Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?`
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
=========================================================
RAJENDRA N SHAH
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
================================================================
Appearance:
MR
KI SHAH with MR VISHWAS K SHAH with MR MASOOM K SHAH, ADVOCATE for
the Applicant.
MR
PS CHAMPANERI, ASST SOLICITOR GENERAL for the Opponent No. 1
MR
PK JANI, GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Opponent No. 2
================================================================
CORAM:
HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR.
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
and
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 22/04/2013
CAV JUDGEMNT
(PER
: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. BHASKAR
BHATTACHARYA)
1. By
this Public Interest Litigation, the writ-petitioner has prayed for
quashing of the Constitution [97th
amendment] Act, 2011 introducing part IXB, as ultra
vires
the Constitution of India.
2. The
case made out by the writ-petitioner is that the Constitution [97th
amendment] Act, 2011 was passed by the Lok Sabha on 22nd
December 2011 and the same was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 28th
December 2011. The President of India bestowed assent to that
amendment on 12th
January 2012 and the said notification was published in the gazette
of India of 13th
January 2012 and the amendment came into force on 15th
February 2012.
2.1 According
to the petitioner, the power under Article 368 of the Constitution of
India itself is the basic structure of the Constitution of India and
the fact that by the impugned constitutional amendment, the procedure
prescribed in the Article 368(2) of the Constitution, which
recognizes the federal structure of the Constitution as one of the
basic structures, has not been followed, is violative of the
Constitution. The petitioner contends that the subject-matter
Co-operative Societies does not fall in the 7th
Schedule Entry 45 of List I of the Constitution and those are
specifically excluded from entry no. 43 of List 1. Therefore,
according to the petitioner, the State legislature is the only
competent authority in law to enact the laws for the co-operative
societies and on that ground, the proposed amendment should be set
aside as violative of the Constitution of India as the consent of the
majority of the State Legislatures was not received before presenting
the Bill proposing the amendment to the President of India.
2.2 According to the
petitioner, it is settled law that a constitutional authority cannot
do something indirectly which it is not permitted to do directly and
if there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the constitutional
authority from doing an act, such provision cannot be allowed to be
defeated by adopting a subterfuge. By the impugned constitutional
amendment, according to the petitioner, the Parliament, a creature of
the Constitution, and not vice-a-versa, has violated the basic
structure of the Constitution by not complying with the requirements
of Article 368 (2) of the Constitution.
3. This Court issued notices
upon the parties including the learned Attorney General of India, and
in response to the notice, Mr. Champaneri, the learned Assistant
Solicitor General of India, has appeared. The submissions of the
Union of India may be summarized thus:
(A). The only limitation on the
Parliament in exercise of the constituent power to amend the
Constitution in the matters enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d),
and (e) of the proviso to sub-Article (2) of Article 368 is that,
such amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures
of not less than one half of the States by the resolution to that
effect passed by those Legislatures before the bill making provision
for such amendment is presented to the President for his assent.
(B). Sub-Article
(1) of Article 368 has been inserted by the Constitution (24th
amendment) Act, 1971 and the original Article 368 has been
re-numbered as clause (2) of Article 368 whereas the words specified
in parts A & B of the First Schedule from the proviso were
omitted by the Constitution [97th
Amendment] Act, 1956.
(C).
Sub-Article (3) provides that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to
any amendment made under this Article. This clause is inserted by the
Constitution (24th
amendment) Act, 1971. Sub-Article (4) and Sub-Article (5) of Article
368 which had been inserted by the Constitution (42nd
amendment) Act, 1976 have been declared to be invalid by the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case of
MINERVA
MILLS V. UNION OF INDIA,
reported in AIR
1980 SC 1789
on the ground that these clauses which remove all limitation upon the
power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and precluded a
judicial review of the Constitution Amendment Act, on any ground,
sought to destroy an essential feature or basic structure
of the Constitution.
(D). The Constitution lays down
different modes of amendment of its various provisions, which are as
under:
(i). A very large number of
provisions are open to alteration by the Union Parliament, by simple
majority like the matters referred to in Articles 2 4, 169 and
240.
(a). Creation of new States or
reconstitution of existing States.
(b). Creation or abolition of
upper chambers in the States.
(c). Administration
of scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes (Part VIII of the 5th
Schedule and Part XXI of the 6th
Schedule.
(ii). If, however, a matter is
not covered by this Article, like cessation of territory to a foreign
power, that can be effected only by enacting an Amendment Act under
Article 368.
(iii). In the case of few
matters relating to the federal structure of the Constitution, a
special mode is prescribed, viz. that the Bill for amendment must be
passed by two-third majority of the members of each House present and
voting (such majority being more than 50% of the total membership of
each House) and then ratified by the Legislatures by one-half of the
States. Those matters are:
Legislative powers between the Union and the States,
(e). Representation of States
in Parliament, and,
(f). The provisions of Articles
368 itself.
