De-Exhibiting Documents in Indian Judicial Proceedings

The Law and Practice of 'De-Exhibiting' Documents in Indian Judicial Proceedings

Introduction

The conduct of trials in India, governed by procedural laws such as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), alongside the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, places significant emphasis on documentary evidence. The process of formally bringing a document on record is known as 'exhibiting'. Once a document is marked as an exhibit, it becomes part of the judicial record. However, situations arise where the validity of such exhibition is questioned post-facto, leading to the concept of 'de-exhibiting' a document – essentially, an application or a judicial determination to remove its status as an exhibit or to disregard it. This article delves into the legal framework and judicial pronouncements in India concerning the de-exhibition of documents, analyzing the powers of the court, the grounds for such action, and the procedural intricacies involved.

The Process of Exhibiting Documents: Admissibility and Proof

Understanding de-exhibition necessitates a clear comprehension of how documents are exhibited. The Delhi High Court in Sudir Engineering Company v. Nitco Roadways Ltd. (1995 SCC ONLINE DEL 251) elucidated that a document passes through three stages: (i) filing, (ii) tendering and admission in evidence (when it is marked as an exhibit and becomes part of the judicial record), and (iii) proof, where the court finally determines its credibility and relevance.

Order XIII Rule 4 of the CPC mandates certain endorsements on every document admitted in evidence. However, it is a well-settled principle, reiterated by the Supreme Court in cases like Sait Tarajee Khimchand And Others v. Yelamarti Satyam Alias Satteyya And Others (1972 SCC 4 562) and H. Siddiqui (Dead) By Lrs. v. A. Ramalingam (2011 SCC 4 240), that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to its proof. The Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation Of India And Another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010 SCC 4 491) emphasized that admission and proof of documents must adhere to procedural norms, and the burden of proof lies on the party relying on the document. Similarly, in Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and another (2003 (8) SCC 745), cited in AMAR SINGH v. GRAM PANCHAYAT RAUNTA AND ANR (2023 SCC ONLINE P&H 442), it was held that mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the Court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents; its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence.

The Gujarat High Court in State Of Gujarat v. Gaurang Mathurbhai Leuva (1999 (2) GLH 564), referencing Rakhaldas Pramanick v. Sm. Shantilata Ghose (AIR 1956 Cal. 619), clarified that when a document is exhibited, the court does not finally decide the rights of the parties or express an opinion on the document. The court is free to discard a particular document at the final adjudication stage if it finds it was not duly proved.

Objections to Admissibility and Exhibition

The timing and manner of raising objections to the admissibility of documents are critical. The Supreme Court in R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P Temple And Another (2003 SCC 8 752) laid down a crucial distinction:

  • Objections relating to the mode of proof (e.g., improper proof of a document that is otherwise admissible) must be raised at the time the document is tendered in evidence. If not raised then, the party is deemed to have waived the objection.
  • Objections that the document is inherently inadmissible in evidence (e.g., because it is prohibited by law, like an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document, or irrelevant) can be raised even at a later stage, including appeal, as the defect cannot be cured.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Girdhari Lal v. Ritesh Mahajan And Another (2005 SCC ONLINE P&H 778), following R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder, observed that if an objection to admissibility is raised before endorsement, the court is obliged to express its opinion.

To prevent trials from being stalled by frequent objections, the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State Of Gujarat And Another (2001 SCC CRI 417) deprecated the practice of holding up trials. It advised that whenever an objection is raised regarding admissibility, the trial court should make a note of such objection and mark the document tentatively as an exhibit (or record the objected part of oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the final stage. This procedure, however, has an exception for objections relating to deficiency of stamp duty, which must be decided before proceeding further (Indrakant Kishordas Shah v. Keshrinath D. Mhatre (Bombay High Court, 2004), citing Bipin Shantilal Panchal).

The Concept and Scope of 'De-Exhibiting' Documents

The term 'de-exhibit' is not explicitly defined in major procedural statutes. Its existence and scope are primarily derived from judicial interpretations and the inherent powers of the court.

Judicial Support for De-Exhibition or Analogous Powers

Order XIII Rule 3 of the CPC empowers the court to "reject any document which it considers irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds of such rejection" at any stage of the suit. This provision, as noted in Narendra Prasad & Others v. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited (Madras High Court, 2015), suggests a continuing power of the court to control its record.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.P Laly Petitioner v. Gurram Rama Rao (2017) (both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court references seem to be the same case or on similar lines) held that the court has the right to de-exhibit a document when its attention is drawn to its inadmissibility (e.g., for want of proper stamp duty). It emphasized the court's duty to decide admissibility and eschew irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, stating that even if a court admits a document, there is nothing prohibiting it from recalling such an order.

The Gujarat High Court in State Of Gujarat v. Gaurang Mathurbhai Leuva (1999 (2) GLH 564) mentioned that if a party files an application to expunge a document admitted in record, the court may, after hearing parties, expunge it if it finds the document is not legally and correctly proved and exhibited. This power to "expunge" is functionally similar to de-exhibiting.

The inherent powers of the court under Section 151 of the CPC, as discussed in K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011 SCC 11 275) in the context of reopening evidence, could potentially be invoked to de-exhibit a document to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to meet the ends of justice, especially where a document has been exhibited through manifest error or fraud.

