Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 1 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI RESERVED ON: 21.04.2016 % PRONOUNCED ON: 03.05.2016 + CRL.M.A. Nos.4181/2016, 4217/2016 IN CONT.CAS.(CRL) 9/2014 COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION ..... Petitioner versus DEEPAK KHOSLA ..... Respondent CM APPL.14665/2014, 8312-8314/2016 IN LPA 550/2014 DEEPAK KHOSLA ..... Appellant versus NEMO ..... Respondent CM APPL.8277-8279/2016 IN LPA 583/2014 DEEPAK KHOSLA ..... Appellant versus NEMO ..... Respondent Appearance: Mr. Deepak Khosla, applicant in person Ms. Sanchita Ain, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA S.RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Mr. Deepak Khosla, the applicant petitioner, seeks recall of the following: (1) The common order dated 08.09.2014 disposing of LPA 550/2014 and LPA 583/2014; (2) The order of the same day, i.e. 08.09.2014 by which the Court directed initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 2 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014
2. The LPA 550/2014 was directed against the order dated 21.08.2014 made in contempt proceedings. LPA 583/2014 in respect of the order of a learned Single Judge made in a company appeal, under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereafter called Companies Act).
3. Contempt Case No 165/2008 was pending, in which the applicant, was party. A Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 24.04.2012 in LPA 16/2014 had directed that the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 04.01.2012 be treated as a show cause notice, to the applicant. His grievance in the appeal, LPA 550/2014 was in respect of directions made by the learned Single Judge, specially pertaining to his enrolment as an Advocate by the Karnataka Bar Council. It was contended in the appeal that such directions were unwarranted, made beyond jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge who was bound by the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act to strictly proceed to decide whether the conduct complained of amounted to contempt. It was submitted that though ostensibly made in the course of contempt proceedings, the Single Judges directions travelled beyond what was permissible. In support of the maintainability of the appeal (LPA 550/2014) reliance was placed on Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank v Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399); Mr. Khosla had urged that directions which had no bearing on the alleged contempt or related matters were extraneous and an appeal in respect of such directions were maintainable
4. In LPA No. 583/2014, another order of a learned Single Judge, dated 03.09.2014 (in Co.A (SB) 35/2014) was impugned. Mr. Khosla had urged that on 03.06.2014 the Company Law Board (CLB) directed the appellants (in the said appeal) to remain personally present on 11.07.2014 and further to file an Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 3 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 affidavit that they were present in the Board meeting held on 27.08.2007. They were to also file the Minutes of the Board meeting on oath with the affidavit. Mr. Khosla stated that the ex-parte order staying the directions of the CLB - made by the Single Judge in the first hearing (dated 11.07.2014) caused him prejudice. It was argued by Mr. Khosla that his move for vacation of the said ex-parte order - was in vain, and that despite his requests the learned Single Judge brushed aside his arguments and listed the matter for consideration on 14.10.2014. The Appeal LPA 583/2014 was therefore preferred. Mr. Khosla urged that Section 10-F of the Companies Act. 1956 enabled a Single Judge to hear and decide appeals against orders of CLB. Yet, letter patents appeals to the Division Bench were not barred in respect of matters, which do not fall within the scope of Section 10-F, or did not raise questions of law. Mr. Khosla relied on Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association vs. S.C. Sekar 2009(2) SCC 784. He also relied on the order of a learned Single Judge in R.P. Khosla v Honble Company Law Board (RP No.527/2013 in WP 6002/2013) to say that an appeal to the Division Bench is maintainable against an order made in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 10-F of the Companies Act. This court rejected the contention, citing Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors 2006 (7) SCC 613 is conclusive. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that an order under Section 10-F is not further appealable in an intra court appeal.
5. In LPA 550/2014, the grievance was that the Single Judge- who commenced the hearing pursuant to an earlier Division Bench order in LPA16/2012, by judgment dated 24.02.2012 inter alia directed that the order of the learned Single Judge of 04.01.2012 would be treated as a show cause notice and the Single Judge was at liberty to issue a supplementary show cause notice, Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 4 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 if required. During the course of such proceedings, the Single Judge on 21.08.2014, directed inter alia, that:
16. The respondent is directed to file an affidavit within four weeks disclosing the number of orders passed by this Court in various proceedings/applications in which costs have been imposed on the respondent and status of the costs in those matters.
17. The Registry is also directed to file a list of all such proceedings/applications filed by the respondent in which costs have been imposed on the respondent.
