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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant/plaintiff, Gurdev Singh, sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from constructing, forcibly possessing, or interfering with the suit land, specifically identified by letters ABCDEFG in the site plan as part of Khasra No.216. The plaintiff claimed exclusive ownership and possession of the suit land and alleged that the defendants, in collusion with settlement field staff, caused a disfigurement of the land's shape during the settlement process, resulting in a reduction of his land area on the eastern side. Upon discovering this, the plaintiff filed an application for correction of Karukans before the Collector Settlement, who ordered a correction on 10.1.1995, deleting certain land parcels from the defendants' ownership and adding them to the plaintiff's. This order was affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner, and the defendants did not pursue further appeal or revision. The defendants contested the suit on grounds of non-maintainability and estoppel, disputing the accuracy of the plaintiff's site plan and alleging encroachment. The trial court allowed the plaintiff's suit, but the appellate court reversed this judgment. The plaintiff then filed the present Regular Second Appeal challenging the appellate court's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order passed by the revenue officer correcting the Karukans, which had attained finality with the Divisional Commissioner's order and was not challenged further, can be examined by the civil court.
  2. What is the effect of the defendants/respondents not filing an appeal or revision against the Divisional Commissioner's order confirming the correction of the Karukans?
  3. Whether the admission of a party to the lis is binding on that party and whether non-consideration of such admission by the lower appellate court caused prejudice to the plaintiff/appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserted exclusive ownership and possession of the suit land and challenged the defendants' alleged encroachment and interference.
  • The plaintiff relied on the order of correction by the Collector Settlement and its affirmation by the Divisional Commissioner as conclusive and binding.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The defendants raised preliminary objections regarding the suit's maintainability and estoppel.
  • They contended the plaintiff's site plan was incorrect and that the plaintiff had encroached upon their land.
  • They argued that the correction order by the Settlement Collector was passed without following proper procedure and without affording them a reasonable opportunity to be heard, thus should not bind them or operate as res judicata.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ujjam Bai Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr, AIR 1962 SC 1621 Jurisdiction of quasi-judicial authority: An authority does not lose jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion; errors can only be challenged on appeal unless jurisdiction itself is lacking. The court applied this principle to hold that the Settlement Collector and Divisional Commissioner had jurisdiction, and their orders, though possibly erroneous, were binding and not void.
Aniyoth Kunhamina Umma v. Ministry of Rehabilitation, AIR 1962 SC 1616 Finality of decisions by competent authorities and effect on fundamental rights claims. The court relied on this precedent to support that a party bound by a final decision cannot claim infringement of rights without challenging the decision through appropriate proceedings.
Gulabdas & CO. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, AIR 1957 SC 733 Jurisdictional correctness of orders and remedy by appeal rather than fundamental rights violation claims. Used to emphasize that even if orders are wrong, if passed within jurisdiction, the remedy lies in appeal, not in fundamental rights petitions.
Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 478 Quasi-judicial decisions are binding unless jurisdictional errors are shown; errors of law or fact cannot be impeached except on appeal. Supported the view that erroneous decisions within jurisdiction are binding unless set aside by prescribed legal remedies.
Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1960 SC 801 Decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, right or wrong, cannot violate constitutional guarantees such as Article 14. Reinforced that the correctness of quasi-judicial decisions does not affect their binding nature if jurisdiction exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the finality and binding nature of the Settlement Collector's order correcting the Karukans and its affirmation by the Divisional Commissioner. It held that the Collector had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the correction application. The court emphasized the settled legal principle that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority does not lose jurisdiction by arriving at a wrong conclusion; such errors do not render the order void but are subject to correction only through the prescribed appellate or revisionary remedies.

The court rejected the respondents' contention that procedural lapses or lack of opportunity to be heard rendered the correction order non-binding. Instead, it underscored that the defendants' failure to challenge the order before competent authorities rendered it final and binding under the doctrine of res judicata as codified in Section 11 Explanation VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Relying extensively on authoritative Supreme Court precedents, the court affirmed that errors of law or fact committed by bodies acting within jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally and must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. The court concluded that the lower appellate court erred in examining and setting aside the correction order, leading to wrongful reversal of the trial court's judgment.