Judicial Reluctance or Limitations on De-Exhibition

Conversely, some High Courts have expressed reluctance to de-exhibit documents once marked, particularly if no objection was raised at the time of exhibition, or prefer deferring the decision on admissibility to the final hearing, aligning with the Bipin Shantilal Panchal dictum.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in AMAR SINGH v. GRAM PANCHAYAT RAUNTA AND ANR (2023 SCC ONLINE P&H 442) observed that when documents were exhibited without objection, they cannot be de-exhibited, and their admissibility and evidentiary value would be determined at the conclusion of the trial. Similarly, in JASWINDER SINGH CHATHA v. PALWINDER SINGH AND ORS (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2019), it was stated that exhibited documents are not required to be de-exhibited at an interim stage, and their genuineness and admissibility should be decided later, emphasizing that holding up the trial on such objections is an 'archaic practice'. The court in HARJIT KAUR @ BARMEET KAUR & ANR v. BHAJAN KAUR & ORS (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2019) noted that while there is no specific provision for de-exhibiting, the court can eschew unreliable evidence at a subsequent stage.

The argument that there is no specific provision under the CPC or the Evidence Act for de-exhibiting documents already exhibited was noted in SANDEEP GHAI v. HARMINDER SINGH AND ORS (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2017).

Grounds for Seeking De-Exhibition

Based on judicial pronouncements, de-exhibition (or rejection/expunging after marking) may be sought or considered on several grounds:

  • Inherent Inadmissibility: If a document is inherently inadmissible under law, e.g., an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument that requires impounding (A.P Laly Petitioner v. Gurram Rama Rao (2017)).
  • Non-compliance with Mandatory Pre-conditions: Failure to comply with statutory requirements for admissibility, such as the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act for electronic records (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal And Others (2020 SCC CIV 4 1)), or lack of proper foundation for secondary evidence under Section 65 (J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007 SCC 5 730)).
  • Irrelevance: If a document is found to be wholly irrelevant to the matters in issue (Order XIII Rule 3 CPC).
  • Fraud or Misrepresentation: If a document was exhibited through fraud or serious misrepresentation to the court.
  • Clerical Error: In rare cases, if a document was marked as an exhibit due to a clear clerical or administrative error by the court staff.

In Peacock Industries Ltd., Udaipur And Others v. Budhrani Finance Ltd., Bombay And Another (2006 SCC ONLINE BOM 703), an application was made for de-exhibiting documents filed with an affidavit of evidence where the objection was raised late. The Bombay High Court in Shri Gopal Shankarrao Deshmukh v. Jagdamba Nagri Sahakari Patsanstha (2014 BC BOM 2 565) dealt with a prayer for de-exhibiting documents tendered when the petitioner was absent, though the court focused on the opportunity for cross-examination.

Procedural Aspects and Reconciling Conflicting Views

The power to de-exhibit or reject a document post-marking appears to be discretionary and must be exercised judiciously. While the Bipin Shantilal Panchal approach aims to streamline trials by deferring most objections on admissibility to the final stage, this does not entirely negate the court's power under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC or its inherent jurisdiction to correct its record or prevent injustice.

A harmonious construction suggests:

  1. As a general rule, objections to admissibility, especially concerning mode of proof, should be raised when the document is tendered. The court may then follow the Bipin Shantilal Panchal procedure.
  2. However, if a document is patently and incurably inadmissible (e.g., barred by a statute, wholly irrelevant, or tendered without fulfilling a mandatory precondition like a Section 65-B certificate for which no exception applies), a party may apply for its de-exhibition/rejection, or the court may act suo motu under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC or its inherent powers.
  3. The court must balance the need for speedy trial against the imperative of ensuring that only legally admissible evidence forms the basis of its decision. Delaying tactics under the guise of de-exhibition applications should be discouraged.
  4. The distinction between "marking for identification" (e.g., using alphabets like Ex. A, Ex. B for disputed documents, as discussed in Sudir Engineering Company v. Nitco Roadways Ltd.) and formal "exhibition" (e.g., Ex. P-1, Ex. D-1) is also pertinent. A document merely marked for identification is less entrenched in the record than one formally exhibited.

The practice of some courts, as noted in Sudir Engineering, to mark documents as exhibits only when they are "proved" is legally incorrect, as marking merely signifies admission into evidence, not proof. The final decision on proof and evidentiary value is always reserved for the judgment stage.

Conclusion

The concept of 'de-exhibiting' documents in Indian judicial proceedings, while not explicitly codified under this specific term, represents the court's inherent and statutory power to regulate its own proceedings and ensure that its record consists of relevant and admissible evidence. While the dictum in Bipin Shantilal Panchal encourages deferring decisions on admissibility to avoid trial delays, this does not abrogate the court's power under Order XIII Rule 3 CPC or its inherent jurisdiction to reject or expunge documents that are patently inadmissible or were brought on record improperly.

The judiciary navigates a delicate balance: upholding procedural fairness by allowing timely objections, ensuring substantive justice by not relying on inadmissible evidence, and maintaining trial efficiency by discouraging frivolous interruptions. Litigants must be diligent in raising objections at the appropriate stage, while courts must exercise their discretion judiciously, ensuring that the quest for procedural perfection does not unduly prolong litigation, yet the sanctity of the evidentiary record is preserved. The ultimate aim remains the just adjudication of disputes based on evidence that is legally sound and properly proved.

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