Section 24(8) CrPC: Special Public Prosecutors and the Modern Indian Prosecution Paradigm

Section 24(8) CrPC: Special Public Prosecutors and the Modern Indian Prosecution Paradigm

Introduction

Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) constitutes the statutory bedrock for the appointment and functioning of Public Prosecutors in India. Among its various sub-sections, Section 24(8)—together with the 2009 proviso enabling victims to engage counsel—has emerged as a pivotal provision, redefining prosecutorial dynamics, victim participation, and the architecture of fair-trial rights. This article offers a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of Section 24(8), critically examining (i) the contours of “Special Public Prosecutors” (SPPs), (ii) jurisdictional limits on the appointing authority, and (iii) the ambit of victim participation vis-à-vis Sections 301 and 302 CrPC, as distilled from recent Supreme Court and High Court decisions.

Statutory Framework

Text and Structure of Section 24

While sub-sections (1)–(7) regulate the ordinary Public Prosecutor cadre—whose appointments require consultation with the High Court—sub-section (8) creates a distinct category of SPPs, empowering the Central or State Government to appoint for any case or class of cases an advocate with at least ten years’ standing. Notably, Section 24(8) is silent on consultation and panel preparation, a legislative choice confirmed in Dr. Tera Chinnappa Reddy v. State of A.P.[1]

The 2009 Proviso: Victim’s Counsel

By Act 5 of 2009 (w.e.f. 31-12-2009) Parliament inserted a proviso: “Provided that the Court may permit the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution under this sub-section.” The deliberate choice of the phrase “assist the prosecution” rather than “assist the Public Prosecutor” differentiates the proviso from Section 301(2) and has fuelled divergent judicial interpretations (Suneel Kumar Singh[2]; Lokesh Singh[3]).

Legislative Purpose and Evolution

Three policy imperatives animate Section 24(8):

  • Expert-driven prosecution. Certain complex or sensitive matters (economic crime, systemic corruption, large-scale violence) demand specialised advocacy beyond the regular prosecutorial cadre.
  • Speed and efficiency. The provision removes the consultative fetters attached to ordinary appointments, enabling swift engagement of competent counsel (Johri Mal[4]).
  • Victim-centric justice. The 2009 amendment realigns the criminal process with the constitutional mandate of Article 21 and Article 39-A, granting victims meaningful, though calibrated, participation (Rekha Murarka[5]).

Jurisprudential Analysis

A. Appointment and Jurisdiction of Special Public Prosecutors

In K. Anbazhagan v. State of Karnataka the Supreme Court held that only the State where the appeal is pending may appoint an SPP; a foreign state’s appointment is ultra vires[6]. The Court, parsing Sections 24, 25-A and 301, underscored the territorial nexus implicit in prosecutorial authority. Significantly, the Court declined to order de novo hearing despite invalid appointment, illustrating a pragmatic balance between procedural purity and judicial economy.

High Courts have reiterated that Section 24(8) is autonomous; neither the consultative mechanism in Section 24(1) nor the district-level panel procedure in Section 24(4) is imported into the SPP regime (Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Raja[7]).

B. Victim’s Right to Engage Counsel

The leading decision Rekha Murarka v. State of West Bengal confirms that the victim’s counsel remains in an assisting role; she cannot usurp the primacy of the Public Prosecutor, conduct cross-examinations, or address oral arguments as of right[5]. The Court harmonised the proviso with Section 301(2), emphasising that unfettered victim control may compromise trial fairness.

Contrastingly, some High Courts have taken an expansive view. In Suneel Kumar Singh the Allahabad High Court held that court-permitted victim’s counsel may participate from inception, moving beyond the written-argument limitation in Section 301(2)[2]. Similarly, Khumukcham Nikita Devi v. State of Manipur rejected the argument that the proviso applies only where a formal SPP is already appointed[8]. The Madras High Court in S.Y. Eswaran further suggested that “assistance” need not be constrained by Section 301[9].

The doctrinal schism hinges on whether the proviso creates a new statutory right parallel to Section 301 (victim-centric view) or merely channels the existing Section 301 mechanism (prosecutor-centric view). The Supreme Court’s preference in Rekha Murarka currently tips the scale toward the latter, but the conflicting High Court jurisprudence indicates a likely future reference to a larger Bench.

