of the ultra vires doctrine arises when a legislature oversteps its assigned domain. When a law is challenged on this ground, courts employ the doctrine of 'pith and substance' to ascertain its true nature and character. The court looks at the substance of the legislation, not merely its form, to determine which list it falls under.

In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970), while examining the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969, the Supreme Court first determined Parliament's legislative competence. It found the Act to be within Parliament's purview under Entry 45 of List I (Banking) and Entry 42 of List III (Acquisition of Property). Although the Act was ultimately struck down for violating Fundamental Rights, the initial inquiry into legislative competence illustrates this first limb of the ultra vires test. More recently, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court applied the pith and substance doctrine to uphold the Aadhaar Act, 2016. It held that the Act, in substance, dealt with the targeted delivery of subsidies from the Consolidated Fund of India, a subject within the Union's domain, and did not unconstitutionally entrench upon state subjects like public health, thereby rejecting the argument that it was ultra vires Article 243-G.

III. Ultra Vires for Violation of Constitutional Limitations

Even when a legislature is competent to enact a law, the law can be declared ultra vires if it contravenes specific prohibitions or limitations within the Constitution. Article 13(2) provides the textual foundation for this principle, stating that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

A. Infringement of Fundamental Rights

The judiciary has consistently struck down legislation found to be in violation of Fundamental Rights.

  • Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression (Article 19(1)(a)): In the landmark case of Shreya Singhal v. Union Of India (2015), the Supreme Court declared Section 66-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, ultra vires the Constitution. The Court found the provision to be vague, overbroad, and lacking a proximate nexus to the permissible grounds for restriction under Article 19(2). By criminalizing speech based on subjective terms like "annoyance" and "inconvenience," the law had a "chilling effect" on free expression and was thus an unreasonable restriction, rendering it unconstitutional.
  • Right to Form Associations (Article 19(1)(c)): In State Of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952), the Court invalidated Section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. The provision empowered the executive to declare an association unlawful based on its subjective satisfaction, without providing for adequate judicial scrutiny. The Court held that such a provision imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to form associations and was, therefore, ultra vires.
  • Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21): The interpretation of Article 21 has evolved dramatically. The early narrow view in A.K. Gopalan v. State Of Madras (1950), which treated Fundamental Rights as isolated silos, was overturned in Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India (1978). The Court in Maneka Gandhi held that the "procedure established by law" under Article 21 must be "fair, just, and reasonable," and not arbitrary or oppressive. Any law that prescribes a procedure depriving a person of life or personal liberty without adhering to these principles of natural justice is ultra vires the Constitution.
  • Right to Equality (Article 14): A law can be struck down as ultra vires if it is manifestly arbitrary. In Shayara Bano v. Union Of India (2017), the Supreme Court, by a majority, held the practice of Triple Talaq (talaq-e-biddat) to be unconstitutional. It was found to be manifestly arbitrary, as it allowed a Muslim husband to unilaterally and irrevocably end a marriage, violating the principles of equality enshrined in Article 14. Similarly, in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. M/S. Tetulia Coke Plant (P) Ltd. (2011), an e-auction scheme was declared ultra vires Article 14 for being discriminatory and arbitrary.

B. The Basic Structure Doctrine as a Ground for Ultra Vires

The most profound expansion of the ultra vires doctrine is its application to constitutional amendments themselves. The Supreme Court, in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. State Of Kerala (1973), propounded the 'basic structure' doctrine, holding that while Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, this power is not unlimited. It cannot be exercised to alter, destroy, or emasculate the fundamental features or the basic structure of the Constitution. Any constitutional amendment that does so is considered ultra vires the amending power.

This doctrine has been applied in several critical cases:

  • In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Court struck down Clause (4) of Article 329-A, inserted by the 39th Amendment Act, which sought to nullify a High Court judgment and place the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial scrutiny. This was held to be a violation of the basic features of democracy, rule of law, and judicial review.
  • In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India (1980), the Court declared Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act as ultra vires. Section 55, which attempted to grant unlimited amending power to Parliament and oust judicial review, was held to destroy the basic structure. Section 4, which gave primacy to Directive Principles over the Fundamental Rights in Articles 14 and 19, was held to disturb the "harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles," which was an essential feature of the Constitution.
  • The doctrine's reach was further clarified in I.R. Coelho (Dead) By Lrs. v. State Of T.N. (2007). The Court ruled that no law placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment) can claim absolute immunity from judicial review. If such a law damages or destroys the basic structure, it can be struck down as unconstitutional. This judgment effectively made the protection of Article 31-B subservient to the basic structure doctrine.

IV. Procedural Ultra Vires in a Constitutional Context

An act can also be ultra vires if it is enacted without adhering to a mandatory constitutional procedure. This is known as procedural ultra vires. As noted by the Orissa High Court, this occurs "when there is a failure to comply with mandatory procedural requirements" (Sukhalal Munda Petitioner v. State Of Odisha, 2017).

A powerful example is the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Rajendra N. Shah v. Union Of India (2013), which was later upheld by the Supreme Court. The High Court struck down Part IXB of the Constitution, introduced by the 97th Amendment Act, 2011, which dealt with co-operative societies. Since "co-operative societies" is a subject in the State List, any constitutional amendment affecting it required ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures, as mandated by the proviso to Article 368(2). As this mandatory procedure was not followed, the amendment was declared ultra vires the Constitution for being procedurally non-compliant.

V. Subordinate Legislation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires

The doctrine of ultra vires is most frequently invoked in the context of subordinate or delegated legislation (e.g., rules, regulations, schemes). Such legislation can be challenged on the ground that it is ultra vires the parent Act that empowered its creation, or on the ground that it is ultra vires the Constitution itself. As the Punjab & Haryana High Court observed, subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same immunity as a statute and can be questioned if it does not conform to the parent statute, is inconsistent with other laws, or is "manifestly arbitrary and unjust" (SIMRAT RANDHAWA v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS, 2020).

A rule or scheme can be declared ultra vires the Constitution if it violates Fundamental Rights. For instance, the Central Administrative Tribunal, relying on Supreme Court precedent, has held that rules giving retrospective effect that prejudicially affect vested rights of individuals are arbitrary and ultra vires the Constitution (N M JABBAR v. THE SECRETARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2019; KANTI PRASAD TYAGI v. D/O ELECTRONICS, 2019). This is a direct application of Article 14 to subordinate legislation.

VI. Conclusion

The doctrine of ultra vires is a vital principle of constitutional governance in India, acting as the primary legal tool for enforcing constitutional supremacy. It ensures that no authority, whether legislative or executive, can act beyond the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. The Indian judiciary, through expansive and purposive interpretation, has used this doctrine to safeguard the federal balance, protect fundamental rights from legislative encroachment, and preserve the core identity of the Constitution through the basic structure test. From striking down statutory provisions that impose unreasonable restrictions (V.G. Row, Shreya Singhal) to invalidating constitutional amendments that seek to undermine judicial review and democratic principles (Minerva Mills, Indira Gandhi), the doctrine has proven to be a flexible and potent instrument. It reinforces the role of the courts as the ultimate arbiters of constitutional validity, ensuring that all state action remains subservient to the supreme law of the land.