Consequently, the court answered the primary substantial question of law in favor of the appellant and found it unnecessary to address the remaining issues, which had become academic.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court reversing the trial court's decision are set aside, and the trial court's judgment and decree are restored and affirmed.

The parties are left to bear their own costs. The decision directly reinstates the plaintiff's injunction relief and confirms the binding nature of the settlement correction orders. No new precedent is established beyond the reaffirmation of settled legal principles regarding jurisdiction, finality of quasi-judicial orders, and res judicata.

    Gurdev Singh v. Narain Singh

    1

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    .

    RSA No.332 of 2007 Reserved on 1.6.2016 Decided on: 2. 6.2 . 01P6 Gurdev Singh Appellant/Plaintiff Versus

    H

    Narain Singh & ors f …R es o pondents/Defendants Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlo r k S t ingh Chauhan, Judge. Whether approved for r

    1 u eporting? Yes. For the Appellant : Mr.N.K.Thakur, Senior Advocate with o Ms. Jamuna, Advocate. For the resp C ondents: Mr.R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate with Mr. Gaurav Gautam, Advocate.

    h Tarlok Singh Chauhan J. g i

    This Regular Second Appeal at the instance of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the 'plaintiff') is directed

    H

    against judgment and decree dated 27.6.2007 passed by learned Additional District Judge (FTC), Una whereby the judgment and decree dated 29.4.2000 passed by the learned Sub Judge 1stClass, Court No.1,Amb has been

    reversed.

    2. The appellant/plaintiff sought the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents/ defendants from raising any sort of construction, taking forcible possession or interfering in any manner in the suit land, more specifically shown by letters ABCDEFG with red

    Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes.

    2

    in the site plan being part of land of Khasra No.216. The .

    contention of the plaintiff was that he was owner in exclu P sive Hissadari possession of the suit land and th H e defe . ndants who were very clever and head st f ron g persons in connivance with the settlement field o staff had got the shape of the suit land disfigured with t reg ard to the location and in consequence thereto Karuka r ns of the suit land were reduced on the eastern side. It u is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that during the p o rocess of settlement defendants got their land increa C sed thereby causing loss and reduction of the land of th e plaintiff. On coming to know about the wrong done h by the settlement field staff with regard to the reducing

    ig of the area of the plaintiff, he filed an application for H

    correction of Karukans before the Collector Settlement who vide order dated 10.1.1995, ordered the correction to the effect that the area comprised of khasra No.213/3, 214/1 and 215/1 be deleted from the ownership of defendants by

    adding the same to the ownership of the appellant/plaintiff.

    The order passed by the Collector was unsuccessfully

    assailed by the defendants before the Divisional

    Commissioner.

    3. Respondents/Defendants contested the suit by raising preliminary objections of non maintainability of the suit and estoppel. In Para No.1 of the written statement the

    3

    ownership of the suit land being that of the plaintiff/appellant .

    was not disputed. However, it was submitted that the P site plan produced by the plaintiff was wrong as he had w . rongly included the land of the defendants in the s ite H plan. In nut shell, the stand of the defendants was f that the plaintiff wanted to encroach upon th t e la o nd of the defendants comprised in khasra No.215.

    4. Plaintiff filed u reprlication to the written statement wherein he denie o d the allegations of the defendants and reiterated th C e claim set out in the plaint. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learn h ed trial court vide order dated 29.4.2000 framed the

    ig following issues: H

    "(1)Whether plaintiff s entitled to the relief of injunction as alleged? OPP. (2) Whether land shown by letters ABCDEFG in site plan is part of the suit land? OPP. (2B) Whether the defendants during pendency of the suit had raised construction on 10.12.1994? OPP.

    (3). Whether suit s not maintainable? OPD.