C. Interface with Sections 301, 302 and 225 CrPC

  • Section 301(2). Permits private counsel without court leave but subordinates them to the Public Prosecutor; written submissions require permission.
  • Section 302. Applicable only in Magistrate trials; private persons may prosecute directly with permission. The Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand clarified that Section 302 does not extend to Sessions Courts, preserving prosecutorial exclusivity[10].
  • Section 225. Mandates that every trial before a Court of Session “shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.” Any interpretation of the proviso to Section 24(8) must, therefore, co-exist with statutory prosecutorial primacy.

Thus, the statutory matrix envisages a graduated spectrum: autonomous private prosecution (Section 302, Magistrate level) → assisted private participation (Section 301) → victim-assisted participation under judicial control (proviso to Section 24(8)) → Public Prosecutor exclusivity (Section 225).

D. Court’s Supervisory Discretion

The proviso’s permissive verb “may” explicitly vests discretion in the trial court. Key factors crystallised in case law include:

  1. Complexity and public importance of the case, warranting specialised advocacy (Anbazhagan);
  2. Efficacy of the existing prosecution; failure or bias may justify greater victim participation (VLS Finance Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi)[11]);
  3. Risk of prejudice to the accused; courts remain constitutionally bound to ensure fair trial guarantees (Art. 21).

Impact on Allied Domains

Section 24(8) ramifications extend beyond trials. In Suraj Singh v. State of U.P. the Supreme Court reaffirmed that appellate courts bear the duty to correct miscarriages of justice in acquittal appeals[12]. A victim-nominated SPP, or at least an active victim’s counsel, bolsters the appellate record, offering an additional layer of scrutiny. Similarly, the right to be heard at the revisional stage has been recognised for complainants (J.K. International v. State (GNCTD)[13]), a principle conceptually allied to the proviso’s participatory ethos.

Critical Evaluation

Section 24(8) embodies a delicate equilibrium between three normative poles:

State interest in orderly prosecution – Victim’s right to participatory justice – Accused’s right to a fair, unbiased trial.

The Supreme Court has thus far leaned toward preserving prosecutorial hierarchy while cautiously widening the victim’s gate. Yet, empirical concerns—over-burdened prosecutors, opaque appointment processes, or perceived prosecutorial capture—fuel demands for a broader reading of the proviso. Legislative clarification, perhaps by codifying procedural guidelines for victim’s counsel (scope of examination-in-chief, filing of interlocutory applications, participation in plea-bargaining or withdrawal motions), would mitigate forum-shopping and ensure uniform practice.

Conclusion

Section 24(8) CrPC, especially post-2009, signifies a paradigmatic shift from a monolithic, State-centric prosecution model to a more pluralistic framework sensitive to victim autonomy and specialised prosecutorial needs. Nevertheless, doctrinal tensions persist—most notably the Section 24(8)/301 interface and the unresolved ambit of “assisting the prosecution.” Future Supreme Court clarification, or targeted legislative intervention, will be crucial to reconcile these tensions and to anchor a coherent, rights-respecting prosecutorial regime in India.

Footnotes

  1. Dr. Tera Chinnappa Reddy v. Govt. of A.P., 2013 (unnumbered) (Telangana HC) – distinguishing SPP appointments from ordinary PP appointments.
  2. Suneel Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 724 (Allahabad HC).
  3. Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC OnLine All 13111.
  4. State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714.
  5. Rekha Murarka v. State of W.B., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1495.
  6. K. Anbazhagan v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 6 SCC 158.
  7. CBI v. A. Raja & Ors., 2020 (Delhi HC).
  8. Khumukcham Nikita Devi v. State of Manipur, 2017 SCC OnLine MANI 79.
  9. S.Y. Eswaran v. Inspector of Police, 2023 (unnumbered) (Madras HC).
  10. Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand, (1999) 7 SCC 467.
  11. VLS Finance Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3908.
  12. Suraj Singh v. State of U.P., (2008) 16 SCC 686.
  13. J.K. International v. State (GNCTD), (2001) 3 SCC 462.