(E). Article
368 does not prescribe the form in which the amendments may be made
and the arrangement may, therefore, add a provision to the
Constitution without altering its existing text in view of the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of SHANKARIPRASAD
vs. UNION OF INDIA
reported in AIR
1951 SC 458.
(F). In
view of the aforesaid decision in the case of Shankariprasad
[supra],
the decision prevailing was that no part of our Constitution is
unamendable and that the Parliament may, by passing a Constitution
Amendment Act, in compliance with the requirement of Article 368,
amend any provision of the Constitution including the fundamental
rights of Article 368 itself. However, in the case of Golaknath
reported in AIR
1967 SC 1643,
the majority of six Judges of a Special Bench of 11 Judges overruled
the previous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Shankariprasad
and took a view that though there is no express provision from the
ambit of the Article 368, the fundamental rights included in Part-III
of the Constitution cannot, by their very nature, be subject to the
process of amendment provided for in Article 368 and that if any of
such rights is to be amended, a new Constituent Assembly must be
convened for making a new Constitution or radically changing it.
(G). The
majority decision on Golaknath s case was superseded by the
Constitution (24th
amendment) Act, 1971, by inserting clause (4) in Article 13 and
clause (1) in Article 368 as a result of which an amendment of the
Constitution, based in accordance with the Article 368, may not be a
law within the meaning of Article 13 and the validity of the
Constitution Amendment Act shall not be open to question on the
ground that it takes away or affects a fundamental right. This
amendment has been held to be valid.
(H). The
decision of Golaknath s case has been overruled by the latter Full
Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Keshavnanad
v. State of Kerala
reported in AIR
1973 SC 1461.
(I). Clauses
(4) and (5) are inserted in Article 368 by the 42nd
Amendment Act, 1976 and the insertion of the said clauses by 42nd
Amendment Act, 1976 provides that:
(a). There is no limitation
express or implied, upon the amendment power under Article 368 (1)
which is a constituent power, and,
(b). A Constitution Amending
Act would not, therefore, be subject to judicial review on any
ground.
The said
amendment, in turn, came to be superseded by the decision of a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of MINERVA
MILLS
[supra].
The said clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 has been invalidated by
the Supreme Court in the said case on the ground that these
provisions introduced by the 42nd
amendment Act, 1976, sought to exclude judicial review, which was one
of the basic features of the Indian Constitution, as held in the
Kesavanand s case and so long as this decision stands, all the
Constitution Amendment Acts shall be open to review by the Supreme
Court to see whether it affected any of the basic features of the
Constitution substantively or the procedural safeguards included in
other clauses of Article 368.
(J). Thus,
the power to amend Constitution is vested in the Parliament and while
exercising the powers under Article 368, the Parliament would not be
subject to the limitations which curb its Legislative powers to make
laws under Articles 245-246 because the amending power conferred by
Article 368 is constituent power as held by the Apex Court in
the case of SASANK
vs. UNION OF INDIA
reported in AIR
1981 SC 522.
(K). By the amendment, by
insertion of Chapter IXB, Article 19(1) (c) has been amended and now
the co-operative societies have also been included in Part-III of the
Constitution in Article 19(1) (c) and therefore, there is an addition
in the fundamental rights so far as addition of fundamental rights
guaranteed under 19(1) (c) has been extended to the Co-Operative
Societies.
(L). Therefore, Article 368 (2)
proviso has to be read in its strict sense and it is apparent that
the amendment under challenge is not changing any of the matters
enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of the provision.
(M). The
Parliament has exercised its constituent powers, which is distinct
from its legislative power and by the 97th
amendment, the Parliament has not legislated on the subject, but in
its constituent power has amended the Constitution by addition of
guarantee of the fundamental rights in favour of the Co-Operative
Societies. By this amendment, the Parliament has not attempted to
change the basic features of the Constitution. The Principles of
Federalism are also not altered. Therefore, the challenge to the 97th
amendment in Constitution is misconceived and has no merits, and
therefore, the writ-petition deserves to be dismissed.
4. The State Government,
although has not filed any affidavit, Mr. Jani, the learned
Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State, has supported
the contentions of Mr. Champaneri, and has prayed for rejection of
the writ-application.
5. Therefore, the question that
falls for determination before us is whether the impugned amendment
violates any of the provisions of the Constitution of India.
6. In order to appreciate the
aforesaid contention, it will be profitable to refer to part IXB of
the Constitution of India containing Articles 243ZH to 243ZT, which
are quoted below:
243ZG. Bar to
interference by courts in electoral matters. Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution,
(a)
the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of
constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made
or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in
question in any court;
(b)
no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by
an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner
as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a
State.
243ZH.
