Section 155(3) Indian Evidence Act: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Challenges

Section 155(3) Indian Evidence Act: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 authorises an adverse party to impeach the credit of a witness “by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.”[1] Although couched in laconic prose, the provision lies at the heart of adversarial fact-finding. By permitting contradiction, it sharpens cross-examination, fosters testimonial discipline, and ultimately protects the fact-finder from being misled. Yet the operational contours of Section 155(3) have proven far from settled. Questions persist regarding (a) its interface with Section 145 (mode of contradiction), (b) its co-existence with the embargo in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), (c) the evidentiary status of electronic and other non-written prior statements, and (d) the temporal limits of its invocation. This article undertakes a critical examination of these issues, with particular reliance on the leading authorities supplied in the reference materials.

Statutory Framework

Textual Placement

Chapter IX of the Evidence Act (Of Witnesses) creates a calibrated hierarchy: Section 145 stipulates the procedure for contradicting a witness by his previous written statements; Section 155(3) identifies “proof of former inconsistent statements” as one of the modes to impeach credibility; and Section 165 vests the judge with ancillary inquisitorial powers to unearth the truth. Construction of Section 155(3) is therefore inseparable from these adjacent provisions.[8][10]

Elements for Application

  • The existence of a prior statement attributable to the witness;
  • Inconsistency between the prior statement and testimony in court;
  • Proof of the prior statement in the manner demanded by Section 145 (i.e., confronting the witness with the relevant portions before proof is adduced);
  • Relevancy to “any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.”

Early Common-Law Influences and Pre-1950s Decisions

The Privy Council in Bhogilal Bhikachand v. Royal Insurance Co. cautioned that Sections 155 and 158 “must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted,” lest trials be diverted to collateral issues.[12] This restrictive stance influenced colonial courts, but post-Independence jurisprudence gradually expanded the operational space of Section 155(3) in line with constitutional commitments to fair trial and robust defence.

The Supreme Court’s Landmark Exposition: Tahsildar Singh

In Tahsildar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P., the Court undertook a magisterial survey of Section 162 CrPC vis-à-vis Sections 145 and 155(3) of the Evidence Act.[2] Five doctrinal propositions emerge:

  1. Primacy of Section 162 CrPC: Police statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC are generally inadmissible except “for the limited purpose of contradiction” under Section 145.
  2. Nature of “omission” as contradiction: An omission amounts to a contradiction only when it is “material and significant” so that its mention is a necessary implication of what is recorded. Mere silence on an ancillary detail does not suffice.
  3. Sequential Procedure: The cross-examiner must first call the witness’s attention to the specific portion of the police statement. Only thereafter may the defence formally prove the statement through the investigating officer.
  4. Integration with Section 155(3): Once the prior police statement is duly proved, it operates under Section 155(3) to impeach credibility; Section 145 is procedural, Section 155(3) substantive.
  5. Judicial Discretion: Trial courts possess latitude to regulate the extent of permissible contradiction to avoid digression and protect witnesses from intimidation.

Post-Tahsildar Consolidation and Refinement

Appellate Scrutiny and Standards of Review

Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra re-affirmed that appellate courts may re-appraise contradictions ignored or misread by the trial court, but only where they go to the root of the prosecution case.[15] The decision underscores that Section 155(3) contradictions, if truly material, can erode the presumption of innocence and warrant reversal of an acquittal as readily as they justify reversal of a conviction.

Dowry Death Jurisprudence

In V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, the Supreme Court interpreted Sections 161–162 CrPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act in tandem with Section 155(3). The Court reiterated that contradictions must be “duly proved” through the investigating officer and cautioned that failure to adhere to the Tahsildar procedure would render the contradiction legally sterile.[3]

Electronic and Tape-Recorded Statements

Technological evolution has posed the question whether non-written media qualify as “statements” for purposes of Section 155(3). The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rup Chand v. Mahabir Pershad initially answered in the negative, holding that tape recordings are not “writing or reduced into writing.”[5] The Supreme Court, however, in Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra treated contemporaneous tape recordings as primary evidence admissible under Sections 7 and 8 and, by necessary implication, available for contradictions under Section 155(3) if properly authenticated.[6] This modern view was reinforced by Navneet Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), which explicitly allowed taped previous statements for both corroboration and contradiction, provided Section 65-B certification is satisfied.[7]

Omissions, Improvements and the “Significance” Test

The Karnataka High Court in K.N. Kiran Kumar distilled from Tahsildar the principle that an omission equates to contradiction only where it is “significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context.”[4] The significance test curbs frivolous contradiction intended merely to harass witnesses.

