The Ambit of "Interference or Obstruction with the Administration of Justice in any other manner" under Indian Contempt Law

The Ambit of "Interference or Obstruction with the Administration of Justice in any other manner" under Indian Contempt Law

Introduction

The law of contempt in India, primarily governed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter "the Act"), serves as a crucial mechanism to safeguard the majesty of law and ensure the unimpeded administration of justice. Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt" and delineates three distinct categories of conduct that constitute this offence. While the first two categories, namely scandalizing the court[12] and prejudicing or interfering with the due course of any judicial proceeding[12], are relatively specific, the third category, "interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner"[12], possesses a broader, more residual character. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of this third limb of criminal contempt, exploring its conceptual underpinnings, diverse manifestations as interpreted by the Indian judiciary, and the essential elements considered in its adjudication.

The significance of this provision lies in its capacity to address myriad actions that, while not directly scandalizing a court or interfering with a specific ongoing proceeding, nonetheless pose a substantial threat to the overall efficacy and integrity of the justice delivery system. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the power to punish for contempt is not intended to protect the dignity of individual judges but to uphold the majesty of law and ensure public confidence in the administration of justice.[17]

Conceptual Framework of "Administration of Justice" and its Obstruction

Understanding the scope of Section 2(c)(iii) necessitates a clear comprehension of the terms "administration of justice," "interfere," and "obstruct." The expression "administration of justice" is of wide import. As observed by the Delhi High Court, citing Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., it encompasses the entire process by which justice is dispensed by established courts of law.[9] The Supreme Court in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Of Orissa High Court And Another clarified that the term is broader than merely the adjudicatory role, incorporating supervisory and administrative responsibilities that ensure the efficient functioning of the legal system.[1]

The Delhi High Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. M/S. Prominent Hotels Limited provided lexical guidance, stating, "...The word 'interfere', means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty... obstruction of justice is to interpose obstacles or impediments, or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the administration of justice."[8] This implies that any act which creates an impediment to the seamless functioning of the judicial machinery can fall within this definition.

The Orissa High Court in Registrar Of The Orissa High Court v. Baradakanta Misra And Another Opposite Parties, a view subsequently relevant in the Supreme Court appeal of Baradakanta Mishra, analyzed the structure of Section 2(c). It noted that the third class of criminal contempt, "interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner," is distinct and means that the interference or obstruction "need not be in course of a judicial proceeding."[10] This interpretation underscores the provision's capacity to address a wide array of conduct detrimental to the justice system, irrespective of its direct linkage to a pending case. The Supreme Court in C.S. Karnan, In Re also reiterated this as one of the distinct forms of contumacious action.[12]

Judicial Interpretation: Diverse Manifestations of Obstruction

The Indian judiciary has, through a catena of judgments, identified various acts that constitute interference or obstruction with the administration of justice "in any other manner." These manifestations highlight the practical application and protective reach of this provision.

Abuse of Court Process

A significant category of conduct falling under this limb is the abuse of the process of the court. The Supreme Court in Advocate General, State Of Bihar v. M/S Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries And Another held that while every abuse of process may not amount to contempt, "abuse of the process of the court calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice... is a contempt of court."[2] The Court emphasized the public interest in the effective and orderly administration of justice, stating that the power to commit for contempt is entrusted "to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."[2, 18] Such abuse can include repetitive filings and strategic litigation intended to nullify court orders or frustrate the legal process.[2]

Falsehoods, Forgery, and Fabricated Evidence

The introduction of falsehoods, forged documents, or fabricated evidence into judicial proceedings is a direct affront to the administration of justice. The Supreme Court in Dhananjay Sharma v. State Of Haryana And Others unequivocally stated that "The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice."[22] The Court further observed that filing false affidavits or making false statements on oath "aims at striking a blow at the rule of law" and that "the stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly."[22]

This principle was echoed in Advocate General, High Court Of Karnataka, Bangalore v. Chidambara And Another, where the Karnataka High Court, citing Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, noted that producing a false and fabricated certificate interferes with the administration of justice.[13] The court added, "Thus, if any person tries to either file any false affidavit, forged document or even makes false statement on oath, the conduct of such person has a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceedings."[13] Similarly, the Delhi High Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. M/S. Prominent Hotels Limited held that if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, or if a fabricated document is filed with an intention to deceive the court or defraud, "the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do," thereby constituting contempt.[8]

Influencing or Intimidating Participants in the Justice System

Actions aimed at influencing, intimidating, or otherwise preventing participants in the justice system from performing their roles lawfully constitute a grave interference with the administration of justice.

