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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 441
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 65(a) of the Act
  • Section 63 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 66 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 65 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 63 of the Evidence Act, 1872
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 441
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 65(a) of the Act
  • Section 63 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 66 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 65 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 63 of the Evidence Act, 1872
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In OS No. 30 of 1999 before the First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, the trial court permitted documents marked as Exts. B-1 to B-8—admittedly photocopies—to be exhibited as secondary evidence. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a civil revision petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed the revision on 3-11-2003, holding that mere photocopies did not satisfy the statutory conditions for secondary evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The present appeal was filed against that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether photocopies can be admitted and marked as secondary evidence under Sections 63 and 65(a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 when the originals are not produced in court.
  2. Whether the party seeking to rely on photocopies had fulfilled the prerequisites of Section 65(a), namely establishing that the originals were in the possession of a third party who failed to produce them after due notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court adopted an unduly rigid approach and ignored the permissive language of Section 63, which contemplates admission of copies made from the original.
  • The mandatory requirements of Section 65(a) were allegedly misconstrued; the appellant contended that the situation justified reception of the photocopies as secondary evidence.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant failed to satisfy the conditions set out in Section 65(a); in particular, there was no proof that the originals were in the possession of a person who refused production after notice.
  • Because the documents were mere photocopies, they did not fall within any of the categories of secondary evidence enumerated in Section 63.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664 Secondary evidence is admissible only when the party lays a proper foundation by proving that the original is unavailable despite compliance with Section 65(a). The Court relied on this case to underscore that, absent proof of the originals being in the adversary’s possession and non-production after notice, photocopies cannot be admitted as secondary evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed Sections 63 and 65(a) of the Evidence Act:

  • Definition of Secondary Evidence (Section 63): The statute lists exhaustively five kinds of secondary evidence; uncertified photocopies do not inherently fall within these categories unless they are copies “made from or compared with the original.”
  • Conditions for Admissibility (Section 65): Secondary evidence is permissible only when the original is shown to be unavailable under enumerated circumstances. Clause (a) requires proof that the original lies with an opposing or unrelated person who has failed to produce it after statutory notice.
  • Best Evidence Rule: The Court reiterated that superior (primary) evidence must be produced when available; inferior (secondary) evidence is acceptable only after accounting for non-production of the original.
  • Application to Facts: The originals were said to be with one P. Srinibas Rao, yet no notice under Section 66 nor any foundational proof was furnished. Consequently, clause (a) of Section 65 was not satisfied.
  • Reliance on Precedent: Drawing from Ashok Dulichand, the Court emphasized that failure to lay the statutory foundation forecloses reliance on photocopies.

Because the statutory pre-conditions were unmet, the High Court correctly held that the photocopies were inadmissible as secondary evidence.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, thereby refusing admission of photocopies as secondary evidence in the absence of compliance with Sections 63 and 65(a). The immediate consequence is that Exts. B-1 to B-8 remain excluded from evidence in OS No. 30 of 1999. The judgment reiterates, without creating new jurisprudence, the strict statutory requirements governing secondary evidence.

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    J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the civil revision petition filed. Challenge in the said petition was to the order dated 3-11-2003 in OS No. 30 of 1999 on the file of learned First Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad wherein documents Exts. B-1 to B-8 were marked and taken as secondary evidence. The challenge in the civil revision was that the aforesaid documents could not have been marked and taken as secondary evidence since they are photocopies.

    3. Learned Single Judge held that the documents which were sought to be received and marked as secondary evidence are photocopies. It was noted that it may be a fact that the originals of the documents are not available with the parties but at the same time the requirement of Section 63 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Act”) is that a document can be received as an evidence under the head of secondary evidence only when the copies made from or compared with the original are certified copies or such other documents as enumerated in the above section. The High Court found that the photocopies cannot be received as secondary evidence in terms of Section 63 of the Act and they ought not to have been received as secondary evidence. Since the documents in question were admittedly photocopies, there was no possibility of the documents being compared with the originals. Accordingly the civil revision was allowed.

    4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a rigid view has been taken by the High Court. The High Court could not have ignored the mandatory requirements as contemplated under Section 63 of the Act more specifically when the section provides when the copies made from the evidence can be adduced as secondary evidence. It was further submitted that the mandatory prescriptions in Section 65(a) of the Act have been lost sight of.

    5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment of the High Court stating that the requirements of Section 65(a) have not been fulfilled in this case and the High Court rightly held that the documents could not have been accepted as secondary evidence.

    6. In order to consider rival submissions it is necessary to take note of Sections 63 and 65(a). Sections 63 and 65(a) read as follows:

    “63. Secondary evidence.—Secondary evidence means and includes—
    (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
    (2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
    (3) copies made from or compared with the original;
    (4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
    (5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.
    65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.—Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases—
    (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power—
    of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or
    of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or
    of any person legally bound to produce it, and
    when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it;”

    7. Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents.

    8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is exhaustive as the section declares that secondary evidence “means and includes” and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence.

    9. The rule which is the most universal, namely, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection. That rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided (sic proved) by primary evidence. Section 65, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube (1975) 4 SCC 664 it was inter alia held as follows:

    “7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 65 of Evidence Act, secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it. Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 65 specify some other contingencies wherein secondary evidence relating to a document may be given, but we are not concerned with those clauses as it is the common case of the parties that the present case is not covered by those clauses. In order to bring his case within the purview of clause (a) of Section 65, the appellant filed applications on 4-7-1973, before Respondent 1 was examined as a witness, praying that the said respondent be ordered to produce the original manuscript of which, according to the appellant, he had filed photostat copy. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case Respondent 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the photostat copy might be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant also filed affidavit in support of his applications. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate that the original document was in the possession of Respondent 1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession of or having anything to do with such a document. The photostat copy appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court.”

    10. The admitted facts in the present case are that the original was with one P. Srinibas Rao. Only when conditions of section prescribed in Section 65 are satisfied, documents can be admitted as secondary evidence. In the instant case clause (a) of Section 65 has not been satisfied. Therefore, the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

    11. The appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.

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    Comments

    J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani .
    (Apr 19, 2007)