Definitions.--In
this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,--
[a] authorised person
means a person referred to as such in article 243ZQ;
[b] board means the
board of directors or the governing body of a co-operative society,
by whatever name called, to which the direction and control of the
management of the affairs of a society is entrusted to;
[c] co-operative society
means a society registered or deemed to be registered under under any
law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in
any State;
[d] multi-State
co-operative society means a society with objects not confined to
one State and registered or deemed to be registered under any law for
the time being in force relating to such co-operatives;
[e] office bearer
means a President, Vice-President, Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson,
Secretary or Treasurer of a co-operative society and includes any
other person to be elected by the board of any co-operative society;
[f] Registrar means
the Central Registrar appointed by the Central Government in relation
to the multi-State co-operative societies and the Registrar for
co-operative societies appointed by the State Government under the
law made by the Legislature of a State in relation to co-operative
societies;
[g] State Act means
any law made by the Legislature of a State;
[h] State level
co-operative society means a co-operative society having its area
of operation extending to the whole of a State and defined as such in
any law made by the Legislature of a State.
243ZI. Incorporation of
co-operative societies.-- Subject
to the provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a State may, by
law, make provisions with respect to the incorporation, regulation
and winding-up of co-operative societies based on the principles of
voluntary formation, democratic member-control, member-economic
participation and autonomous functioning.
243ZJ. Number and term of
members of board and its office bearers.--
[1] The board shall consist of such number of directors as may be
provided by the Legislature of a State, by law:
Provided that the maximum
number of directors of a co-opeative society shall not exceed
twenty-one:
Provided further that the
Legislature of a State shall, by law, provide for the reservation of
one seat for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and two
seats for women on board of every co-operative society consisting of
individuals as members and having members from such class or category
of persons.
[2] The term of office of
elected members of the board and its office bearers shall be five
years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall
be coterminous with the term of the board:
Provided that the board may
fill a casual vacancy on the board by nomination out of the same
class of members in respect of which the casual vacancy has arisen,
if the term of office of the board is less than half of its original
term.
[3] The Legislature of a
State shall, by law, make provisions for co-option of persons to be
members of the board having experience in the field of banking,
management, finance or specialisation in any other field relating to
the objects and activities undertaken by the co-operative society, as
members of the board of such society:
Provided that the number of
such co-opted members shall not exceed two in addition to twenty-one
directors specified in the first proviso to clause[1]:
Provided further that such
co-opted members shall not have the right to vote in any election of
the co-operative society in their capacity as such member or to be
eligible to be elected as office bearers of the board:
Provided also that the
functional directors of a co-operative society shall also be the
members of the board and such members shall be excluded for the
purpose of counting the total number of directors specified in the
first proviso to clause[1].
243ZK. Election of
members of board.--[1]
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law made by the Legislature
of a State, the election of a board shall be conducted before the
expiry of the term of the board so as to ensure that the newly
elected members of the board assume office immediately on the expiry
of the term of the office of members of the outgoing board.
[2] The superintendence,
direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and
the conduct of, all elections to a co-operative society shall vest in
such an authority or body, as may be provided by the Legislature of
a State, by law:
Provided that the
Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for the procedure and
guidelines for the conduct of such election.
243ZL. Supersession and
suspension of board and interim management.--
[1] Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being
in force, no board shall be superseded or kept under suspension for a
period exceeding six months:
Provided that the board may
be superseded or kept under suspension in case--
[i] of its persistent
default;
[ii] of negligence in the
performance of its duties; or
[iii] the board has
committed any act prejudicial to the interests of the co-operative
society or its members; or
[iv] there is a stalement in
the constitution or functions of the board; or
[v] the authority or body as
provided by the Legislature of a State, by law, under clause[2] of
article 243ZK, has failed to conduct elections in accordance with the
provisions of the State Act.
Provided further that the
board of any such co-operative society shall not be superseded or
kept under suspension where there is no Government shareholding or
loan or financial assistance or any guarantee by the Government:
Provided also that in case
of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the
provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 [10 of 1949] shall
also apply:
Provided also that in case
of a co-operative society, other than a multi-State cooperative
society, carrying on the business of banking, the provisions of this
clause shall have the effect as if for the words six months ,
the words one year had been substituted.
[2] In case of supersession
of a board, the administrator appointed to manage the affairs of such
co-operative society shall arrange for conduct of elections within
the period specified in clause [1] and handover the management to the
elected board.
[3] The Legislature of a
State may, by law, make provisions for the conditions of service of
the administrator.
243ZM. Audit of accounts
of co-operative societies.--
[1] The Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with
respect to the maintenance of accounts by the co-operative societies
and the auditing of such accounts at least once in each financial
year.
[2] The Legislature of a
State shall, by law, lay down the minimum qualifications and
experience of auditors and auditing firms that shall be eligible for
auditing accounts of the co-operative societies.
[3] Every co-operative
society shall cause to be audited by an auditor or auditing firms
referred to in clause [2] appointed by the general body of the
co-operative society:
Provided that such auditors
or auditing firms shall be appointed from a panel approved by a State
Government or any authority authorised by the State Government in
this behalf.
[4] The accounts of every
co-operative society shall be audited within six months of the close
of the financial year to which such accounts relate.
[5] The audit report of the
accounts of an apex co-operative society, as may be defined by the
State Act, shall be laid before the State Legislature in the manner
as may be provided by the State Legislature, by law.