Witnesses:

The Delhi High Court in Court On Its Own Motion v. State & Others observed that "Influencing someone who might be called as a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify would amount to interference in the administration of justice."[9] The Court, quoting C.J Miller's work on Contempt of Court, further noted that "It has long been clear that it [is] an offence at common law to use threats or persuasion to witnesses to induce them not to appear in courts of justice, or to endeavour to persuade a witness to give evidence in a particular sense or to alter the evidence already given."[9] The Supreme Court in Shraddha Gupta v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others, while dealing with a different statutory context, listed "preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant or any witness from discharging his lawful duties" as a type of proscribed conduct, illustrating the general legal disapproval of such acts.[11]

Judicial Officers:

The protection of judicial officers from harassment, intimidation, or assault is paramount for the independent administration of justice. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State Of Gujarat And Others, the Supreme Court took serious note of the assault and public humiliation of a Chief Judicial Magistrate by police officers, holding it to be contempt of court.[7] The Court emphasized that such actions undermine judicial authority and obstruct the administration of justice by creating an environment of fear. Similarly, the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Munni Devi And Others v. State Of U.P deprecated attempts to scandalize judicial officers of subordinate courts, observing that "Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language, and, at times, blatant condemnatory attacks... are often designedly employed with a view to tame a Judge into submission to secure a desired order," thereby obstructing the administration of justice.[20]

Acts Tending to Erode Public Confidence and Undermine Judicial Authority

While acts that scandalize or lower the authority of the court primarily fall under Section 2(c)(i), such conduct can also, in certain circumstances, be construed as interfering with or obstructing the administration of justice "in any other manner" under Section 2(c)(iii). This occurs when the aspersions are so grave that they not only malign the judiciary but also tend to shake public confidence to an extent that the very functioning of the justice system is impeded. The Supreme Court in In Re v. Ajay Kumar Pandey stated, "The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself."[17]

In Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. And Another . v. State Of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that a publication calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by creating an apprehension in the minds of people regarding the integrity or fairness of a judge can amount to contempt.[5, 14] This principle was reiterated in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt) And Others.[16] Even criticisms of the judiciary, if they transcend legitimate bounds and are aimed at undermining its authority, can impact the administration of justice. As seen in E.M Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, remarks that portray the judiciary as an instrument of oppression, thereby instilling distrust, were held to be contempt.[4] Similarly, in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, publishing a pamphlet with scurrilous attacks on judges, alleging dishonesty and bias, was found to undermine judicial integrity and public confidence, thereby constituting gross contempt that obstructs the administration of justice.[6]

Essential Elements and Defences

Tendency to Interfere

A crucial aspect of Section 2(c)(iii) is that an act need not have actually interfered with or obstructed the administration of justice. A mere "tendency" to do so is sufficient to constitute criminal contempt. The Supreme Court in Dr. D.C Saxena Contemnor v. Hon'Ble The Chief Justice Of India clarified that what is relevant is whether "the offending or affront act produces interference with or tendency to interfere with the course of justice. What is material is the effect or the tendency of the act..."[19] This was also affirmed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in In Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra, citing D.C. Saxena.[24]

Substantial Interference Requirement

Notwithstanding the broad scope of contempt, Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduces a vital safeguard. It provides that no court shall impose a sentence for contempt unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it "substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice." The Madras High Court in A.V. Raman highlighted this, stating, "A reading of the said Section makes it clear that a trifling act cannot be magnified into contempt... contempt is not punishable where it does not substantially interfere with the due course of justice."[21] This provision ensures that the contempt jurisdiction is not invoked for trivial or technical infractions.

Mens Rea

Generally, mens rea, or a guilty mind, is not considered an essential ingredient for establishing the offence of criminal contempt, particularly under Section 2(c)(iii). As stated in In Re : Vinay Chandra Mishra, citing Supreme Court jurisprudence, "Mens rea is not an essential ingredient for proving criminal contempt. ... What is material is the effect or the tendency of the act..."[24] However, the intention or motive behind the act may be relevant for determining the quantum of punishment.

The Inherent Power of Superior Courts

It is pertinent to note that the power of the Supreme Court and High Courts to punish for contempt is not solely derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India designate the Supreme Court and High Courts, respectively, as courts of record, vesting them with inherent powers to punish for contempt of themselves. This inherent power is independent of statute and serves to protect the dignity and authority of these courts and, by extension, the entire judicial system.[3, 7] This constitutional power underpins the judiciary's ability to address acts that obstruct the administration of justice effectively.

Conclusion

The provision concerning acts that "interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner" under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is a cornerstone of the legal framework designed to protect the sanctity and efficacy of the Indian judicial system. Its broad ambit allows courts to address a diverse range of conducts, from the abuse of court process and filing of false evidence to the intimidation of judicial participants and acts that erode public faith in justice. While its application requires a careful balance, ensuring that it is invoked only for acts that substantially interfere or tend to substantially interfere with justice, its existence is vital for maintaining the rule of law, preserving the purity of the judicial process, and ensuring that the administration of justice remains unhindered and commands public confidence. The judiciary, through its interpretations, continues to delineate the contours of this provision, adapting it to new challenges while upholding the fundamental principles of justice.

References