    (4) Whether plaintiff is estopped from filing suit? OPD. (5). Relief.

    6. The learned trial court allowed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial court, respondents/defendants filed appeal before the learned lower appellate, who allowed the same,

    4

    constraining the appellants to approach this court by way of .

    instant Regular Second Appeal. P

    7. On 1stAugust, 2007, the appeal was adm . itted on the following substantial questions of law: H

    "1. Whether the order passed by f the revenue Officer ordering the correction of the Karukans which were wrongly prepared during the s o ettlement, can be gone into by the civil court, m r ore t pa rticularly when such order of correction had attained the finality with the order of the Divisional C u ommissioner and no further appeal or revision o was preferred?. 2. What is the effect of non filing the appeal/ revision by C the defendants/ respondents against the order of confirmation passed by the Divisional Commissioner of h

    correcting the mistake with regard to the Karukans committed by the field staff?. g

    3. Whether the admission of a party to the lis is binding i

    on such party and can be used against such person and H

    non consideration of such admission by the learned lower appellate court has caused a prejudice to the plaintiff/appellant?." I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case.

    Substantial Question No.1

    8. It is not in dispute that during settlement, the karukans prepared were ordered to be rectified by the Collector vide order Ext P-8 and the order so passed was affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner vide order Ext P-9. It is further not in dispute that this order has attained finality, having not been assailed before any authority or even a

    5

    court of competent jurisdiction. Now, what would be the .

    effect of the order?. P

    9. Section 11 Explanation VIII of the Code . of Civil Procedure reads as under: H

    "An issue heard and finally dec f ided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, com p o etent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, n r otw t ithstanding that such Court of limited ju u risdiction was not competent to try such su o bsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised."

    10. It C cannot be disputed that the Settlement Collector had h the jurisdiction to entertain the application for correction.

    ig Therefore, in such circumstances, whether the order was H

    right or wrong or in accordance with law or not in accordance with law, would not make the order coram non judice or void and the respondents/defendants, if at all aggrieved, were required to assail the same before the competent authority.

    11. To be fair to the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, he has vehemently argued that once it is proved on record that no proper procedure was followed by the Settlement Collector while ordering the correction of entries and also bearing in mind that these corrections were carried out at the back of the respondents without affording proper and reasonable opportunity of being

    6

    heard to them, these findings cannot be held to be binding .

    much less operate as res judicata against P the respondents/defendants. .

    12. It is more than settled that f wh ere H a court or Tribunal is having authority or ju o risdiction to decide a particular dispute, but in exercis t e o f such jurisdiction, comes to a wrong conclusion then r it is difficult to hold that such an order is void. The corre u ctness of the order has nothing to do with the jurisdictio o n of the court. It is equally settled that where a qua C si judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wron h g conclusion whether it is wrong in law or facts and if

    ig decides wrongly, the party wronged can only take the H

    recourse prescribed by law for setting the matters right and if that course is not taken, the decision, however, wrong, cannot be disturbed.

    13. Similar issue came up before a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ujjam Bai Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh& anr, AIR 1962 SC 1621 and it was held as under:

    "15.Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra vires? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means authority to decide.

    7

    Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question P of law .or fact for the purpose of giving a decision o . n it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until (1) (1962)

    1 S.C.R. 540 reversed on appeal. Where H a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide f a m atter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by comi o ng to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong i t n law or in fact. The question, whether a tribunal r hat; ju risdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the c u orrectness of its findings on these facts, but upon t o heir nature, and it is determinable "at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the enquiry". C (Rex v. Bolten, (1841) 1 QB 66 at p.74).. Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for h

    loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and g

    the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its i

    jurisdiction by determining any of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for

    H

    reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to

    observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But

    it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision

    upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is

    empowered or required, (i. e.) has jurisdiction to

    determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies

    in its logical consistency. But there are other oases

    where Parliament when it empowers an inferior tribunal

    to enquire into certain facts intend to demarcate two

    areas of enquiry, the tribunal's findings within one area

    being conclusive and with in the other area impeachable.