18. The respondent Mr. Deepak Khosla states that he appears as an advocate as well. He states that he appears in cases other than the cases which are his personal cases. He states that he predominantly practices in Delhi. He states that he is enrolled with the Bar Council of Karnataka (Enrolment No. KAR 1280/2013).
19. He states that though there are certain matters in contemplation to be filed in the State of Karnataka, however, no matter has been filed till date in the State of Karnataka.
20. The Respondent is directed to file within four weeks copy of the enrolment application as well as the supporting documents filed by him with the Bar Council of Karnataka for his enrolment.
21. The Secretary, Bar Council of India is directed to obtain a copy of the enrolment application form along with the supporting documents submitted by the respondent with the Bar Council of Karnataka and furnish the same to this Court within a period of four weeks. It was urged, based on Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank (supra) that the letters patent appeal was maintainable and that the Single Judges order was neither proper nor appropriate. This court rejected the contention, on the ground that the merits of the contentions could not be gone into, because the Single Judge had competence to issue the directions and that they could not be gone into merits at all.
6. The Court noticed that the averments in LPA were objectionable, and Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 5 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 prima facie contumacious; it therefore, initiated proceedings under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act by a separate order (dated 08.09.2014) and directed the matter to be placed before the concerned roster bench. Present applications
7. A spate of applications were filed - for recalling the orders as far as they dismissed the two appeals (LPA Nos.550 and 583/2014) on the one hand, and initiated contempt proceedings (which were numbered as Cr. Co No.9/2014) on the other. The said applications are elaborated in the following paragraphs.
8. The three pending applications in LPA 583/2014, Cont. Case (Crl.) No. 9/2014 and LPA 550/2014 are: (1) CM 8277/2016 (in LPA-583/2014) and CM 8312/2016 (in LPA 550/2016) whereby the appellant urges the court to recall its order dismissing the appeal. It is urged that the Court did not hear any arguments on the ground of bias of the learned Single Judge; consequently it is not a speaking order on that question. The applicant further urges that since it is not a speaking order, it is a nullity. It is further argued that since the submission that the Single Judges order (impugned in the appeal) was incorrect in overlooking the directions of the Supreme Courts order, dated 08.05.2014, the order (of 08.09.2014) should have taken that into consideration. Since it did not, the order requires to be recalled. It is urged that the order-initiating contempt was made without a hearing and in illegitimate exercise of sans-jurisdiction. As it was not preceded by a hearing, the order initiating contempt, made by the court, which held itself bereft of jurisdiction to decide the appeal, was untenable. (2) CM 14665/2014 & CM 8313/2016 (in LPA 550/2014); CM 8278/2016 (in LPA 583/2014), and Crl.M.A.4217/2016 in Cont. Case (Crl.) 9/2014 seek Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 6 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 exemption from filing certified copies of orders and documents, etc. (3) Crl. M.A.4181/2016 (in Cont. Case (Crl.) 9/2014; CM 8279/2016 (in LPA 583/2014) and CM 8314/2016 (in LPA 550/2016) list 25 grounds why the order of 08.09.2016 is to be recalled; these include the demand that court hearings be recorded; whether courts permission is necessary for the purpose, if a court is requested for such permission and is disinclined to do so, should it refer the matter to a larger Bench, whether the power of adjournment includes the power to re-notify and the procedure thereof, i.e., if the next date should be the succeeding date and if so, the priority to be accorded to a given case, whether judges should read the record before the oral hearing; courts powers to curtail hearing time, power of court to cite authorities (in their orders) that are not cited during oral hearing, etc.
9. All the applications mentioned above, in para 8, were taken up on 09.03.2016 and the court again heard them on 14.03.2016.Initially Mr. Salman Khurshid, Senior Advocate appeared for Mr. Khosla, but later, he ceased to represent him. Mr. Khosla urged- on 14.03.2016, that he would complete the arguments in the applications in Cr. Co. No. 9/2016. In the circumstances, the applications were listed again on 21.04.2016. On that day, he sought permission of the Bench which hears urgent listing mentioning and filed four applications that were listed in court. At the outset of the hearing, on the day, i.e. 21.04.2016, Mr. Khosla insisted that the said four applications had to be considered and orders made, after which he would address the Court on the pending applications. The Bench, which had assembled specially for the purpose of hearing the pending applications (as indeed it had assembled earlier on the two dates) had alerted Mr. Khosla about the limited time available - it sat at 4:00 PM for the matter. However, Mr. Khosla insisted that the court should hear the new Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 7 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 applications (CM 6441, 6443, 6444 & 6463/2016), which it did. As a consequence, there was no time for further oral hearing. The court had been requested to dispose of the pending applications (by the Supreme Courts order dated 11.04.2016) preferably within a week. Since oral hearings had taken place earlier and since Mr. Khosla had filed written submissions, the court reserved its orders on 21.04.2016.