Interplay with Judicial Powers under Section 165

While Section 155(3) arms parties, Section 165 empowers judges to probe ex mero motu. K.V. Vijyadas v. State of Kerala illustrates the synergistic use of Sections 155 and 165 to recall witnesses even after defence evidence is closed, if justice so demands.[11] Thus, the statutory design balances adversarial rights with judicial duty to elicit the truth.

Persistent Controversies

Scope of “Any Stage”

Whether Section 155(3) may be invoked at the appellate stage remains debated. While some High Courts allow fresh contradictions on appeal in exceptional circumstances, the prevailing view, aligned with the doctrine of finality, is that contradictions must ordinarily be taken during trial unless they involve pure questions of law or manifest miscarriage of justice.

Collateral Facts and Character Evidence

Attempts to smuggle bad-character evidence through the portal of contradiction are rebuffed by Section 54, unless the character itself is in issue or evidence of good character has been adduced.[17][18][19] Consequently, cross-examination under Section 155(3) cannot be used to circumvent the exclusionary rule against propensity evidence.

Non-Compliance with Section 145 Procedure

Failure to first confront the witness renders the prior statement inadmissible for contradiction. In Subhash v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court disregarded supposed contradictions resting on un-confronted medical records and thereby restored the presumption of innocence.[14]

Comparative Note

Section 155(3) is conceptually akin to Section 6 of the English Civil Evidence Act 1968 and Rule 613 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. Yet the Indian statute, read with Section 145, prescribes a more stringent two-step procedure, reflecting the colonial legacy of strict documentary control over testimonial impeachment. Modern reforms in other jurisdictions towards liberal admissibility and discretionary exclusion lend weight to arguments for legislative simplification in India.

Critical Appraisal and Reform Proposals

  • Codifying Electronic Contradictions: Legislative clarification that “statement” includes audio-visual media would harmonise case-law advances and avert conflicting High Court rulings.
  • Streamlining Procedure: Merging Sections 145 and 155(3) into a unified provision may eliminate technical traps while preserving fair-trial safeguards.
  • Guardrails against Harassment: Statutory recognition of the “significance test” could empower judges to disallow trivial contradictions at inception, reducing witness fatigue.
  • Training of Trial Judges: Frequent errors in applying the Tahsildar protocol underscore the need for judicial training modules on evidentiary impeachment.

Conclusion

Section 155(3) remains an indispensable but demanding instrument in the cross-examiner’s toolkit. Supreme Court jurisprudence, beginning with Tahsildar Singh and extending through V.K. Mishra, has sought to reconcile the competing imperatives of robust impeachment and procedural fairness. Yet technological change, evidentiary overlaps, and tactical excesses continue to generate uncertainty. Thoughtful statutory clarification, coupled with disciplined judicial application, can ensure that the provision fulfils its constitutional promise—testing testimonial truth without degenerating into collateral skirmishes.

Footnotes

  1. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s 155(3).
  2. Tahsildar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012.
  3. V.K. Mishra & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588.
  4. K.N. Kiran Kumar v. State by Mandya Rural Police, 2016 Cri LJ (Kar HC).
  5. Rup Chand v. Mahabir Pershad, AIR 1956 P&H 173.
  6. Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147.
  7. Navneet Arora v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10915.
  8. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s 145.
  9. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s 162.
  10. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s 165.
  11. K.V. Vijyadas v. State of Kerala, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker (High Court).
  12. Bhogilal Bhikachand v. Royal Insurance Co., 1928 Bom LR 818 (PC).
  13. State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 507.
  14. Subhash v. State of Haryana, (2011) 2 SCC 715.
  15. Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.
  16. See also A.A. Mohammed Nissam v. State of Kerala, 2016 Ker LT 159.
  17. Rinku Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat (High Court).
  18. Shyam Vinay Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat (High Court).
  19. Anshu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat (High Court).