243ZN. Convening of
general body meetings.--
The Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions that the
annual general body meeting of every co-operative society shall be
convened within a period of six months of close of the financial year
to transact the business as may be provided in such law.
243ZO. Right of a member
to get information.--[1]
The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for access to every
member of a co-operative society to the books, information and
accounts of the co-operative society kept in regular transaction of
its business with such member.
[2] The Legislature of a
State may, by law, make provisions to ensure the participation of
members in the management of the co-operative society providing
minimum requirement of attending meetings by the members and
utilising the minimum level of services as may be provided in such
law.
[3] The Legislature of a
State may, by law, provide for co-operative education and training
for its members.
243ZP. Returns.--
Every co-operative society shall file returns, within six months of
the close of every financial year, to the authority designated by the
State Government including the following matters, namely:-
[a] annual report of its
activities;
[b] its audited statements
of accounts;
[c] plan for surplus
disposal as approved by the general body of the co-operative society;
[d] list of amendments to
the bye-laws of the co-operative society, if any;
[e] declaration regarding
date of holding of its general body meeting and conduct of elections
when due; and
[f] any other information
required by the Registrar in pursuance of any of the provisions of
the State Act.
243ZQ. Offences and
penalties.--[1] The
Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions for the offences
relating to the co-operative societies and penalties for such
offences.
[2] A law made by the
Legislature of a State under clause [1] shall include the commission
of the following act or omission as offences, namely:--
[a] a co-operative society
or an officer or member thereof wilfully makes a false return or
furnishes false information, or any person willfully not furnishes
any information required from him by a person authorised in this
behalf under the provisions of the State Act;
[b] any person wilfully or
without any reasonable excuse disobeys any summons, requisition or
lawful written order issued under the provisions of the State Act;
[c] any employer who,
without sufficient cause, fails to pay to a co-operative society
amount deducted by him from its employee within a period of fourteen
days from the date on which such deduction is made;
[d] any officer or custodian
who wilfully fails to handover custody of books, accounts, documents,
records, cash, security and other property belonging to a
co-operative society of which he is an officer or custodian, to an
authorised person; and
[e] whoever, before, during
or after the election of members of the board or office bearers,
adopts any corrupt practice.
243ZR. Application to
multi-State co-operative societies.--The
provisions of this Part shall apply to the multi-State co-operative
societies subject to the modification that any reference to
Legislature of a State , State Act or State Government
shall be construed as a reference to Parliament , Central
Act or the Central Government respectively.
243ZS. Application to
Union territories.--
The provisions of this Part shall apply to the Union territories and
shall, in their application to a Union territory, having no
Legislative Assembly as if the references to the Legislature of a
State were a reference to the administrator thereof appointed under
article 239 and, in relation to a Union territory having a
Legislative Assembly, to that Legislative Assembly:
Provided that the President
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the
provisions of this Part shall not apply to any Union territory or
part thereof as he may specify in the notification.
243ZT. Continuance of
existing laws.--Notwithstanding
anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to
co-operative societies in force in a State immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution [Ninety-seventh Amendment] Act,
2011, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall
continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of
one year from such commencement, whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxx
6.1 The enabling provision for
amendment of the Constitution being Article 368 is also quoted below:
368. Power of Parliament
to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.
(1). Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its
constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any
provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid
down in this article.
(2). An amendment of this
Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for
the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is
passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that
House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of
that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President
who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such
amendment seeks to make any change in
(a)
article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or
(b)
Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI,
or
(c)
any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d)
the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e)
the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also
require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half
of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those
Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is
presented to the President for assent.
(3). Nothing in article 13
shall apply to any amendment made under this article.
(4). No amendment of this
Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or
purporting to have been made under this article whether before or
after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any
court on any ground.
(5). For the removal of
doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation
whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of
addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution
under this article.
7. After hearing the learned
counsel for the parties and after going through the provisions quoted
above and also the other provisions of the Constitution of India, it
appears that only the State Legislature is authorized to enact law
relating to Co-Operative Societies as would appear from the
fact that it is placed at item No. 32 in List II-STATE LIST in the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
8. We do
not dispute for a moment that by amending the provisions of the
Constitution of India, the Parliament can bring the said item from
List-II of the 7th
Schedule to List I UNION LIST or List III CONCURRENT LIST
and in such circumstances, the Parliament will also have right to
legislate law relating to Co-Operative Societies. However, in order
to bring such amendment for shifting an item from List-II of the 7th
Schedule to List I UNION LIST or List III CONCURRENT LIST of
the 7th
Schedule, such amendment is required to be passed
in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that
House present and voting the
amendment and such amendment shall also be required to be ratified
by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by
resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the
Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the
President for assent.
9. In the
case before us, admittedly the formality indicated in Article 368 (2)
of the Constitution for taking ratification has not been complied
with before presenting it to the President for assent. The Central
Government, in its affidavit has stated that in the conference of the
Ministers of the State, the Ministers approved such amendment and at
the same time, there being no amendment of the List II of the 7th
Schedule, Article 368(2) cannot have any application.