10. Mr. Khoslas arguments and submissions are firstly that the order of 08.09.2014 are a nullity and therefore unsustainable. He argued that there is no delay in approaching the court, with the applications since the law is well settled that whenever it is brought to the notice of a court that its orders are void, on account of violation of fundamental principles of justice, the power of the court to cure that illegality-ex debito justitiaeis invoked. In such eventuality, technical and procedural barriers, including limitation, has to pave the way to enable the court to address the injustice and right it. He relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court, reported as A.P. Papayya Sastry v Government of AP AIR 2007 SC 1546; Kiran Singh v Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 and Bishunath Tewari v Mst. Mirchi AIR 1955 Pat 66. It was submitted that Section 44 of the Evidence Act - which iterates that a decree is vitiated on account of fraud or collusion, places a judgment delivered by a court not competent to deliver it on the same footing. Such being the case, the refusal of the Division Bench to hear the arguments on the question of bias (in LPA 550/2014 and LPA 583/204) and in proceeding to dismiss them as not maintainable, was unwarranted in law; its order therefore, was a nullity. It was highlighted that the court was duty bound to take cognizance of the allegations of bias which were supported by documents and clearly established that not only was the learned Single Judge straying beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction, but was conducting the Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 8 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 proceedings in violation of principles of natural justice. By refusing to go into these vital aspects and proceeding to dismiss the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Division Bench erred; its order dated 08.09.2014 had to therefore, be recalled.
11. It was submitted that the Division Bench on the one hand expressed lack of jurisdiction to entertain the two appeals and did not address itself to the main issues on the merits, urged in the said appeals. On the other hand, it proceeded to - on the basis of the pleadings, initiate contempt proceedings under Section
14 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It was urged that there was nothing on the record to disclose that the objectionable pleadings were adverted to; the applicant Deepak Khosla was not even given a notice, much less a hearing about why contempt proceedings had to be initiated. Since criminal contempt proceedings were likely to have adverse impact on the applicant, the court was duty bound to give him notice and reasonable opportunity before initiating them. It was urged that while the defenses available in law at a later stage in the criminal contempt proceedings once initiated were not precluded, the initiating order itself suffered from illegality and was void for want of hearing. Such nullity was of the same kind as undermined the validity of the orders dismissing the appeals. Furthermore, it was urged that the court did not possess jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 14 because the filing of pleadings which contained allegedly objectionable averments did not and could not have constituted contempt on the face of the court.
12. It was urged by Mr. Khosla, in addition, in CM 4181/2016, that the judgment rendered by the Division Bench further to the criminal contempt proceedings were a clear nullity. He argued that in another contempt matter, i.e. Contempt Appeal No.7/2015, a Division Bench had taken on record an affidavit Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 9 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 expressing apology, filed by the applicant: Mr. Khosla and disposed of the appeal, by its order dated 23.12.2015. That order was relevant and was sought to be brought on record and to the notice of the Bench hearing the Criminal Contempt case. The Bench, which had disposed of the earlier Criminal contempt, in December 2015, had permitted the filing of an affidavit or some pleading before the Bench hearing the Criminal contempt case. However, the latter Bench, despite repeated attempts for placing the materials on record and averments in that regard, ignored and overlooked them and proceeded to convict the applicant. This rendered its judgment a nullity. Analysis and Findings
13. As is apparent from the previous discussion, Mr. Khosla premises his application on his leitmotif, nullity. The nullity, which he highlights, is in respect of various shades of judicial conduct: primarily the absence of hearing, in the two appeals filed by him (on the issue of nullity in the Single Judges orders). Kiran Singhs aphorism that nullity can be set up in any proceeding- main or collateral is undoubtedly a precept, which binds all the courts. Papayya Sastry, and other judgments which have followed it, continue to iterate it. The question is whether Mr. Khoslas submissions are right.
