Error Within Jurisdiction: A Critical Analysis in the Context of Indian Law

Introduction

The concept of "jurisdiction" is foundational to any legal system governed by the rule of law. It delineates the power and authority of courts, tribunals, and other adjudicatory bodies to hear and determine matters. Within this framework, a critical distinction arises between an "error of jurisdiction" (or lack of jurisdiction) and an "error within jurisdiction." An error of jurisdiction occurs when an authority acts without the legal power to do so, rendering its decision a nullity. Conversely, an error within jurisdiction refers to a mistake made by an authority that is otherwise acting competently within the scope of its powers. The implications of this distinction are profound, particularly concerning the availability and scope of judicial review. While errors of jurisdiction are generally amenable to correction through prerogative writs like certiorari and prohibition, errors committed within jurisdiction are often treated with greater deference, subject to review only under limited circumstances, such as an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This article undertakes a critical analysis of "error within jurisdiction" under Indian law, drawing upon key judicial pronouncements and statutory principles to elucidate its contours, challenges, and evolving nature.

Conceptual Foundations: Jurisdiction and Its Breach

Defining Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction, in its most fundamental sense, means the authority to decide. As observed in Walchandnagar Industries Limited v. Indraprastha Developers (Bombay High Court, 2013), if a court or tribunal had an entitlement to enter upon an inquiry into a question, then any subsequent error could generally be regarded as an error within jurisdiction. This authority is typically conferred by statute and can be circumscribed by various factors, including subject matter, territorial limits, pecuniary value, and the nature of the parties involved. In Kiran Singh And Others v. Chaman Paswan And Others (1955 SCC 1 107, Supreme Court Of India, 1954), the Supreme Court emphasized that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, highlighting the significance of proper valuation in determining the competent forum.

The traditional understanding of jurisdiction focused on whether the authority had the initial power to embark upon the inquiry. However, this has evolved significantly.

What Constitutes a Jurisdictional Error?

A jurisdictional error arises when a decision-maker, though vested with authority, breaches an express or implied condition of that decision-making power, thereby vitiating the decision. The Supreme Court in BHUDEV MALLICK ALIAS BHUDEB MALLICK v. RANAJIT GHOSHAL (Supreme Court Of India, 2025) noted that such an error renders the decision "in law…no decision at all." This reference identifies several categories of jurisdictional error, including: misunderstanding the applicable law, asking the wrong question, identifying a wrong issue, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, exceeding the bounds of reasonableness, denying procedural fairness, or making an erroneous finding based on no evidence.

The landmark English decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, widely influential in Indian jurisprudence (as noted in Shri M.L Sethi v. Shri R.P Kapur (1972 SCC 2 427, Supreme Court Of India, 1972) and Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority Of India And Others (2006 SCC 10 424, Supreme Court Of India, 2006)), significantly broadened the concept of jurisdictional error. Post-Anisminic, it is understood that a tribunal may lose jurisdiction not only by lacking it at the outset but also by exceeding or abusing its authority during the proceedings. Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. (2006) acknowledged that "the concept of jurisdiction has acquired 'new dimensions'," moving beyond the pure theory that jurisdiction is determinable only at the commencement of an inquiry.

Walchandnagar Industries Limited (2013) further illustrates instances of jurisdictional error: a decision made in bad faith, failure to comply with principles of natural justice, misconstruing the provisions granting power leading to deciding a question not remitted, refusing to consider relevant material, or basing a decision on irrelevant material.

The Crucial Distinction: Error Within Jurisdiction v. Error of Jurisdiction

The General Principle: Immunity of Errors Within Jurisdiction

A cornerstone principle is that a court or tribunal possessing jurisdiction to decide a matter does not lose it merely by arriving at an erroneous conclusion, whether on law or fact. This was affirmed in Gurdev Singh v. Narain Singh (Himachal Pradesh High Court, 2016) and Sadhu Singh And Ors. v. Surjeet Singh (Himachal Pradesh High Court, 2018), both referencing the Privy Council's dictum in Malkarjun v. Narhari (1900 L.R. 27 I.A. 216) that "a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed."

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (AIR 1964 SC 907), as cited in Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited v. Bhadra Products (2018 SCC 2 534, Supreme Court Of India, 2018), held that if a court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties, merely making an error in deciding a vital issue (like limitation) does not mean it acted beyond its jurisdiction; it is an error of law within jurisdiction.

Consequently, mere errors of law or fact, if committed by a body acting within its jurisdiction, are generally not amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari, unless such error is "manifest" or "apparent on the face of the record." This was a key holding in Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan And Others (1964 AIR SC 477, Supreme Court Of India, 1963) and T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa And Another (1954 AIR SC 440, Supreme Court Of India, 1954). The writ of certiorari is not an appellate remedy to re-evaluate factual findings or correct every minor legal error.