10. Mr. Champaneri, the learned
Assistant Solicitor General of India, and Mr. Jani, the learned
Government Pleader appearing for the State of Gujarat, have
laboriously contended before us that by the amendment impugned, the
power of the State Legislature to enact law relating to Co-Operative
Societies has not been taken away, and thus, the provisions of
Article 368(2) are not applicable.
11. It
appears from the provisions contained in Article 243.ZG to Article
243ZT introduced by way of the impugned amendment that though there
is no amendment of List-II of the Constitution by taking aid of
Article 368(2) of the Constitution, by incorporating Chapter IXB
starting from Article 243.ZG and ending with Article 243ZT, various
restrictions have been imposed upon the State Legislatures while
enacting law relating to Co-Operative Societies which was earlier
unfettered prior to the incorporation of Chapter IXB. For instance,
in Article 243ZI, it is said that the
Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to
the incorporation, regulation and winding-up of co-operative
societies based on the principles of voluntary formation, democratic
member-control, member-economic participation and autonomous
functioning but such
law must be subject to the provisions of Part IXB.
In Article 243ZJ, a definite restriction has been imposed upon the
State Legislatures regarding fixation of maximum number of Directors
of a Co-Operative Society which
shall not exceed twenty-one.
Further, the State Legislatures have been asked to provide for
reservation of one seat for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes and two seats for women on board of every co-operative society
consisting of individuals as members and having members from such
class or category of persons. Similarly, in sub-Article [2] of
Article 243ZJ, the duration of the term of office of the elected
members of the board and its office bearers has been fixed to be five
years and in sub-Article (3) thereof, a further direction has been
given upon State Legislatures in the matter of enacting law relating
to Co-Operative Societies regarding co-option of the member in the
board of director and further provisions regarding the rights of such
co-opted members have also been made. Similarly in Article 243ZK, a
further condition has been imposed that the election of a board shall
be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board so as to
ensure that the newly elected members of the board assume office
immediately on the expiry of the term of the office of members of the
outgoing board. In Article 243ZL, a further condition has been
imposed that no board shall be suspended or kept under suspension for
a period exceeding six months and has also provided various
conditions under which a Board may be superseded or kept under
suspension. In Article 243ZM, it is mandatorily prescribed that the
account of every society should be audited within six months from the
close of the financial year to which the accounts relate. Article
243ZP casts a duty upon the society to file return within the period
fixed there in and there is no scope of ignoring the same. Article
243ZQ prescribes the acts which would be the offences relating to the
co-operative societies and the State Legislature cannot deviate from
those mandates.
12. If this Part IXB was not
incorporated, the State Legislatures would have the absolute right to
enact law on the above subjects according to the decision of such
Legislatures whereas after the amendment, no option is given to the
State Legislature to deviate from or ignore those provisions. Thus,
by incorporation of Part IXB, various restrictions have been imposed
relating to laws of Co-Operative Societies which have constrained the
jurisdiction of the State Legislatures to enact any law relating to
Co-operative Societies on those aspects. In other words, in spite of
the fact that the law relating to Co-Operative Societies is still in
the List II of the 7th
Schedule, without bringing the subject of Co-Operative Societies
either into List I or List III, by way of this amendment, the
Parliament has controlled the said power without complying with the
provisions of Article 368 (2) of the Constitution by taking
ratification of the majority of the State Legislatures. The object
achieved by the amendment by way of incorporation of Part IXB could
be easily achieved by bringing the subject of Co-Operative Societies
in LIST 1 UNION LIST or LIST III-CONCURRENT LIST but in that
case, there would have been the necessity of such
amendment being required to be passed
in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that
House present and voting the
amendment and such
amendment being required to be ratified by the Legislatures of not
less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed
by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such
amendment is presented to the President for assent.
By way of the impugned amendment, instead of taking consent of the
majority of the State Legislatures, by merely taking consent of the
Ministers of the State, the purpose has been sought to be achieved.
13. In other words, what could
not be achieved except by complying with the provisions of Article
368 (2) of the Constitution, the selfsame purpose has been sought to
be achieved by the amendment impugned in this writ-application
without complying with the provisions of Article 368 (2) of the
Constitution.