14. In both appeals, this Court was of opinion that it did not possess primary jurisdiction to consider the merits. In one, it was because an appeal did not lie after an order was made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, by a Single Judge. This view was based on binding precedent: Kamal Kumar Dutta(supra). In that ruling the Supreme Court clearly held that ..where appeal has been decided from an original order by a single Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 10 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed by the CLB and against that appeal has been provided before the High Court under Section 10F of the Act, that is an appeal from the original order. Then in that case no further Letters patent appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. It is clear to this court therefore, that had the Bench proceeded to hear the merits of the appeal (LPA 583/14), or as to the conduct of the Single Judge in making any order in exercise of his company appellate jurisdiction under Section 10-F, the order of the Bench would have fit the description of one made by a court lacking jurisdiction. Therefore, we see no merit in the submission that in refusing to hear arguments on the issue of the conduct of proceedings by the Single Judge or his orders (in exercise of Section 10-F power) the proceedings before the Division Bench were vitiated and were a nullity.
15. As far as LPA 550/2014, i.e. the appeal against an order made in contempt proceedings are concerned, Mr. Khoslas arguments were rejected and it was held that the Supreme Courts ruling in Midnapore Co-operative (supra) did not apply:
9. Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank (supra)does, in Para 11 (IV) clearly states that a court cannot make any direction as to the merits of the dispute: Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of cc act . Do the impugned directions in the present case, contained in the order of 21-08-2014 amount to one relating to the merits of the dispute? The answer, in our opinion is clearly in the negative. Undeniably the directions were made in the course of contempt proceedings, pending on the file of this court, since 2008. The learned single judge was, in the opinion of this court, merely following the directions contained in the judgment of the Division Bench in LPA 16/2012- which had attained finality with the dismissal of the special Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 11 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 leave petition (by the Supreme Court) preferred by Mr. Deepak Khosla. The Division Bench had required him to respond to a show cause notice; importantly, it had barred him from orally hearing, and was specifically refused audience. That order remains operative. Mr. Khoslas contention was that he is now an enrolled member of the Bar, although his enrolment is from Karnataka. It was in the context of this contention that he was required to produce details; the Single Judge also made observations and directions to the Bar council of India. This, in the opinion of the court, does not amount to deciding the merits, or a direction touching upon the merits of the matter in relation to which contempt proceedings were drawn or initiated. They are however, directly connected with the proceedings, inasmuch as they relate to the right of Mr. Khosla to have an audience and oral hearing, which he insisted. So far as the question of nullity of the order dated 21-08-2014 is concerned on the ground of its being made without jurisdiction at all, the argument is misconceived. The learned single judge had and has the right to regulate the conduct of proceedings before him, especially having regard to the direction contained in Para 73 of the Division Bench judgment dated 24-04-2014. Therefore, the contention that the present appeal LPA 550/2014 against the order dated 21-08-2014 is maintainable, is without merit. The appeal is not maintainable; it has to fail. That since the Bench refused to go into the merits of the matter (i.e. propriety of the Single Judges order or his alleged conduct in refusing to give proper hearing or truncating hearings) the argument that its order is a nullity is an insubstantial argument.
16. So far as the order initiating contempt proceedings are concerned, Mr. Khoslas objections are two-fold. One that the pleadings were not pressed at that stage in the oral hearings and therefore could not be the basis for drawing criminal contempt proceedings; two that they did not constitute criminal contempt on the face of the court. These two errors or infirmities went into the root of the Courts jurisdiction (which according to him, lacked in jurisdiction to go into the merits and expressly said so) and therefore the initiating order was Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 12 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 void.
17. The court, while making its contempt initiating order (as termed by Mr. Khosla) went by the facial nature of the pleadings in the appeal, which pointedly alluded to the alleged behavior of the Single Judge. The Court was of opinion that they were prima facie contumacious. The order of court - initiating contempt- spelt out why they were objectionable. The order dismissing the appeals also recorded that the pleadings were expressly brought to the notice of Mr. Khosla; he however did not express anything to indicate that he wished to withdraw the pleadings, or that he was contrite. The Court therefore had to deal with pleadings, which in its opinion were facially contumacious. Section 2 (c) defines criminal contempt as follows: "2(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which -
(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner."
L.D. Jaikwal vs State Of U.P AIR 1984 SC 1374;Re: R.L Ahuja, [1993} Supp.
4 SCC 446and In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate AIR 1998 SC 3299 are prima facie authorities on the question that objectionable pleadings and averments, which are either scurrilous or tend to lower the authority and prestige of the courts, constitute criminal contempt.