When an Error Ceases to be "Within" Jurisdiction

The line between an error within jurisdiction and one that ousts jurisdiction can be thin and often depends on the construction of the empowering statute. An error of law can become a jurisdictional error if it pertains to a matter on which the jurisdiction of the authority depends. For instance, a misconstruction of a statutory provision that defines the scope of the authority's power can lead to an excess of jurisdiction.

The Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (AIR 1949 PC 239), cited with approval in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025) and relevant to the interpretation of revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), observed that if an erroneous decision results in the subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, it becomes a jurisdictional error. This principle was also echoed in Shri M.L Sethi (1972), distinguishing errors of law related to jurisdiction from other errors of law.

Furthermore, a decision based on "no evidence" can be considered a jurisdictional error, as it implies the authority has acted arbitrarily or without applying its mind to relevant material, effectively stepping outside the bounds of its lawful authority. While not explicitly termed as such in all early cases, the requirement for decisions to be based on some evidence is fundamental to lawful exercise of power.

Judicial Scrutiny of Jurisdictional Competence in India

Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

Article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers High Courts to issue writs, including certiorari and prohibition, for the enforcement of fundamental rights and "for any other purpose." This is a cornerstone of judicial review over administrative and quasi-judicial actions.

The writ of certiorari is invoked to quash decisions of inferior courts or tribunals that suffer from an error of jurisdiction or a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque And Others (1955 SCC 0 1104, Supreme Court Of India, 1954), the Supreme Court clarified that an error of law apparent on the face of the record could be corrected by certiorari, but this power does not extend to re-appreciating evidence. The Court emphasized that for certiorari to quash a decision, the error must be "manifest on the record, necessitating a clear, undeniable mistake in law or jurisdiction."

Syed Yakoob (1963) further refined this, stating that a writ of certiorari can be issued if a tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it, or if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. However, it cannot be issued to correct a mere error of fact, however grave, nor can the High Court act as an appellate body. The finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is generally final.

T.C Basappa (1954) reinforced that certiorari is supervisory, not appellate. It is for correcting jurisdictional excesses or procedural irregularities where there is a "manifest error evident on the face of the proceedings."

The writ of prohibition is issued to prevent an inferior court or tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction or acting contrary to the rules of natural justice.

Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution

Article 227 grants High Courts the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction. This power is broader than that under Article 226 in some respects but is to be exercised more sparingly. In USHA MARTIN GROUP THROUGH ITS ASST VICE PRESIDENT v. INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT (Jharkhand High Court, 2022), citing Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division (AIR 1958 SC 398), it was reiterated that the power of interference under Article 227 is limited to ensuring that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not for correcting mere errors, even if apparent on the face of the record. Hari Vishnu Kamath (1954) also noted that Election Tribunals are under the supervisory purview of High Courts via Article 227.

Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure

Section 115 of the CPC allows the High Court to revise orders of subordinate courts in specific circumstances. As interpreted in Shri M.L Sethi (1972), citing Pandurang Dhuni Chowgule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav (AIR 1966 SC 153), revisional jurisdiction is invocable only if the subordinate court has (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Mere errors of fact or law, unless they relate to jurisdiction, are not correctable under Section 115. The distinction drawn in Joy Chand Lal Babu (AIR 1949 PC 239) and cited in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025) is pertinent here: an erroneous decision leading to an improper exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction triggers revisional power.

Article 32 and Jurisdictional Errors

In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1962 AIR 1621, Supreme Court Of India, 1961), a Constitution Bench held that an erroneous interpretation or application of an intra-vires statute by a quasi-judicial authority acting within its jurisdiction does not, per se, constitute a violation of fundamental rights remediable under Article 32 of the Constitution. Such errors are to be corrected through the statutory appeal mechanisms. However, if the authority acts under an ultra-vires statute or clearly exceeds its jurisdiction in a way that infringes fundamental rights, Article 32 may be invoked. This contrasts with situations like that in Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State Of Gujarat (1974 SCC 2 121, Supreme Court Of India, 1974), where an order infringing a fundamental right passed in violation of audi alteram partem was held to be a nullity, and could be challenged collaterally.

Specific Contexts and Nuances from Reference Materials

Valuation and Jurisdiction

Kiran Singh (1954) dealt with Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. It established that an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation shall not be entertained by an appellate or revisional court unless the appellant shows that the error has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on its merits. A mere change of forum is not, by itself, prejudice. This provision carves out an exception to the general rule that a decree by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.

Election Tribunals

Election Tribunals, as quasi-judicial bodies, are subject to the High Courts' writ jurisdiction. Hari Vishnu Kamath (1954) affirmed the High Court's power under Article 226 to issue certiorari against Election Tribunal decisions for jurisdictional errors or manifest errors of law (e.g., misinterpretation of mandatory rules like Rule 47(1)(c) of the then election rules). T.C Basappa (1954) similarly involved an election dispute, where the Supreme Court clarified that certiorari is not for re-evaluating the Tribunal's findings of fact but for ensuring it acts within its jurisdiction and legal bounds.