    "The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the

    8

    existence of some particular fact. Such a, fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the .

    determination whether it exists (1) [1841] 1 Q.B. 6 . 6, P 74. or not is logically prior to the determinati H on of the actual question which the tribunal has to try. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fa ct when, at the

    inception of an inquiry by a tr o ibunal f of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whet t her it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive r at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction o u r not. There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further o exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject

    C to that an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction h

    which it would not otherwise possess."

    ig

    (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. II page 59). The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is H

    that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi judicial body cannot, in general, be' impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior

    courts strito sensu but also the findings of administrative

    bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity.

    Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with

    power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and

    provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions

    must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal.

    Even the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to

    such decisions. (See Living stone v. Westminister

    Corporation (1) Re Birkenhead Corporation (2) Re 56

    Denton Road Twickenham(3) Society of Medical Officers

    of Health v. Hope(4). In Burn & Co. Calcutta v. Their

    9

    Employees(5) (1) [1904] 2 K.B. 109. (2) (1952) Ch. 359,

    (3) [1953] Ch. 51. (4) [1959] 2 W.L.R. 377, 391, 396, 397, .

    402. (5) [1956] S.C.R. 781: (S) AIR 1957 SC 38 P ) this Court said that although the rule of res jud . icata as enacted by s. 11 of the Code of Civil P rocedure did not in terms apply to an award made by a f n indu H strial tribunal its underlying principle which is founded on sound public policy and is of universal application must apply. In Daryao v. The State of U . P o . (1) this Court applied the doctrine of res judicata in respect of application under

    Art. 32 of the Constittution. It is perhaps pertinent to

    observe here u that rwhen the Allahabad High Court was moved o by the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of assessment, passed on an alleged C misconstruction of the notification of December 14, 1957, the High Court rejected the petition on two grounds. The h

    first ground given Was that the petitioner had the alternative remedy of getting the error corrected by g

    appeal the second ground given was expressed by the i

    High Court in the following words: H

    "We have, however, heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but we are not satisfied that the interpretation put upon this notification by the Sales Tax Officer contains any obvious error in it. The circumstances make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for

    the petitioner unlikely. It is admitted that even

    handmade biris, have been subject to Sales Tax

    since long before the dated of the issue of the

    above notification. The object of passing the

    Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special

    Importance) Central Act No. 58 of 1957, was to

    levy an additional excise duty on certain important

    articles and with the concurrence of the State

    Legislature to abolish Sales Tax on those articles.

    According to the argument of the learned counsel

    10

    for the petitioner during the period 14th December, 1957, to (1) [1961] 2 S.C.A. 591. P.

    30th June, 1958, the petitioner was liable . neither to payment of excise duty nor to pay- ment of Sales Tax. We do not know why th H ere should have been such an exemption. The language of the notification might well be reafd as meaning that the

    notification is to t 'a ppl o y only to those goods on which an add r i- tional Central excise duty had been levied and paid". If the observ u ations 'quoted above mean that the High Court re o jected the petition also on merits, apart from the other ground given, then the principle laid down in

    C Daryao v. The State of U. P. (1) will apply and the petition under Art. 32 will not be maintainable on the ground of h

    res judicata. It is,' however, not necessary to pursue the g

    question of res judicata any further, because I am resting i

    my decision on the more fundamental ground that an error of law or fact committed by a judicial body cannot, H

    in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. 16. In Malkarjun Narhari (2) the Privy Council dealt with a case in which a sale took place after notice had been

    wrongly served upon a person who was not the legal

    representative of the judgment. debtor's estate, and the

    executing court had erroneously decided that he was to

    be treated as such representative. The Privy Council

    said:

    "In so doing the Court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake, it is true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right;

    11

    (1) (1961) 2 S.C.A. 591. .

    (2) [1950] L.R. 279, A, 216. 225. P

    and if that course is not taken the dec H ision, . however wrong, cannot be disturbed".