18. This Court holds the argument that the initiating order was a nullity (because it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the appeals, in the first place) to be Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 13 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 meritless. The power to initiate contempt proceedings is independent of the jurisdiction that the court exercises in relation to a case or a given cause, in a particular instance. Thus, the court may entertain and hear a case and grant relief; it might refuse to entertain the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Yet, regardless of its jurisdiction over such matters or such cases (individually) the court always has the power to regulate its proceedings, and furthermore, as a court of record (by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution), ensure observance of order. It also has the power to initiate contempt proceedings, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is that jurisdiction which the court exercised. The power to initiate no doubt is in respect of matters enumerated in the said Act. Yet, the procedure suggested by Mr. Khosla is alien. What he would have the Court is to first put the objectionable material to the alleged contemnor, issue show cause notice, hear him or her, give a preliminary ruling and then proceed in the matter. Section 14 regulates the exercise of jurisdiction to initiate contempt, on the face of the court. It also clearly spells out the procedure, which the court is to follow if it is of opinion that contempt occurred on the faceof the High Court i.e. within its presence or hearing. This was brought most clearly in Dr. D.C. Saxena v Honble the Chief Justice of India [(1996) 5 SCC 216: The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby was protected from scurrilous attack on the judge or the court. if the forum of the judicial process is allowed to mount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question arises whether the forum of the judicial process of vilification of the judges or imputations to the judges in the pleadings presented to the court would give liberty of freedom of expression to an advocate or a light of the above discussion, we have little doubt to conclude that when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to conduct himself in a manner befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 14 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of the of the judiciary would be a thing of the past.
19. Section 14 itself provides the procedure that Courts are to follow. After initiation of the proceedings, through the order dated 08-09-2014, the Court ceased to have any control over the matter; it was proceeded with by another Bench, that considered the reply, explanation and arguments of the applicant/Mr. Deepak Khosla. The hearings in relation to the said criminal contempt proceedings took place for over a year; spread over about 20 or so hearings. What transpired during those hearings, or subsequent to it, are matters, which this Bench cannot go into; it is and was not the criminal contempt roster,
i.e. another Division Bench. Therefore, the submissions as to nullity of judgment rendered, for the reasons mentioned by Mr. Khosla, in CM 4181/2016, are not matters that this Bench is competent to rule upon.
20. As to the other contentions urged in the applications, i.e. the 24 questions or issues sought to be raised, this court notices that these are repetitions of one or the other demands made by Mr. Khosla about the alleged lack of clarity in the power of the court to conduct proceedings and the need to record court proceedings. This court is of opinion that the reliefs claimed cannot be granted; whether a case not taken up for hearing on a date, and then adjourned to another day, or whereas on the same day another case may be adjourned to an earlier date, are matters within the discretion of the presiding judge. The crushing workload and the need to adhere to or follow procedures mean that each day, each moment, the judge performs a delicate balancing act, in trying to reach a just or proper decision. Each of these acts cannot be termed Crl.M.A.4181&4217/16 in Cont.Case (Crl.)9/14 Page 15 CM-14665/14, 8312-8314/16 in LPA 550/14 CM-8277-8279/16 in LPA 583/2014 as unguided exercise of power for which elaborate regulation is necessary. As a presiding official, he has to ensure smooth and efficient functioning of the days proceedings; in the course of that task, time limits are to be necessarily imposed on counsels right to be heard. Yet at the end of the day, not all cases can be reached or taken up for full hearing and disposal. Then too, those, which cannot be heard, are to be adjourned for another day. Exercise of discretion therefore has to be judicious; the adjourned date has to be one, when the case concerned can reasonably be expected to be given a meaningful hearing.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, the applications have no merit. CM 8277 & 8279/2016 in LPA 583/2014, Crl.M.A. 4181/2016 (in Cont. Case (Crl.) No. 9/2014) and CM 8312 & 8314/2016 (in LPA 550/2016) are, therefore dismissed; CM 14665/2014 & CM 8313/2016 (in LPA 550/2014); CM 8278/2016 (in LPA 583/2014), and Crl.M.A.4217/2016 in Cont. Case (Crl.) 9/2014 are disposed of.
22. A copy of this order be given under the signatures of Courtmaster. S. RAVINDRA BHAT (JUDGE) J.R. MIDHA (JUDGE) MAY 03, 2016
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