Evacuee Property Adjudication

In Ebrahim Aboobakar And Hawabai Aboobakar Of Bombay v. Custodian General Of Evacuee Property, New Delhi (1952 AIR SC 319, Supreme Court Of India, 1952), the Supreme Court addressed who constitutes a "person aggrieved" for appeals under evacuee property laws. It held that an informant whose claims were rejected by an order was a "person aggrieved" and had locus standi. The case also affirmed the appellate authority's power to examine the legitimacy of both substantive and preliminary matters.

Arbitral Awards

In the context of arbitration, an error in the interpretation of a contract by an arbitrator is generally considered an error within jurisdiction. As held in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Through Its Senior Manager (S) v. Shree Ganesh Petroleum Rajgurunagar (2022 SCC 4 463, Supreme Court Of India, 2022), courts do not sit in appeal over an arbitral award and will not interfere with the arbitrator's interpretation unless it is patently unreasonable, perverse, or ignores the terms of the contract, thereby violating public policy. M/S. Jeypore Sugar Company Limited v. M/S. Laxmi Organic Industries Ltd. Others (Madras High Court, 2015), citing Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction ([2003] 8 SCC 154), emphasized the distinction: an arbitrator acts within jurisdiction if acting per the contract terms, but acts in excess if traveling beyond the contract.

Taxation and Administrative Orders

As established in Smt. Ujjam Bai (1961), if a taxing statute is intra-vires, an erroneous assessment by a quasi-judicial authority acting within its jurisdiction (e.g., by misinterpreting the Act or a notification) is an error within jurisdiction. Such errors are to be corrected through statutory remedies, not typically by invoking Article 32. Modi Rubber Ltd. v. The Board Of Central Excercise And Customs (Delhi High Court, 1978) reiterated this, distinguishing errors within jurisdiction (remediable via statutory appeal/revision) from actions without jurisdiction (e.g., taxing an export sale contrary to Article 286(1)(b)), which could be challenged directly via writ petition.

The Evolving Landscape: The "Thinning Divide" and Materiality

The traditional distinction between errors of law within jurisdiction and errors of law going to jurisdiction has become increasingly blurred, largely due to the influence of Anisminic. The Supreme Court in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025) referenced an article by Krystal Cunningham-Foran discussing a "new rule" where "the court will quash for any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictional." This suggests a significant expansion of what constitutes a jurisdictional error, moving towards a position where almost any misconstruction of a statute by a tribunal could be framed as it "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal" or "addressing themselves to a wrong question."

The judgment in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025) also highlights the observation that this expansive view "comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong," leaving tribunals with "virtually no margin of legal error." This "thinning divide" was also noted by Mathew, J., in Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju [(1974) 3 SCC 415], as quoted in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025).

Amidst this expansion, the concept of "materiality" of the error has gained prominence. Citing the Australian High Court case LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12, BHUDEV MALLICK (2025) points to a two-fold test for jurisdictional error: first, an error must have occurred, and second, "the error must be material such that the decision affected by error could realistically have been different if there was no error." This requirement of materiality acts as a crucial check, ensuring that not every trivial error of law leads to the quashing of a decision.

Despite these developments, determining whether an error is jurisdictional or merely within jurisdiction often remains a complex exercise, hinging on the construction of the specific empowering statute, which, as noted in BHUDEV MALLICK (2025), may offer little guidance.

Conclusion

The distinction between an "error within jurisdiction" and an "error of jurisdiction" is a nuanced and evolving doctrine in Indian administrative and procedural law. While traditionally, errors committed by a competent authority within the legitimate scope of its powers were largely insulated from judicial review by way of certiorari (unless apparent on the face of the record), the modern trend, influenced by global jurisprudence, has expanded the categories of errors that can be classified as jurisdictional. This includes misinterpreting statutory powers, failing to consider relevant matters, considering irrelevant matters, or breaching natural justice.

The Indian judiciary, through a series of pronouncements, has navigated this complex terrain, seeking to balance the need for accountability of decision-making bodies with the imperative of allowing them a degree of operational autonomy and finality in their decisions. The principles laid down in cases like Hari Vishnu Kamath, Syed Yakoob, Smt. Ujjam Bai, and Shri M.L Sethi, when read alongside more recent expositions like those discussed in BHUDEV MALLICK, demonstrate a continuous effort to refine the tools of judicial review. The introduction of materiality as a component of jurisdictional error further tempers the potentially unbridled scope of review that might arise if every error of law were deemed jurisdictional.

Ultimately, while the lines may sometimes appear blurred, the conceptual distinction remains vital. It underpins the supervisory role of higher courts, ensuring that public power is exercised lawfully and fairly, without unduly transforming judicial review into an appellate process for every administrative or quasi-judicial determination. The challenge for legal practitioners and courts alike lies in discerning, on the facts and statutory context of each case, whether an error merely reflects a mistaken exercise of valid authority or one that fundamentally vitiates the authority itself.