    17. The above view finds suppo f rt f rom a number of decisions-of this Court. o

    1. Aniyoth Kunhamina Um ma v. Ministry of Rehabilitation , Petn No.32 of 1959, D t /- 22.3.1961 (AIR 1962 SC 1616). In this case it u had b r een held under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, that a certain person was an evacuee and that certain plots of land which belonged to him o were, therefore, evacuee property and vested. in

    C the Cus- todian of Evacuee Property.' A transferee of the land from the evacuee then presented a petition under h

    Art. 32 for restoration of the lands to her and complained g

    of an infringement of her fundamental right, under Art. 19 i

    (1) (f) and Art. 31 of the Constitution by the aforesaid order under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. H

    The petitioner had been a party to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under that Act earlier- mentioned. This Court held that as long as the decision under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act which had become final stood, the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of any fundamental right. This Court

    dismissed the petition observing :

    " We are basing our decision on the ground that the competent authorities under the Act had come to a certain decision, which decision has now become final the petitioner not having moved against that decision in an. appropriate court by an appropriate proceeding. As long as that decision stands, the petitioner cannot complain of the. infringement of a fundamental right, for she has no such right".

    12

    2. Gulabdas & CO. v. Assistant Collector, of Customs (S) AIR 1957 SC 733. In this case certain imported goods .

    had been assessed to customs tariff. The ass P essee continued in a petition under Art. 32 that the . duty (1)

    [1962] 1 S.C.R. 505. (2) A.LR. [1957] S.C. 733, 736.

    should have been charged under a differ H ent item of that tariff and that its fundamental ri f ght was violated by reason of the assessment ord o er charging it to duty under a wrong item in the tar t iff. This Court held that there was no violation of funda r mental right and observed : "If the u provisions of law under which impugned orders have been passed are with jurisdiction, w o hether they be right or wrong on fact,' there is really no question of the infraction of a

    C fundamental right. If a particular decision is erroneous on facts or merits, the proper remedy is h

    by way of an appeal".

    ig

    3. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, 1957 SCR 701: (S) AIR 1957 SC 478). In this case the Government H

    had held that the petitioner had been trafficking in licences and in that view confiscated the goods imported under a licence. A petition had been filed under Art. 32 challenging this action. It was held :

    "If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authority in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32".

    4. The Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society. Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad, 1960-3 SCR 177: (AIR 1960 SC 801). In this case it was contended that the decision of the Transport Authority in granting a permit for a motor carriage service had offended Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Court held that the decision of a

    13

    quasi-judicial body, right or wrong, could not offend Art. 14." .

    14. Once the Settlement Collector ha . d Pthe jurisdiction to make the necessary correctio H ns and such order was affirmed by the Divisional Com f mis sioner who too had the jurisdiction, then even if it is o assumed that the order passed was wrong, the sam r e w t ou ld not make such order a nullity or having been p u assed without jurisdiction and would , therefore, be bind o ing on the parties. 15. C Accordingly, question No.1 is answered in favour of appella nt by holding that the order passed by Collector Sett h lement was required to be assailed by the respondents

    ig before a competent authority or court and in absence of any H

    challenge to the same, the learned lower appellate court could not have gone into the validity of the order passed either by the Settlement Collector or the Divisional Commissioner and thereafter reverse the judgment and

    decree passed by the learned Trial Court.

    16. Since question No.1 has been answered in favour of appellant, the appeal succeeds on this sole count alone. Therefore, in such circumstances, there is no requirement or even necessity to answer the remaining two other substantial questions of law framed by this Court on 1.8.2007 which have now only become academic.

    14

    17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, appeal .

    succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the judgment P and decree passed by the learned lower appellate cour . t is set aside and that of the learned trial court is affir me H d. The appeal is allowed in o the

    f aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their t own cots.

    ur (Tarlok Singh Chauhan), Judge. June 2 ,2016.

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    Gurdev Singh v. Narain Singh
    (Jun 2, 2016)