14. In
the case of Builders
Association of India & others etc.etc. v. Union of India and
others etc.etc., reported
in
AIR 1989 SC 1371, a
Constitutional Bench [five judges] of the Supreme Court was
considering whether the Constitution [46th
Amendment] Act, 1982 was passed after proper ratification as required
under Article 368[2] and whether the State was bound to follow
Article 286 and Central Sales Tax Act while levying tax under Article
366. In the said case, in Schedule VII List II Entry No. 54, the
scope was expanded. The plenary power of the State government was
expanded by interfering with its exclusive power under Article 246 by
the said amendment. The Supreme Court, for the purpose of considering
the question inquired whether ratification process of Article 368[2]
was complied with and thereafter, upheld the validity. In this
connection, we may profitably record the following observation of the
Supreme Court appearing in para-29 at page 1386:
The
Attorney-General has also produced before us the file containing the
resolutions passed by the Legislatures of the 12 States referred to
in the Memorandum, set out above. We are satisfied that there has
been due compliance of the provisions contained in the proviso to
Article 368[2] of the Constitution. We, therefore, reject the first
contention. Before proceeding further, we should observe that there
would have been no occasion for an argument of this type being urged
in Court if at the commencement of the Act it had been stated that
the Bill in question had been presented to the President for his
assent after it had been duly ratified by the required number of
Legislatures of States. We hope that this suggestion will be followed
by the Central Secretariat hereafter since we found that even the
Attorney-General was not quite sure till the case was taken up for
hearing that the Bill which had become the 46 th
Amendment had been duly ratified by the required number of States.
14.1 By
relying upon the aforesaid decision, Mr. Shah impressed upon us that
whenever even the case of expansion of scope of a particular entry in
the list is taken up for consideration, it is the duty of the
Constitution Court to see that the constitutional procedures for
ratification in Article 368[2] are complied with and according to
him, in the case before us, the scope of Entry No. 32 of List II
having been restricted by interfering with its exclusive power under
Article 246 and ratification procedure prescribed in Article 368[2]
not having been complied with, 97th
Amendment is unconstitutional. We find that Mr. Shah is substantially
correct in his submission.
15. In
the case of Kihoto
Holohan v. Zachillhu and others, reported in 1992 Supp [2] Supreme
Court Cases 651,
a five-judge-bench of the Supreme Court was considering whether
Schedule X introduced by Constitution [52nd
Amendment] Act, 1985 was constitutionally valid or not, inasmuch as
para-7 of the Schedule X took away the powers of judicial review. It
appears from the said judgment that one of the questions raised
before the Supreme Court was, having regard to the legislative
history and evolution of the principles underlying the Tenth
Schedule, Paragraph 7 thereof in terms and in effect, brought about a
change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India and, therefore, the Bill introducing the
amendment attracted the proviso to Article 368[2] of the Constitution
and would require to be ratified by the Legislature of the States
before the Bill is presented for Presidential assent. Ultimately, in
para-62 of the judgment the Supreme Court made the following
observations:
62.
In the present case, though the amendment does not bring in any
change directly in the language of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, however, in effect paragraph 7 curtails the operation
of those articles respecting matters falling under the Tenth
Schedule. There is a change in the effect in Articles 136, 226 and
227 within the meaning of clause [b] of the proviso to Article
368[2]. Paragraph 7, therefore, attracts the proviso and ratification
was necessary. Accordingly, on Point [B], we hold:
That
having regard to the background and evolution of the principles
underlying the Constitution [Fifty-second Amendment] Act, 1985,
insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the
Constitution of India, the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the Tenth
Schedule of the Constitution in terms and in effect bring about a
change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India and, therefore, the amendment would require
to be ratified in accordance with the proviso to sub-article [2] of
Article 368 of the Constitution of India.
15.1 By relying upon the
aforesaid decision, Mr. Shah rightly submitted before us that
although in the said case, in effect, there was no change in the
language of the articles mentioned in Clauses [a] to [e], even then,
ratification envisaged under Article 368[2] proviso was required to
be complied with.
16. In
the case of S.R.
Bommai and others v. Union of India and others, reported
in
[1994] 3 SCC 1,
a nine-judge-bench of the Supreme Court was considering whether the
presidential proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution was
subject to judicial review and if the answer was in affirmative,
then, to what extent.
16.1 It
appears that six different judgments were delivered. Pandian, J. was
of the view that it is subject to review but in rare cases. Ahmadi,
J. was of the view that only on the limited ground of mala
fide
and vires,
the same can be subject to judicial review. On the other hand, Verma
and Dayal, JJ were of the view that such interference should be very
narrow. Sawant and Singh, JJ, however, held that the entire judicial
review was applicable. Ramaswamy J, on the other hand, restricted His
Lordship s observations that on legal mala
fide
and high irrationality, it can be reviewed and traditional parameters
and proportionality of judicial review was not applicable. Reddy and
Agarwal, JJ were of the view that it is entirely subject to judicial
review.
16.2 By
relying upon the above decision, Mr. Shah, in our opinion, was
justified in contending that we should interfere in these cases as
the basic structure of federalism which was the subject matter in the
case of S.R.
Bommai
(supra),
was ignored.
17. In
the case of M.
Nagaraj and others, v. Union of India and others, reported in [2006]
8 SCC 212,
challenge was whether Constitution [85th
Amendment] Act, 2011 inserting Article 16[4A] was constitutionally
valid. It appears that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity on the ground that it complied with Width Test and the Test
of Identity. By relying upon the said decision, Mr. Shah, in our
opinion, was right in submitting that constitutional amendment is to
be tested on its width and one has to examine the identity.
18. In
the case of I.R.
Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N., reported in [2007] 2 SCC 1,
a
nine-judge-bench of the Supreme Court, returned its unanimous verdict
through Sabharwal, CJI. In the said case, the question was whether
the Laws placed under Schedule IX inserted by Article 31B were
immuned from the judicial review. Sabharwal, CJI, answered the
question by holding that it is not immuned and was subject to
judicial review. The observations made in para-151 at page 111 are
quoted below:
151.
In conclusion, we hold that:
[i] A law that abrogates or
abridges rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution may
violate the basic structure doctrine or it may not. If former is the
consequence of the law, whether by amendment of any article of Part
III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to
be invalidated in exercise of judicial review power of the Court. The
validity or invalidity would be tested on the principles laid down in
this judgment.
[ii] The majority judgment
in Kesavananda Bharati case read with Indira Gandhi case requires the
validity of each new constitutional amendment to be judged on its own
merits. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights
guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account for
determining whether or not it destroys basic structure. The impact
test would determine the validity of the challenge.
[iii] All amendments to the
Constitution made on or after 24-4-1973 by which the Ninth Schedule
is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be
tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the
Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14,
Article 19, and the principles underlying them. To put it differently
even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional
amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that
they destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right
or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic
structure.
[iv] Justification for
conferring protection, not blanket protection, on the laws included
in the Ninth Schedule by constitutional amendments shall be a matter
of constitutional adjudication by examining the nature and extent of
infraction of a fundamental right by a statute, sought to be
constitutionally protected, and on the touchstone of the basic
structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14
and Article 19 by application of the rights test and the
essence of the right test taking the synoptic view of the
articles in Part III as held in Indira Gandhi case. Applying the
above tests to the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the
basic structure then such law[s] will not get the protection of the
Ninth Schedule.
This is our answer to the
question referred to us vide order dated 14-9-1999 in I.R. Coelho v.
State of T.N.
[v] If the validity of any
Ninth Schedule law was already been upheld by this Court, it would
not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declared by
this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights
in Part III is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after
24-4-1973, such a violation/infraction shall be open to challenge on
the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure as
indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the
principles underlying thereunder.
[vi] Action taken and
transaction finalized as a result of the impugned Acts shall not be
open to challenge.
18.1 By relying upon the said
decision, Mr. Shah, in our view, was right in submitting that the
contention of Mr. Champaneri or Mr. Jani that we cannot look into the
question whether formalities of ratification have been complied with
or not or whether basic structure of the Constitution has been hit is
not tenable.
19. Mr. Shah also placed strong
reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.C.
Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, reported in [1987] 1 SCC 625.
In the said decision, the question was whether by promulgating the
ordinances from time to time on a massive scale in a routine manner
under Article 213 by Governor and without replacing them by Act of
Legislature, the constitutional provisions were infringed. In this
connection, Mr. Shah strongly placed reliance upon para-7 at page 393
of the said decision, wherein, it was observed by Bhagawati, CJI that
a constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what it is not
permitted to directly. If there is a constitutional provision
inhibiting the constitutional authority from doing an act, His
Lordship proceeded, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated
by adoption of any subterfuge and that it would be clearly a fraud on
the constitutional provision.
19.1 By relying upon the said
decision, Mr. Shah strenuously contended that the object of the
amendment before us is to overcome the provision contained in
Article 368[2] by taking ratification of majority of the State
Legislatures and thus, we should strike down the said provision.
20. We
also find substance in the contentions of Mr. Shah that by the
amendment impugned in this writ-application, one of the basic
structures of the Constitution, viz. the principles of federalism has
been affected. There is no dispute that federalism is one of the
basic structure of our Constitution. Once the subject of Co-Operative
Societies is in the List II of the 7th
Schedule, by depriving the State Legislatures of their free exercise
of right to enact on the said subject and by curtailment of their
right over the subject matter to abide by the newly enacted provision
of the Constitution without following the requirement of ratification
as provided in Article 368(2), the doctrine of federalism which is
one of the basic features of the Constitution has been infringed.
21. At
this stage, we may profitably refer to the following observations of
the nine-bench-decision of the Supreme Court in the case of I.R.
Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N. (supra):-
By
addition of the words 'constituent power' in Article 368, the
amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original
Constituent Assembly. It remains a Parliament under a controlled
Constitution. Even after the words 'constituent power' are inserted
in Article 368, the limitations of doctrine of basic structure would
continue to apply to the Parliament. It is on this premise that
clauses 4 and 5 inserted in Article 368 by 42nd Amendment were struck
down in Minerva Mills case.
22. Thus,
the amendment is violating the basic structure of the Constitution so
long as the subject of Co-Operative Societies is in the List II
of the 7th
Schedule and at the same time, the provisions of Article 368(2) has
not been complied with. The Constitution has not permitted
curtailment of the power of the State Legislatures over the subject
mentioned in List II without taking recourse to Article 368 (2).
23. We now propose to deal with
the decisions cited by Mr. Champaneri, the learned Assistant
Solicitor General of India, appearing for the Union of India.
24. In
the case of Sasanka
vs. Union of India reported
in
AIR 1981 SC 522,
the question that had arisen before a five-judge-bench of the
Supreme Court was whether the provisions of Chapter IIB of the West
Bengal Land Reforms -Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) inserted by the West
Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act III of
1971), and replaced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,
1972 (Act XII of l972) with retrospective effect from February 12,
1971, which provide for a fixation of ceiling on agricultural
holdings and for matters ancillary thereto, were violative of the
second provision to Art. 31A (1) of the Constitution. In that
context, the Supreme Court in paragraph 35 of the judgment made the
following observations upon which Mr. Champaneri has placed strong
reliance:
35.
As regards the submission that Parliament cannot in exercise of its
constituent power under Art. 368 validate a State law, it seems to us
that the entire submission proceeds on a misconception arising from
failure to distinguish between a law made in exercise of the
legislative power and the law made in exercise of the constituent
power. When Art. 31-B was introduced in the Constitution by the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, it validated retrospectively
13 Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule, which, but for this
provision, were liable to be impugned under Art. 13 (2).Article 31-B
conferred constitutional immunity to such laws (all being enactments
of State Legislatures) and Parliament alone could have done so by
inserting the said Article in the Constitution in exercise of its
constituent power under Art. 368. In substance and reality it was a
constitutional device employed to protect State laws from becoming
void under Art. 13 (2). It will appear clear that the language in
Art. 31-B is virtually lifted from Art. 13 (1), and (2), while Art.
13 (2) invalidates legislation, which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by Part III,
Art. 31-B extends protective umbrella to such legislation if it is
included in Ninth Schedule and, therefore, the Courts will have no
power to go into the constitutionality of the enactment as included
in the Ninth Schedule except on the ground of want of legislative
competence.
(Emphasis
supplied by us).
24.1 As
it appears from the portion highlighted by us, the question involved
in that matter regarding the validity of the State Laws included in
the Ninth Schedule cannot have any application to the facts of the
present case. Regarding constituent power under Article 368, we have
already relied upon the observations of the nine-bench-judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of I.R.
Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N. (supra) holding
that by
addition of the words 'constituent power' in Article 368, the
amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original
Constituent Assembly.
We, thus, find that the above decision relied upon by Mr. Champaneri
does not help his client in any way.
25. Mr.
Champaneri also relied upon paragraphs 108 to 122 of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Ashoka
Kumar Thakur v. Union of India reported
in
(2008) 6 SCC 1.
In those paragraphs, the Supreme Court dealt with the question
whether the 93rd
amendment of the Constitution was against the basic structure of the
Constitution or not. By the Constitution [93rd
amendment] Act, 2005, clause (5) was added to Article 15 of the
Constitution which is an enabling provisions which states that
nothing in Article 15 or in sub-clause (g) of Clause (I) of Article
19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law,
for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
Tribes insofar as such special provisions relate to their admission
to the educational institutions including private educational
institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State. In such a case
it was held by the Supreme Court that the said amendment does not
violate the basic structure of the Constitution so far as it relates
to aided educational institutions. The Supreme Court further held
that the question whether reservation could be made for SCs, STs or
SEBCs in private educational institutions on the basis of the
Constitution [93rd
amendment] or whether reservation could be given in such institutions
or whether any such legislation would be violative of Article
19(1)(g) or Article 14 of the Constitution or whether the said
amendment which enables the State Legislatures or Parliament to make
such legislation are all questions to be decided in a properly
constituted lis between the affected parties and others who support
such legislation.
25.1 As
pointed out above, in dealing with a case where the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of reservation for SEBCs in central
educational institutions, the contention that an amendment that
inserted a fundamental right is violative of the basic structure of
the Constitution was found to be untenable. We fail to appreciate how
the decision is relevant for our purpose where the question is
without taking recourse to the specific provision of Article 368(2)
requiring ratifications of the majority State Legislatures whether
the power of the State Legislature in enacting law relating to
Co-operative Societies can be curtailed by the Parliament. We have
already pointed out that a
constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what it is not
permitted to do directly.
26. Thus, the decisions cited
by Mr. Champaneri do not help his client.
27. We, therefore, allow this
Public Interest Litigation by declaring that
the Constitution [97th
amendment] Act, 2011 inserting part IXB containing Articles 243ZH to
243ZT is ultra
vires
the Constitution of India for not taking recourse to Article 368(2)
of the Constitution providing for ratification by the majority of the
State Legislatures. This order, however, will not affect other parts
of the Constitution [97th
amendment] Act, 2011. In
the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
(BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA,
CJ.)
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
mathew
FURTHER ORDER:
After
this judgment was pronounced, Mr. Champaneri, the
learned Assistant Solicitor General of India appearing
on behalf of the Union of India prays for stay of operation of our
judgment.
In
view of what has been stated above, we find no reason to stay our
judgment. The prayer is refused. However, certified copy be given by
24th
April 2013, if applied for.
(BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA,
CJ.)
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
mathew
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